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Abstract
This thesis examines the determinants of capital structure in the MENA coun-
tries. The main interest is to investigate both financial firms specially banks and
non-financial firms. This study test the main theories of capital structure, namely:
trade off theory and pecking order theory. The countries included in this thesis are
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (Include both Abo-Dhabi and Dubai stock in-
dexes), Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine and Jor-
dan. The characteristics it covers as suggested by previous literature are tangibility,
profitability, risk, debt tax shield, growth, dividends,size, cash flow and liquidity. It
will also investigate the effect of the industry, credit rating and ownership structure
on the capital structure
This study also investigates the determinants of capital structure in Islamic and
conventional banks. This is one of the first attempts to empirically examine the de-
terminants of capital structure in Islamic and conventional banks in general and in
MENA countries in particular. This study fills the gap in this important area of re-
search and can provide a base for future research on capital structure in Islamic
banks. This thesis use different models to test the capital structure and these
are Panel data models (OLS, Fixed, and Random); Tobit and Dynamical model
(Arellano-Bover Blundell-Bond), Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and General-
ized Regression Neural Networks (GRNN).
The results suggest that the three methods used in this study lead to similar re-
sults with a few exceptions in some countries. This thesis finds that the relation
between leverage and the determinants of capital structure is different when using
the market or the book leverage. It also finds that the determinants of capital struc-
ture between the MENA countries are different. For example, profitability attribute
relation with leverage follow the trade-off theory in some countries and follow the
picking order theory in other countries. Also, liquidity is significant in all the coun-
tries in the sample and have a negative relation to leverage. In addition, tangibility is
found to have a mixed results with some countries following the trade-off theory and
other countries which follow the trade-off theory but overall it is a key determinant
of capital structure.
Additionally, the findings show that although that the majority of firms in the MENA
countries don’t pay dividends the relation between the long term debt and leverage
is negative in all the countries in the sample. The growth opportunities have a
negative relation in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar and
Tunisia but positive in rest of the countries. The cash flow attribute have a neg-
ative relation with leverage in all the countries in the sample except Saudi Arabia
iii
and Qatar when using the short and long term debt. Furthermore, the ownership
variable is expected to have a negative relation when the ultimate owner is an insti-
tution. The results show that overall when there is an ultimate owner the leverage
will have a negative relation. Suggesting that ultimate owners will force managers
to keep a low debt in firms capital structure.
This PhD also attempt to investigate the capital structure in banks within the
MENA countries. A special focus is on the differences between the Islamic banks
and conventional banks capital structure. First, the findings show that the banks
follow the same determinants of capital structure as non-financial firms and that
regulations are not the main determinant of capital structure in banks. Then, This
study show that there is a difference in capital structure of Islamic banks in com-
parison with conventional banks. The findings for the dividends variable show that
Islamic banks do not follow the pecking order theory but conventional banks don’t.
The results of the size variable show that when Islamic banks are large they use
less debt in their capital structure. Growth variable show mixed results depending
on the use of book or market leverage. Ownership structure show that when there
is an ultimate owner leverage increase which is the reverse of the relation in the
non-financial firms. The age variable is negative in relation to the book leverage and
positive with the market leverage. Also, credit rating relation is different between the
two banks, as it is positive with the conventional banks and negative with Islamic
banks. Therefore, this study conclude that the main capital structure theories are
applicable to MENA countries. Also indicate that Islamic banks have a different
capital structure to conventional banks.
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Glossary of Arabic Words
Ijarah
is an exchange transaction in which a known benefit arising from a specified asset
is made available in return for a payment, but where ownership of the asset itself is
not transferred.
Ijma
is a term referring to the consensus or agreement of the Muslim community basi-
cally on religious issues.
Ijtihad
is a term of Islamic law that describes the process of making a legal decision by
independent interpretation of the legal sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Istisna
is a contract of exchange with deferred delivery, applied to specified made-to-order
items.
Mudaraba
is a contract of partnership in which one side provides capital and other side pro-
vides labor.
Musawama
is a term that describes a sale in which the seller is not obligated to disclose the
price paid to create or obtain the good or service.
Musharka
is a joint enterprise or partnership structure with profit/loss sharing implications that
is used in Islamic finance instead of interest-bearing loans.
Qiyas
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is the process of deductive analogy in which the teachings of the Hadith are com-
pared and contrasted with those of the Qur’an, in order to apply a known injunction
to a new circumstance and create a new injunction.
Quran
is the central religious book of Islam, which the revelation from God.
Riba
it refers to the charged interest which is forbidden under Sharia law because it is
exploitive.
Salam
is a contract in which advance payment is made for goods to be delivered at a future
date, following Islam and Islamic shariah.
Sharia Law
is the Islamic legal system derived from the religious precepts of Islam, particularly
the Quran and the Hadith.
Sunnah
is the verbally transmitted record of the teachings, deeds and sayings, silent permis-
sions or disapprovals of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, as well as various reports
about Muhammad’s companions.
Urf
is a term referring to the custom, or ’knowledge’, of a given society. To be recog-
nized in an Islamic society it must be compatible with the Sharia law.
Zakkat
payment made annually under Islamic law on certain kinds of property and used for
charitable and religious purposes, one of the Five Pillars of Islam.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
T
he original work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) sets the foundation
for the new corporate finance theory. They argued that under sev-
eral assumptions the capital structure have no effect on the value
of the company. Half a century since their propositions and the de-
bate is still on. The importance of the problem is what fuels more researchers to
study what determines a company capital structure. The purpose of this thesis is
to compare different approaches used in testing the determinants of capital struc-
ture. The thesis data is from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region which
includes countries with unique tax systems. This study also shed light on the dif-
ference in determining the capital between these countries. The majority of studies
in the chosen countries exclude the financial firms based on the fact that they are
regulated. This study use both the financial and non financial firms following recent
evidence which suggested that the capital structure of financial firms also follows
classic determinants.
1.2 The objectives of the study
The main objectives of the study are:
• To investigate empirically the capital structure theories which are the Trade-
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off-theory and the pecking order theory in the MENA countries for the non-
financial firms. Using different methods namely the Panel Data Models , Tobit
Model, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and Artificial Neural Networks
(ANN).
• To Study the cross-country differences in capital structure between the MENA
countries.
• To Compare the empirical approaches used to study capital structure which
are the Panel Data Models , Tobit Model, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)
and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN).
• To investigate empirically the capital structure theories which are the Trade-
off-theory, The pecking order theory in the MENA countries for the financial
firms. Using different methods namely the Panel Data Models , Tobit Model,
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN).
• To compare the capital structure of Islamic banks and Conventional banks in
the MENA countries.
• To Investigate and empirically test the relationship between Capital structure
and Credit Rating by following the model of Kisgen (2006), this study will also
model the relation using SEM and ANN for for the banks sample only.
1.3 The contribution and significance of the study
The common practice in the literature is biased towards a single approach. A gap
exists in the literature in terms of methodological comparisons. While several stud-
ies did compare different models like OLS, Panel Data and SEM, this is the first
study to our knowledge that uses the majority of the approaches in the same study.
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This thesis could be used as a guide to the different approaches used to study the
determinants of capital structure.
This study use the Panel data models which are the OLS, Fixed effect and Ran-
dom effect. We also use the Dynamical model suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991) to test the speed of adjustment. Then, we use the Partial Least Square
Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) to investigate the different attributes of
capital structure.This approach does have several advantages over the panel data
models. Finally, we use the GRNN models to check the robustness of our results
as this tool provided the variable impact using the Artificial Neural Networks.
Moreover, despite the importance of MENA countries which include the Gulf
Council Countries (GCC) as the largest oil producers in the world, to our knowl-
edge this is the first study to apply the SEM and GRNN approaches in this region.
Furthermore, financial institutions are excluded in the literature due to the fact
that they are under the government regulations and therefore they do not have a
choice to make in regards to their capital structure. However, despite the existence
of regulations which control the banks leverage behavior bankers still have some
flexibility within a specific range were they could determine their capital structure.
This thesis will include financial and non-financial companies which is a major con-
tribution since no study has examined banks in the selected area. We also compare
the Islamic and Conventional banks’ capital structure in the MENA countries. Ev-
idence by Octavia and Brown (2010) and Gropp and Heider (2010) suggest that
regulations are of second order and that banks do follow the classic determinants
of capital structure.
Additionally, the classic capital structure determinants that affect the capital struc-
ture choice are mostly similar across the studies in the literature. Limited studies
used Kisgen (2006) model of credit rating to test the relationship with capital struc-
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ture in the MENA countries. He argues that credit rating has an impact on the
choice of corporation financing.
1.4 Thesis organization
The thesis will be divided into seven chapters. Chapter one is the introduction chap-
ter. Chapter two will provide an in depth background about the economic, financial
and institutional environment in the MENA countries. This will include the eco-
nomic measures such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), external balances,
unemployment, population, immigration, currency and inflation. Then the financial
background will include the capital markets, access to finance, accesses to credit,
financial stability,efficiency and Islamic finance. Finally, an overview of the institu-
tional characteristics such as accounting standards, quality of investor laws, ease
of doing business, regulators, stock exchanges and tax systems. Chapter three will
provide a literature review of the main theories of capital structure. First, it discuss
the cost of capital and the cost of debt. Then it will provide a theoretical review of the
main theories of capital structure such as Modigliani-Miller modes, trade-off theory,
pecking order theory, agency cost theory and market timing theory. Then, it will pro-
vide a review of the empirical evidence from different parts of the world. First it start
with the cross-country comparison studies. Then it provide a survey of the studies
conducted in the developed, developing and MENA countries. This chapter also in-
clude a discussion of the methods used in approaching the capital structure as well
as the measures widely used in the previous studies. Chapter four will start with
the data used in this study, and the variables chosen and pre-analysis statistics.
Then a discussion of the different methodologies used which are the Panel Data
analysis and the Partial Least Square Structural Equation modeling PLS-SEM and
The Generalized Regression Neural Networks (GRNN). After that, The correlation
matrices and factor loadings will be presented and discussed.
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Chapter five include the findings for the determinants of capital structure in the
non-financial firms in the MENA countries. This PhD test the classic determinants
of capital structure for ten countries and do a cross section comparison to see the
differences. This chapter also study the effect of the industry classification and
ownership structure on capital structure. In this chapter three approaches are used
as stated before which are Panel Data Models, SEM, ANN.
Chapter six investigate the determinants of capital structure in financial firms.
The focus of this chapter is on the Banks in the MENA countries. This chapter also
include a comparison between the Islamic and Conventional banks. In this chapter
Panel Data Models, SEM, ANN are used. In this chapter a test of the credit rating
and ownership structure for a pooled sample of banks from the MENA countries is
presented.
Chapter seven gives a summary of the results, findings and a theoretical dis-
cussion. It also provide the implications and limitations of this thesis. Finally, it
concludes the thesis and recommend future research areas that researchers could
follow.
9
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Background and Literature Review
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
T
his chapter will present an overview about the economic, financial and in-
stitutional backgrounds of the MENA countries. Screening these coun-
tries background is important for several reasons. First, it will identify
the main characteristics of these countries. Then, it will explore the main economic
indicators which will help us understand the behaviour of the leverage choice in the
later chapters.
Our main interest in this chapter is to highlight the differences between the MENA
countries and the other regions as well as finding similarities and differences be-
tween them. Generally, the MENA region constitutes countries with very high in-
come mainly from exporting oil and countries with very low income which are depen-
dent on foreign aid. These issues make this area interesting and worth researching.
2.2 Economics Background
This section reviews the leading features of the MENA countries. These include the
main economic indicators like gross domestic product (GDP), annual GDP growth
rate, GDP per capita in US dollars, the annual gross national saving (GNS) as a
percentage of (GDP), external trade, unemployment, population and immigration
and currency and inflation.
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2.2.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
The MENA region represents a considerable portion of the world GDP. In 2013 the
total nominal GDP reached 3296 billion US dollars which represents 5.1% of the
world GDP. Several countries have a very high GDP such as Turkey and Saudi
Arabia which between them share almost 47.5% of the region’s total GDP. Saudi
Arabia GDP is 745 billion while Turkey GDP is around 820 billion in 2013. On the
other hand, the majority of the countries in the region are small economies such as
Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Palestine and Yemen. These countries
for example if combined will only result in 291 billion US dollars which represent
only 35% of the size of the largest economy in MENA countries which is Turkey.
Table 2.1 demonstrating the value of the GDP for the MENA countries in the last 9
years.
Table 2.2 shows that the majority of the countries experienced a stable growth
rate in the last decade.Moreover, the real GDP growth rate in the MENA region
was similar to the World and North America with a value of 2.25%; although it was
significantly higher in 2012 reaching 5.75%. All economies in the world were hit
by the financial crises of (2008-2009) and it did have a strong effect on MENA
countries as they record their lowest growth rate. However, since then the majority
of countries have bounced back to their pre-crises levels except the countries who
are in the middle of political conflicts such as Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Libya. The
countries with the highest growth rate in 2013 are Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia.
This is due to the increase in the oil price during this year. However, we also notice
that Libya did have a sharp fluctuation in the last 3 years. This is due to the political
change and the distribution of the oil which led the country to a negative growth rate.
Furthermore, Syria did not report any figures since the uprising started in 2011 and
before that as well. Iran was hit hard in 2013 and suffered a negative annual growth
12
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Table 2.1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in US$ billions
Country Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Algeria 103B 117B 135B 171B 137B 161B 199B 204B 210B
Bahrain 16B 19B 22B 26B 23B 26B 29B 30B 33B
Egypt 90B 107B 130B 163B 189B 219B 236B 263B 272B
Iran 192B 223B 286B 356B 363B 423B 528B 503B 369B
Iraq 50B 65B 89B 132B 112B 143B 191B 216B 223B
Jordan 13B 15B 17B 22B 24B 26B 29B 31B 34B
Kuwait 81B 102B 115B 147B 106B 120B 161B 183B n/a
Lebanon 21B 22B 25B 29B 35B 38B 40B 43B 44B
Libya 44B 56B 72B 93B 62B 75B 35B 82B 75B
Morocco 60B 66B 75B 89B 91B 91B 99B 96B 104B
Oman 31B 37B 42B 61B 48B 59B 70B 78B 81B
Qatar 45B 61B 80B 115B 98B 125B 170B 190B 202B
Saudi Arabia 328B 377B 416B 520B 429B 527B 670B 734B 745B
Syria 29B 33B 40B n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Tunisia 32B 34B 39B 45B 43B 44B 46B 45B 47B
Turkey 483B 531B 647B 730B 615B 731B 775B 789B 820B
UAE 181B 222B 258B 315B 255B 287B 349B 384B n/a
Palestine 5B 5B 5B 6B 7B 8B 10B 10B n/a
Yemen 17B 19B 26B 30B 28B 32B 29B 32B 36B
Totals 1819B 2111B 2518B 3051B 2664B 3135B 3665B 3914B 3296B
1Source: IMF
for the first time in the last decade and this is due to the new sanctions imposed by
the European Countries who decided to join the US in its oil ban.
Moreover, the GDP per capita average in the MENA countries is around $8,550.
This is considered to be significant in comparison with other regions. The MENA
countries are closer to the levels of Latin America and the Caribbean region as
well as East Asia and Pacific where the average GDP per capita is $10,008 and
$9,115 respectively. However, the region is still significantly far from the developed
economies in the region of North America and Europe and Central Asia where the
first is almost 6 times and the second is almost 3 times the average of the MENA
countries. Countries in the MENA region vary in their averages significantly. As
Table 2.3 show several countries have a substantial average while other countries
have a low average. For example, we could see that countries like Qatar and Kuwait
13
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Table 2.2: Annual Growth Rates of Real GDP
Country Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Algeria 5.90 1.70 3.40 2.00 1.60 3.60 2.80 3.30 2.70
Bahrain 6.77 6.47 8.29 6.24 2.55 4.34 2.10 3.40 5.49
Egypt 4.47 6.84 7.09 7.16 4.69 5.15 1.76 2.21 2.10
Iran 4.62 5.89 7.82 0.58 3.94 5.89 3.00 3.00 -5.80
Iraq 4.40 10.16 1.38 6.61 5.81 6.90 9.68 9.16 3.95
Jordan 8.14 8.12 8.18 7.23 5.48 2.34 2.56 2.65 2.83
Kuwait 10.08 7.52 5.99 2.48 -7.08 -2.37 6.30 6.19 n/a
Lebanon 2.70 1.60 9.40 9.10 10.30 8.00 2.00 2.20 0.90
Libya 9.90 5.90 6.00 3.80 2.10 5.00 -62.08 104.48 -9.37
Morocco 2.98 7.76 2.71 5.59 4.76 3.64 4.99 2.69 4.41
Oman 3.99 5.50 6.80 12.80 1.10 5.60 4.49 4.99 5.07
Qatar 7.49 26.17 17.99 17.66 11.96 16.73 14.79 2.56 5.55
Saudi Arabia 7.26 5.58 5.99 8.43 1.83 7.43 8.57 5.81 3.80
Syria 6.20 5.00 5.70 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Tunisia 3.82 5.65 6.22 4.74 3.61 3.61 -0.23 4.09 2.81
Turkey 8.40 6.89 4.67 0.66 -4.83 9.16 8.77 2.13 4.05
UAE 4.86 9.84 3.18 3.19 -4.80 1.67 3.88 4.37 n/a
Palestine 8.84 -5.84 -2.91 -7.74 19.54 3.44 7.66 13.84 n/a
Yemen 5.59 3.17 3.34 4.01 4.13 3.32 -15.09 2.47 4.16
2Source: IMF
have a superior average with values of $76,025 and $37,056 consequently. Also,
countries like Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates do have
considerably high averages. In a different manner, the likes of Egypt, Morocco,
Palestine, Syria and Yemen are considered to have a low average of GDP per
capita. The reasons behind the extraordinary averages in Kuwait and Qatar include
the mix of high income from oil and the small population.
In addition, a distinct feature that is obvious in the MENA region is the significant
difference in the gross national saving as a percentage of GDP. Although, the av-
erage for the MENA region is considered high with 31.6% the average savings of
the world is 25%. It is due mainly to oil exporting countries who are the reason be-
hind the high average. As Table 2.4 illustrates countries like Algeria, Kuwait, Libya,
Qatar and Saudi Arabia have around 50% of their GDP as savings. However, coun-
14
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Table 2.3: Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in US dollars
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Algeria 3141 3514 3992 4990 3943 4567 5528 5694 5683 4561
Bahrain 18324 21156 24171 28416 18563 19420 22918 23477 23930 22264
Egypt 1283 1506 1771 2160 2453 2776 2930 3112 3146 2348
Iran 2925 3429 4312 4857 4927 5638 6599 7211 5568 5052
Iraq 1794 2266 3003 4328 3575 4278 5529 6305 6708 4198
Jordan 2300 2689 2990 3757 3987 4326 4618 4879 5207 3862
Kuwait 27015 31907 33733 42824 30410 33481 43723 45824 44585 37056
Lebanon 5713 5903 6639 7795 8983 9501 9856 10311 10793 8388
Libya 8204 9328 11239 14186 10071 11729 5513 12778 14761 10867
Morocco 1973 2152 2439 2851 2885 2850 3082 2999 3260 2721
Oman 11806 13784 15369 21808 16734 23351 23380 24765 24729 19525
Palestine 1456 1443 1576 1856 1963 2339 2665 2783 n/a 2010
Qatar 50121 58443 65007 79582 59676 74901 98031 99731 98737 76025
Saudi Arabia 14079 15625 16678 20157 16095 19113 23599 25085 25163 19510
Syria 1510 1705 2014 2554 2557 2803 n/a n/a n/a 2190
Tunisia 3218 3394 3807 4345 4169 4198 4335 4232 4533 4026
Turkey 7040 7626 9245 10272 8528 10017 10471 10609 11236 9449
UAE 43989 52486 57468 65992 51270 54411 63626 64840 64780 57651
Yemen 798 882 971 1171 1061 1272 1343 1377 1461 1149
3Source: IMF
tries such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen have
low savings which are below the world average. We can see that the oil exporter
countries have a substantially high average of around 43.4%. But, countries in the
non-exporting category have a low average of around 15.3%. The results of the
non-exporting are considered below the world average by around 48.8%.
2.2.2 External Balance
The external balance on goods and services is also called the net exports. It is
calculated as the difference between the value of the exports and imports. The
countries who have a positive value are said to have a surplus and the countries
that have a negative value are facing a deficit. The soaring prices of oil which
started In 2006 through to the end of 2014 meant that oil exporters experienced a
high level of surplus. For example, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar did all benefit from
the oil prices and the value of external balance in 2013 was around 21.2%, 45%
15
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Table 2.4: Annual Gross National Savings (GNS) as a percentage of (GDP)
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Algeria 51.9 54.6 57.0 57.6 47.1 49.2 46.1 42.4 47.7 50.4
Bahrain 35.4 38.2 42.7 44.1 30.2 34.5 37.3 42.0 39.2 38.2
Egypt 21.2 20.4 22.9 22.9 16.8 17.5 14.5 13.6 13.5 18.2
Iran 39.0 39.2 46.4 44.4 42.5 47.7 43.9 35.0 37.6 41.7
Iraq 38.8 24.5 18.6 40.0 16.3 24.4 31.8 27.3 23.5 27.2
Jordan 16.1 18.7 13.2 16.4 19.5 16.0 12.6 7.4 17.3 15.2
Kuwait 56.8 64.7 57.2 58.5 43.0 52.2 59.6 62.2 59.2 57.0
Lebanon 8.2 16.8 21.0 20.9 24.4 23.6 14.1 8.6 7.9 16.2
Libya 64.8 73.0 73.2 77.7 54.1 59.1 29.2 52.4 46.5 58.9
Morocco 30.6 31.6 32.4 32.9 30.2 30.9 27.8 26.3 29.5 30.2
Oman 39.9 41.6 37.6 41.9 24.1 33.6 46.3 44.6 41.7 39.0
Palestine -2.0 2.0 26.0 30.0 7.0 9.0 0.0 6.0 n/a 9.8
Qatar 63.7 59.2 59.0 58.0 46.1 57.2 55.7 55.4 56.3 56.7
Saudi Arabia 47.6 48.5 48.9 52.8 36.6 43.4 50.7 51.0 48.2 47.5
Syria 19.2 24.3 21.2 18.9 18.5 20.9 n/a n/a n/a 20.5
Tunisia 20.8 21.6 21.5 22.1 21.9 21.6 17.6 18.2 18.1 20.4
Turkey 15.4 16.0 15.1 16.1 12.8 13.3 14.1 14.7 14.2 14.6
UAE 31.6 34.5 30.7 30.1 24.2 25.0 31.5 32.6 31.5 30.2
Yemen 22.3 17.5 10.2 10.8 3.3 7.9 1.4 9.3 6.0 9.9
Oil exporter 45.5 46.3 45.8 48.9 35.8 41.6 41.8 42.8 41.9 43.4
Non-Oil exporter 15.1 17.1 18.9 19.8 15.5 16.2 10.6 11.1 12.8 15.3
World 23.4 24.7 24.9 24.7 22.7 23.9 24.7 24.8 25.0 24.3
4Source:IMF
and 45.8% respectively. However, several countries were facing a negative level
such as Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco as Figure 2.1 shows.
Non-oil exporters in the MENA countries suffered critically from negative trade
balances. Although it is not bad to have a deficit in trade balance in the short term,
it is considered to be a problem when it is persistent. The Algeria trade balance
decreased significantly since the levels of 2005. Although the exports did increase
by 29.2% the large increase in imports by 63% led the country to hit a low in 2013
in terms of trade balance. Therefore, the external balance as a percentage of GDP
represented only 2.8% in 2013. Also, Egypt continues to have a deficit in their
trade balance. The deficit increased from 2005 to 2013 by 68% mainly with the
increase in imports. Jordan and Lebanon also face the same problem as Egypt.
A significant increase in imports without the exports matching these imports meant
16
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both countries have suffered from a deficit since 2005. However, their levels did
increase from 2005 to 2013 by 55% and 56.7% respectively. Moreover, Morocco,
Syria and Tunisia did have a deficit in their balance of trade for the same reasons.
The exports are increasing at a larger rate than the exports. The trade balance
deficit was more than doubled in Morocco for the last 10 years. It did decrease by
-1.8% for Syria although this number is not correct due to the political conflict in the
country. It also increased by 19% for Tunisia. Turkey and Palestine also faced a
negative level with their negative trade balance increasing by 2.5 times in Turkey
and 18% in Palestine. Yemen did have a positive trade balance for the year 2011
but there is no data available for the 2012 and 2013.
The export revenues for most of the oil exporting countries depend on the price
of oil. On the other hand, the imports are mostly to satisfy the domestic demand
for goods. However, the majority of oil exporters in the MENA countries faced a
long term problem of a less diversified economy. The oil producing countries in this
study all faced a healthy positive trade balance. This is connected to the extreme
revenues they received from the high price of oil. First, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait have had a solid increase in their trade balance in the last 9 years. The
growth rate is around 87%, 41% and 66% from 2005 to 2013. The average increase
per year is around 9.6%, 4.6% and 7.3% respectively. Likewise, Iraq and Iran and
Libya also benefited from the increased oil prices. Iran did have an increase of 50%.
Iraq increase was substantial due to the fact that it was in a war until 2005 where the
trade balance was 165 and now reached 28550 with an increase of almost 99.4%.
Libya also faced the same problem as Iraq where there was a sharp fluctuation
in their trade balance. A deep drop started with the Arab uprising in 2011 where
the trade balance dropped by 182% due to the disturbance in oil production. It
increased again to normal levels in 2012 only to drop again in 2013. Also, Oman,
17
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
5Source: IMF
Figure 2.1: External Balance as a percentage of (GDP)
Qatar and United Arab Emirates are all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) and oil exports have faced a deficit in the last decade. Their deficit increased
from 2005 to 2013 by 79.1% for Oman, 71.4% for Qatar and 66.5% for UAE.
The MENA countries trade with a broad number of countries, with the exception
of countries which face sanctions such as Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Libya. In general
the main regions exporting to the MENA countries are Asia with 35.6% and Europe
with 28.9% and the MENA region with 17.8%. On the other hand, the major im-
porters from the region are Asia with 13% and the MENA region with 17.8%. The
MENA region countries contribute around 7% of the World total trade.
2.2.3 Unemployment
One of the major challenges facing countries in the MENA region is the high long-
term unemployment rate. The unemployment varies between the different countries
in the region. In the GCC countries with a small population such as Kuwait, Qatar
and the UAE the unemployment is very low with values of 1.5%, 0.6% and 3.8%
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Table 2.5: Unemployment as a percentage of total labor force)
Country Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Algeria 15.3 12.3 13.8 11.3 10.2 10 9.9 9.8 n/a
Bahrain 8.8 8.5 8.2 7.8 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.4 n/a
Egypt 11.2 10.6 8.9 8.7 9.4 9 12 11.9 n/a
Iran 12.1 11.6 10.6 10.5 12 13.5 13.3 13.1 n/a
Iraq 18 17.5 16.9 15.3 15.3 15.2 15.2 15.1 n/a
Jordan 14.9 14 13.1 12.7 12.9 12.5 12.9 12.2 n/a
Kuwait 2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 n/a
Lebanon 8 8.1 9 9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 n/a
Libya 9.1 9 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.1 8.9 n/a
Morocco 11 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.1 9.1 8.9 9 n/a
Oman 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.1 n/a
Qatar 1.2 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 n/a
Saudi Arabia 5 6.3 5.7 5.1 5.4 5.5 4.4 5.6 n/a
Syria 9.2 8.2 8.4 10.9 8.1 8.4 8.4 8.3 n/a
Tunisia 12.9 12.5 12.4 12.4 13.3 13 12.9 12.8 n/a
Turkey 10.6 10.2 10.3 11 14 11.9 9.8 9.2 n/a
UAE 3.1 3.3 3.4 4 4 4 4 3.8 n/a
Palestine 26 23.6 21.6 26 24.5 23.7 21 23 n/a
Yemen 16.1 15.7 15.3 15 14.6 17.8 17.7 17.6 n/a
6Source: IMF
respectively. On the other hand, countries with a large population such as Saudi
Arabia and Oman have a considerable high unemployment rate. The rate in Saudi
Arabia is 5.6% and in Oman 8.1%. The special case is Bahrain which does have
a small population but at the same time a high unemployment rate in comparison
with similar sized countries in the region such as Qatar and UAE. The percentage
is 7.4%.
Other countries in the MENA region do have a significantly high unemployment
rate ranging between 8 and 23 percent. Countries in North Africa which are Alge-
ria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia share a high number of unemployed citizens.
Algeria did decrease the unemployment from 15.3% in 2005 to 9.8% in 2012. Fur-
thermore, Morocco also did decrease the unemployment rate from 11% to 9% from
2005-2013. One of the main reasons behind that is the stable political status in the
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two countries. On the other hand, Egypt did decrease the unemployment from 2005
to 2011 by 2.2% but the Arab rising in 2011 had an effect on the unemployment rate
increasing to record levels of 12% in 2011 and 11.9% in 2012. The case in Egypt is
the same as in Libya where levels increased after the revolution. Tunisia always has
a high unemployment rate. The rate was over 12% from 2005 to 2012, reaching at
peak in 2009 with a figure of 13.3%. The rest of the countries in the MENA region
also have a high unemployment rate. These are Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria,
Turkey, Palestine and Yemen.
It is better to discuss Iraq and Syria first simply because these are countries
with unstable political issues. Iraq has recently been in a war and the situation is
still uncertain. Moreover, the situation is even worse in Syria. The civil war is still
ongoing and numbers of refugees increasing. The war has claimed 180,000 lives
up to now, and the economic loss is estimated at $144 Billion (US) which is the
equivalent of two and a half times the 2010 (GDP). Also, Iran suffered greatly from
the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The unemployment rate in 2008 was 10.5% and
increased to 12%, 13.5% and 13.3% from 2009-2011. This also has a relationship
with the Iranian Nuclear program and the sanctions imposed on them. Turkey did
have a noticeably high rate as well, as Table 2.5 shows the financial crisis had a
strong effect on unemployment reaching 14% in 2009 from 11% the previous year.
In addition, the unemployment rate did improve in the years 2011-2012 reaching
better levels than before the crisis of 9.8% and 9.2% in that order. Jordan’s rate did
decrease from 14.9% in 2005 to 12.2% in 2012. Lebanon on the other hand, had a
stable unemployment rate ranging from 8-9% through the last decade.
According to OSullivan et al. (2011) the two countries with the largest level of
unemployment are Palestine and Yemen. Their levels have been increasing sub-
stantially in the last 15 years. Yemen has had a high rate through the last 9 years.
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It has also increased in the last three years. The unemployment rate was around
17.6% for the year 2012. It is understandable for a country like Palestine to face
such economic turmoil. Therefore, it is not shocking to find out that the unemploy-
ment rates are the highest in the area. The rate was 23% in 2012. OSullivan et al.
(2011) also points out that these figures are the official ones and that non official
numbers would be higher than these levels. They stress that the unemployment lev-
els are higher in a certain group of the population. As they point out the percentage
is high in the youthful and especially fresh graduates.
2.2.4 Population and Immigration
The MENA countries have different levels of resources and population. The total
population is around 468 million which represents 6.5% of the population of the
world. The population varies from countries with high population such as Egypt,
Iran and Turkey with 82 million, 77.4 million and 74.9 respectively to countries with
low population such as Bahrain and Qatar who have 1.3 and 2.1 million inhabitants
only. Several reasons contribute to the high growth experienced by the region.
These are the improvement in health care and standard of living plus a high fertility
rate.
As Table 2.6 shows all the countries in our sample have experienced a growth
in the population over the last 7 years. For example as we can see from the table
countries like Qatar, UAE, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait have a very high rate of
growth, where the increase in the population was 164%, 125%, 44%,51% and 46%
respectively. On the other hand, the rest of the countries had an average of 15%
over the period from 2005-2013. The countries with the lowest growth are Tunisia
and Morocco where the growth was 8.5% and 9.5%.
It is also notable that the majority of the rich countries used to have a small
population and the low income countries have a large population. This situation
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Table 2.6: Total Population in Thousands
Country Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Algeria 33961 34507 35097 35725 36383 37063 37763 38482 39208
Bahrain 880 951 1032 1116 1192 1252 1293 1318 1332
Egypt 71778 72991 74230 75492 76775 78076 79392 80722 82056
Iran 70152 70977 71809 72661 73543 74462 75424 76424 77447
Iraq 27377 28064 28741 29430 30163 30962 31760 32578 33417
Jordan 5411 5536 5661 5786 5915 6046 6181 6318 6459
Kuwait 2296 2417 2555 2702 2850 2992 3125 3250 3369
Lebanon 3987 4080 4140 4186 4247 4341 4383 4425 4467
Libya 5594 5686 5782 5877 5964 6041 6103 6155 6202
Morocco 30125 30395 30667 30955 31277 31642 32059 32521 33008
Oman 2522 2555 2570 2594 2663 2803 3025 3314 3632
Qatar 821 968 1152 1359 1564 1750 1911 2051 2169
Saudi Arabia 24690 25372 25916 26366 26796 27258 27762 28288 28829
Syria 18167 18805 19561 20346 21032 21533 21962 22399 22846
Tunisia 10029 10128 10225 10329 10440 10549 10674 10778 10887
Turkey 67743 68626 69497 70364 71241 72138 73059 73997 74933
UAE 4149 4876 5797 6799 7718 8442 8925 9206 9346
Palestine 3320 3406 3494 3597 3702 3811 3927 4047 4170
Yemen 20140 20662 21182 21704 22230 22763 23304 23852 24407
Totals 403144 411002 419109 427387 435695 443922 452032 460124 468184
7Source: IMF
led to high income countries which are the GCC countries and Libya spending on
transforming their countries from deserts to modern countries. This transformation
with no labour led them to import labour from their neighboring countries as well
as other countries. This led to the foreign work force becoming dominant in these
countries.
It is also notable that the majority of the rich countries used to have a small pop-
ulation and the low income countries a large population. A recent report by the
(UN) shows the figures of the in and out in the whole world. Table 2.7 demonstrates
the numbers of immigrants in the different countries in the MENA region, as well
as the number of expats living abroad either in MENA countries or other countries.
We notice that the countries could be classified into two groups. The first group
is countries where there is a large number of immigrants in some extreme cases
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Table 2.7: Total Immigration in Thousands
Country In Out
Total MENA Others Mena Total MENA Others Mena
Algeria 270.4 114.4 156.0 42% 1,716.2 35.7 1,680.5 2%
Bahrain 729.4 129.3 600.1 18% 61.7 16.2 45.5 26%
Egypt 297.4 191.4 106.1 64% 3,469.4 2,885.9 583.6 83%
Iran 2,649.5 84.4 2,565.2 3% 1,058.6 35.5 1,023.1 3%
Iraq 95.8 69.3 26.4 72% 2,318.7 1,434.1 884.6 62%
Jordan 2,925.8 2,862.5 63.3 98% 639.2 494.0 145.2 77%
Kuwait 2,028.1 344.6 1,683.4 17% 323.0 247.1 75.9 77%
Lebanon 849.7 825.9 23.8 97% 683.1 119.7 563.4 18%
Libya 756.0 508.7 247.2 67% 142.2 18.0 124.2 13%
Morocco 50.8 25.3 25.4 50% 2,854.5 48.8 2,805.7 2%
Oman 1,112.0 68.4 1,043.6 6% 24.0 12.5 11.5 52%
Palestine 256.5 162.6 93.9 63% 3,640.2 3,503.4 136.8 96%
Qatar 1,601.0 284.2 1,316.8 18% 19.9 13.9 6.1 70%
Saudi Arabia 9,060.4 2,492.6 6,567.8 28% 262.9 98.0 164.9 37%
Syrian 1,394.2 1,001.6 392.6 72% 681.0 373.9 307.1 55%
Tunisia 36.5 14.2 22.3 39% 643.6 26.5 617.1 4%
Turkey 1,864.9 59.1 1,805.8 3% 3,109.0 184.5 2,924.5 6%
United Arab Emirates 7,827.0 1,315.4 6,511.6 17% 131.5 74.2 57.3 56%
Yemen 314.7 28.1 286.6 9% 923.2 810.3 112.9 88%
8Source: United Nation
higher than the citizens. On the other hand, a second group is countries with a large
number of citizens and a large number of expats who live outside the country of ori-
gin. Countries with a very large foreign population are Bahrain 69%, Kuwait 60.1%,
Qatar 73% and UAE 83.75%. In these countries the foreigners are more than the
natives. This is linked with the development of the oil industry. These foreigners
are mainly from outside the MENA countries, the percentages are 18%, 17%, 18%
and 17% respectively. Therefore, the majority of the foreigners are from non-MENA
countries.
In addition, there are also countries with a medium foreign population such as Jor-
dan 45%, Lebanon 19%, Libya 12%, Oman 30%, Saudi Arabia 31.4%. The reason
we did not list Jordan and Lebanon with the first group is that the majority of the
foreigners are refugees either from Palestine, Iraq and Syria. Then there is Libya,
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Oman and Saudi Arabia. These three countries are all oil exporters and have a
considerably high number of foreigners in their countries. Saudi Arabia has the
largest population of foreign workers in the region with the number reaching 9 mil-
lion at the end of 2013. This practise did lead to a big challenge in these countries
where citizens could not find jobs and this will be discussed later in the section of
unemployment.
Countries with a large population did have a reverse effect. While the oil exporting
countries were importing work force these countries were exporting workers either
to the oil countries or other countries. Table 2.7 under the section out we can see
the figures for the countries in MENA region. Countries with a significantly high
number of expatriates living abroad as a percentage of the total population are Jor-
dan 9.9%, Kuwait 9.59%, Lebanon 15.29% and Morocco 8.65%. Also Palestine
has around 87.30% of the population as refugees in neighbouring countries. Fur-
thermore, the countries with the large number of expats as a number are Palestine,
Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Iraq, Algeria and Iran. In total there are 22.7 million expats
from the MENA countries in which 10.4 million are in other MENA countries.
2.2.5 Currency and Inflation
The MENA countries’ currencies are classified into 3 exchange rate regimes. First,
countries which peg their currency to the US dollar which is also called the fixed
exchange rate system. These are the GCC countries with the exception of Kuwait.
These countries are Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. Using the fixed-
exchange rate helped these countries to keep the level of inflation low and avoid
currency fluctuations. It also gave confidence to investors. However, these benefits
are at a cost as they have less flexibility to react to temporal shocks that they face.
For example, these countries will have to follow the US interest rates strictly. The
only tool they have to reduce inflation is to cut spending and to reduce credit to the
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private sector. Ambitious plans for a currency monetary union were being promised
in the last decades but never materialised.
The second regime is the managed float regime used by the remaining countries
in the MENA region. In this system countries manage their exchange rates by selling
and buying currencies. It could be either managed against a major currency such as
the US dollar or the Euro or it can be floated with no major currency to correspond
to. Countries that manage to float their currencies to the US dollar include Egypt,
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya and Syria. Moreover, countries in North Africa such as Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia manage to float their currencies against the Euro. Yemen and
Iran on the other hand are float managed freely without a major currency. The only
country in the MENA region with free float exchange rate is Turkey.
Figure 2.2: Annual Inflation for MENA countries
9
Source: IMF
The inflation rate in the MENA countries averaged 6.96% between 2005 and
2013. This is higher than the world for the same period where the average is around
4.46%. Overall the countries did have a stable inflation rate from 2005 to 2007.
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However, the whole world including the MENA region faced soaring inflation rates
in the year 2008. This is due to the high fuel prices in 2008 reaching a record peak
of 145 in July 2008. The oil prices eventually crashed with the start of the financial
crises. In this year the world average inflation was 9.01% and the MENA countries
average was above that with a rate of 11.87%. After that, the inflation rates did
decrease to stable rates.
Figure 2.2 shows the inflation rates in the countries in the MENA region. It also
shows the average inflation in the Arab world which includes the majority of the
countries in the MENA region in addition to the World average inflation. The GCC
countries in general had a reasonable inflation rate through the last decade with the
exception of the year 2008 which we discussed earlier. The average inflation rate
for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE is below the 5% mark. Qatar
is the only country with an average higher than that which is equal to 5.45%. On
the other hand Bahrain and UAE did have a low inflation rate of 2.41% and 2.89%
respectively.
Additionally, countries in the North Africa region also have an average inflation
rate closer to this experienced by the GCC countries and the World. Algeria, Mo-
rocco and Tunisia all have an average inflation below the World average of 4.46%.
The exception is Egypt who through the last 9 years faced a high inflation rate. How-
ever, Morocco had a low inflation rate average at 1.79%.Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,
Palestine had an acceptable averages ranging between 2.59% and 5.57%. Also,
Turkey faced a high inflation and the average was 8.51% for the last decade.
Countries which faced political uncertainty or sanctions also faced a high inflation
rates. These were Iran, Iraq Syria and Yemen. The averages were 19.89% for
Iran, 12.92% for Iraq, 10.71% for Syria and 11.84% for Yemen. Iran had faced an
extremely high inflation rate for the previous three years. The inflation was 39.27%
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in 2013 which is the highest in the last 9 years. Iraq on the other hand had high
inflation in the years 2005 to 2007 due to the war. The last reported figure of Inflation
for Syria in 2012 was also the highest with a value of 36.70%.
2.3 Financial Background
This section provides an evaluation of the capital markets, the banking system and
the Islamic finance. Our focus is to discover the special features of these areas and
show how this research would fill the gap in the wider context taking into consider-
ation that the region is vital in the advancement and improvement of the financial
markets and the Islamic finance. Financial market development is vital to the over-
all development of an economy. When the financial system operates effectively
it does enhance the availability and transparency of the information. That brings
down transaction costs, which would enhance asset allocation and would increase
the growth. A Country’s main objective is to boost growth which is the main factor
in decreasing poverty.
In this section we discuss the development of the capital markets in MENA coun-
tries including stock markets and bond markets. We overview the different mea-
sures of development such as size, liquidity. We then discuss the access to finance
which is measured by the creditworthiness of borrowers and lowering financing ob-
stacles that are facing consumers and businesses. Finally we discuss the financial
stability and efficiency of the economies in the MENA countries.
2.3.1 Capital Market
The data in this section is obtained from World Bank data base extracted it from the
S&P Emerging market data base. We obtain data to quantify different measures
which would help in understanding the developments of the financial sector in the
MENA countries. These measures are size and market liquidity. It is worth men-
tioning that cross-country comparisons using these measures should be made with
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caution as differences in accounting standards could limit their accuracy.
Bond Market
Fixed income market or bond market is one of the bases of the capital markets.
However, it is underdeveloped in the MENA countries. Its importance comes from
the fact that it does offer the risk free products which are used in the financial market
as the measure for setting the prices of other products that have risk in the financial
markets. In a recent report by the Bank of International Settlements it is reported
that the MENA countries fixed income assets to GDP is equal to 4% only which is
considered low in comparison with other regions. For example, the ratio in Asia is
around 12%.The majority of the bonds issued in the region are government bonds
which represent around 82% of all issues. The reason for that is that bank lending
is the dominant source of capital in the region.
Stock Market
We overview the following measures for size which are market cap and number
of listed local firms.Then, we explore the market liquidity measures which are the
value of shares traded as a percentage of GDP and the value of shares traded as
a percentage of market capitalization.
As Figure 2.3 shows, the size of the stock market in the MENA countries varies
widely. It also shows the negative effect the 2008 financial crises on the market
value of firms.The largest two markets are Saudi Arabia and Turkey with values of
$373 billion and $308 billion US dollars respectively. Iran also has a medium sized
market with a value of $140 billion and Qatar is $126 billion US dollars. Kuwait,
UAE, Egypt and Morocco have a size of $97, $67,$58 and $52 billion dollars.
In addition, the sum of the values of the market capitalization of Jordan, Oman,
Bahrain, Lebanon, Tunisia and Palestine is equal to $ 57.9 billion dollars which is
less than the size of the capital market of Egypt. Several countries which are facing
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(a) Market Capitalization of Listed companies
(b)Total Listed Domestic Companies
Figure 2.3: Capital Market Size Measures
political uncertainty such as Algeria,Iraq, Libya and Syria have no available data.
On the other hand Yemen does not have a stock market.
In addition Figure 2.3 shows the number of listed firms in each economy which
is also a measure of the size of the capital market. As the Figure demonstrates
several countries have an increase in the number of listed firms while others have
decreased. For example, Turkey has listed 103 companies since 2005 which equals
25%. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia doubled the number of listed firms in 2005 to
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reach 158 firms. Kuwait and Jordan both added 46 and 42 firms to their exchange.
However, it is worth noting that both Kuwait and Jordan had a higher number of firms
in 2010 but decreased after that due to several companies exiting and mergers and
acquisitions of firms. Palestine had a dramatic increase of 50% while Morocco and
Qatar increased 30%. Moreover, Oman, Tunisia and UAE also had an increase of
around 25% in the listed firms number.
Several countries had a massive decrease in the number of firms listed. For
example, Egypt had a substantial decrease due to a restructure of the market. In
addition, 40% of the firms that were listed in Iran in 2005 exited. In Bahrain 8.8% and
Lebanon 9.5% of firms exited in 2013 in comparison to 2005. Like we mentioned
before there is no data available for Algeria,Iraq, Libya and Syria and Yemen.
Market liquidity
The liquidity of the market is the capacity to simply buy and sell securities. Two
measures of liquidity are the total value of the shares traded divided by GDP. The
second measure is the turnover ratio. Both measures are important to determine
the size of the market and the economy as well.
We first start with the turnover ratio. It is calculated by dividing the value of the
shares traded by the market capitalization. Figure 2.4 shows the ratio for the coun-
tries in the MENA region. We notice that the largest two markets are Saudi Arabia
and Turkey. The turnover ratio for Saudi Arabia is 144% and Turkey is 136%. It is
worth noting that the ratio for Saudi Arabia was even higher in 2005 at 231%. But
the collapse of the market in 2006 did have an effect on the size of the market. After
that, we notice that Egypt has a ratio of 37.8% , UAE’s ratio is 25.3% and Kuwait’s
ratio is 23.2%. Then, Iran, Oman, Qatar and Tunisia all have a ratio between 17%
and 12%. In cintrast, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon are the economies with a low ratio.
Interestingly Bahrain’s ratio is only 1.9%. There is no available data for the rest of
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(a)Stock Traded Turnover ratio
(b) Stock Traded Total value
Figure 2.4: Market Liquidity Measures
the countries.
Secondly, the ratio of the stock traded value as a percentage of the GDP. This is
a measure of the size of the economy. Again the results of this ratio do complement
the turnover ratio. Figure 2.4 illustrates that Saudi Arabia and Turkey are the largest
two economies in the MENA region. The third largest economy is Kuwait, and
Jordan is the fourth with a ratio of 9%. Qatar and Egypt have a ratio of 7.7% and
8.1% respectively. It is also worth mentioning that the rest of the countries have
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a ratio less than 5%. This shows that the countries in the MENA countries have
diffrent sizes either using the turnover ratio or the traded stock value to the market
capitalization. The economy with the highest growth is Tunisia with a 67% from 2005
to 2012 but Turkey and Iran had a 6% and 3% respectively. All the other countries
in the MENA region did have a large decrease in their ratio. The countries with the
significant decreases are Jordan and UAE and Palestine.
2.3.2 Access to Finance
(a)ATMs per 100,000 Adults
(b)Comercial Banks Branches per 100,000 adults
Figure 2.5: Access to Finance Measures
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The stable financial system characteristics could be making efficient savings and
quality investments. Smooth access to banking services lowers the transaction
costs and increases reliability. Several measures are used to quantify the finan-
cial access which are value of deposits and loans, and outreach indicators which
include number of branches and number of cash machines. Another measure is
the number of point of sale terminals but data for this indicator is not available and
therefore we exclude it. Figure 2.5 shows the number of cash machines (Auto-
mated Teller Machines ATMs) per 100,000 adults. It is a computerized device that
provides the clients with access to all financial transactions in a public place. The
advances of the technology in recent years have allowed customers of banks to do
all kinds of transactions through these machines. This increased the importance of
their accessibility. The numbers vary in the MENA countries where countries have
a significant increase and other countries improve slightly.
Before we discuss the improvement over the last decade it is important to point
out that there is a difference between the GCC countries group and the other coun-
tries. Average of the number is 53.6, 52.6, 49.1 and 48.9 for Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and UAE. Data for Bahrain and Oman is not available but we do expect
them to be within this range. After that we notice that Turkey has a close rate to the
GCC countries with an average of 45.6. Lebanon, Jordan and Iran all have a rate
between 20 and 30. Morocco, Tunisia and Palestine have an average rate of 17.6,
16.6 and 12.5 in that order. Finally, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Iraq all
have a low average below 8 ATMs per 100,000.
The country with the highest improvement is abnormally Iran. The number in-
creased from 4.4 in 2005 to 46.1 in 2012 with an increase of 234%. Then, Algeria
and Egypt which improved by 138% and 115%. Then Iraq and Syria which im-
proved significantly by 114% and 115% respectively. It is worth mentioning that the
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improvement in Iraq is due to the redevelopment of Iraq after the war and the case
of Syria is due to the fact that they only started operating ATMs in 2002. Yemen
also has a high increase of around 137%.
(a)Borrowers from commercial banks
(b Depositors with commercial banks)
Figure 2.6: Depositors and Borrowers from Commercial Banks
Financial inclusion is the supply of financial services for example banking ser-
vices to low income and poor people. On the other hand, the opposite is called
financial exclusion where the financial services are exclusive to the medium and
high income society or the services are expensive and not affordable by the low
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income segment. Two measures presented by the IMF which measure usage di-
mensions of the financial inclusion are the number of depositors from commercial
banks per 1000 adults and number of borrowers from commercial banks per 1000
adults.
Figure 2.6 shows both measures. Several MENA countries do not provide data
for these measures. These are Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco and UAE. The
MENA countries with a high increased rate in 2012 are Algeria, Libya and Yemen.
The rate of increase was 9%, 9% and 27% respectively. However, Kuwait and Syria
did not report recent data for this measure. Kuwait’s last reported rate is for 2011
and it shows an increase of 12% in comparison with 2010. Syria also had a high
increase of 27% between 2009 and 2010. Economies which faced a decrease
include Lebanon -3%, Palestine -1% and Saudi Arabia -1%.Furthermore, Figure
2.6 also shows the borrowers from commercial banks. Countries with a high growth
are Yemen, Palestine and Tunisia. On the other hand, countries with a decrease
include Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
2.3.3 Access to Credit
Financial institutions are intermediaries between depositors and borrowers, they
are demanded by regulators to reduce obstacles facing business and people. This
cannot be done without the banks having the protection of the legal system and the
availability of the credit information. When legal systems are weak or the collateral
law enforcement is lacking, banks will opt to issue fewer loans and therefore slow
the development of the economy. Therefore, this section first starts by discussing
these two measures which are the strength of legal rights index and the depth of
credit information index.
The first measure is the strength of the legal rights index which measures laws
of bankruptcy and collateral which would protect the lenders’ rights. The measure
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(a) Strength of Legal Index
(b)Depth of Credit Information
Figure 2.7: Access to Credit Measures
ranges from 0 to 12 and as 2.7 shows the MENA countries’ average score is con-
sidered low with a score of 3. The index scores increased dramatically in 2013 and
2014. The country with the highest score in 2014 is Saudi Arabia. The rest of the
countries have a score of 1 or 2. Two countries scored 0 which are Turkey and
UAE. This indicator is a disappointing one as the majority of countries did improve
previously scoring high in 2012 and 2011 reaching a score of 5, but since then they
dropped. This might have serious implications in the credit markets in the MENA
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countries as banks will be reluctant to provide loans.
The second measure is the depth of the credit information index which measures
the availability of the credit information through either public or private credit agen-
cies. The score ranges between 0 for the lowest and 8 for the highest. Figure 2.7
shows the scores of the MENA countries. The figures shows how the countries
vary widely between highest score and lowest score. Egypt and Oman scored 8
in the index, while Bahrain, Tunisia, Turkey and Palestine scored 7. On the other
hand, countries which scored 0 and therefore do not have agencies to provide credit
information are Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and UAE.
To sum up we find that MENA countries vary widely in their level of access to
credit. Overall, the majority of countries have a low legal rights index and depth of
credit information in comparison to the world or other regions.
2.3.4 Financial Stability and efficiency
Efficiency
The efficiency of the banking sector is important for the economic development of
the economy and to sustain a healthy financial system. There are two measures
of efficiency which are the ratio of bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans
and the interest rate spread. The first one which is the bank non-performing loans
identify the quality of the loans in the banking system portfolio. Nonperforming
loans are loans where the debtor has not made the scheduled payment for more
than 90 days. These are either defaulted loans or close to being defaulted. The
total gross loans is the total amount of loans issued by the banking sector in an
economy. Therefore this ratio would explain how much of the loans are defaulted.
On the other hand the interest rate spread is a measure of the difference between
the cost of mobilizing liabilities and the earnings on asset. When the difference
is narrow it indicates low transaction costs and thus encourages more investment.
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When the spread is small it would mean that the market considers its customer to
be of low risk; on the other hand if the spread is negative then it would indicate that
the market considers the corporate firms to be lower in risk in comparison to the
government.
(a)Banks non-preforming loans to total gross loans
(b) Interest Rate Spread
Figure 2.8: Interest Rate spread and Banks non preforming loans
Figure 2.8 shows both of them for the sample of this study. First there is no
available data for Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria for the nonperforming loans ratio. The
average for the world is around 4% and the average in the MENA region is 4.8%.
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The following countries have a lower rate than the world and the MENA region: 1)
Kuwait 3.6%, 2) Lebanon 4%, 3) Oman 2.1%, 4) Palestine 2.9%, 5) Qatar 1.9%, 6)
Saudi Arabia 1.3% and Turkey 2.6%. On the other hand, the rest of the countries
did have a higher level than the world and the MENA region. For example, Yemen’s
ratio is the highest in the region with 21.7%. Algeria and Egypt both have a high ratio
of 10.6% and 9.3% respectively. Lastly, Jordan, Morocco, UAE have a percentage
of 7%, 5.9% and 7.3%,
In addition, the interest rate spread is shown in the second chart of Figure 2.8.
The majority of the countries are below the world average which is 3.9% in 2013.
Yemen and Iraq are the countries with the highest percentages of 6.8% and 7.35%
correspondingly. Algeria on the other hand has a stable rate of 6.25% for 2013 and
has been within this range for the last decade. Bahrain, Egypt and Jordan are all
within the same range between 4.2% and 4.8%. Countries with percentages lower
than the average for the world are: 1) Kuwait 2.54%, 2) Oman 3%, 3) Libya 3.5%,
4) Qatar 3.7%. The country with the lowest positive value is Lebanon with around
1.52%. Interestingly Iran did have a negative ratio of -3.76%, which means that the
market has more confidence in the corporate firms rather than the government.
Stability
As stable and efficient financial system is important to increase economic activity
and welfare. Therefore instability could cause significant harm to the financial sys-
tem. As Gadanecz and Jayaram (2008) discussed several measures are used to
assess the stability of the economy and these include the ratio of bank capital to
assets and the size of the domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a share
of the GDP. We start first with the domestic credit to the private sector as a share of
GDP. The world average for 2013 is 128% and the MENA region average is 35.2%.
As Figure 2.8 shows there are countries with a high domestic credit to the private
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(a)Domestic credit to private sectory by Banks
(b) Bank capital to asset ratio
Figure 2.9: Stability Measures
sector such as Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey which are the non-
oil exporting countries. On the other hand, countries with low percentages include
Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Palestine and Yemen. Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and UAE with values between 40% and 60%. Bahrain is the only GCC country with
a high value of 70%. Egypt and Turkey have a value of 27% and 66% respectively.
Secondly, the ratio of bank capital to assets. This measures the stability of the
banks and also their solvency which could be used to assess the banks capacity
40
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
to deal with losses. The majority of countries do not report their figures. We notice
that those in the GCC which reported their figures have a high ratio. These are
Kuwait 12.5%, Oman 11.9% , Saudi Arabia 13.6% and UAE 15.2% in 2013. Like-
wise, Jordan’s ratio is 12.9% and Turkey is 11.2%. Palestine, Morocco and Egypt
all reported lower values than the GCC with their ratio around 10%, 8.9% and 7%.
The world average is around 10% and the MENA average is 11.7%. The reason
for high ratios in general all over the MENA region is the application of the Basel III
requirement for capital which is around 8%. We could conclude from this that the
majority of countries banks are stable and could deal with unexpected shocks to the
economy.
2.3.5 Islamic Financial System
Islamic finance originated with the birth of Islam more than 1400 years ago when the
Prophet Mohamed (PBUH) was in charge of his wife’s trading operations. After that
the Islamic partnerships or contract became the dominant contract in the business
environment for centuries and the conventional system that pays interest is little
used in daily transactions. These partnerships performed as the foundations for
economic function of the Islamic area at that time. The reason for that is that they
united the most important roles for welfare interest; these parts of production are
capital, labour and entrepreneurship. The investor supplied the money and the
entrepreneur managed the business, while they shared an agreed percentage of
the profits. If there was a loss, the investor will lose his money and the entrepreneur
will lose his time and labour Khan and Mirakhor (1989).
The cornerstone of the Islamic financial system, as explained by Iqbal (1997),
is the absolute prohibition of the payment or receipt of any assured or guaranteed
rate of return, which prevents the use of debt-based instruments and cancels the
concept of interest. The system’s main focus is risk sharing that promotes en-
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trepreneurship, discourages approximate behavior, and underlines the importance
of contracts. Whether in loans or sales, the banning of interest (Riba) is the central
principle of the system. Interest can be defined as any positive predetermined rate
fixed to the maturity and is considered forbidden. The general consensus among
Islamic researchers is that it covers not only overcharging of interest but also the
charging of interest as practiced widely.
Although the most important restriction is that the Islamic financial system must
work under the ban of interest, it is crucial to understand that what Islamic law for-
bids is the fixed return on financial transactions, and not the uncertain rate of return
that represents profits. For this reason profit sharing is the basis of modern Islamic
banking. To explain further, Islamic banks do not pay interest on their customer
accounts. Instead the customer funds are invested on the basis of profit sharing
investment accounts (also called profit loss sharing accounts). In this setup the
banks act as a fund manager where an agreed percentage can be taken out of the
profit on the customer’s account. The difference between the account holders and
the shareholders is that the latter are entitled to get a percentage of the profits of
the bank. The main source of profit for Islamic banks is the management fees they
get from the account holders for managing their funds (Archer and Karim 2006).
Before we discuss further about Islamic banks it is important to explain that the
main principle is to ban interest (Riba). Khan and Bhatti (2008) define Islamic Bank-
ing as an equity based system replacing interest with profit loss sharing products
(PLS).By banning interest and commanding Zakat, which is a deduction of 2.5% on
the wealth that remains unused through a full Islamic calendar year, capitalists are
forced to not retain funds which could lead to handicapping the flow of funds to the
market and making continuous supply of funds to be used to finance new invest-
ments. Several challenges are facing Islamic banks which are summarised by Khan
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and Bhatti (2008). First, they carry more liquidity than conventional banks. Second,
they commit 95% per cent of their funds to short term loans. The products used
by Islamic banks under the principle of profit loss sharing (PLS), are summarised in
Next Table.
Karim and Ali (1989) suggest that Islamic Banks are more reliant on issuing Eq-
uity and not using debt, this assumption will be validated. We are also interested to
see if the determinants of capital structure are different between Islamic and con-
ventional banks. We compare the results we get from the regression to find if there
is a difference and if theory could explain it. To our knowledge this is the first study
to shed the light on the capital structure of Islamic banks, therefore there is a very
small number of previous studies in the literature.
Recently, the Islamic finance industry has rapidly grown at a substantial growth
rate. Recent reports by Ernest and Young (2013) suggested that Islamic banking
assets globally are worth around US$ 1.7 trillion. The same report also suggested
that the average annual growth for the last four years is around 17.6%.These figures
make studying Islamic finance and banking very important for both researchers and
practitioners.
Islamic Finance is following the Islamic Law (Sharia) in financial transactions.
The Islamic Law started with the revelations of the Prophet Mohammad Peace Upon
him. Sharia is based on two sources. Primary sources such as the Quran and
Sunnah which are the traditions and practice of Prophet Mohmmed. Secondary
sources of Sharia are:
1. Agreement of scholars on an issue
2. Qiyas The use of Quran or Sunnah as means to solve a new problem
3. Ijtihad An opinion of a single Islamic scholar towards an issue
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4. Urf Common practices and customs
The two major principles of Sharia in financial transactions are:
1. the prohibition of Riba (Interest).
2. The transactions should not be in Haram (Forbidden) products or firms that
deal in forbidden activities.
Two modes of Islamic financing are widely used in Islamic banks. These are:
1. Financing through participatory modes since Islamic finance prohibited the
interest, it has been replaced with entrepreneurial contracts which could be
either the Musharka or Modharbah.
(a) Mushrkah is based on the idea that both parties are partners in the
same project and they both share the profit and the risks involved. The
investment capital could be unequal.
(b) Mudaraba is when the partnership includes a partner giving the money
and the other partner investing the money on behalf of the first partner
for an agreed percentage of the profits. However, all losses in the capital
are only suffered by the person who provided the fund, as the Mudarib
will suffer the loss of his time or efforts.
2. Financing through debt creating modes
• Mudaraba is a sale agreement where a party would provide goods for
a deferred payment at an agreed profit margin. There are rules to this
contract but the most important one is that the provider of the goods
should be owned and in positions of the seller before the agreement.
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The other important rule is that the seller should disclose the price he
paid to obtain the goods.
• Musawama is the same sale agreement as Mudaraba however, the
only difference is that the seller is not obliged to disclose the price he
paid for the good or the service.
• Salam is a sale agreement in which one party agrees to supply goods
at a future date for current full payment. As in the agricultural industry
where a bank would supply capital to a former in exchange for agricul-
tural goods at the harvesting season, in this agreement the seller dose
not yet own or possess the goods he is selling.
• Istisna is a contract to manufacture goods. It could be a Salam con-
tract by full advance payment or by future payment. The delivery of the
product will be at a future date as it takes time to manufacture it. It is
mainly used in the construction and manufacturing industry.
• Ijarah is similar to the traditional leasing contract. But, there are a few
conditions that should be agreed on in the contract to avoid Haram.
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2.4 Institutional Background
The sample of this study constitutes 10 different countries. Therefore it is impor-
tant before we compare the differences in capital structure to analyse the different
institutional characteristics. In section 2.4.1 we discuss the accounting standards.
In section 2.4.2 we provide the data about the investor protection laws. Section
2.4.3 is about the ease of doing business and what it measures. Then, in section
2.4.4 we talk about the regulators institutions and the stock exchanges. Finally, we
discuss the different tax systems in the MENA countries in section 2.4.5
2.4.1 Accounting standards
Due to different accounting standards adopted by the countries in the MENA coun-
tries it is not possible to compare these standards. However, our interest is to in-
vestigate the quality of these accounting standards. Therefore, we use a measure
constructed by the World Bank ’doing business’ project. These measures range
from 0 to 10 with higher values meaning more disclosure. However, a limited num-
ber of countries are included in this project. Figure 2.10 show the countries’ ranking
in this measure. Several countries have a high value such as Jordan, Syria and
Tunisia who scored 9, 9 and 10 respectively. Moreover, Bahrain, Egypt and Libya
all scored 8. It is worth mentioning that the improvement in Tunisia is significant
in the last three years. Where it did scored 4,6,10 in 2012,2013,2014 respectively.
Figure 2.10 shows the rest of the countries’ scores.
2.4.2 Quality of Investor protection laws
Investors are interested in the laws in the country of their investments simply to
know how they are protected. It is not possible to measure the protecting laws and
their enforcements. Therefore, we use the property rights as an index for the sake
of comparison of the MENA countries as suggested by Bae and Goyal (2009). This
index is provided by the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom as well
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Figure 2.10: Business Extent of Disclosure
as other indicators which are presented in Table 2.8. The value of the property
rights range between 0 for the worst and 100 for the best. From the table Bahrain,
Qatar, Jordan and UAE have a high index in comparison to other countries in the
MENA region. However, countries with a very low property rights index include Iran,
Libya and Syria scoring only 10. It is worth mentioning that the region rank index
includes 10 kinds of freedoms but this study only provide the freedoms related to
the financial and economic context.
Based on the ranking for all of the freedoms in the region we could see that the
GCC countries are top such as Bahrain, UAE and Qatar. However, in this index
Turkey is considered in Europe and therefore the ranking is not relevant. Countries
like Iran, Egypt and Iraq are ranked at the bottom and this is mainly affected by their
low score in the property right index.
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Table 2.8: Investors Protection and Economic Freedom
Country Name Region
Rank
Property
Rights
Fiscal
Freedom
Business
Freedom
Monetary
Freedom
Trade
Freedom
Investment
Freedom
Financial
Freedom
Algeria 14 30.0 80.0 66.6 71.2 60.8 25.0 30.0
Bahrain 1 60.0 99.9 72.5 74.2 78.6 65.0 80.0
Egypt 12 20.0 85.8 65.4 67.4 70.0 50.0 40.0
Iran 15 10.0 81.2 57.0 48.7 41.4 0.0 10.0
Iraq N/A N/A N/A 57.7 73.6 N/A N/A N/A
Jordan 5 60.0 93.7 59.1 80.6 79.6 70.0 60.0
Kuwait 7 45.0 97.7 58.6 74.0 76.2 55.0 50.0
Lebanon 10 20.0 91.3 54.7 72.0 75.8 60.0 60.0
Libya N/A 10.0 95.0 46.8 71.4 80.0 5.0 20.0
Morocco 9 40.0 70.9 68.8 81.9 78.2 70.0 60.0
Oman 6 55.0 98.5 68.4 76.2 76.8 65.0 60.0
Qatar 3 70.0 99.7 70.5 79.7 81.8 45.0 50.0
Saudi Arabia 8 40.0 99.7 65.8 68.4 76.4 40.0 50.0
Syria N/A 10.0 N/A 57.3 N/A N/A 0.0 20.0
Tunisia 11 40.0 74.3 81.2 74.8 61.2 35.0 30.0
Turkey 32 45.0 76.1 61.0 72.4 84.6 75.0 60.0
UAE 2 55.0 99.5 74.7 83.8 82.4 40.0 50.0
Yemen 13 30.0 91.5 54.0 68.5 77.6 50.0 30.0
2.4.3 Ease of doing business
The ease of doing business is a measure published by the World Bank to rank the
different economies. It is an average of different topics. The topics this measure
covers are in Table 2.9. Therefore, it is an appropriate measure for the business
friendly regulations in the MENA countries.
Table 2.9: Topics Included in Ease of Doing Business Index
Topics
Starting a Business Getting Credit
Registering Property Trading Across Borders
Paying Taxes Getting Electricity
Resolving Insolvency Protecting Minority Investors
Dealing with Construction Permits Enforcing Contracts
Figure 2.11 shows the ease of doing business index, the data is only available
for the years 2013 and 2014. It shows that the countries who improved from 2013
are Tunisia, Egypt and Palestine. On the other hand, the countries with a significant
drop are Iran and Qatar where each dropped 10 places. We can see that the highest
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countries in the ranking are Tunisia, Oman, Morocco and Bahrain.
Figure 2.11: Ease of Doing Business
2.4.4 Regulators and Stock Exchanges
The development of the financial markets is in parallel with strong regulation and
easy access to stock exchanges. In this section we discuss the stock exchanges
ownership and history. We also discuss the regulators of the stock market as in
Table 2.11. One distinctive feature is that the majority of the stock exchanges are
either state owned or public institutions, which is not the norm in the world where
most exchanges are privately owned. Currently only the Dubai financial market
is private with around 20% of shares traded. Although the fact that the MENA
exchange is currently owned or run by the government there is a shift of direction
towards a private exchange.
Table 2.10 shows the details of the exchanges in the MENA region. The major-
ity of the stock exchanges with the exception of Egypt and Tunisia are fairly new.
Also, the only country with more than one exchange is the United Arab Emirates,
with the Emirate of Dubai having 2 exchanges. Egypt stock exchange was called
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Table 2.10: Stock Market Exchanges in MENA region
Country Stock Exchange Date of establishment Ownership Structure
Algeria Bourse D Alger 1993 State-owned
Bahrain Bahrain Stock Exchange 1987 State-owned
Egypt Egyptian Exchange3 1883 Public institution
Iraq Iraq Stock Exchange 2004 Mutualised
Iran Tehran Stock Exchange 1967 Public Institution
Jordan Amman Stock Exchange 1999 Public institution
Kuwait Kuwait Stock Exchange 1984 Public institution
Lebanon Beirut Stock Exchange 1920 Public institution
Libya Libyan Stock Market 2007 State-owned
Morocco Bourse de Casablanca 1929 Mutualised
Oman Muscat Securities Market 1988 State-owned
Palestine Palestine Exchange 1995 Privately held
Qatar Qatar Exchange 1997 State-owned
Saudi Arabia Tadawul 1984 State-owned
Syria Damascus Securities Exchange 2009 Public institution
Tunisia Bourse de Tunis 1969 Mutualised
Turkey Borsa Istanbul 1985 State-owned
United Arab Emirates Dubai Financial Market 2000 State-owned
Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange 2000 State-owned
Nasdaq Dubai 4 2005 State-owned
the Alexandria Stock exchange and was established in 1883. Later the Cairo Stock
Exchange was established in 1903. The Egyptian exchange used to be called the
Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE). The Bourse de Tunis is the Tunisian
stock exchange and it was founded in 1969 and Tehran Stock exchange was formed
in 1967. The rest of the stock exchanges were all formed after 1980. The stock ex-
changes of Iraq, Libya and Syria were formed in 2004, 2007 and 2009 respectively.
In addition, the majority of the countries in the MENA region have established
special government institutions to monitor and supervise the capital markets. They
are either called the Capital Market Authority (CMA) or the Securities Commission
(SC). Regulatory responsibilities and powers do vary between the countries. As
Table 2.11 shows the establishment of these institutions is generally recent. These
immature organizations although having extensive regulatory power and in some
cases independence, do report to the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Despite few of
them having independence from the government, most do rely on government mon-
etary support. To sum up there is a decent effort in the regulations of the MENA
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Table 2.11: Regulators of Capital Markets in MENA region
Country Securities regulator Established Enforcement function in CMA
Algeria
Commission dorganisation et de surveillance
des operations de bourse (COSOB)
1993
Direction for Development and Market Surveillance
Disciplinary Chamber
Bahrain Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) 2006 Capital Markets Supervision Directorate
Egypt Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) 2009 Central Department for Enforcement
Iraq Iraq Securities Commission (ISC) 2004 Inspection Department
Iran Securities and Exchange Organization (SEO) 2006 Administration and supervisory duties
Jordan Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) 1997 Legal and Enforcement Department
Kuwait Capital Market Authority (CMA) 2010 Supervision sector
Lebanon Capital Market Authority (CMA) 2011 Not yet developed
Libya Capital Market Authority (CMA) 2013 Not yet developed
Morocco Le Conseil Déontologique des Valeurs Mobilières (CDVM) 1993
Inquiries and Surveillance
(and Examinations Joint Committee)
Oman Capital Markets Authority (CMA) 1998 Department of Investigation and Enforcement
Palestinian Palestine Capital Market Authority 2004 N/A
Qatar Qatar Financial Markets Authority 2005
Surveillance Department,Disciplinary Committee
Appeals Committee
Saudi Arabia Capital Markets Authority (CMA) 2003 Enforcement Division
Syria
Syrian Commission on Financial Markets
and Securities (SCFMS)
2005 Enforcement Division
Tunisia Conseil du marché financier (CMF) 1994
Department of Market Surveillance
Enforcement Department
Turkey Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) 1982 Financial regulatory and supervisory
UAE
Dubai Financial Services Authority 2004 Enforcement Committee
Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (ESCA) 2000
Licensing Supervision and Enforcement De-
partment
10
ource:Amico
(2014)
region stock exchanges, but there is more to be done.
2.4.5 Tax system
The tax in the MENA countries can be classified into two groups. Countries with
heavy tax rates and countries with low or no tax rates at all. Table 2.12 shows the
income tax rates and corporate tax rates among the countries in the region. As
we can see the GCC countries with the exception of Saudi Arabia have no income
tax. Saudi Arabia adopted the Islamic Zakat and therefore the Zakat is 2.5% of the
income of the individuals. In contrast North African countries have a high income
tax rate. For example, Morocco has the highest income tax rate of 38%. Likewise,
Tunisia, Algeria, Iran and Turkey all have a high income tax rate of 35%.
The corporate tax rate is also the same as the income tax rate. The GCC coun-
tries in general have a low corporate tax with the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain all are
with no corporate tax charges for local firms. Saudi Arabia apply the same for cor-
porate tax rate as the income tax rate with a rate of 2.5%. Oman and Kuwait are
the only GCC countries with high corporate tax rate of 12% and 15% respectively.
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Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine all have a rate of 15%. The rest of the MENA
countries have a high corporate tax rate which is above 20%.
The last column of Table 2.12 shows the tax burden as a percentage of the GDP.
This measure is important in showing which economies rely greatly on taxes. In
Turkey the tax burden represent 27.7% of the GDP. Morocco and Tunisia also rely
heavily on taxes with 23.7% and 21% of the GDP. Tariff rates are important tools
to protect the local product and producers from competitive markets. It shows that
countries like Iran have 21.8% which is considered to be high. The reason is that
the tariff for automotive vehicles is 100%. The same rate is also applied in Egypt.
The rest of the countries have a low rate below 15%.
Table 2.12: Tax and Tariff Rates in MENA countries
Country Name Tariff Rate (%) Income Tax Rate (%) Corporate Tax Rate (%) Tax Burden % of GDP
Algeria 12.1 35.0 25.0 12.2
Bahrain 5.7 0.0 0.0 3.4
Egypt 10.0 25.0 25.0 12.9
Iran 21.8 35.0 25.0 5.9
Iraq N/A 15.0 15.0 N/A
Jordan 5.2 14.0 14.0 15.3
Kuwait 4.4 0.0 15.0 0.7
Lebanon 7.1 20.0 15.0 15.7
Libya 0.0 10.0 20.0 0.7
Morocco 3.4 38.0 30.0 23.7
Oman 4.1 0.0 12.0 2.5
Palestine N/A 20.0 15.0 N/A
Qatar 4.1 0.0 0.0 5.1
Saudi Arabia 4.3 2.5 2.5 3.7
Syria N/A 22.0 28.0 N/A
Tunisia 14.4 35.0 30.0 21.0
Turkey 2.7 35.0 20.0 27.7
United Arab Emirates 3.8 0.0 0.0 7.2
Yemen 6.2 20.0 20.0 7.0
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Literature Review
3.1 Introduction
T
he capital structure theories are very important, due to the fact that every
single company has to make a decision about what capital structure they
should choose. In this chapter we discuss the main capital structure
theories and their application. We start with section 3.2 where we review the cost of
financing and the Weighted Average Cost Of Capital (WACC). Then, in section 3.3
we discuss the work of Modigliani-Miller. After that, section 3.4 is about the trade-off
theory and section 3.5 is presenting the pecking order theory. Then, section 3.6 is
about the agency cost theory and section 3.7 will review the market timing theory.
After discussing the main theories in capital structure literature, this chapter will
discuss the classifications used by international institutes to differentiate between
economies. Then, a review of empirical results around the world. Next, a review of
the capital structure in developed and developing economies. Finally, a review of
the methodologies and approaches used to study capital structure.
3.2 Cost of Capital
The cost of capital is a very important tool for business valuation of investments. It
is the rate of return that the debt or equity holders would accept in exchange for their
supply of capital. Using this tool help firms to decide which projects or investments
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they should take. It is also widely used as a discount rate to predict the present
value of the investment cash flows. There are different methods for calculating the
cost of capital, but we provide the most relevant one to capital structure which is the
weighted average cost of capital (WACC).
Before we calculate the WACC we need the cost of debt and the cost of equity.
3.2.1 Cost of Debt
There are two methods to calculate the cost of debt. The yield to maturity approach
and the debt rating approach. The approach of our interest is the yield to maturity
approach. It is calculated by discounting the cash flows received and the cash pay-
ment over the period of financing. The following formula is used for the calculation:
P = C0 −
(
C1
1 + i +
C2
(1 + i)2 + ..........+
CN
(1 + i)N
)
(3.1)
where,
CN is cash flow in period N
i is cost of debt financing
N is the number of periods
3.2.2 Cost of Equity
Several methods are used to estimate the cost of equity. These are the capital
asset pricing model, dividend discount model and the bond yield plus risk premium.
In this section we use the capital asset pricing model which is also called (CAPM).
E(Ri) = RF + βi[E(RM)−RF ] (3.2)
where,
βi is the return sensitivity of stock i to changes in the market return
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E(RM) is the expected return on the market
E(RM)−RF is the expected market risk premium or equity risk premium (ERP)
3.2.3 Weighted Average Cost of Capital
The WACC can be defined as :
WACC = wdrd(1− t) + wprp + were (3.3)
where,
Wd is the proportion of debt that the company uses when it raises new funds
rd is the before-tax marginal cost of debt
t is the company’s marginal tax rate
wp is the proportion of preferred stock the company uses when it raises new funds
rp is the marginal cost of preferred stock
we is the proportion of equity that the company uses when it raises new funds re is
the marginal cost of equity
3.3 Modigliani-Miller Theories
In their paper Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that under a specific set of as-
sumptions the company capital structure financing decision is irrelevant to its mar-
ket value. These assumptions were relaxed later in subsequent studies to unlock a
substantial amount of research towards capital structure theory.
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) restrictive assumptions are:
1. All investors have complete knowledge of what future returns will be.
2. All firms within an industry have the same risk regardless of capital structure.
3. No taxes.
4. No transactions costs.
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5. Individuals can borrow as easily and at the same rate of interest as the cor-
poration.
6. All earnings are paid out as dividends (thus, earnings are constant and there
is no growth.
7. The average cost of capital is constant.
3.3.1 Modigliani and Miller (1958) First Proposition
In the first proposition they stated that:
Vj = (Sj +Dj) = X¯j/ρk, for any firm j in class k (3.4)
Where :
j is the company
X¯j is the expected profit before deducting interest
Dj is the market value of the debt of company j
Sj is the market value of the common share of company j
Vj is the market value of all the securities or market value of the firm
ρk expected rate of return of any share in class k
Then they would conclude the following statement:
"The market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and is given by
capitalizing its expected return at the rate ρk appropriate to its class."
The same proposition can be expressed in a different way by solving it for the
average cost of capital x¯j/Vj which could be defined as the ratio of its expected
return to the market value of all the securities. Then their proposition could be:
X¯j
(Sj +Dj)
≡ X¯j
Vj
= ρk, for any firm j in class k (3.5)
Then, "the average cost of capital to any firm is completely independent of its
capital structure and is equal to capitalization rate of pure equity stream of its class".
56
CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW
3.3.2 Modigliani and Miller (1958) Second Proposition
They then derive from the First proposition that the rate of return on common stock
in companies whose capital structure includes debt is a linear function of leverage
and can be demonstrated by the following equation :
ij = ρk + (ρk − r)Dj/Sj (3.6)
which is expressed as "the expected yield of a share of stock is equal to the ap-
propriate capitalization rate ρk for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a premium
related to financial risk equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times the spread between
ρk and r."
3.3.3 Modigliani and Miller (1963) Corrections
In this communication Modigliani and Miller (1963) revisited their previous proposi-
tions in an attempt to correct errors they committed. In their original paper Modigliani
and Miller (1958) proposed that under a set of assumptions there is no relation be-
tween the firm capital structure and its value. They also added that firms should try
to maximize their use of debt to take advantage of the tax shield. However, their
new revised models state there is still a benefit of using debt over equity but it also
includes risks and costs that should be taken into consideration. They also added
that firms could use retained earnings as a substitute for debt as it could be cheaper
in some instances.
3.4 Trade-off Theory
The two papers we discuss in the previous section which were done by Modigliani
and Miller (1958) and Modigliani and Miller (1963) lead Kraus and Litzenberger
(1973) to suggest a hypothesis. Their hypothesis is to introduce market imperfec-
tions in the form of the costs of bankruptcy and corporate taxes to the model.In other
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words, we could assume that there are benefits and costs associated with the use
of debt. The addition of the corporate tax to the model shows that using leverage
would reduce the amount firms pay in corporate income tax. On the other hand, the
use of bonds would require the firm to pay a fixed amount and if they cannot meet
it they will be bankrupted and pay the costs. Therefore, we could say that Kraus
and Litzenberger (1973) shifted the focus into deciding the level of debt that would
take the most of the tax advantage and minimize the probability of bankruptcy to
maximize the market value of the firm. The dynamic form of trade-off theory as-
sumes that the actual capital structure of a particular firm at a particular moment in
time does not necessarily equal the target capital structure of that firm but the firm
dynamically adjusts its capital structure to a moving target.
As we can see in Figure 3.1. Where,
1. is the MM results when incorporating the corporate effects,
2. value of the firm reduces by bankruptcy penalties,
3. value added by the debt tax shield,
4. actual price of stock,
5. value of the stock if MM(1958) holds,
D0 threshold debt level where bankruptcy becomes material,
D1 optimal capital structure: marginal tax shelter benefits,
So is the value of the stock if the firm uses no financial leverage.
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Figure 3.1: Trade-off Theory
3.5 Pecking Order Theory
It assumes that given information asymmetry between stake holders, firms will re-
sort to internally generated funds first to finance their growth, then debt before eq-
uity in order. The main backbone of the theory is the introduction of the asymmetric
information between the company insiders and outsiders and how this would affect
the firm capital structure. It is developed and supported by Myers and Majluf (1984)
and Myers (1984) who were the first to propose the Pecking order theory. However,
in fact it was first discussed in the literature by Donaldson (1961) who conducted
a survey study and found results to support this behavior of firms. It states that
investors or share holders have less information about the true value of the firm
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assets and therefore will monitor the managers’ financing decisions to forecast the
future of the firm.
Furthermore, Baker and Wurgler (2002) state that the pecking order theory has
no assumption about the optimal capital structure or leverage ratio. However, its
main idea is that managers tend and try to minimize adverse costs and that the
capital structure is the result of the firm financing requirement over time.
Myers (1984) suggested the following assumptions of the pecking order theory:
1. Firms prefer internal finance.
2. They adapt their target dividend payout ratios to their investment opportuni-
ties, although dividends are sticky and target payout ratios are only gradually
adjusted to shifts in the extent of valuable investment opportunities.
3. Sticky dividend policies, plus unpredictable fluctuations in profitability and
investment opportunities, mean that internally-generated cash flow may be
more or less than investment outlays. If it is less, the firm first draws down its
cash balance or marketable securities portfolio.
4. If external finance is required, firms issue the safest security first. That is, they
start with debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, then
perhaps equity as a last resort.
3.6 Agency Cost Theory
In this theory the model is based on how to use capital structure as disciplinary tool
to keep the interest of managers and share holders and debt holders in the same
direction which is to maximize the value of the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
discuss two kinds of conflicts that might arise between the stakeholders of the firm.
These are:
1. Conflict between managers and share holders.
2. Conflict between equity share holders and debt holders.
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Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that the conflict between managers and share
holder will generally be about operating decisions. This problem could be solved by
using debt since it gives the power to the bond holders to force liquidation. Further-
more, Jensen (1986) states that using debt firms will incur interest payments which
would decrease the cash flow available for self-interested managers.
On the other hand, conflict between share holders and debt holders because of
the investment return is higher than the payment to the debt holders and then share
holders will get most of the profit. However, if the investment returns are low the
debt holders will suffer from the loss. Therefore, share holders might encourage
risky investments that debt holders would not support.This is known as the asset
substitution effect.
3.7 Market timing theory
The market timing theory is based on the idea that firms will issue equity based
on the market condition in an effort to time the market. If the market is high and
the market-to-book ratio is high then firms will prefer to issue equity. The theory
changes the view that the current capital structure is the result of an optimizing
strategy but that it is the sum of previous issues to time the market.
Furthermore, Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that in addition to the condition
market they find a significant relationship between business cycle and equity is-
suance. They also document a relationship between equity issuance and the share
price. They notice that when firms are overvalued they always issue equity.
3.8 Countries Classification
Before we discuss the evidence around the world it is worth mentioning that differ-
ent classifications exist in deciding the level of development in a certain country.
Nielsen (n.d.) compares the different classifications by three different international
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agencies. These are the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund IMF
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). According to their research
there is different terminology used in the classification. The classification of the
(IMF) divide countries into two main groups, advanced economies and emerging
and developing economies.
On the other hand, the UNDP classifies countries into 3 main categories which
are developed economies, economies in transition and developing economies. They
also have other classifications based on fuel exporter or importer status and they
use countries development level and measure it by the Gross National Income (GNI)
per capita.However, the World Bank (WB) classification is broader and based on
the level of income, with countries ranking from high income, upper middle income,
lower middle income to low income.
Table 3.1: Countries Classification
Country IMF UNDP World Bank
Algeria Emerging and Developing Developing Upper middle income
Bahrain Emerging and Developing Developing High income
Egypt Emerging and Developing Developing Lower middle income
Iran Emerging and Developing Developing Upper middle income
Iraq Emerging and Developing Developing Upper middle income
Jordan Emerging and Developing Developing Upper middle income
Kuwait Emerging and Developing Developing High income
Lebanon Emerging and Developing Developing Upper middle income
Libya Emerging and Developing Developing Upper middle income
Morocco Emerging and Developing Developing Lower middle income
Oman Emerging and Developing Developing High income
Qatar Emerging and Developing Developing High income
Saudi Arabia Emerging and Developing Developing High income
Syria Emerging and Developing Developing Lower middle income
Tunisia Emerging and Developing Developing Upper middle income
Turkey Emerging and Developing Developing Upper middle income
United Arab Emirates Emerging and Developing Developing High income
Palestine Emerging and Developing N/A Lower middle income
Yemen Emerging and Developing Developing Lower middle income
1
Table 3.1 shows the countries in our sample classification by the three different
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agency groups; all the countries in the sample are in the Emerging and Developing
class by the IMF and the Developing class by the UNDP. However, the World Bank
classification shows that the countries are different. The first category is the high
income which includes the 6 GCC countries. After that we can see the upper middle
income which includes Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia and
Turkey. Finally, the lower middle income which include the rest of the countries.
3.9 Capital Structure around the World
After clarifying the different classifications widely used by agencies to distinguish
between economies, we can now group studies based on the classification we dis-
cussed earlier. In this section we are going to present an overview of the studies
of capital structure based on the sample choice. The first section will discuss the
comparison studies. The second section will discuss the studies in the developed
economies. The third section will discuss the studies based on the developing
economies. The last section will focus on the studies conducted on the MENA
countries which is the main interest of this thesis.
3.9.1 Cross-Country Comparison Studies
The studies of capital structure started mainly by testing in a single country. After
that researchers were interested in seeing if there is a difference in the way firms
choose their capital structure in different countries. An advantage of cross-country
comparison or international comparison is that it can be used to connect empirical
results of capital structure with institutional differences as argued by Wald (1999).
By using this approach researchers can observe and assess different institutional
settings and their effect on the choice of capital structure.
The first study to do so was conducted by Rajan and Zingales (1995) where they
studied and compared the G7 countries at that time. These countries were United
States , Japan, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom and Canada. The main
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Table 3.2: Cross-Country Comparison Studies
Papers Countries in Sample Sample Years
Rajan and Zingales (1995) G7 Countries 4557 Firms 1987-1991
De Jong et al. (2008) 42 Countries around the world. 11845 Firms 1997-2001
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) Developed and Developing Countries 9649 Firms 1980-1991
Wald (1999) USA , Japan, UK, Germany, France. 4000 Firms 1991-1992
Booth et al. (2001) Developing Countries , 826 Firms 1980-1991
objective of their paper was to investigate if other countries’ capital structures were
different from the United States. They found that the level of leverage in firms is sim-
ilar across 5 of the countries in the sample except for Germany and the UK which
are lower in their leverage. They also added that there are substantial differences in
the institutional characteristics. The differences could by summarized by different
tax and bankruptcy codes, corporate control and banks’ historical roles. Further-
more, they found that the correlation between leverage and other determinants of
capital structure in the US is similar in other countries as well.
Furthermore,Wald (1999) investigated a sample of 5 developed economies, which
are France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States. Although similar
in choice of sample with Rajan and Zingales (1995), he explained that instead of fo-
cusing on testing theories, his focus will be on firm characteristics namely size, risk,
growth and inventories. The results of his study are in line with Rajan and Zingales
(1995) in terms of similar debt levels across countries. His findings included that
profitability, research & development, tax and moral hazard have a predictable re-
lation and are all stable for the countries in the sample. On the other hand, growth,
risk, size and inventories have different relations in the countries of the study. The
differences might suggest that institutional characteristics have substantial power in
explaining capital structure.
After that, a study by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) which focused on a
larger sample included developed and developing economies. The sample included
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30 countries and they based their selection criteria on availability of data. Although
this paper was merged in the paper of Booth et al. (2001) at a later stage, this study
does provide more details. The main contribution of this study is the link between
the stock market development and the capital structure. The findings show that
there is a significant relation between stock market development and both long-term
and short-term debt in both developed and developing countries. When the sample
is divided into 2 subsamples which are developed and developing countries the
findings are remarkably different. The result shows that for developed markets more
development would result in exchanging equity for debt financing. It also shows that
in developing markets the results are different between large and small firms, where
they suggest that the large firms increase their usage of leverage when the stock
market develops and small firms will not be affected by the development of the
stock market. This study provides a comprehensive examination of the institutional
factors that affect the decisions of capital structure. This thesis applied the same
examination of the countries of study in Chapter 2.
In a later study using the same sample Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999)
investigate the debt maturity association with financial markets and institutions. This
study finds that there is a relation between the long-term debt of large firms and the
stock market activity and banking sector size. They find a difference in the long-
term debt between developed and developing countries where the first would have
a larger amount of their total debt as long-term debt. They also conclude that firms
in countries with a strong legal system would have more long-term debt and this
debt will have a longer maturity. Finally they also note that their study provides
an evidence that firms in developing countries would have a lower long-term debt
value than firms in the developed markets. They finally, recommend that developing
countries should try to improve the legal and financial infrastructure in order to make
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it easier for firms to access long-term debt.
In addition, a key study by Booth et al. (2001) examines a sample of 10 develop-
ing countries. The main focus of the paper was to test if capital structure decisions
differ if the firm is in a developed or developing country. They also study if the clas-
sic factors affecting capital structure of a single economy are the same in developed
and developing countries. The findings of this study conclude that the same factors
affect both developed and developing countries. Yet, several differences do exist
and they conclude that this evidence proves the impact of institutional characteris-
tics on capital structure.
De Jong et al. (2008) use a broad sample of 43 countries around the world;
the sample includes both developed and developing countries. The main goal of
their study is to investigate the effect of country specific factors both directly and
indirectly. They argued that the literature focuses on the indirect effects. Their main
results are that they give evidence that the assumption of equality in international
comparison of firm factors is baseless. They also recommend that researchers
should not use pooling regression and instead use country-specific analyses. Their
results can be summarized as that although the majority of countries across the
sample have similar results in a set of factors, different results were observed as
well. The theory therefore could not be generalized without taking into consideration
institutional effects.
Additionally, Bancel and Mittoo (2004) did a cross country study surveying 16 Eu-
ropean countries in an attempt to understand how managers make their decisions
about their firms’ capital structure. The total sample included 720 firms and they
compared the findings with the US firm’s managers. They concluded that although
institutional differences exist, the overall picture is that European managers base
their decisions on the same factors as their US counterparts. However, they find
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dissimilarities across countries on many dimensions especially between Scandina-
vian and non-Scandinavian countries. In addition, the quality of the legal system
and cost of capital accounts for the variation in the level of debt. They also find a
strong relation between growth opportunities and issuance of common equity. They
also voiced their concern about the accuracy of answers by the managers and
the motivations behind it. Finally they concluded that the evidence in their study
is strongly supporting the trade-off theory and that firms would decide their optimal
capital structure by balancing the trade-off between tax advantages and bankruptcy
costs.
In addition, Nagano (2003) carried out a comparison study between East Asian
countries capital structures which are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and
Thailand in the period after the Asian financial crises. They find a significant reliance
of firms in these countries on the usage of external short-term debt. The sample
of the study consisted of non-financial firms for the period from 1992 to 2001. The
study concluded that cross-country investigation shows that the finance behaviour
of the firms in these countries follows the pecking order theory. The firms first prefer
the internal generated funds, then they will chose short-term bank loans. The study
also concludes that there is no relationship between issuing equity and the level
of debt which could be linked to the aftermath of the financial crisis which reveals
that high stock prices are not the motivation of equity issuance in the region. The
findings also show that there are differences in the determinants of capital structure
between these countries.
Equally important is a study by Aggarwal (1990) on the capital structure of large
Asian companies. The study focused on examining the role of country, industry
and size in the decision of the firm capital structure. The paper used a sample of
474 Asian firms from 20 countries. Several conclusions were reached by this study
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which are: 1) there is an empirically significant difference in international and within
industry between the Asian companies. 2) The average equity to assets is to some
extent comparable. This study used the average for the variables in the years 1981
and 1982.
3.9.2 Evidence from Developed Countries
In this section we discuss the major studies that were based on samples from the
developed countries. We summarize and criticize the findings and conclusions they
made. Table 3.3 provides a summary of these studies.
Table 3.3: Studies in Developed Countries
Papers Countries in Sample Sample Years
Akhtar (2005) Australia 4287 Firms 1992-2001
Goyal et al. (2002) Defense US firms 61 Firms 1980-1995
Chen et al. (1999) Dutch Firms (Netherlands) 51 Firms 1984-1995
Nikolaos and Maria (2007) Greece 129 1997-2001
Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2007) Irish SMEs companies. 300 Firms
Akhtar and Oliver (2009) Japan 360 Firms 1994-2003
Sogorb-Mira (2005) SMEs Spanish Firms 6482 Firms 1994-1998
Nikolaos and Maria (2007) SMEs France and Greece 3258 Firms 1992-2002
de Miguel and Pindado (2001) Spanish 133 Firms 1990-1997
Song (2005) Swedish Firms 6000 Firms 1992-2000
Ted et al. (2011) Swedish Stock Exchange 393 Firms None
Drobetz and Fix (2005) Swiss Firms 253 Firms 1991-2001
Gaud et al. (2005) Swiss Stock Exchange 104 Firms 1991-2000
Ozkan (2001) UK Firms 390 Firms 1984-1996
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) UK Firms 379 Firms 1991-2002
Fattouh et al. (2008) UK listed company 6614 Firms 1988-1998
Baskin (1989) United States of America. 378 Firms 1960-1972
Jandik and Makhija (2001) US Electric and Gas Utilities. 134 Firms 1975-1994
Frank and Goyal (2009) US Firms 4200 Firms 1950-2003
Leary and Roberts (2010) US Firms 34470 Firms 1980-2005
Helwege and Liang (1996) US Firms IPO after 1982. 367 Firms 1983-1992
Kayhan and Titman (2007) US large firms 3100 Firms 1960-2003
Shyam-Sunder and C. Myers (1999) US Large Firms 159 Firms 1971-1989
Frank and Goyal (2003) US Public Firms 3800 Firms 1971-1998
Matjaz and Dusan (2009) Slovenian Firms 4280 1999-2006
We first discuss the studies which were based on the United States as these
were the starting point in the research of capital structure. These include but are
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not limited to Frank and Goyal (2009) , Leary and Roberts (2010), Helwege and
Liang (1996),Kayhan and Titman (2007), Shyam-Sunder and C. Myers (1999) and
Jandik and Makhija (2001).
First, Frank and Goyal (2003) investigated the publicly US traded firms using a
sample from 1971 to 1998. The first paper focused only on testing the pecking
order theory. In a later study Frank and Goyal (2009) investigated the majority of
the factors suggested to be important in the decision of capital structure using a
larger sample from 1950-2003. Their findings in the first paper suggested that in
large firms there is evidence of a pecking order theory. They also find that internal
financing is not adequate to finance new investments and that external financing
is used severely. Furthermore, in their second paper they found that the empirical
evidence is consistent to some extent with the trade-off theory. They conclude
that the evidence from publicly traded firms in the US firms identify weaknesses
in the capital structure theories. They criticised the market timing theory claiming
that the choice of capital structure could be the result of manager’ optimization.
They also argued that the pecking order theory does not take into consideration
the industry mean leverage, as it does not account for industry differences. Then
they commented on the fact that trade-off theory take into account many of the
factors like size, tangibility, growth opportunities and industry leverage. However,
a weakness of the theory is that the relation between leverage and profitability is
ambiguous. This relation theoretically states that firms with high profitability tend to
have lower bankruptcy costs and thus should use more debt, but empirically their
study finds it is the opposite.
Leary and Roberts (2010) investigated the US firms between 1980 and 2005.
Their findings show that the pecking order theory does not account for more than
50% of the financing decisions. They also note that when taking into account other
69
CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW
factors from other theories the accuracy of the model increases significantly. In their
initial model by limiting or allowing firms capacities to vary they found that only 20%
would follow the pecking order theory. On the other hand, when adding variables
suggested by the trade-off theory their model classification power increased. There-
fore, they suggested that a model with a wide range of determinants would precisely
classify 80% of the decisions. They also heavily criticised the pecking-order theory
suggesting that it is the result of incentives conflict.
Shyam-Sunder and C. Myers (1999) also tested the static trade-off theory against
the pecking order models using a sample from large US firms in the period between
1971 and 1989. Instead of testing the theories in the same model, they test each
theory separately to test statistical power. They conclude that the pecking order
theory for the mature firm’s sample they used is robust. They also found that the
performance of the target adjustment model is fine when it is tested separately.
Furthermore, they also suspect that the results could be extended to growth firms.
Furthermore, Helwege and Liang (1996) examined the presence of the pecking
order using a panel of IPO firms. Their interest was to investigate a young firm’s
capital structure decisions after their IPOs. The findings of their papers are against
the pecking order theory and in line with the optimal capital structure theory. This
mainly is because in the optimal capital structure firms would use external financing
even in the lack of the deficit in the earning simply to adjust and reach their target
capital structure. They also conclude that the equity is not the last in order as
suggested by the pecking order theory as it did seem to be used more than bank
loans. The only findings supporting the pecking order is that they noticed that firms
issuing public bonds are large in size and profitable.
In another study, Kayhan and Titman (2007) examined the effects of the firms
histories in their capital structure; they used a sample from US large firms for the
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period 1960-2003. The paper investigated how leverage is affected by stock price
histories, cash flows and investment expenditures. Their results indicate that the
variables they used have a strong effect on the change in capital structure. They
conclude that their results support the optima capital structure theory, where firms
try to adjust their capital towards a target debt ratio. However, they found that the
speed of adjustment is considered to be slow. Also, as suggested by Shyam-Sunder
and C. Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) they argue that the increase in
the leverage is linked with higher financial deficits.
In addition, Goyal et al. (2002) investigated a single industry which is US defense
firms. They only tested the relationship between corporate debt and the growth.
The reason behind their choice is that there was a significant change in the growth
opportunities level in the period between 1980 and 1995. They concluded that their
results proved that when growth opportunities are in decline firms would increase
their use of debt.
Then, Baskin (1989) tested the pecking order theory using a US firms sample.
The motivation of their study is the growing popularity of the pecking order theory
at that time. The empirical evidence in their study shows that the pecking order
hypothesis has more explanatory power than the static trade-off theory. This could
be summarized as that they are in favor of the pecking order theory explanation of
the variation of capital structure in the US firms.
Furthermore, most studies drop firms which are regulated such as utilities, finan-
cial firms. Therefore, an interesting study by Jandik and Makhija (2001) focus on a
single industry which is the electric and gas utility firms in the US. The reason be-
hind choosing firms in a specific industry is to focus only on the firms characteristics
as firms in the same industry will be exposed to the same macro-economic factors.
They used variables representing both the trade-off theory and pecking order theory
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and found that both theories can explain the change in capital structure in regulated
firms. Furthermore, Gropp and Heider (2010) influential paper has shed light on the
capital structure of banks. Their findings disproved that banks are regulated and
therefore do not have a choice to make in their capital structure. More details about
bank structure are provided in Chapter six.
Now we present studies from the EU countries such as de Miguel and Pin-
dado (2001), Song (2005),Ted et al. (2011),Drobetz and Fix (2005),Gaud et al.
(2005),Nikolaos and Maria (2007),Sogorb-Mira (2005) and Chen et al. (1999).
First, Song (2005) and Ted et al. (2011) examined the capital structure in Swedish
firms. Song included all the firms in Sweden and Ted et al. used a survey popu-
lation of only 393 firms. Ted et al. (2011) are in support of the trade-off theory
especially the fact that the majority of managers’ answers indicated that they have
a target capital structure. They found weak evidence of agency costs and transac-
tions costs associated with the information asymmetry. They argued that the results
are contradicting pecking order theory, but could be in support of signaling theory
if we consider that the adoption of a target capital structure is a signal. In addition,
Song (2005) finds that the results are to some extent supporting the trade-off the-
ory. However, they argue that there are differences between the short term debt and
long term debt. They also note that most firms in the Swedish market are heavily
leveraged.
Second, Drobetz and Fix (2005) and Gaud et al. (2005) investigated the capital
structure decisions in Swiss firms. Both studies used the same period and a similar
sample of the listed Swiss firms. Although similar in data and models they found
different results for the adjustment speed which is due to the differences in the
leverage definitions used in both studies. In the study of Drobetz and Fix (2005)
their findings show no conflict with the theories of the pecking order and trade-off
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theory except for the profitability proxy where they found support for the pecking
order as more profitable Swiss firms tend to use less leverage. Gaud et al. (2005)
find that the size of the companies and the tangibility of the assets are positively
related to leverage and that growth and profitability are negatively associated.
Third, both de Miguel and Pindado (2001) and Sogorb-Mira (2005) studied Span-
ish firms. However, the sample used is different simply because the first focused on
the listed firms and the second focused on Small or Medium Enterprise. de Miguel
and Pindado (2001) developed a target adjustment model by taking into account
both firms and institutional characteristics. Their findings for the relationship be-
tween cash flow and debt support the pecking order theory. On the other hand,
Sogorb-Mira (2005) finds that the pecking order theory preforms very well in the
context of the SMEs, where their preferred choice of financing is the internal funds
then the debt and their last resort is the issuance of equity. They also note that the
behaviour of the Spanish SMEs is similar to those in developed countries.
Fourth, Nikolaos and Maria (2007) studied the capital structure of the listed firms
in the Athena Stock Exchange in Greece using a sample of 129 firms from 1997 to
2001. The findings of the study show support for the pecking order theory in both
the relation of the liquidity and interest coverage ratio. However, they found that
the relation between size and debt is positive which is consistent with the trade-off
theory. Furthermore, Chen et al. (1999) investigated Dutch firms using 51 firms.
Their results are supporting the static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory
but they found no relation with the asymmetric information behind the pecking order
theory. Their study showed that the leverage ratio is low in the period between 1982
and 1992 in comparison with other EU countries.
Next we debate studies which use a sample from the United Kingdom such as
Ozkan (2001),Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) and Fattouh et al. (2008).
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First, Ozkan (2001) used data of 390 UK firms for the period from 1984 to 1996.
Their findings support the hypothesis that firms have a long-term target leverage
ratio and they adjust to this target quickly. This result is in support of the trade-off
theory where the prediction is that there is a negative relation between leverage and
non-debt tax shield. Their paper added further contribution in modelling the capital
structure which will be discussed further in the methods used in the capital structure
section.
Second, Fattouh et al. (2008) also investigate the UK listed companies using a
conditional quantile regression. Their results are that profitability and non-debt tax
shields are negatively related to leverage while size and tangibility are positively
related to leverage. Their results are supporting both the trade-off theory and the
pecking order theory.
Third, Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) explored the potential determinants of cap-
ital structure in the UK market. The sample they used consists of 379 firms and for
the period from 1991 to 2002. They find that using different measures of leverage
could change the results of the independent variables. They also find that tangibility,
growth, size, risk and profitability are all determinants of capital structure. This also
supports that both the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory could explain
the capital structure of the firms in the UK.
Fourth, Bennett and Donnelly (1993) attempted to use the cross-sectional data
to explain the choice of capital structure in the UK. As previously explained they
found evidence to support both theories of capital structure. To clarify they find
that non-debt tax, tangibility, size and profitability are all significant in explaining
capital structure. They also found strong evidence for the industry classification
in explaining the capital structure of the UK firms. Furthermore, they agree with
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) in that changing the definition of leverage leads to
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different results especially when changing from the book value to the market value
of leverage.
Several studies investigated other developed countries such as Akhtar and Oliver
(2009) who chose Japan and Akhtar (2005) who chose a sample from Australia. In
both studies the authors focused on the multinational and domestic firms in both
countries. The findings of Akhtar (2005) shows differences in the capital structure
of domestic and multinationals. They found that bankruptcy costs are only signif-
icant for the multinationals firms which might indicate that domestic firms follow a
pecking order theory while multinational follow the trade-off theory. They also find
that the industry classification is not consistent across the domestic and multination-
als. Furthermore, in their study of Japanese firms Akhtar and Oliver (2009) also find
different results between domestic and multinational firms. Their findings also indi-
cate that multinational firms have less leverage and that Japanese bankruptcy costs
are significant for multinationals only. The differences between the two categories
of firms include age, tangibility, free cash flows, exchange rate risks, non-debt tax
shield, growth, size and profitability.
3.9.3 Evidence from Developing countries
We first start with studies using a sample from China. These include Chen (2004),
Huang and Song (2006) and Qian et al. (2007). Chen (2004) inspected a firm level
panel data of listed Chinese firms. They claim that their findings do not support the
trade-off theory or the pecking order theory and they suggest a new pecking order
theory. They also argue that the reason behind their claim is that China has special
institutional differences in comparison to Western economies. The conclusion of
this study is that Chinese firms are theoretically different in their capital structure in
comparison with other countries in the developed world. The difference is that they
have a preference for short-term debt and that the amount of long term debt is lower.
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Despite their theoretical predictions the findings are contradicting as they find that
the Western finance theories are also applicable to the Chinese firms although with
substantial institutional differences. But they only provide incomplete justification of
the capital structure choice. Their conclusion is that firms in China prefer internal
funds, equity and finally debt.
Then, a study by Huang and Song (2006) included a large sample of 1200 Chi-
nese listed firms. They agree with Chen (2004) in that Chinese firms have a low
amount of long term debt and have a special institutional environment. However,
they suggest that the differences are that the economy is a command economy in
transition and also that the Chinese listed firms are mostly state-owned firms. They
conclude that Chinese listed firms have the same determinants of capital structure
as firms in other countries. But they find the Chinese preference of equity over
debt to be odd. Their explanations are that this might be the result of an immature
bond market and the over valuation of the stocks. Their findings also include no
significant impact of ownership structure on the capital structure of firms.
Furthermore,Qian et al. (2009) investigate a sample of 650 Chinese publicly listed
firms. The main contribution of the paper is the use of the dynamic panel model
to test the adjustment target speed which will be discussed later. However, their
findings are that Chinese firms adjust to an optimal capital structure slowly. They
also find a negative relation between leverage and volatility, growth, non-debt tax
shield and profitability, in contrast to a positive relation with size, tangibility and
government ownership.
Additionally, studies based on Pakistani firms were done by Sheikh and Wang
(2011) and Hijazi and Tariq (2006). The first investigated the manufacturing industry
and the latter the cement industry. Sheikh and Wang (2011) finds a high debt
in the proportion of the capital structure in comparison with developed countries
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Table 3.4: Studies in Developing Countries
Papers Countries in Sample Sample Years Type
Chen (2004) Chinese Listed Companies 88 1995-2000 Non Financials
Qian et al. (2007) Chinese Listed Firms 650 Firms 1999-2004 Non Financials
Sheikh and Wang (2011) Pakistan 160 2003-2007 Non Financials
Balasundaram and Valeriu (2010) SiriLankan Manufacturing 2003-2007 Non Financials
Nagano (2003) East Asian Firms 2256 1992-2001 Non Financials
Suhaila and Wan Mahmood (2008) Malaysian Firms 17 2000-2005 Non Financials
Hijazi and Tariq (2006) Pakistani Cement Industry 22 1997-2001 Non Financials
Huang and Song (2006) Chinese Listed Firms 1200 1994-2003 Non Financials
Kakani and Reddy (1998) Indian Profitable and Large 100 1985-1995 Non Financials
Bradley et al. (1984) Not known 821 1962-1981 Non Financials
and the same finding is also noted in Hijazi and Tariq (2006). Both studies find
that there is an explanation of the major capital structure theories in explaining the
capital structure. Moreover, a study in the Sri Lankan market by Balasundaram and
Valeriu (2010) used the profitability as the dependent variable and find that there is
a positive relation between leverage and 5 measures of profitability. On the other
hand, Kakani and Reddy (1998) also investigate the manufacturing firm’s capital
structure in the Indian developing market. Their findings suggest that size is not
significant in deciding capital structure and that profitability is significant.
In the same way several studies examined the Malaysian firms such as Suhaila
and Wan Mahmood (2008) and Zain (2003). In Zain (2003) thesis the sample con-
sist of two boards of the Malaysian market while Suhaila and Wan Mahmood (2008)
use a small sample. Zain (2003) finds strong support for the pecking order theory
especially in the past profitability being a determinant of capital structure. The study
also finds that the non-debt tax shield is not significant and that firms in the second
board have a high debt levels which is mainly short-term debt. The findings also
show that industry classification (Sectors) have power to explain capital structure.
On the other hand, Suhaila and Wan Mahmood (2008) use only 17 firms for the
period from 2000 to 2005. They find a negative result between leverage, size and
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liquidity which is in agreement with Zain (2003) and that firms do follow pecking
order theory in their capital structure choice.
3.9.4 Evidence from MENA countries
In this Section we include all the papers carried out in the MENA countries which
is the area of this study. Table 3.5 summarises the studies done in the area of
interest for this study. We can classify the studies into cross country studies and
single-country studies.
Table 3.5: Studies MENA Countries
Papers Countries in Sample Sample Size Years
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) Saudi Arabia 53 Firms 2003-2007
Al-Sakran (2001) Saudi Arabia 35 Firms 1993-1997
Barakat and Rao (2003) MENA Countries 461 Firms 1996-2001
Fakher et al. (2009) Libyan Firms 55 Firms 1995-1999
Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki (2012) Listed Firms in Qatar 36 Firms 2004-2008
Barakat (2014) Saudi Arabia 46 Firms 2009-2012
Sbeti and Moosa (2011) Kuwait Firms 59 Firms N/A
Eldomiaty (2007) Egypt 100 with the largest market cap. 100 Firms 1998-2004
Sbeti (2010) Saudi Kuwait Oman 986 Firms 1998-2005
Omet and Mashharawe(2002) Jordanian, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia. 455 Firms 1996-2001
Zeitun and Tian (2007) Jordan 167 Firms 1989-2003
First, we start with the cross-country studies. There is only one study with a
focus on MENA countries and this is Barakat and Rao (2003). The focus of the
paper is to investigate the role of taxes in capital structure choice. Their results are
in support of the assumption of the portability of capital structure theory. The paper
used a pooled regression model classifying the sample into taxed and non taxed
economies. Although this approach might serve their purpose we cannot conclude
anything in regard to institutional differences. Their results also have contradicting
results with the theory. It is thought that taxed economies would have utilized the
non-debt tax shield and vice versa; while their results were significant for non taxed
economies and insignificant for taxed economies.
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Omet and Mashharawe(2002) covered four countries which are Jordan, Kuwait,
Oman and Saudi Arabia. They covered a period from 1996 to 2001 and include
455 firms from four economies. Their results show that countries in the sample do
follow the main stream corporate finance theories. According to them the countries
each have a unique taxation system, in which Jordan and Oman have a tax system
and Kuwait has a tax-free system and Saudi Arabia have Zakat. They also find that
the different tax systems the capital structure of the firms is not affected. Lastly,
they recommend that an in depth study of the capital structure in the Arab world
with more variables will reveal more about the leverage in these countries.
Furthermore, Sbeti (2010) who studied firms in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman
agree with the results of Omet and Mashharawe(2002) and find that the capital
structure in the countries of the study can be explained by the capital structure
theories. In addition, she also finds that tax considerations make these countries
have a weak effect. Sbeti (2010) also claims that her study is the first to implement
a dynamic adjustment model which produces the result that firms in these countries
do adjust their leverage to a target leverage ratio through time.
Second, several studies investigated Saudi Arabia such as Al-Sakran (2001), Al-
Dohaiman (2008), Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) and Al-Tally (2014). Al-Sakran (2001) was
one of the first to study the Saud Arabian firms. However, since the paper was
before the stock market boom the sample of the study is small with 35 firms only
making the sample. He concluded that despite the absence of taxes the levels of
leverage were not low. Although this study was before the development of the stock
market as we explain in the next studies these phenomena continue through the
years and might be explained that managers or owners of firms prefer not to take
debt either for religious or customs issues.
Al-Dohaiman (2008) examines the capital structure of both listed and non-listed
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firms in Saudi Arabia. The initial sample included 80 listed firms in which 10 are
banks and 8143 unlisted firms from all the industries. Their findings include that
Saudi firms have a low amount of debt in comparison to developed countries which
is an indication of firm preferring to finance their activities through equity rather than
debt. This finding is to some extent in agreement with the findings of Chen (2004)
in the Chinese market. The study suggests several stylized facts to explain the
findings which include that the stocks in the market are overvalued, the weakness
of the legal system for lenders and the immaturity of the bond market. The relations
of profitability and liquidity support the pecking order while the trade-off theory has
limited explanation with only the growth opportunities supporting.
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) also studied the Saudi market before the boom and used
balanced panel data of 53 listed firms for the period of 2003 to 2007; the study
used 3 measures of book leverage only. They conclude that the three main theo-
ries of capital structure which are the pecking order, trade-off and agency theory
have a partial explanation for Saudi firms financing decisions. They find that firms
rely more on the short-term debt in contrast to long-term debt which might be ex-
plained by the dependency of Saudi firms on banks loans. Their empirical findings
could be summarized in that they find a positive relation for profitability, size, growth
and institutional ownership. On the other hand, the relation between leverage and
tangibility, government ownership, family ownership, risk, dividend and liquidity is
negative. They also highlight the absence of a secondary debt market as the main
reason behind the economy being a banking economy.
Al-Tally (2014) is the only recent study which used recent data that include the
boom in the Saudi stock market. The motivation of the study is collapse of the stock
market in 2006 which resulted in a loss of around 66% of the total market value
followed by the global financial crises in 2008. This study also finds a similar result
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to the previous studies in which firms prefer equity over debt. The findings also
reject the trade-off theory in that firms prefer the use of debt to take advantage of
the non-debt tax shield. Also the study concluded that there is a positive relation-
ship between profitability and leverage, also that the mean of the Zakat payment is
constant when the leverage is below 30%.
Third, Zeitun and Tian (2007) researched capital structure in Jordanian firms.
They chose a panel data sample of 167 firms for the period from 1989-2003. They
claim that the Jordan economy has a unique setting with the large number of ex-
ternal shocks it went through for political uncertainty. They also added that the
existence of the Islamic banks and the absence of a mature bond market in the
economy is a unique feature. It is worth noting that this study focuses on firm per-
formance as well as the capital structure. They conclude that their results for short
term debt does support the pecking order theory in which firms with high profitability
will have high portion of short term debt.
In addition, Al-Najjar (2008) find that when using single equation models Jorda-
nian firms have the same determinants of capital structure as developed economies.
In addition the findings of the study show that the agency theory has power in ex-
plaining capital structure decisions. It also shows that firms in the Jordanian market
do have a target capital structure and a fast speed of adjustment. Also, it shows
that firms use both short and long term debt to adjust their capital structure target.
The study finds evidence for the signaling, agency, pecking order and bankruptcy
theory. He recommended that research could be done by using a larger sample
form the MENA countries which is the interest of this study.
Fourth, Eldomiaty (2007) carried out an interesting study about the economy of
Egypt. He attempts to test the three main capital structure theories namely the
trade-off theory, the pecking order theory and the cash flow theory. This study
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used a sample of the largest 100 firms in terms of market cap in the Egyptian stock
market (EGX100). He adopted the partial adjustment model for both the long-term
and short-term debt and found that firms used both of them to adjust the leverage to
a target leverage ratio using excessively long-term debt. The findings are supported
mainly by the trade-off and pecking order theory and concluded that the common
theories of capital structure do explain the behaviour of firms in the developing
economies.
Furthermore, Eldomiaty and Ismail (2009) used a sample of 100 firms for the
period from 1998-2004. Their sample was selected based on the firm being non-
financial and chose the largest 100 firms by market value as they did in Eldomi-
aty (2007). They suggested that none of the capital structure theories provide the
complete answer for the capital structure decisions. They used three definitions
of leverage which are long-term, short-term and total debt investigating the three
theories of capital structure we mentioned previously. Their findings show that the
behaviour of the long-term and short-term debt show strong evidence of trade-off
theory. Their contribution is the use of subset selection criteria using ten subset
section criteria. The findings of their study are in line with Booth et al. (2001).
Then, Omran and Pointon (2009) studied the capital structure of the Egyptian
stock exchange using 122 firms. Their main focus was to compare the capital struc-
ture of firms in different industries such as food, heavy industries, contracting and
services. The study used 4 measures of debt which are the financial leverage,
long-term debt, short-term debt and interest ratio. The conclusion of this study is
that there are significant differences between the industries in terms of their lever-
age and different results for each definition of the leverage. Also they find a positive
relation between long-term debt and tangibility and a negative relation with higher
business risks. On the other hand, they find a negative relation between short-
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term debt and size, growth in earnings and growth of assets especially in heavy
industries.
In addition, a recent study by Wahba (2014) investigated the capital structure,
ownership and firm performance in Egyptian firms. The study used a sample of the
50 most active firms for the years from 2008 to 2010 and the data from 2011 onward
was excluded due to the Egyptian revolution. The findings of the study suggest that
in addition to the firm characteristics the stake holders do have an effect. The study
is focused on the relationship between the firm performance and capital structure
taking into consideration other variables. The findings also suggest that there is no
effective arrangement for capital structure nor ownership structure but that different
arrangements are not equally good. To sum up, the relation between performance
and capital structure is positive.
Fifth, Fakher et al. (2009) try to explore the Libyan market. The results of this
study show their strong support for the static-trade off theory and the agency cost
theory; however, not the asymmetry theory. On the other hand, one study is based
on the Qatar economy is by Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki (2012). The reason is that
the number of firms in Qatar is small with only 39 listed firms. Their results show
that companies in Qatar also follow the main stream capital structure theories. They
also indicated a low value of debt and they linked it with the under development of
the bond market.
Ghazouani (2013) tested the static trade-off theory and the existence of dynam-
ical adjustment model using a sample of Tunisian firms. The static model results
indicate that profitability and tangibility are the main determinants of capital struc-
ture in Tunisian firms. Nevertheless, the results of the dynamical model show that
the adjustment cost are high and the speed is slow.
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3.10 Methods used in capital structure research
Capital structure empirical evidence has been following the development in statis-
tical methods in an attempt to answer the question of what the important factors
are in the decision of capital structure. Early empirical studies used the Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) and Tobit model. Then the panel data models became popu-
lar and since then they were used by most studies. However, for a long time there
was an attempt to find better methodologies to address the questions of the capital
structure theories.
3.10.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
The first approach used in the capital structure research was the OLS used with
either time series data or with cross-sectional data. The first one focuses on study-
ing the effects of issuing new debt or equity on the stock prices of firms. On the
other hand, the second approach is used to regress the dependent variable on the
determinants of capital structure.
The use of the OLS in early research of capital structure has been criticised
heavily recently. First, Friend and Lang (1988) used the ordinary least squares but
faced a problem of heteroscedastic probability which they solve by transforming the
dependent variable logarithmically. Second, Lemmon et al. (2008) criticised heavily
the use of the static OLS stating that it is poor for dealing with the unobserved
heterogeneity in the capital structure research. They also recommend the use of the
fixed effect estimates, instrumental variables and structural estimations to overcome
this issue.
3.10.2 Tobit Model (TBM)
Tobit estimate was first introduced by Tobin (1958) as a limited dependent variable.
However, it was first used in the study of Rajan and Zingales (1995) who argued
that using this methods was because the adjustments they made to the dependent
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Table 3.6: OLS Studies
Model or Approach Papers Form of model
OLS Akhtar and Oliver (2009) Al-Sakran (2001) Run by model:
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) Single Factor
Drobetz and Fix (2005) Multi Regression
Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2007) By Sector
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
Fakher et al. (2009)
De Jong et al. (2008)
Shyam-Sunder and C. Myers (1999)
Kakani and Reddy (1998)
variable resulted in negative leverage values which were truncated using a Tobit
model at -1. Furthermore, a study by Wald (1999) used a heteroskedastic Tobit es-
timator instead of the OLS because the dependent variable is a ratio of debt/assets
and therefore censored at zero. However, several empirical studies did not find
a difference between the results they obtain from the OLS and the Tobit such as
Huang and Song (2006).
Table 3.7: Tobit Model Studies
Model or Approach Papers Form of model
Tobit Akhtar (2005) -Due to truncated leverage variable.
Barakat and Rao (2003) -More Efficient than OLS
Matjaz and Dusan (2009)
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Kayhan and Titman (2007)
Rajan and Zingales (1995)
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011)
3.10.3 Panel Data models (PDM)
In previous methods which are the OLS and the Tobit model, the cross-sectional
data might cause endogeneity issues as argued by Borsch-Supan and Kake (2002).
The results of these issues are that the OLS is biased in this context and therefore
could not be used in this fashion. It is worth mentioning that this does not discard
all the previous studies using the OLS model as stated by Baker and Martin (2011)
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who suggested that using past years factors as done by Rajan and Zingales (1995)
does elevate this problem.
However, researchers either in capital structure literature such as Baker and Mar-
tin (2011), Borsch-Supan and Kake (2002) or in statistics such as Baltagi (2005),
Gujarati and Porter (2009) and Hsiao (2003) state that Panel Data Models are more
efficient in dealing with heterogeneity and endogeneity issues. The main advan-
tages of the panel data models are presented in Chapter 5. However, several es-
timates can be used as substitute for the OLS and the Tobit models we discussed
earlier. These are the pooled regression ordinary least squares and the random
effects Tobit models. Furthermore,
Table 3.8: Panel Data Models Studies
Model or Approach Papers Form of model
Fixed , Random Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) Powerful research instruments which take into
account effects of cross-sectional data.
Booth et al. (2001)
Buettner et al. (2009)
Chen (2004)
Chen et al. (1999)
Nikolaos and Maria (2007)
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Nikolaos and Maria (2007)
Sbeti (2010)
Zeitun and Tian (2007)
Sheikh and Wang (2011)
Song (2005)
Omet and Mashharawe (2002)
Suhaila and Wan Mahmood (2008)
Gaud et al. (2005)
Goyal et al. (2002)
Hijazi and Tariq (2006)
Frank and Goyal (2009)
Frank and Goyal (2003)
Sogorb-Mira (2005)
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011)
Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki (2012)
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3.10.4 Dynamical Panel Model (DPD)
The dynamical panel data models arise based on the modelling of one of the im-
portant questions of capital structure. This question is based on the optimal capital
structure theory or the target capital structure. A study by Graham and Harvey
(2001) surveying a sample of 3982 CFOs finds that 19% answered that there is no
target ratio range. Whereas 10% have a very strict target, 37% a flexible target and
34% a somewhat tight target. This results in strong support for the trade-off theory
of capital structure where firms balance between the benefits of the tax shield and
the costs of the probability of financial bankruptcy. Therefore, firms would deviate
from their target for a while but then would start to adjust back to it when they can.
Furthermore, a leading study of the pecking order theory was done by Shyam-
Sunder and C. Myers (1999) states that changes occurring in the debt ratios are
a result of the need for external funds and it is not an attempt to adjust the capital
structure as suggested by the dynamic trade-off theory. In addition, an interesting
finding of Shyam-Sunder and C. Myers (1999) shows that even under the pecking
order theory the time patterns of capital expenditure and operating income could
produce a mean-reverting debt. Drobetz and Fix (2005) argued that this result
could be explained by the fact that there is a serial correlation between debt and
capital investment or that the internal funds do vary over different business cycles.
In addition, Fama and French (2002) find that the estimate of the partial adjustment
model supports the trade-off theory and that leverage is mean-reverting.
3.10.5 Structural Equation Modeling(SEM)
The first attempt to use the Structural equation modelling methodology in the capital
structure context was done by Titman and Wessels (1988) and they state that the
main advantage of using such an approach is that it can measure precisely the rela-
tion between the dependent unobservable factors and the independent observable
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Table 3.9: Dynamical Panel Model Studies
Model or Approach Papers Form of model
Dynamical de Miguel and Pindado (2001) 2 step GMM .
Drobetz and Fix (2005) Arrelano-Bond GMM.
Eldomiaty (2007)
Sbeti (2010)
Qian et al. (2007)
Nagano (2003)
Gaud et al. (2005)
Ozkan (2001)
Shyam-Sunder and C. Myers (1999)
one. Furthermore, Titman and Wessels (1988) criticize the basic approach used in
the capital structure research which is selecting proxies to estimate the unobserv-
able attributes. They showed that the problems with such an approach are:
• There is no single variable that represents a proxy and therefore researchers
might use the one which improves their results.
• It is hard to find a variable that represents a proxy which is not associated with
other proxies and therefore a researcher might choose a variable to measure
a proxy but this variable will have an effect on many other proxies of interest.
• Because the variables are inadequate measures of the proxies they should
measure, using them would create an error-in-variable problem.
• The correlation between the measurement errors of the dependent variable
and the independent variables might create spurious correlations even when
the independent is unrelated to the dependent variable.
Based on these problems Titman and Wessels (1988) recommended the use of
the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to overcome these issues.
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Table 3.10: SEM Based Studies
Model or Approach Papers Form of model
SEM Titman and Wessels (1988) Covariance based Structural Equation Modeling.
Jairo (2009)
Chen and Jiang (2001)
Chang et al. (2009)
Chiarella et al. (1991)
3.10.6 Artificial Neural Networks
Recently a new approach to handle the questions of capital structure is the use of
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). Although the models of ANN are not new in sci-
ence and engineering it has started to be widely used in finance literature. They
were used for example in corporate finance for the following applications as sug-
gested by Hawley et al. (1990):
• Financial Simulation. A network could be created for managing cash flow, risk
management and in capital investment decisions.
• Prediction. Forecasting of financial data is a very complicated task. Therefore
the use of ANN could increase the efficiency in comparison to the traditional
forecasting software. Another area that the ANN could be used in is predicting
investors’ reaction to firm announcements or change in financial policy.
• Evaluation. A neural network system could be designed for example to screen
undervalued firms for mergers or acquisitions purposes.
• Credit Approval. Several studies used the ANN for several credit approval
applications. These included for example the credit cards applicant decisions
or the approval of loans for both individuals and firms.
The use of this approach was applied in the capital structure studies by a limited
number of researchers such as Pao (2008) and Abdou et al. (2012). In Pao (2008)
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the study focused on a comparison between the multiple regression analysis and
the (ANN). He concluded that the (ANN) models accomplish a better fit in compar-
ison to the multiple regression analysis and that they are capable of detecting and
handling complex non-linear relations between debt and the independent variables.
Furthermore,Abdou et al. (2012) also used the Generalized Regression Neural Net-
work (GRNN), which is a special neural network, to compare the capital structure of
UK retail firms with the multiple regression models. They also confirm the results of
Pao (2008) and conclude that judging by both the root-mean-square errors and the
mean absolute errors the (GRNN) network performs better.
3.10.7 Survey Evidence
Due to the complexity of measuring the hypotheses of capital structure and the in-
tersection between different measures it is important to use the survey evidence ap-
proach to investigate this in more detail. Several key studies have been conducted
since the early development of the capital structure literature such as Donaldson
(1961), Graham and Harvey (2001) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004). This study will
not investigate this approach but future plans to use it are in place.
First, Donaldson (1961) did a survey of 25 firms from 5 different industries and
his results motivated later work of Myers (1977) and Myers (1984) to model a theory
of the pecking order in determining the capital structure of firms. Second, Graham
and Harvey (2001) did a survey of 392 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) about the
choice of capital structure and other things. Their findings state that the most impor-
tant factor in the corporate debt decisions is that the manager wishes for financial
flexibility. Third, Bancel and Mittoo (2004) did a similar study to Graham and Harvey
(2001) but their focus was on the cross-country comparison. Their findings are im-
portant because they find that firms financing policies in their sample are subjective
by institutional characteristics and international operations. They also find that firms
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decide their optimal capital structure by trading off the costs and benefits which is
in line with the trade-off theory.
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3.11 Variables used in the Capital Structure Research
In this section we need first to summarize the tables and try to eliminate all the
duplicated variables. We then convert the big table into small ones each with the
subsection we chose below. This section could also include a discussion about the
fact that comparing studies is hard because we cannot compare studies which use
different measures of leverage.
We can also discuss the problem of different accounting standards and mea-
sure across the different countries and extend this to what different studies did to
overcome this problem.
3.11.1 Measure of Leverage
A key question in the empirical capital structure research is the use of market lever-
age or book leverage as the independent variables. Several studies including Myers
(1977) suggest that since the firm is unable to control the market leverage and that
debt is supported by the assets the firm holds, the use of book leverage is more ap-
propriate. Furthermore, Graham and Harvey (2001) and Fama and French (2002)
also support this idea that the use of book value leverage is a better reflection of
managers’ decisions in choosing the capital structure.
On the other hand, the use of book value leverage is heavily criticised by Welch
(2007) stating that this ratio is flawed and that it can only explain the capital structure
partially. Finally, Fama and French (2002) suggest that because of the uncertainty
of the ideal definition of leverage it is better to present both market and book lever-
age.
Market Leverage
Table 3.11 presents a summary of the measures that were used by the previous
studies in the literature. Overall the majority of the studies follow a similar selection
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of the leverage ratio. However, as the table shows some studies suggest a deferent
definition either based on theoretical or empirical grounds. The three main market
leverage ratios are:
• Long term debt to market value of equity LT/MVE
• Short term debt to market value of equity ST/MVE
• Total debt to market value of equity TD/MVE
Other studies use a different measure either for theoretical or empirical reasons.
For example, Titman and Wessels (1988) suggested the use separate measures
of debt which are the long-term , short term and the convertible debt to market
value of equity ratio in exchange for using the aggregate measure of total debt. The
reason behind this approach is that different theories are related to different types
of debt instrument. But, this is based on the availability of data and therefore it is
not applicable in economies of the developing world where there is a shortage of
data.
Furthermore, Akhtar and Oliver (2009) use a different measure to the ones mainly
used in the literature as shown in Table3.11, where they instead of using the market
value of equity used the market value of equity plus the long term debt in the de-
nominator of this ratio. The argument they made for their choice is that short-term
debt does have a high variability and thus would bloat the debt ratio. Although they
used this measure they report that there was no difference in the results between
their measure and the main stream measures and that the correlation between the
measures is 90%.
Book Leverage
In the same fashion book leverage is defined by many measures as both Table 3.12
and Table 3.13 show. The main three measures as discussed before in the market
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leverage are also mainly used in the book leverage:
• Long term debt to book value of assets LT/BTA
• Short term debt to book value of assets ST/BTA
• Total debt to book value of assets TD/BTA
However, several other measures are also suggested and used such as the Earn-
ings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) to interest
charge which is suggested by Jairo (2009). In this study Jairo (2009) used 8 differ-
ent measures to represent leverage.
Furthermore, Drobetz and Fix (2005) used a different measure which is the debt
to net assets instead of using total assets. Their rationale for using this ratio is that
it is not changed by non- interest-bearing-debt which is a category of debt that is
entered in the balance sheet but it does not require interest payments. These in-
clude for example pension money which is influenced by factors that are not related
to finance decisions.
In addition, Leary and Roberts (2010) used a different approach to study the
capital structure. In order to test the pecking order theory. For that reason they
modeled their study by using three different measures representing the order of the
theory which are the internal funds, debt and equity issuance. They used different
dummy variables to represent these factors as Table 3.13 shows. However, in order
to replicate their study a data base of issuance of equity and debt must be available.
As discussed in the previous section on the dynamical system, different studies
using this model did have to use different treatment of the ratios for their purpose.
For example, instead of using the long term debt to total assets they use the dif-
ference in the long term debt. In this environment there is no need to scale the
variables by total assets and instead the use of the ratio in its original values is
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recommended. This can be seen for example, in the study of Eldomiaty (2007) and
Kayhan and Titman (2007). However, some studies recommend using the differ-
ence but also scaling the ratio as suggested by Leary and Roberts (2010).
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Table 3.11: Measures of Market Leverage in Previous Studies
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Chang et al. (2009) LT/MVE Long term debt to market value of equity.
Titman and Wessels (1988)
Chen and Jiang (2001)
Al-Sakran (2001)
de Miguel and Pindado (2001)
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
De Jong et al. (2008)
Huang and Song (2006)
Chang et al. (2009) ST/MVE Short term debt to market value of equity.
Titman and Wessels (1988)
Chen and Jiang (2001)
Al-Sakran (2001)
Barakat and Rao (2003)
Chang et al. (2009) C/MVE Convertible debt to market value of equity.
Titman and Wessels (1988)
Akhtar and Oliver (2009) LTD/LTD+MVE Long term debt to long term
debt plus market value of equity.
Akhtar (2005)
Bradley et al. (1984)
Barakat and Rao (2003) TD/MVE Total debt to market value of equity.
Chen et al. (1999)
Sbeti (2010)
Gaud et al. (2005)
Goyal et al. (2002)
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
Huang and Song (2006)
Booth et al. (2001) TDR Total liabilities divided by total liabilities plus net worth.
Booth et al. (2001) LTBD Total liabilities minus current liabilities divided by
total liabilities minus current liabilities plus net worth.
Booth et al. (2001) LTMD Total liabilities minus current liabilities divided by
total liabilities minus current liabilities plus equity
market value.
Nagano (2003)
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Table 3.12: Measures of Book Leverage in Previous Studies A
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Chen and Jiang (2001) LTD/BTA Long term debt to book value of assets.
Jairo (2009)
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009)
Barakat and Rao (2003)
Chen (2004)
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996)
Zeitun and Tian (2007)
Omet and Mashharawe (2002)
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
Fakher et al. (2009)
Huang and Song (2006)
Kakani and Reddy (1998)
Sogorb-Mira (2005)
Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki (2012)
Chen and Jiang (2001) STD/BTA Short term debt to book value of assets.
Jairo (2009)
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009)
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996)
Barakat and Rao (2003)
Zeitun and Tian (2007)
Fakher et al. (2009)
Kakani and Reddy (1998)
Sogorb-Mira (2005)
Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki (2012)
Jairo (2009) TL/TA Total liabilities to total assets.
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009)
Nikolaos and Maria (2007)
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996)
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Omet and Mashharawe (2002)
Jairo (2009) TD/EQ Total debt to total equity.
Barakat and Rao (2003)
Chen et al. (1999)
Zeitun and Tian (2007)
Jairo (2009) TD/CAP Total debt to capital, CAP is defined
as total debt plus the market value of equity.
Al-Sakran (2001)
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Zeitun and Tian (2007)
Fattouh et al. (2008)
Jairo (2009) CL/TA Current liabilities to total assets.
Jairo (2009) EBITDA/I EBITDA to interest charge.
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Table 3.13: Measures of Book Leverage in Previous Studies B
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Chen (2004) TD/TA Total debt to book value of total assets.
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Nikolaos and Maria (2007)
Sbeti (2010)
Zeitun and Tian (2007)
Sheikh and Wang (2011)
Suhaila and Wan Mahmood (2008)
Gaud et al. (2005)
Goyal et al. (2002)
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
Fakher et al. (2009)
Huang and Song (2006)
Ozkan (2001)
Sbeti and Moosa (2011)
Kakani and Reddy (1998)
Sogorb-Mira (2005)
Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki (2012)
Drobetz and Fix (2005) D/NA Debt to net assets. Where Net assets is total
assets minus accounts payable and other current liabilities.
Leary and Roberts (2010)
Eldomiaty (2007) D(TD) Difference in total debt.
Kayhan and Titman (2007)
Eldomiaty (2007) D(LTD) Difference in long term debt.
Eldomiaty (2007) D(STD) Difference in short term debt.
Leary and Roberts (2010) D(TD/TA) Debt Issuance is Change in total debt
divided by total assets
Leary and Roberts (2010) EQUISSU Equity Issuance is the Sale of common stock.
Leary and Roberts (2010) INT Internal financing is assumed if no issuance is made.
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3.11.2 Profitability
In this section we are going to discuss the different measures of profitability as
different measures have been used in previous research. There are several reasons
for measures to be used based on availability of data and other measures have
been used for their linkage with the theory.
The main indicators used heavily in the literature are:
• EBIT/TA is the Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) to total assets. Which
is also called the Return on Total Assets (ROTA).
• ROA Return on Assets (ROA)
• OI/TA Operating Income to Total Assets (OI/TA)
Using the EBIT/TA which is also called the Return on Total Assets (ROA) in the
majority of the studies on capital structure is for theoretical reasons. The reason is
that this ratio is not subjected to the choice of the firm capital structure. Both the
EBIT/Ta and the ROA are similar with the only difference being that we use the net
income as the numerator while the latter use EBIT. Despite the use of EBIT and Op-
erating Income being used interchangeably, the difference between the two of them
is that the operating income is considered to be Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) while the EBIT is a non-GAAP measure.
The main reason for using the OI/TA is studies using the Structural Equation
Modelling (SEM) such as Chiarella et al. (1991) and Titman and Wessels (1988)
need to use more than one variable to represent the attribute or the proxy for prof-
itability. Also for the same reason they use the variable Operating income to Sales
OI/SALES which is also called Return on Sales (ROS). Also, the use of the Return
on Equity (ROE) as seen in Table 3.14 is limited because in contrast to the (ROA) it
is affected by the firm choice of capital structure.
99
CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Table 3.14: Measures of Profitability in Previous Studies
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Chiarella et al. (1991), OI/TA Operating income to Total assets.
Chang et al. (2009)
Titman and Wessels (1988)
Chen et al. (1999)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Fattouh et al. (2008)
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
De Jong et al. (2008)
Chiarella et al. (1991) OI/SALES Operating income to Sales.
Jairo (2009)
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Chiarella et al. (1991) ROE Return on Owners Equity.
Chen and Jiang (2001)
Zeitun and Tian (2007)
Chen and Jiang (2001) EBIT/SAL Ratio of EBIT over sales.
Jairo (2009) RE/TA Retained earnings to book
value of assets.
Jairo (2009) EBIT/TA Ratio of EBIT to total assets.
Barakat and Rao (2003)
Chen (2004)
Qian et al. (2007)
Song (2005)
Sheikh and Wang (2011)
Nikolaos and Maria (2007)
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Zeitun and Tian (2007)
Omet and Mashharawe (2002)
Nagano (2003)
Fattouh et al. (2008)
Gaud et al. (2005)
Hijazi and Tariq (2006)
Kayhan and Titman (2007)
Ozkan (2001)
Rajan and Zingales (1995)
Wald (1999)
Friend and Lang (1988) NetIncome/SAL Ratio of average net income
to total sales for last 4 years.
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) ROA Return to total assets.
Al-Sakran (2001)
Sbeti (2010)
Booth et al. (2001)
Matjaz and Dusan (2009)
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Zeitun and Tian (2007)
Huang and Song (2006)
Rajan and Zingales (1995)
Kakani and Reddy (1998)
Sogorb-Mira (2005)
Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki (2012)
Al-Sakran (2001) PM Profitability margin.
Eldomiaty (2007)
Eldomiaty (2007) ROI Return on Investment.
Zeitun and Tian (2007) TobinQ Equity Market Value+ Liabilities Book Value
divided by Equity Book value + Liabilities book value.
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) ROCE Return on Capital Employed.
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3.11.3 Firm Size
Firm size is a determinant of capital structure and is widely used in both financial
and accounting research. As Table 3.15 shows there is a limited number of vari-
ables that are used to represent this attribute. We also see that several studies
especially the ones using the SEM approach would use more than one measure.
The most widely used measures are the log of sales Ln(Sales) and the log total
assets Ln(TA) obviously for availability of data. On the other hand, a few studies
such as Eldomiaty (2007) suggest instead of using the logarithmic treatment of the
assets or the revenues to use a dummy variable. An example of such treatment is
to classify firms into 3 or 4 dummy variables based on the size of the firm.
On the other hand, Chen and Jiang (2001) use the SEM approach and thus need
more than one measure of the firm size determinants and so used the following:
• Ln(Sales) Logarithmic transformation of sales
• Ln(Worker) Logarithmic transformation of number of workers
• Ln(MV) Logarithmic transformation of market value
Furthermore, Titman and Wessels (1988) attempt to use the SEM forced them to
find alternative measures of firm size. Therefore, they suggested the use of the quit
ratio. The reason for using this measure is that it reflects the idea that large firms
would have lower quit rates due to the broader carrier opportunities.
Several issues might be the reason behind trying to use different measures.
For example, Jairo (2009) stated that they attempted to use both the Ln(TA) and
Ln(Sales) but due to the high correlation between these two measures it was not
possible.
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Table 3.15: Measures of Firms Size
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Chiarella et al. (1991) Ln(Sales) Natural Log of Sales.
Sheikh and Wang (2011)
Chen and Jiang (2001)
Jairo (2009)
Barakat and Rao (2003)
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Booth et al. (2001)
Buettner et al. (2009)
Chen et al. (1999)
Matjaz and Dusan (2009)
Nikolaos and Maria (2007)
Nikolaos and Maria (2007)
Song (2005)
Qian et al. (2007)
Omet and Mashharawe (2002)
Nagano (2003)
Suhaila and Wan Mahmood (2008)
Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2007)
Fattouh et al. (2008)
Gaud et al. (2005)
Hijazi and Tariq (2006)
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
Huang and Song (2006)
Kayhan and Titman (2007)
Ozkan (2001)
Rajan and Zingales (1995)
Chen and Jiang (2001) Ln(Workers) Natural log of number of workers.
Song (2005)
Chen and Jiang (2001) Ln(MV) Natural log of the market value.
Jairo (2009) Ln(TA) Natural log of total assets.
Friend and Lang (1988)
Akhtar (2005)
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009)
Al-Sakran (2001)
Chen (2004)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Sbeti (2010)
Fattouh et al. (2008)
Goyal et al. (2002)
Fakher et al. (2009)
De Jong et al. (2008)
Frank and Goyal (2009)
Leary and Roberts (2010)
Sbeti and Moosa (2011)
Wald (1999)
Kakani and Reddy (1998)
Sogorb-Mira (2005)
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011)
Titman and Wessels (1988) QR Quit Ratio
Eldomiaty (2007) Dum(SIZE) Dummy Variable
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3.11.4 Growth Opportunities
Growth opportunities are the growth potential the firms have in the future based on
the past growth that the firm experienced. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest
that managers or owners of firms with 100% debt financial structure would have an
incentive to engage in investments which promise extremely high returns to pay-out
if the investment is successful even if there is a low probability of success. In this
case if the investment is successful then the owner or manager will take all the gains
and in the case of failure the debt holders will be responsible for all the losses.
As Table 3.16 shows there are many variables of growth opportunities used in
the capital structure literature especially and in the corporate finance literature in
general. The three ratios which were used are the following:
• GTA is the growth in total assets as a percentage.
• MTB is the market value to book value ratio.
• MBA is the market to book values of assets ratio.
Furthermore, the percentage of change in total assets (GTA) and percentage of
change in sales (GSA) are the growth of the firms as a percentage. Also, another
treatment of the (GSA) is using the average of the (GSA) as employed by Chen and
Jiang (2001) and Chen et al. (1999). In addition, Chen (2004) suggested the use of
a combination of the two measures by using the GSA to GTA (GSA/GTA).
However,Goyal et al. (2002) and Wald (1999) suggested the used of the Research
and Development (R&D) either to total assets or sales.Titman and Wessels (1988)
argue that normally firms would fund the (R&D) to create future investments.
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Table 3.16: Measures of Growth Opportunities
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Chang et al. (2009) GTA Percentage of change in total assets.
Jairo (2009)
Al-Sakran (2001)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Song (2005)
Fakher et al. (2009)
Chen and Jiang (2001)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Fattouh et al. (2008)
Wald (1999)
Kakani and Reddy (1998)
Chiarella et al. (1991) AVGTA Average growth rate of total assets.
Hijazi and Tariq (2006)
Chen and Jiang (2001) GSA Percentage of change in Sales.
Chen et al. (1999)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Fattouh et al. (2008)
Chang et al. (2009) MBE or MTB Market to book equity.
Friend and Lang (1988)
Barakat and Rao (2003)
Booth et al. (2001)
Chen et al. (1999)
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Goyal et al. (2002)
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
Frank and Goyal (2009)
Chang et al. (2009) MBA Market to book assets.
Jairo (2009)
Nagano (2003)
Gaud et al. (2005)
Goyal et al. (2002)
De Jong et al. (2008)
Leary and Roberts (2010)
Ozkan (2001)
Rajan and Zingales (1995)
Sheikh and Wang (2011) GSA/GTA Growth of sales by growth of total assets.
Chen (2004)
Titman and Wessels (1988) CE/TA Capital Expenditure to Total assets.
Chang et al. (2009)
Jairo (2009)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Goyal et al. (2002)
Frank and Goyal (2009)
Shyam-Sunder and C. Myers (1999)
Titman and Wessels (1988) R&D/TA Research and Development to total assets.
Goyal et al. (2002)
Chang et al. (2009) R&D/Sales Research and Development to sales.
Jairo (2009)
Bradley et al. (1984)
Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2007)
Kayhan and Titman (2007)
Chen and Jiang (2001) Ln(MTB) Natural log of market to book ratio.
Jairo (2009) TobinQ TobinQ ratio
de Miguel and Pindado (2001)
Qian et al. (2007)
Huang and Song (2006)
Sbeti and Moosa (2011)
Nikolaos and Maria (2007) AVGEARN Annual percentage change on Earnings.
Suhaila and Wan Mahmood (2008)
Eldomiaty (2007) ASTURN Assets turnover = Sales/Total Assets
Goyal et al. (2002) EPR Earning to price ratio.
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3.11.5 Tangibility of Assets
Also called the collateral value of assets; it is about the type of assets the firm holds
and its relation to the firm capital structure. In the trade-off theory as explained
by Myers (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), firms can use their assets as
collateral to secure debt at a lower cost in comparison to the issuance of equity.
Therefore, firms with high value assets are expected to issue more debt to utilize this
chance. As Table3.17, the following are the main indicators used in the empirical
literature:
• FA/TA Fixed assets to total assets.
• TangA/TA which is the tangible assets to total assets book value. The differ-
ence with the previous measure is that in this measure it includes inventories.
• INVP/TA is the inventory and gross plant and equipment value to total assets.
Furthermore, one of the measures suggested and used by Titman and Wessels
(1988) and Jairo (2009) is the use of intangible assets to total assets. The intangible
assets are assets which are not physical in nature such as trademarks, copyrights
and brand recognition. In addition, a measure suggested by Booth et al. (2001) is
to use the fixed assets to total assets.
One of the issues of using tangibility is that there is a difference between indus-
tries in terms of their fixed assets. For example, a firm in the utilities industry is
expected to have more fixed assets in comparison with a software company. Ac-
cording to Booth et al. (2001) it is expected that the influence of tangibility will differ
between the long-term debt and the total debt ratios. They also find that the tangibil-
ity of assets is similar across countries with about 40% in a sample of 10 developing
countries.
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Table 3.17: Measures of Assets Tangibility
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Chiarella et al. (1991) INVP/TA Inventory and gross plant and equipment to total assets.
Chang et al. (2009)
Jairo (2009)
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009)
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
Wald (1999)
Titman and Wessels (1988) IA/TA Intangible assets to Total assets.
Jairo (2009) Sogorba used it as a growth measure.
Sogorb-Mira (2005)
Chen and Jiang (2001) FA/TA Fixed assets to total assets.
Jairo (2009)
Akhtar (2005)
Matjaz and Dusan (2009)
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Zeitun and Tian (2007)
Sheikh and Wang (2011)
Song (2005)
Qian et al. (2007)
Omet and Mashharawe (2002)
Nagano (2003)
Fattouh et al. (2008)
Hijazi and Tariq (2006)
Fakher et al. (2009)
De Jong et al. (2008)
Huang and Song (2006)
Kayhan and Titman (2007)
Rajan and Zingales (1995)
Sbeti and Moosa (2011)
Kakani and Reddy (1998)
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011)
Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki (2012)
Akhtar and Oliver (2009) TangA/TA Tangible assets to total assets in book value.
The tangible assets include sum of fixed assets and inventories.
Friend and Lang (1988)
Barakat and Rao (2003)
Chen (2004)
Chen et al. (1999)
Nikolaos and Maria (2007)
Sbeti (2010)
Frank and Goyal (2009)
Sogorb-Mira (2005)
Booth et al. (2001) TA-CA/TA Total assets-current assets divided by total assets.
Leary and Roberts (2010) Tang net property plant and equipment.
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3.11.6 Liquidity
Another key determinant of capital structure is the firm liquidity, which is represented
by different measures as presented in Table3.18. The main ratios used in the em-
pirical literature are:
• CR which is the current ratio calculated as current liabilities divided by current
assets.
• QR which is the quick ratio calculated by subtracting inventories from current
assets and dividing them by current liabilities.
Table 3.18: Measures of Liquidity
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) CL/CA Current ratio current liabilities to current assets.
Sbeti (2010)
Sheikh and Wang (2011)
Omet and Mashharawe (2002)
De Jong et al. (2008)
Eldomiaty (2007) QR Quick ratio.
Nikolaos and Maria (2007)
Suhaila and Wan Mahmood (2008)
Eldomiaty (2007) WCR Working capital ratio
Eldomiaty (2007) CR Current ratio.
Ozkan (2001)
Sbeti and Moosa (2011)
Eldomiaty (2007) CashR Cash ratio.
Furthermore, Ozkan (2001) stated that the liquidity ratios relations with the lever-
age have mixed results; the study stated that it is expected that firms with high
liquidity ratios would be encouraged to have higher debt ratio since they are able
to pay their short-term obligations when they occur. From that we could conclude
that the relation is positive but firms with high liquidity ratios might use their cash
to finance their investments and thus would not issue more debt and therefore the
relation would be inverse.
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Furthermore, Myers and Rajan (1998) argued that it is established in the literature
discussed in the previous paragraph that firms have an easier task trying to raise
external debt against their liquid assets. However, their findings show that liquidity
could have a negative effect and can reduce the amount of external debt a firm can
raise. In addition, firms with high liquid assets have a higher probability of investing
in illiquid projects.
3.11.7 Volatility or Risk
This is a measure of the financial distress and the agency costs are higher with in-
creased volatility of the stock returns. The trade-off theory for that reason suggests
a negative relation between the volatility and leverage. Also the pecking-order the-
ory proposes the same relation. As suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980),
the investors cannot predict the future returns and therefore the view is that firms
with high earnings volatility are bought with caution and the holders of these firms
would require a higher return.
The recommended measure used by Jandik and Makhija (2001) and De Jong
et al. (2008) is the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating in-
come (STDGOI). However, this measure is not always possible to construct as data
of operating income are not always available per quarter especially in the develop-
ing markets. For that researchers use several alternatives for this measure which
include the standard deviation of the share price as used by Frank and Goyal (2009)
and Jairo (2009). Another measure which is suggested by Al-Najjar and Hussainey
(2011) and that is mainly used in accounting research is the Beta coefficient and in
some cases the Alpha coefficient.
Chen and Jiang (2001) did a SEM study and therefore used two measures as
proxies for earning volatility which were logarithmically transformed and these are:
• Ln(STDNI) which is the log of the standard deviation of net income.
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Table 3.19: Measures of Risk
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Chang et al. (2009) (STDGOI) Standard deviation of the percentage
change in operating income.
Jairo (2009)
Bradley et al. (1984)
Helwege and Liang (1996)
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
De Jong et al. (2008)
Sbeti and Moosa (2011)
Chang et al. (2009) (CV(ROA)) the coefficient of variation of ROA
Qian et al. (2007)
Kakani and Reddy (1998)
Chang et al. (2009) (CV(ROE)) the coefficient of variation of ROE
Chang et al. (2009) (CV(OITA)) coefficient of variation of
operating income to total assets
Jairo (2009) (CV(EBITDA)) Coefficient variation of EBITDA.
Chen and Jiang (2001) Ln(STDNI) Log of standard deviation of net income.
Chen and Jiang (2001) Ln(STDEBIT) Log of standard deviation of EBIT.
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009)
Qian et al. (2007)
Huang and Song (2006)
Leary and Roberts (2010)
Jairo (2009) STDSP Standard deviation of share price.
Frank and Goyal (2009)
Barakat and Rao (2003) SDOE/TA Standard deviation of earning
scaled by total assets.
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Sheikh and Wang (2011)
Song (2005)
Gaud et al. (2005)
Wald (1999)
Matjaz and Dusan (2009) STDROA Standard deviation of Return on Assets.
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) BETA Beta of the Firm.
• Ln(STDEBIT) which is the log of standard deviation EBIT.
On the other hand, Chang et al. (2009) also used a SEM approach and used four
measures of volatility and these in addition to the (STDGOI) are:
• CV(ROA) which is the coefficient of variation of ROA.
• CV(ROE) which is the coefficient of variation of ROE.
• CV(OITA) which is the coefficient of variation of OI to TA.
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3.11.8 Tax Considerations
Tax considerations are the motivation and the cornerstone of both the Irrelevance
theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and the starting point of the trade-off theory.
As stated by the trade-off theory, firms will use the deductibility of the interest pay-
ments to reduce their tax payments. MacKie-Mason (1990) states that they clarified
the relation between the debt policy and the tax shields. This study states that the
motivation of using debt for firms is linked positively with the effective marginal tax.
Furthermore, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) linked the non-debt tax shields with
variation in the debt policy. They argued that each firm has its own internal opti-
mal capital structure based on the tax shield substitutes such as depreciation and
investments credit in the presence of tax. Furthermore, Baker and Wurgler (2002)
state that Ross (1985) argues that if a firm issues debt excessively they would be
tax drained which means that they could not utilize their maximum tax shield. Then
debt would be kicked out and the motivation to use debt vanishes as the non-debt
tax shield increase.
On the other hand, Scott (1977) debates that a significant non-debt tax shield
would have large tangible assets that could be used as collateral to secure debt. As
Table3.20 shows, different measures were used in the literature but the main one
is the depreciation to total assets ratio. The trade-off theory suggests a negative
relation between the leverage and the non-debt tax shield. This relation is proved
empirically by Ozkan (2001), Sogorb-Mira (2005) and Titman and Wessels (1988).
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Table 3.20: Measures of Tax
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Chiarella et al. (1991) DEP/TA Ratio of depreciation to Total assets.
Chang et al. (2009)
Jairo (2009)
Friend and Lang (1988)
Akhtar (2005)
Bradley et al. (1984)
Chen (2004)
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996)
Drobetz and Fix (2005)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Sheikh and Wang (2011)
Song (2005)
Qian et al. (2007)
Fattouh et al. (2008)
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
Frank and Goyal (2009)
Huang and Song (2006)
Ozkan (2001)
Wald (1999)
Sogorb-Mira (2005)
Drobetz and Fix (2005) DEP/OP Ratio of depreciation to operating profit.
Titman and Wessels (1988) OI-i-T/0.42 Income tax payment (T) Operating income (OI) .
Interest payments (i) and the corporate tax rate during the sample
(%42)
Jairo (2009)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Chang et al. (2009) NDT/TA Ratio of non-debt tax shield to total assets.
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
Kakani and Reddy (1998)
Chang et al. (2009) ITC/TA Ratio of investment tax credit to total assets.
Jandik and Makhija (2001)
Frank and Goyal (2009)
Barakat and Rao (2003) DTAX Dummy variable for presence of corporate tax.
Barakat and Rao (2003) MTR Marginal tax rate.
Booth et al. (2001) AVGTAX The average tax rate is estimated from before-
and after-tax income.
Huang and Song (2006)
de Miguel and Pindado (2001) EBIT-TaxP/TaxR Earnings before interest and tax .
Eldomiaty (2007) ECTR The effective corporate tax rate. Which
is (estimated taxable profits x corporate tax rate)/(pre-tax profits).
Zeitun and Tian (2007) TAX Total tax to earnings before interest and tax.
De Jong et al. (2008)
Sogorb-Mira (2005) ETR Effective tax rate which is the taxes to EAIBT.
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3.11.9 Uniqueness
The first study to suggest the uniqueness as a determinant of capital structure was
by Titman and Wessels (1988). The main argument is that firms who produce
specialized products in the case of their liquidation would cause their customers,
workers and suppliers to suffer greatly. Also the fact that their workers and sup-
plier have a special set of skills and their customers would suffer in finding another
company to offer this service. Therefore, they suggested that firms would have a
negative relationship between debt and uniqueness.
Table 3.21: Measures of Uniqueness
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Chang et al. (2009) R&D/S Research and Development to sales.
Song (2005)
Kayhan and Titman (2007)
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011)
Drobetz and Fix (2005) R&D DUM Dummy variable if firms report R&D expenditure.
Eldomiaty (2007) SES Selling expenses over sales.
Kayhan and Titman (2007)
Kakani and Reddy (1998) UNIQDUM Dummy 1 unique and 0 not unique.
As 3.21 shows there are a few studies which use the uniqueness as a determi-
nant of capital structure. The main measure of the uniqueness is the Research
and Development (R&D) expenses as argued by Titman and Wessels (1988). The
reason for choosing R&D is that firms with substitute replacement for their product
will not invest heavily on creating a new product because their products could be
duplicated without difficulty. In addition, as argued by Titman and Wessels (1988)
and empirically tested by Eldomiaty (2007) the use of selling expenses to sales is a
measure of uniqueness because it is expected that firms with new products would
spend more on advertising and promoting their unique products. It is expected that
the relation between debt and uniqueness will be negative.
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3.11.10 Dividends
The dividends factor is a very important determinant of capital structure especially
for the pecking-order theory. Since the pecking-order theory as explained by Myers
(1984) states that firms would issue internal funds then debt then equity it is ex-
pected that the relationship between the debt and the dividends is positive because
firms who pay high dividends would not have enough internal generated cash and
thus would require to take debt to finance investments as presented by the study of
Baskin (1989).
On the other hand, Frank and Goyal (2009) divide the sample of their study into
different sub samples in order to test the theory that firms who are constrained
by either size, dividends paying status and market-to-book ratio have different de-
terminants of capital structure. Their findings conclude that these factors are not
significantly important and that financing constraints measured by these measures
have no effect.
Table 3.22: Measures of Dividends
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) DPR Dividend pay-out ratio
Barakat and Rao (2003)
Eldomiaty (2007)
Sbeti and Moosa (2011)
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) DIV/TA Dividends to total assets.
Shyam-Sunder and C. Myers (1999) DIV Dividends payments
Furthermore, empirical evidence by Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) and Ben Naceur et al.
(2006) find that there is a negative relationship between leverage and dividends
payments. On the other hand, Al-Najjar (2008) finds that there is no significant
relation between the dividends policy (dividend pay-out ratio) and the leverage of
the firm in Jordanian firms.
As Table 3.22 shows, there is a limited number of measures that are used to
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represent the dividends proxy. There is the dividend pay-out ratio which is defined
as the dividends to net income. A few studies use the dividends amount as a
percentage of total assets such as Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996). Also as
discussed before a few firms would use a dummy variable to distinguish dividend
paying firms from non-paying firms.
3.11.11 Industry Classification
The industry the firm is in has an impact on the leverage of the firm simply based
on the business needs of the business. Studies in capital structure have empirically
tested these effects and mainly find that they do have an impact on the firm leverage
level and on the decision of the capital structure choice. As argued by Frank and
Goyal (2009) and stated by Baker and Wurgler (2002) there are two reasons for this
impact which are:
• managers or owners use the median leverage of the industry as a benchmark
for their own firm capital structure decisions.
• the existence of a set of attributes which are correlated but omitted and there-
fore cause this relation with leverage.
Furthermore, Frank and Goyal (2009) also add that the idea of using the average
as a benchmark for firms contributed in adding the industry mean as a proxy for
target capital structure studies. They also added that the reason of such an effect
might be that firms face the same forces and shocks and therefore would make
correlated financial structure decisions and therefore industry factors do not have
a straight relation to leverage. They also added that under the trade-off theory
the relation is positive between the median leverage and the firm debt. On the other
hand, the pecking order theory has no direct link and the industry should only matter
if it does serve as a proxy for the firm finance deficit.
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In addition, Harris and Raviv (1991) review the literature based on the industry
studies and documented that leverage ratios are high in industries and low in oth-
ers. The overall picture is that the drugs, cosmetics, instruments, electronics, metal
mining, food and machinery would have a low leverage. On the other hand, indus-
tries such as construction, metal working, chemicals and petroleum have a medium
or high leverage. Moreover, Lemmon et al. (2008) test the effect of the industry
mean leverage and find that it is significant and has a high impact on the decision
of capital structure.
3.11.12 Ownership Structure
As argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) the agency theory
states that manager ownership and the use of debt would reduce the agency costs
facing firms. Lee and Kuo (2014) empirical results are in line with the agency theory
and find that manager’s ownership and debt are tools to reduce the agency costs.
Furthermore, Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) find that firms owned heavily by an
institution would have low debt to capital ratios which would suggest a negative re-
lationship. Lee and Kuo (2014) also find that the presence of an ultimate ownership
could serve as a discipliner to the managers decisions. In addition, Al-Najjar (2008)
finds that there is a negative relation between institutional ownership and leverage
which supports the results of Lee and Kuo (2014). On the other hand, King and
Santor (2008) study the link between family ownership and leverage and find that
family owned firms with a single share class have higher leverage than other firms.
These findings were also verified by both Michaely and Vincent (2012) and Al-Ajmi
et al. (2009).
In addition, government ownership is considered an important ownership struc-
ture variable. A study by Qian et al. (2007) finds that there is a negative relationship
between leverage and state ownership. There are two ways of measuring the own-
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ership structure relation with leverage. The first one is the use of a dummy variable
for the ultimate owner based on the percentage of shares they own. The second
one is the use of the share in percentage. Both measures and other measures are
presented in Table 3.23.
Table 3.23: Measures of Ownership Structure
Papers Variable Ratio Definition
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) Government_Dum A dummy variable if the largest shareholder own 10%.
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) Families_Dum A dummy variable if the largest shareholder own 10%
Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2007) Institution_Dum
Huang and Song (2006)
Al-Sakran (2001) Government The share of the government ownership in the firm.
Huang and Song (2006) MANAG Managerial ownership is the shareholding
of directors, supervisors and management.
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) CHS Closely Held Shares.
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) NEXDR Percentage of non-executive directors on the board.
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) DRCTR Number of executive and non-executive
directors on the board.
3.11.13 Credit Rating
Credit rating is an evaluation tool to choose stocks and bonds issued by corpora-
tion and firms. Firm managers’ main goal should be to maximize the firms value
regardless of other factors. However, a study by Kisgen (2006) shows that firms
managers care about their credit rating. The findings of the study state that firms
near an upgrade in their rating or a downgrade would prefer not to issue debt in
comparison with firms which are not near a change in their credit rating.
On the other hand, Lemmon and Zender (2010) suggest that firms would finance
their activities through equity and hence issue less debt if their access to the debt
market is restricted. The pecking order theory would suggest that firms with a credit
rating will use less debt and more equity due to the fact that these firms experience a
lower degree of information asymmetry as discussed by Baker and Wurgler (2002).
Generally, there are two measures of credit rating (debt rating in some cases)
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and these are:
• Coding the credit rating into a number.
• Create dummy variables for firms near an upgrade or downgrade.
3.12 Summary
This chapter started with an overview of the main capital structure theories theo-
retically. Then discussed the classification of the MENA countries. From the re-
view of the capital structure around the world some observations are made. Cross
country comparison studies are not unified in terms of the leverage definition they
use. Also, these studies are done only using the Panel data models and rare have
applied other approaches. Furthermore, these studies focused on the classic de-
terminants of capital structure and only few did try for example to investigate the
relation between leverage and credit rating in cross country comparison studies.
Moreover, studies that were done in the developed countries test one theory in
place of another one, which might lead to confusing results as these studies are not
comparable. Also, studies in the developed countries ignore firms which are regu-
lated and in some cases small firms. However, studies in the developing countries
have a different story. Size is an important in the majority of the studies and the
use of the market leverage as a dependent variable is rare. In addition, as the case
of the cross country comparison studies few attempted to use different approaches
such as the (SEM) and (ANN).
Additionally, studies in the MENA countries focus on one country analysis with a
few exception. None of the studies in the MENA country used the credit rating as a
determinants of capital structure. Also, no study used the other approaches.
This study will fill in the gaps in the literature in several ways. First, by using
three approaches this study will be deep enough to judge which of them is most
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appropriate to use in the study of MENA countries capital structure. Also, this study
will use both market and book leverage to test the relation with the determinants.
In addition, this study use both the non-financial and financial firms. To sum up in
this chapter we explore studies around the world. Then, the widely used methods
to study capital structure were presented with the major features and their weak-
nesses. Finally, a detailed examination of the measures and variables used in the
empirical studies in the literature was made.
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Chapter 4
Methodology and Data Description
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we discussed the background, theoretical and empirical
literature for capital structure in the MENA region. Taking into consideration the
previous chapters we study the data of interest and the methodology approach to
use. This chapter is structured as follows: section 5.2 present the data description,
section two, three and four discuss the different approaches used in this study. After
that section six would show the descriptive statistics and section seven will show the
correlation matrix. Section eight will include the factors loading and finally section
nine will provide a summary of the theoretical predictions for the theories used in
this study.
4.2 Data Description
The sample of this study will be based on the MENA Countries. The data is ob-
tained from Blomberg and Bankscope for the majority of the proxies we used. How-
ever, several proxies data were not available and therefore we acquired them from
the financial statements. This study use data from different sources. First, we
use the Bloomberg data base for the majority of the data for the Non-Financial
firms in the countries in the MENA countries. Second, we use the Bankscope for
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the data about the credit rating for the Financial firms (banks) and for the own-
ership structure data. This study will use both the non-financial firms and banks
listed in the MENA countries. The period of this study is for the years 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009,2010,2011,2012 and 2013. On the other hand, Lebanon, Palestine and
Turkey are used partially, only the financial banks are used. This is due to the fact
that there is only 12 non-financial firms in Palestine and 4 firms In Lebanon. Due to
unavailability of data the following countries were excluded totally from the study:
1. Algeria: The reason for excluding Algeria is that it does only have 4 listed
firms in the stock market.
2. Iran: No data is available in any data base for the firms in Iran.
3. Iraq The collapse of the Iraqi regime caused the stock market to closed and
then start a new one.
4. Libyia: Several reasons did force the exclusion of Libyan firms from the study.
First, for the years 2011 until now the country is in conflict as the results of the
Arab uprising. Second, the number of firms listed in the Libyan stock market
is only 10 firms in which 6 are banks and 4 are insurance firms.
5. Syria: Although there is stock exchange in Syria, the current conflict and the
civil war makes it unreasonable to study. The Syrian regime is hit by economic
sanctions by almost all the countries in the world.
6. Yemen: There is public stock exchange in Yemen. The financial sector is
underdeveloped and it is not possible to get data about the firms.
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Table 4.1: Banks Sample by country
Country of Origin Total Assets Loans Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Total
Bahrain 96298 37.07 6 8 14
Egypt 175237 60.3 3 8 11
Jordan 118152 53.31 1 10 11
Kuwait 194671 112.12 4 6 10
Lebanon 159973 46.65 0 6 6
Morocco 45162 60.16 0 6 6
Oman 54347 37.8 0 6 6
Palestine 468 0.19 1 6 7
Qatar 180805 114.55 3 5 8
Saudi Arabia 435121 253.97 4 7 11
Tunisia 3489 1.9 0 11 11
Turkey 730278 432,572 2 15 17
UAE 421446 266.57 6 14 20
Total 2615454 433616.6 30 108 138
4.3 Variables used in the thesis
The following table shows the variables selected for this study. Choice of these
variables is based on the previous studies. However, several challenges did oc-
cur when selecting the variables to present each determinants of capital structure.
The main challenge is the availability of data and therefore few variables were
dropped. For example, an important factor is the uniqueness as suggested by
Titman. Furthermore, the tax variable which represent the non-debt tax shield is
only presented by one variable in the SEM approach due to unavailability of other
measures. Also, credit rating data is not available for the non-financial firms and
therefore was dropped from the analysis.
Moreover, it is notable that firms in the MENA countries don’t report their Re-
search and Development expense and therefore this measure is dropped from the
growth variables. Also, TobinQ is only available for the past year and therefore was
also dropped. The table show the variables used and their formulas which were
extracted from the literature review chapter.
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Table 4.2: Variables Used in the Thesis
Variable Name Formula
Profitability
1 Return on Assets. Net Income / Total assets.
2 Return on Equity Net Income/ Common Equity.
3 Return on Sales or Profit Margin Net Income/Net Sales
4 Operating Income to Total Assets Operating Income/Total assets
5 Operating Income to Total Sales. Operating Income/Total Sales
6 EBIT to Sales EBIT/SALES
7 EBIT To Total assets EBIT/TA
8 Tobinq
Size
1 Log of Sales Ln(Sales)
2 Log of Total assets. Ln(TA)
3 Log of Number of Workers Ln(Workers)
4 Log of Market Value Ln(MV)
5 Quit Rate QR
Growth
1 Growth of Total assets GTA
2 Growth of Total Sales GTS
3 Market to Book ratio MTB
4 Capital Expenditures to Total assets. CE/TA
5 Research and Development to Total assets. R&D/TA
6 Research and Development to Sales R&D/SAL
7 TobinQ
Tangibility
1 Inventory and gross plant and equipment to total assets. INVP/TA
2 Intangible assets to Total assets. IA/TA
3 Fixed Assets to Total Assets FA/TA
4 Tangible assets to Total Assets. Tang/TA
5 Net Property and plant and Equipment. NPP&E
Tax
1 Depreciation to Total assets. DEP/TA
2 Depreciation to Operating income. DEP/OP
3 Investment Tax Credit to Total Assets. ITC/TA
4 Non Debt tax shield to Total Assets. NDTS/TA
Risk or Volatility
1 Standard Deviation of Share Price STDV(PE)
2 Beta BETA
3 Standard Deviation of ROA
4 Standard Deviation of ROE
Dividends
1 Dividends amount to Total assets DIV/TA
2 Dividends payout ratio. DPR
3 Dividends payment amount DIV
Cash Flow
1 Cash and Bank deposits and marketable securities to Long Term debt. CA/CD
2 Cash and Bank deposits and marketable securities to Total assets. CA/TA
3 Cash and Bank deposits and marketable securities to current debt. CA/CD
4 EBIT plus depreciation and amortization to Total assets. EBIT+DEP+AMOR/TA
Uniqueness
1 Research and Development to Sales R&D/Sales
2 Research and Development Dummy R&D DUM
3 Selling expenses to Sales. SE/SAL
Liquidity
1 Current Ratio Current Liabilities/Current Assets
2 Quick Ratio (Current Assets−Inventories)/Current Liabilities
3 Cash Ratio Cash and Cash Equivalent/Current Liabilities.
4 Working Capital Ratio Current Assets / Current Liabilities
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4.4 Panel Data Analysis
The panel data is also called longitudinal data - is a multi-dimension data which con-
tains observation on several phenomenas which are observed over multiple periods
of time. In our study we observe the financial ratios representing different compa-
nies over a period of time which is measured on yearly bases. The advantages if
using the panel data instead of using other types of data such as cross-section and
time series data as listed by Baltagi (1995) are:
1. Panel data enable controlling for individual heterogeneity,
2. Panel data combine time series and cross-section observations, so it will in-
clude more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables
, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency.
3. Panel data are better suited to study the dynamic of change.
4. Panel data is better in detecting and measuring effects that cannot be ob-
served normally in cross section or time sires data.
5. Panel data models allow us to construct and test more complicated behavioral
model than purely cross-section or time series data.
6. Panel data are usually gathered at micro units, which could result in more
accurate variables.
The panel data model take the following format as suggested by Gujarati and Porter
(2009) :
Yit = β1i + β2X2it + β3X3it + uit i = 1, ...., N ; t = 1, ...., T (4.1)
where i denotes the cross-sectional unit and t denotes the time-periods. In our
model the i denotes the company and t denotes the year. If each i have the same
number of time observations then the panel data is called balanced data. On the
other hand, if the number is less or more then it is called unbalanced data. The
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data in our sample is balanced data unless we mention otherwise.
4.4.1 Fixed Effects Models:
Before using the we should chose the assumption we make about the intercept, the
slope coefficients, and the error term uit. In this study we use two variations of the
fixed effects. Which are namely:
1. Pooled Model: It is also called the population averaged model. The as-
sumption is that all the coefficients are constant across time and firms. In
this approach we disregard the time and the space dimensions which are the
main features of panel data and simply pool the data to estimate a regular
OLS. The formula for the OLS regression model is :
Yit = α +X ′itβ + uit i = 1, ...., N ; t = 1, ...., T (4.2)
Where, In the pooled model the uit which is the disturbance model can be
explained as :
uit = µi + vit (4.3)
Where µ represents the cross-section disturbance and the vit are the rest of
the effects.
2. Fixed effect Model : Also called the Least-Square Dummy Variable (LSDV),
If we assume the slope coefficients are constant but the intercept is varies
across firms. This model takes into account the individuality of the each firm
by letting the intercept vary for each firm but in the same time the slope coef-
ficients are constant across all the firms.
Yit = αi + β′Xit + it (4.4)
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As the equation show the intercept term α does have a subscript i which
would mean that the intercept for each firms can be different. This model
is a special case of the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) but it includes dummy
variables for each firm. These dummy variables are differential intercept dum-
mies, where each dummy would take a value of 0 or 1 based on the group.
As the following equation:
Yit = α1 + α2D2i + α3D3i + α4D4i + β2X2it + β3X3it µit (4.5)
Where D2i = 1 if this observation belongs to group A and 0 other wise, D3i =1
if the observation belongs to Group B and 0 otherwise.
.
4.4.2 Random Effects Models
The second approach to test panel data is using the Random Effects models. Al-
though it is undemanding to apply the fixed effect, it comes with a large cost which
is the loss of degrees if freedom. The main advantage of the (REM) is that it could
be used with time invariant variables such as gender or dummy variables.In this
model the αi is considered to be a random variable instead of fixed and the mean
value is α. The intercept for the individual firm in this model is expressed as:
αi = α + i, i = 1, ...., N (4.6)
Thus, the Random Effects Model (REM) would be expressed by substituting
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equation 4.6 into equation 4.1 and the model would be as follow:
Yit = αi + β′Xit + t + µit
= αi + β′Xit + νit
(4.7)
where,
νit = t + µit (4.8)
Gujarati and Porter (2009) suggest that νit is the composite error term. It contains
two error components which are:
1. t is the firm specific error component. This error term cannot be detected
directly and it is known to be latent variable or (unobservable).
2. µit is the combined firm specific error and the time series error.
As the previous sections show that both the (FEM) and (REM) could be used
in the case of this study. One way to decide which model is more suitable and
appropriate is to use the Hausman test. The null hypothesis of the test is that the
FEM and REM do not differ significantly. If the null hypothesis is accepted then we
could conclude that using the REM is more appropriate. On the other hand, of the
hypothesis is rejected then we can’t use the REM and the results of the FEM are
more appropriate. The Hausman statistics test formula is as follow:
H = (βc − βe)′(Vc − V e)−1(βc − βe) (4.9)
where,
βc is the coefficient vector from the fixed effect estimator
βe is the coefficient vector from the random effect estimator
Vc is the covariance matrix of the fixed effect estimator
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Ve is the covariance matrix of the random effect estimator
It is also worth mentioning that the Hausman statistics test is distributed as χ2.
4.4.3 Dynamical Models
In addition, a new direction in the research of capital structure argues that firms
depart from their optimal capital structure temporarily as Drobetz and Fix (2005)
findings show. Both Ozkan (2001) and de Miguel and Pindado (2001) developed a
target adjustments model which will identify the optimal capital structure as well as
adding a lagged variable to test the speed of adjustments.
Therefore we intend in this thesis to use the dynamic capital model which take
the following form:
Levit− Levit−1 = αit(Lev∗it − Levit−1) (4.10)
where,
αit is the coefficient of the adjustments speed.
Levit is the Leverage of firm i at time t.
Lev∗i t is the lagged leverage of firm i at time t.
After inserting firm id i and time t we get the following model:
Levit = αβ1 + (1− α)Levit−1 + α
∑
βjXijt + dt + ηi + νit (4.11)
where,
dt is the time specific effect.
ηi is the firm specific effect.
νit is the white disturbance.
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4.4.4 Tobit Model
The tobit model is developed by Tobin (1958). When the sample have only infor-
mation about some of the observations and not all of them it is called a censored
sample. For that reason the tobit model is also called the censored or the limited
dependent regression mode. The tobit model which is also a linear panel-level
random effects could be expressed as the following equation:
Y ∗i = Xitβ + i i = 1, ....., N (4.12)
The intuition for using this model as argued Wald (1999) is that the dependent
variable which is the leverage ratio is censored at zero. The values of the Short
term debt and Long term debt and Total debt proxies are all between 0 and 1.
Furthermore, many companies have a zero debt policy thus it is expected that a
percentage of the companies in our sample will have it. Using the Tobit instead of
the OLS is because the using it will lead to a downwards-biased estimate of the
slope coefficient and an upward biased estimate of the intercept. The tobit model is
a random effects model and there is not fixed effect model. The observed variable
Y ∗it is the censored version of Yit. The model could be censored from the left or the
right or uncensored. The observation role for the mode is as follow:
Yit =

Y ∗i if y
∗
i > L
L if y∗i ≤ L
4.5 Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was first used by Titman and Wessels (1988)
in modelling the determinants of capital structure choice. Several papers have fol-
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lowed after that and these include Chen and Jiang (2001), Jairo (2009) Chang et al.
(2009) Chiarella et al. (1991). The major advantages of using the SEM rather than
other models is as presented by Chang et al. (2009) is that it explicitly models
measurement errors and can estimate parameters with full information maximum
likelihood (FIML), which provides consistent and asymptotically efficient estimatesI˙.
Furthermore ,Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that the major advantage of us-
ing SEM is that it allows the researcher to investigate the relation between the un-
observable and observable variables. Furthermore, Chiarella et al. (1991) Stated
that capital structure theories propose a hypothesised determinants which can not
be directly measured. Therefore the whole idea of using SEM is to construct la-
tent variables which can not be represented and therefore it should be used in the
research of capital structure.
As mentioned before SEM environment allows us to construct a latent variable
which can not be measure directly. (See Hair et al. (2010). SEM is superior to mul-
tiple regression analysis and Factor analysis for because they can not handle latent
variables. Furthermore, Factor analysis can not state any information about the
relationships between the different latent variables. SEM consists of two models,
which are the measurement model and the path model. The measurement model
asses the relationship between the construct (Latent variable) and the variables
measuring it. On the other hand, the path model deals with relationships between
the different constructs. In the measurement model we get the loading of each vari-
able. This important because it shows us if this variable is important and if it does
have a relationship with other variables we might use. SEM models parameters can
be estimate using two approaches. These are:
1. Covariance based approach
2. Variance based approach.
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Figure 4.1: Path Diagram of the Model
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Table 4.3: Summary of SEM-PLS Model Fit Measures
Model Fit Measure Notes
Average path coefficient (APC) Ideally P<0.001
Average R-squared Ideally P<0.001
Average adjusted R-squared Ideally P<0.001
Average block VIF Ideally <= 3.3
Average full collinearity VIF Ideally <= 3.3
Tenenhaus GoF Small >= 0.1, medium >= 0.25, large >= 0.36
Sympson’s paradox ratio Acceptable if >= 0.7, ideally = 1
R-squared contribution ratio Acceptable if >= 0.9,
Statistical suppression ratio Acceptable if >= 0.7
Nonlinear bivariate causality direction ratio Acceptable if >= 0.7
In this thesis we intend to use the Variance based approach called Partial Least
Squares (PLS) for the following reasons as discussed by Hair et al. (2012):
(a) The ability of analysing non-normal data.
(b) The ability to deal with small sample sizes.
(c) Formative measurement of latent variables.
In this study our main goal is to compare the capital structure of Islamic banks and
conventional banks. Since the number of Islamic banks in the area of our interest is
considered small, it is important to use PLS as it is able to deal with small sample
size.
4.6 Generalized Regression Neural Networks (GRNN)
Non-linear models have become popular in the literature recently. Several tech-
niques and kinds are available but we use the Generalized Regression Neural Net-
works available from (Palisade Cooperation). Abdou et al. (2012) have used this
method in their study of the retail industry In the UK. They concluded that these
models add insights which can not be done using the conventional regression mod-
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els. Pao (2008) compared the results of ANN and multiple regression analysis in
the context of Capital structure in Taiwan. He highlights the advantages of using
ANN which are that they don’t require any assumptions about the distribution, cor-
relation or missing data. These are in general terms the most problematic issues
face researchers using the multiple regression analysis. Furthermore, Several the-
oretical advantages are important for the use of the ANN. The main one is that
the researcher does not have to set any assumptions or relationships before using
the method. As the ANN will start the relationships through training and learning
processes that is very similar to the way the human brain works. In addition, an
important feature of the ANNs is that is does not require any assumptions about
the underlying population distributions. In this study we use the GRNN which is the
General Regression Neural Networks (GRNN). The output we expect from using
this method is what is called the analysis of variables impact. This results show us
the most important variables that have an impact on the dependent variable regard-
less of the problems that might exist in the data set. These could include the small
data bases and the data bases with variables that have missing data.
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Figure 4.2: GRNN Architecture for two independent numeric variables
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4.7 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics tables are provided in the appendix and the first one is for
the banks data and the rest of the tables are for the non-financial firms data. First,
the banks table shows that the book leverage ratios in the banks of the MENA coun-
tries are considered to be lower in comparison to the sample of Gropp and Heider
(2010). However, the market leverage is higher for the developed banks sample.
Profitability is higher in the MENA sample.
In this section the mean of total debt in book value and market value is analysed.
As these two measures include the short term and long term debt. First, As Table
A.14 show the descriptive statistics for all the countries in this study sample. The
mean for the book value total debt is 18% and for the market value total debt is 20%.
It is notable that the countries leverage ratio means are in the range from 14% to
27% in book values and between 16% and 31% in market value with the exception
of Bahrain where leverage means are low. The countries which are less that the
MENA average are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Palestine, Qatar and UAE. The
rest of the countries are above the average with Tunisia and Oman have the high-
est leverage ratios in this sample. It worth mentioning that the leverage ratios in
the MENA countries are very low in comparison to other developed countries. For
example, Booth et al. (2001) present a descriptive table showing the ratios in devel-
oped and developing countries and it shows that debt is above 30% in developed
countries and above 50% for developing countries.
This thesis use six profitability ratios but for comparison reasons this section will
compare using one ratio which is the operating income to total assets. First, as
stated in the tables in Appendix A.1 the mean of the profitability ratio for the MENA
countries is 6.2%. This average is considered to be low as well in comparison to the
developed world as shown by Wald (1999) study where countries such as the US
135
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION
have a mean profitability of 7.1%. The countries in the MENA countries could be
classified to countries with low profitability mean such as Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait
and Qatar, and countries with high profitability in comparison to the mean such as
Egypt 8.9%, Morocco 11% and Saudi Arabia 8.2%.
The liquidity measure this study use is the current ratio which is the current assets
to current liabilities. As the tables in Appendix A.1 show countries in the MENA
countries are in good condition in terms of liquidity. The mean for the MENA coun-
tries is 2.6 which indicate that firms have two times and half the current liabilities in
current assets. Overall the countries in the sample are within the same range with
the exception of Morocco where the liquidity ratio is low with 1.89. De Jong et al.
(2008) study present a descriptive statistics and comparing to that we could see
that countries in the MENA region are in same range with developed economies if
not better in some cases.
The ratio used to present volatility is the standard deviation of the share price. Other
studies used the standard deviation of the operating income which is not possible
in this study due to lack of quarterly data. The mean of the MENA countries risk
measures is %49. Countries with a volatile market in the sample where Kuwait and
UAE which an average percentage of 69% and 59%. Size is defined as the logarith-
mic of sales. The countries in the sample are in the range between 16 and 19. Two
widely used ratios to represent the size are the logarithmic of total assets where the
range is between 5 and 10 and the logarithmic of sales where the range is between
16 and 19. This study used the logarithmic of sales because of high correlations for
the log of total assets. Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets
and it is a measure of how much of the firms assets are fixed assets. The mean
of the MENA countries is 26%. Which is considered to be high in comparison to
the US and the UK in De Jong et al. (2008) study where the mean is 14% and 8%
respectively. Furthermore, we notice that Bahrain, Jordan Oman and UAE have a
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higher mean than the other countries in the sample where the mean is higher than
30%.
The non-debt tax shield is a measure of the tax benefit a firm can take advantage of
when using debt. It is defined as the depreciation and amortization expense to the
total assets. The MENA countries average is 2.6% which is considered low when
compared to the developed countries such as Wald (1999). The countries in the
sample are in the rate of 2% to 3%. Except Bahrain, Morocco and Palestine which
are lower than that. On the other hand, Qatar and Oman have a high percentage
with 4.7% and 5.6% respectively.
Dividends is defined as the dividends payment amount to the total assets. On av-
erage, the MENA firms pay 2.9% out of the total assets in dividends. As the tables
in Appendix A.1 show Tunisia and Jordan are the lowest in the sample with an
average of 1.8% and 1.5% respectively. On the other hand, Bahrain, Qatar and
Saudi Arabia are the highest in the MENA countries with 4.1% and 4.5% and 4.1%
respectively. Growth opportunities variable is defined as the average percentage
of yearly growth for the last eight years. As the tables in Appendix A.1 show the
growth rate for the MENA countries which is 0.4%. All the countries in the sample
are within the same range with the exception for Qatar in which it is 0.8%.
4.8 The Correlation Matrix
The following twelve tables show the correlation tables for the countries in the sam-
ple. It does include the leverage measures as well as the determinants of capital
structure. As the Panel data analysis require that the dependent variable should
not have a high correlation with the independent variable these tables were used to
decide which determinants ratios should be included in order to eliminate the endo-
geneity problem. As for the other approaches such as the SEM-PLS and the GRNN
it is not required as these sophisticated approaches can handle such issues.
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Table 4.4: Bahrain Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Bahrain A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A LTDBVA 1.00
B STDBVA 0.41 1.00
C TDBVA 0.79 0.78 1.00
D LTDMVE 0.76 0.35 0.69 1.00
E STDMVE 0.30 0.84 0.75 0.33 1.00
F TDMVE 0.57 0.79 0.88 0.71 0.90 1.00
G Profita 0.07 -0.30 -0.17 0.01 -0.47 -0.35 1.00
H Liquidi -0.31 -0.40 -0.40 -0.32 -0.36 -0.41 -0.11 1.00
I Volat -0.16 -0.13 -0.19 -0.15 -0.15 -0.18 -0.06 0.29 1.00
J Size 0.46 0.23 0.47 0.41 0.23 0.36 0.40 -0.44 -0.30 1.00
K Tangibi 0.45 0.16 0.34 0.36 0.13 0.26 0.04 -0.44 -0.15 0.30 1.00
L Tax 0.11 -0.09 0.06 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 0.11 -0.21 -0.06 0.14 0.29 1.00
M Dividen -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.13 -0.18 -0.19 0.26 0.02 -0.01 0.12 -0.25 0.12 1.00
N Growth 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 0.09 0.01 0.05 1.00
O Fcash -0.28 -0.44 -0.40 -0.25 -0.40 -0.41 0.27 0.41 0.15 -0.12 -0.36 -0.02 0.28 0.01 1.00
Table 4.5: Egypt Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Egypt A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A LTDBVA 1.00
B STDBVA 0.22 1.00
C TDBVA -0.13 0.00 1.00
D LTDMVE 0.64 0.23 -0.13 1.00
E STDMVE 0.31 0.68 -0.01 0.40 1.00
F TDMVE -0.06 -0.03 0.71 -0.03 0.02 1.00
G Profita 0.13 -0.08 -0.16 -0.02 -0.01 -0.16 1.00
H Liquidi 0.03 -0.04 -0.22 0.05 -0.03 -0.19 0.00 1.00
I Volat -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 1.00
J Size -0.16 -0.17 0.17 -0.12 -0.12 0.19 0.26 -0.26 0.02 1.00
K Tangibi 0.08 0.19 0.03 0.15 0.23 0.07 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.12 1.00
L Tax 0.30 0.07 -0.05 0.17 0.17 -0.07 -0.10 0.06 -0.04 -0.16 0.07 1.00
M Dividen 0.14 -0.07 -0.17 -0.03 -0.05 -0.18 0.60 0.04 0.00 0.18 -0.11 -0.07 1.00
N Growth -0.12 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 0.27 0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.09 -0.14 1.00
O Fcash -0.06 -0.06 0.09 -0.07 -0.06 0.10 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.18 -0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.02 1.00
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Table 4.6: Jordan Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Jordan A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A LTDBVA 1.00
B STDBVA 0.08 1.00
C TDBVA 0.34 0.69 1.00
D LTDMVE 0.80 0.00 0.29 1.00
E STDMVE 0.02 0.79 0.71 0.05 1.00
F TDMVE 0.28 0.58 0.84 0.36 0.76 1.00
G Profita -0.15 -0.11 -0.18 -0.19 -0.20 -0.23 1.00
H Liquidi -0.11 -0.08 -0.31 -0.06 -0.18 -0.28 0.06 1.00
I Volat 0.11 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 0.05 1.00
J Size -0.06 0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.06 0.10 0.47 -0.14 -0.19 1.00
K Tangibi 0.08 -0.15 -0.10 0.05 -0.13 -0.12 -0.06 -0.16 -0.04 0.09 1.00
L Tax 0.26 0.12 -0.10 0.17 -0.04 -0.12 -0.14 0.16 0.02 -0.16 0.00 1.00
M Dividen -0.13 -0.20 -0.28 -0.14 -0.25 -0.30 0.56 0.12 -0.08 0.30 -0.04 -0.02 1.00
N Growth -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 0.00 -0.08 -0.09 0.21 0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.05 0.02 1.00
O Fcash -0.06 -0.25 -0.21 -0.10 -0.24 -0.13 0.25 0.29 0.07 0.06 -0.22 -0.06 0.25 0.09 1.00
Table 4.7: Kuwait Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Kuwait A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A LTDBVA 1.00
B STDBVA 0.17 1.00
C TDBVA 0.60 0.69 1.00
D LTDMVE 0.74 0.14 0.63 1.00
E STDMVE 0.24 0.78 0.62 0.20 1.00
F TDMVE 0.42 0.63 0.84 0.65 0.74 1.00
G Profita 0.03 -0.16 -0.07 -0.03 -0.24 -0.20 1.00
H Liquidi -0.23 -0.34 -0.44 -0.27 -0.29 -0.40 0.12 1.00
I Volat -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 1.00
J Size 0.10 0.16 0.29 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.27 -0.31 -0.24 1.00
K Tangibi 0.27 0.06 0.20 0.29 -0.13 0.07 0.08 -0.20 0.23 0.02 1.00
L Tax 0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.11 -0.04 0.10 -0.06 0.08 0.06 0.19 1.00
M Dividen -0.15 -0.24 -0.26 -0.20 -0.27 -0.31 0.45 0.37 -0.09 0.06 -0.09 0.10 1.00
N Growth 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.11 -0.06 -0.04 0.09 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 1.00
O Fcash -0.26 -0.25 -0.34 -0.23 -0.25 -0.32 0.14 0.38 -0.06 -0.02 -0.17 0.06 0.29 -0.03 1.00
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Table 4.8: Morocco Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Morroco A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A LTDBVA 1.00
B STDBVA 0.06 1.00
C TDBVA 0.77 0.65 1.00
D LTDMVE 0.87 0.09 0.70 1.00
E STDMVE 0.04 0.79 0.53 0.16 1.00
F TDMVE 0.57 0.60 0.80 0.73 0.79 1.00
G Profita -0.35 -0.38 -0.50 -0.48 -0.48 -0.63 1.00
H Liquidi -0.08 -0.35 -0.27 -0.14 -0.32 -0.31 0.38 1.00
I Volat 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.16 -0.17 -0.02 1.00
J Size 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.17 -0.25 -0.18 1.00
K Tangibi 0.40 -0.04 0.28 0.26 -0.18 0.04 0.06 -0.31 -0.09 0.56 1.00
L Tax 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 -0.10 0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.19 0.24 1.00
M Dividen -0.16 -0.16 -0.22 -0.26 -0.26 -0.34 0.59 0.36 -0.07 0.21 0.09 0.21 1.00
N Growth 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 1.00
O Fcash -0.19 -0.18 -0.26 -0.20 -0.13 -0.21 0.16 0.17 -0.13 -0.06 -0.12 -0.06 0.09 0.09 1.00
Table 4.9: Oman Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Oman A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A LTDBVA 1.00
B STDBVA 0.25 1.00
C TDBVA 0.08 -0.02 1.00
D LTDMVE 0.81 0.21 0.11 1.00
E STDMVE 0.17 0.76 -0.02 0.34 1.00
F TDMVE 0.02 0.23 0.76 0.02 0.16 1.00
G Profita 0.04 -0.16 -0.42 -0.05 -0.25 -0.46 1.00
H Liquidi 0.06 -0.11 -0.33 0.13 -0.11 -0.39 0.18 1.00
I Volat -0.03 0.10 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 1.00
J Size -0.07 -0.30 -0.15 -0.16 -0.37 -0.27 0.50 -0.02 -0.09 1.00
K Tangibi 0.42 0.34 0.11 0.43 0.34 0.17 -0.28 0.03 0.00 -0.45 1.00
L Tax 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.36 0.35 -0.04 -0.13 0.04 -0.03 -0.27 0.37 1.00
M Dividen 0.02 -0.10 -0.35 -0.04 -0.18 -0.41 0.43 0.21 -0.05 0.29 -0.18 -0.07 1.00
N Growth 0.07 -0.07 -0.06 0.02 -0.12 -0.07 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.08 -0.06 0.07 1.00
O Fcash -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.13 0.11 0.01 -0.03 0.14 -0.16 -0.07 0.07 0.06 1.00
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Table 4.10: Palestine Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
.
Pals A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A LTDBVA 1.00
B STDBVA 0.66 1.00
C TDBVA 0.66 0.68 1.00
D LTDMVE 0.11 0.42 0.00 1.00
E STDMVE -0.18 -0.04 -0.38 0.87 1.00
F TDMVE -0.13 0.04 -0.30 0.63 0.67 1.00
G Profita -0.10 -0.19 -0.11 -0.24 -0.11 -0.45 1.00
H Liquidi -0.14 -0.34 0.05 -0.52 -0.35 -0.58 0.35 1.00
I Volat 0.02 0.04 -0.12 0.31 0.35 0.25 -0.07 -0.13 1.00
J Size -0.19 -0.24 -0.25 -0.16 -0.01 0.16 0.40 -0.20 -0.03 1.00
K Tangibi 0.46 0.72 0.28 0.78 0.52 0.27 -0.14 -0.28 0.23 -0.33 1.00
L Tax 0.30 0.29 0.01 0.62 0.54 0.19 0.02 -0.12 0.20 -0.45 0.62 1.00
M Dividen 0.03 -0.18 0.04 -0.39 -0.30 -0.59 0.77 0.38 -0.09 0.21 -0.26 0.00 1.00
N Growth -0.37 -0.63 -0.41 -0.42 -0.09 -0.20 0.38 0.49 0.00 -0.01 -0.46 -0.02 0.45 1.00
O Fcash 0.30 -0.08 -0.06 -0.31 -0.23 -0.42 0.34 0.42 0.00 -0.36 0.05 0.34 0.51 0.49 1.00
Table 4.11: Qatar Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Qatar A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A LTDBVA 1.00
B STDBVA 0.42 1.00
C TDBVA 0.37 0.03 1.00
D LTDMVE -0.02 0.07 0.04 1.00
E STDMVE -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.25 1.00
F TDMVE -0.05 -0.16 0.01 0.07 -0.17 1.00
G Profita 0.02 0.05 0.13 -0.01 0.10 -0.04 1.00
H Liquidi -0.08 0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 -0.02 1.00
I Volat -0.15 -0.03 -0.03 -0.17 0.04 0.23 -0.03 -0.05 1.00
J Size -0.14 -0.17 0.28 -0.14 0.02 0.09 0.40 -0.28 0.08 1.00
K Tangibi 0.03 0.04 -0.14 0.23 0.12 -0.36 0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.15 1.00
L Tax -0.05 -0.04 -0.32 -0.14 -0.07 -0.15 -0.09 -0.08 -0.14 -0.33 0.09 1.00
M Dividen -0.05 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.17 -0.45 0.18 0.00 -0.14 0.37 0.22 0.03 1.00
N Growth -0.11 -0.03 -0.14 -0.03 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 1.00
O Fcash -0.18 -0.11 0.02 0.00 0.27 -0.20 0.31 -0.02 0.00 0.30 0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.05 1.00
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Table 4.12: Saudi Arabia Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Saudi A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A LTDBVA 1.00
B STDBVA 0.35 1.00
C TDBVA -0.09 -0.14 1.00
D LTDMVE -0.07 0.03 0.08 1.00
E STDMVE -0.06 0.02 -0.05 0.58 1.00
F TDMVE 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.05 -0.02 1.00
G Profita -0.11 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.12 -0.34 1.00
H Liquidi -0.06 -0.04 0.08 -0.08 -0.06 0.01 0.05 1.00
I Volat 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.08 0.11 -0.12 0.02 1.00
J Size -0.06 0.01 0.11 -0.09 -0.16 0.37 0.33 -0.05 -0.11 1.00
K Tangibi -0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.17 0.17 -0.12 0.03 -0.11 -0.07 -0.16 1.00
L Tax -0.10 -0.07 0.10 0.31 0.33 -0.05 0.06 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 1.00
M Dividen -0.07 0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.14 -0.31 0.62 0.05 -0.16 0.22 -0.04 -0.05 1.00
N Growth 0.00 0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.02 -0.05 1.00
O Fcash 0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.32 -0.13 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 1.00
Table 4.13: Tunisia Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Tunisia A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
LTDBVA 1.00
STDBVA 0.16 1.00
TDBVA 0.55 0.73 1.00
LTDMVE 0.18 0.10 0.23 1.00
STDMVE 0.19 0.06 0.19 0.34 1.00
TDMVE 0.23 0.10 0.26 0.79 0.84 1.00
Profita 0.23 0.02 0.17 0.12 0.24 0.22 1.00
Liquidi -0.07 -0.05 -0.17 -0.22 -0.29 -0.31 -0.08 1.00
Volat 0.35 -0.12 0.15 0.15 0.37 0.33 0.13 -0.07 1.00
Size -0.04 0.32 0.13 0.19 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.06 -0.08 1.00
Tangibi -0.25 0.05 -0.04 0.21 -0.01 0.12 0.03 -0.22 -0.04 -0.21 1.00
Tax 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.25 0.19 0.08 -0.07 0.20 -0.15 0.28 1.00
Dividen -0.12 -0.08 -0.16 -0.28 -0.29 -0.35 -0.19 0.24 -0.17 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 1.00
Growth -0.15 0.19 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.13 0.34 -0.16 0.26 -0.09 -0.19 -0.08 1.00
Fcash -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.10 0.42 0.00 0.30 -0.19 -0.07 -0.05 0.22 1.00
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Table 4.14: UAE Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
UAE A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
LTDBVA 1.00
STDBVA 0.41 1.00
TDBVA 0.33 0.05 1.00
LTDMVE -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 1.00
STDMVE -0.14 -0.08 0.07 0.29 1.00
TDMVE -0.06 -0.03 -0.14 0.14 -0.16 1.00
Profita 0.20 0.06 0.26 -0.01 -0.06 -0.27 1.00
Liquidi 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.17 -0.06 1.00
Volat -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 -0.08 0.03 1.00
Size 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.29 0.04 0.32 -0.10 -0.07 1.00
Tangibi 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.43 0.26 0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.01 -0.19 1.00
Tax 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.22 -0.13 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.15 0.42 1.00
Dividen 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.20 0.25 0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.12 -0.08 1.00
Growth 0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 -0.08 0.23 0.01 -0.08 0.17 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1.00
Fcash -0.06 -0.07 0.15 -0.13 -0.16 -0.11 0.11 -0.05 0.03 0.38 -0.21 -0.09 0.14 0.04 1.00
Table 4.15: MENA Correlation for Panel Data
This table shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression. Book
debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market
debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability
is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability
to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the
logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
MENA Variable A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
A LTD/BVA 1.00
B STD/BVA 0.23 1.00
C TDBVA 0.18 0.28 1.00
D LTD/MVA 0.47 0.13 0.19 1.00
E STD/MVA 0.12 0.52 0.23 0.33 1.00
F TD/MVA 0.12 0.27 0.61 0.25 0.35 1.00
G Profitability 0.04 -0.10 -0.14 -0.06 -0.14 -0.25 1.00
H Liquidity -0.04 -0.09 -0.19 -0.05 -0.11 -0.22 0.02 1.00
I Risk -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.02 1.00
J Size -0.02 -0.03 0.07 -0.03 -0.10 0.06 0.33 -0.14 -0.10 1.00
K Tangibility 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.26 0.15 0.08 -0.09 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 1.00
L Debt Tax 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.18 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.12 0.16 1.00
M Dividends 0.01 -0.10 -0.16 -0.08 -0.17 -0.29 0.49 0.10 -0.06 0.21 -0.08 -0.03 1.00
N Growth -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.08 0.11 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.04 1.00
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4.9 Factors Loading
The major advantage of using WarPls SEM software is that it can deal with missing
data and small data bases efficiently. As we could see in the following tables the
measurement model factor loading. These tables indicate the loading of each vari-
able with the main construct (factor) and if it is significant or not. As a researcher
we should set up a cut off point for the loading of the variables. Variables with very
low loading should be dropped from the model or it might cause the construct to
be under estimated. According to Hair et al. (2010) and Hulland (1999) no loading
should be below 0.40 and in extreme cases nothing should be below 0.20.
The first Table 4.16 is the banks sample loading factor table. As it shows the factor
loadings chosen for the banks study are above the required rule of 0.2. One more
important point is that it should have the same sign as the other variables under the
same factor which is also met.
The tables after that are the factor loading for the MENA countries non- financial
firms. First, is the table which include all MENA countries sample and as it shows
that all the loading are above the 0.20 mark. The exception is for the MTB, EFFTAX,
DVDPO, CATA, and CALTD which all have the inverse sign to the other variables
and therefore were dropped.
Then, Table 4.18 shows the table for Bahrain, the variables which are dropped are
EFFTAX, BETA, and DVDPO because of an inverse sign. EBITDEPTA is dropped
due to low loading value. Table 4.19 shows the loading for Egypt and the follow-
ing are dropped which are EFFTAX, DVDPO, CALTD, and CASTD for inverse sign.
Moreover, Table 4.20 for Jordan and the dropped variables are MTB, NFATA, EFF-
TAX, and DVDPO. Then Table 4.21 shows Kuwait loading and the dropped vari-
ables are PM for low loading. Also, VOLA for the inverse sign.
Furthermore, Morocco table shows that EFFTAX, STDROA and DVDPO for having
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an inverse sign. Table 4.25 shows Qatar SEM factor loading and the dropped vari-
ables are CETA, DEP/OI and DVDPO for having and inverse relation. In Saudi Ara-
bia factors loading Table 4.26 TAGR, GTS, EFFTAX, DVDPO, CALTD and CASTD
for having a negative sign.
In the same fashion, the table showing the Tunisia which is Table 4.27 shows that
many variables are dropped. These are MTB, NFATA, EFFTAX, STDROA, VOLA,
DPS and EBITDEPTA. Finally, the UAE Table 4.28 show that PM, CETA, DEP/OI,
BETA, DIVTA, CALTD and CASTD are dropped.
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Table 4.16: Banks SEM Factor Loding
Variables Prof Size Growth Age Tax Risk Dividend Liquid CR Ownership
PM -0.86
OPM -0.86
ROE -0.82
ROA -0.8
MCAP -0.84
TASSETS -0.96
REVENUE -0.92
GR_EPS -0.379
GR_ASSETS -0.872
GR_REV -0.873
AGE -1
DEP_TAX -1
VOLAT -0.72
BETA -0.37
ALPHA -0.71
DIVDP -0.359
DIVPS -0.87
DVDPO -0.869
INTERB (-0.325)
NTL_TA -0.905
NTL_STF -0.644
NTL_TDE -0.75
LIQ_DEP (-0.689)
LIQ_TDE (-0.359)
CR_SP -0.7
CR_FITCH -0.82
CR_MODY -0.41
CR_CI -0.32
OWN_IND -0.361
OWN_HOL -0.082
OW_COO -0.388
OW_INSU -0.26
OW_BANK -0.53
OW_GOV -0.375
OW_ADV -0.725
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Table 4.17: MENA SEM Loding
Variables Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Flow Liqud
OITA 0.987
ROA 0.992
ROE 0.974
PM 0.802
OI/SAL 0.795
EBIT/SAL 0.826
EBIT/TA 0.994
LNSAL 0.993
LNMV 0.996
LNTA 0.994
TAGR 0.961
GTS 0.964
MTB (-0.487)
CE/TA 0.023
NFA/TA 0.12
INA/TA 0.992
TANG/TA 0.999
INVP/TA 0.998
DEP/TA 0.985
EFFTAX (-0.911)
DEP/OI 0.986
STDROE 1
STDROA 1
VOLA 0.104
BETA 0
DIV/TA 0.949
DVDPO (-0.869)
DPS 0.971
CA/TA (-0.075)
CA/LTD (-0.100)
CA/STD 0.983
EBITDEP/TA 0.983
CURRAT 0.819
QUIRAT 1
CASRAT 0.999
WCRAT 0.999
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Table 4.18: Bahrain SEM Factor Loading
Variables Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Flow Liqud
OITA 0.844
ROA 0.804
ROE 0.77
PM 0.675
OI/SAL 0.919
EBIT/SAL 0.916
EBIT/TA 0.858
LNSAL 0.75
LNMV 0.762
LNTA 0.76
TAGR 0.881
GTS 0.731
MTB 0.815
CE/TA 0.593
NFA/TA 0.629
INA/TA 0.659
TANG/TA 0.7
INVP/TA 0.705
DEP/TA 0.903
EFFTAX (-0.767)
DEP/OI 0.851
STDROE 0.98
STDROA 0.98
VOLA 0.78
BETA (-0.096)
DIV/TA (-0.129)
DVDPO 0.719
DPS 0.895
CA/TA 0.851
CA/LTD 0.844
CA/STD 0.767
EBITDEP/TA 0.221
CURRAT 0.547
QUIRAT 0.897
CASRAT 0.902
WCRAT 0.884
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Table 4.19: Egypt SEM Factor Loading
Variables Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Flow Liquid
OITA 0.787
ROA 0.844
ROE 0.82
PM 0.957
OI/SAL 0.96
EBIT/SAL 0.962
EBIT/TA 0.832
LNSAL 0.817
LNMV 0.869
LNTA 0.884
TAGR 0.795
GTS 0.993
MTB 0.531
CE/TA 0.531
NFA/TA 0.085
TANG/TA 0.963
INA/TA 0.941
INVP/TA 0.902
DEP/TA 0.957
EFFTAX (-0.173)
DEP/OI 0.999
STDROE 1
STDROA 1
VOLA 0.225
BETA 0.473
DIV/TA 0.852
DVDPO (-0.802)
DPS 0.935
CA/LTD (-0.258)
CA/STD (-0.153)
CA/TA 0.947
EBITDEP/TA 0.948
CURRAT 0.918
QUIRAT 0.974
CASRAT 0.97
WCRAT 0.981
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Table 4.20: Jordan SEM Factor Loading
Variables Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Liqud
OITA 0.739
ROA 0.776
ROE 0.799
PM 0.936
OI/SAL 0.625
EBIT/SAL 0.85
EBIT/TA 0.713
LNSAL 0.837
LNMV 0.741
LNTA 0.854
TAGR 0.915
GTS 0.94
MTB (-0.668)
CE/TA 0.647
NFA/TA (-0.401)
TANG/TA 0.841
INA/TA 0.89
INVP/TA 0.826
DEP/TA 0.606
EFFTAX (-0.944)
DEP/OI 0.995
STDROE 1
STDROA 1
VOLA 0.238
BETA 0.462
DIV/TA 0.818
DVDPO (-0.366)
DPS 0.815
CA/LTD 0.796
CA/STD 0.847
CA/TA 0.866
EBITDEP/TA 0.662
CURRAT 0.507
QUIRAT 0.983
CASRAT 0.986
WCRAT 0.982
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Table 4.21: Kuwait SEM Factor Loading
Variables Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Liqud
OITA 0.853
ROA 0.807
ROE 0.833
PM 0.158
OI/SAL 0.926
EBIT/SAL 0.928
EBIT/TA 0.847
LNSAL 0.868
LNMV 0.886
LNTA 0.89
TAGR 0.95
GTS 0.992
MTB 0.911
CE/TA 0.314
NFA/TA 0.1
TANG/TA 0.945
INA/TA 0.932
INVP/TA 0.91
DEP/TA 0.98
EFFTAX 0.843
DEP/OI 0.979
STDROE 1
STDROA 1
VOLA (-0.061)
BETA 0.155
DIV/TA 0.799
DVDPO 0.981
DPS 0.868
CA/LTD 0.721
CA/STD 0.8
CA/TA 0.864
EBITDEP/TA 0.788
CURRAT 0.86
QUIRAT 0.871
CASRAT 0.882
WCRAT 0.894
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Table 4.22: Morocco SEM Factor Loading
Variables Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Flow Liqud
OITA 0.694
ROA 0.696
ROE 0.912
PM 0.823
OI/SAL 0.593
EBIT/SAL 0.798
EBIT/TA 0.688
LNSAL 0.906
LNMV 0.796
LNTA 0.891
TAGR 0.986
GTS 0.955
MTB 0.253
CE/TA 0.568
NFA/TA 0.229
TANG/TA 0.854
INA/TA 0.865
INVP/TA 0.83
DEP/TA 0.94
EFFTAX (-0.416)
DEP/OI 0.951
STDROE 0.026
STDROA (-0.026)
VOLA 0.905
BETA 0.826
DIV/TA 0.738
DVDPO (-0.603)
DPS 0.859
CA/LTD 0.909
CA/STD 0.943
CA/TA 0.726
EBITDEP/TA 0.478
CURRAT 0.839
QUIRAT 0.852
CASRAT 0.837
WCRAT 0.831
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Table 4.23: Oman SEM Factor Loading
Variables Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Flow Liqud
OITA 0.776
ROA 0.784
ROE 0.783
PM 0.819
OI/SAL 0.995
EBIT/SAL 0.995
EBIT/TA 0.782
LNSAL 0.778
LNMV 0.827
LNTA 0.862
TAGR (-0.889)
GTS (-0.977)
MTB 0.986
CE/TA 0.515
NFA/TA 0.588
TANG/TA 0.862
INA/TA 0.859
INVP/TA 0.817
DEP/TA (-0.872)
EFFTAX 0.918
DEP/OI 0.987
STDROE 1
STDROA 1
VOLA 0.082
BETA (-0.103)
DIV/TA 0.826
DVDPO (-0.678)
DPS 0.908
CA/LTD 0.924
CA/STD 0.846
CA/TA (-0.912)
EBITDEP/TA (-0.798)
CURRAT 0.944
QUIRAT 0.999
CASRAT 0.942
WCRAT 0.931
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Table 4.24: Palestine SEM Factor Loading
Variables Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Flow Liqud
OITA 0.686
ROA 0.758
ROE 0.799
PM 0.917
OI/SAL 0.926
EBIT/SAL 0.914
EBIT/TA 0.761
LNSAL 0.744
LNMV 0.848
LNTA 0.871
TAGR (-0.666)
GTS 0.919
MTB 0.641
CE/TA 0.326
NFA/TA (-0.113)
TANG/TA 0.999
INA/TA 0.999
INVP/TA 0.638
DEP/TA 0.833
EFFTAX (-0.163)
DEP/OI 0.482
STDROE 0.819
STDROA 0.819
VOLA 0.495
BETA 0.089
DIV/TA 0.775
DVDPO (-0.032)
DPS 0.84
CA/LTD 0.437
CA/STD 0.462
CA/TA 0.748
EBITDEP/TA 0.73
CURRAT 0.725
QUIRAT 0.825
CASRAT 0.606
WCRAT 0.723
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Table 4.25: Qatar SEM Factor Loading
Variables Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Flow Liqud
OITA 0.764
ROA 0.616
ROE 0.626
PM 0.242
OI/SAL 0.862
EBIT/SAL 0.865
EBIT/TA 0.779
LNSAL 0.66
LNMV 0.729
LNTA 0.772
TAGR 0.993
GTS 0.905
MTB 0.73
CE/TA (-0.087)
NFA/TA 0.37
TANG/TA 0.788
INA/TA 0.667
INVP/TA 0.657
DEP/TA 0.672
EFFTAX 0.445
DEP/OI (-0.736)
STDROE 0.927
STDROA 0.926
VOLA 0.805
BETA 0.495
DIV/TA 0.79
DVDPO (-0.852)
DPS 0.728
CA/LTD 0.812
CA/STD 0.877
CA/TA 0.815
EBITDEP/TA 0.684
CURRAT 0.979
QUIRAT 0.974
CASRAT 0.975
WCRAT 0.977
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Table 4.26: Saudi Arabia SEM Factor Loading
Variables Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Flow Liqud
OITA 0.786
ROA 0.812
ROE 0.849
PM 0.863
OI/SAL 0.815
EBIT/SAL 0.801
EBIT/TA 0.794
LNSAL 0.811
LNMV 0.818
LNTA 0.862
TAGR (-0.265)
GTS (-0.968)
MTB 0.98
CE/TA 0.641
NFA/TA 0.324
TANG/TA 0.822
INA/TA 0.866
INVP/TA 0.869
DEP/TA 0.959
EFFTAX (-0.879)
DEP/OI 0.992
STDROE 0.997
STDROA 0.997
VOLA 0.704
BETA 0.426
DIV/TA 0.815
DVDPO (-0.639)
DPS 0.79
CA/LTD (-0.749)
CA/STD (-0.582)
CA/TA 0.932
EBITDEP/TA 0.919
CURRAT 0.995
QUIRAT 0.999
CASRAT 0.996
WCRAT 0.993
156
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION
Table 4.27: Tunisia SEM Factor Loading
Variables Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Flow Liqud
OITA 0.94
ROA 0.972
ROE 0.975
PM 0.953
OI/SAL 0.768
EBIT/SAL 0.875
EBIT/TA 0.978
LNSAL 0.95
LNMV 0.763
LNTA 0.898
TAGR 0.584
GTS 0.592
MTB (-0.083)
CE/TA 0.603
NFA/TA (-0.518)
TANG/TA 0.597
INA/TA 0.594
INVP/TA 0.595
DEP/TA 0.918
EFFTAX (-0.850)
DEP/OI 0.922
STDROE 0.314
STDROA (-0.314)
VOLA (-0.931)
BETA 0.875
DIV/TA 0.886
DVDPO (-0.582)
DPS 0.955
CA/LTD 0.758
CA/STD 0.622
CA/TA 0.539
EBITDEP/TA (-0.056)
CURRAT 0.955
QUIRAT 0.875
CASRAT 0.855
WCRAT 0.753
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Table 4.28: UAE SEM Factor Loading
Prof Size Growth Tang Tax Risk Divdend Cash Flow Liqud
OITA 0.924
ROA 0.936
ROE 0.916
PM (-0.918)
OI/SAL 0.927
EBIT/SAL 0.934
EBIT/TA 0.959
LNSAL 0.836
LNMV 0.805
LNTA 0.822
TAGR 0.863
GTS 0.957
MTB 0.973
CE/TA (-0.101)
NFA/TA 0.64
TANG/TA 0.849
INA/TA 0.874
INVP/TA 0.884
DEP/TA 0.468
EFFTAX 0.879
DEP/OI (-0.853)
STDROE 0.999
STDROA 0.999
VOLA 0.387
BETA (-0.488)
DIV/TA (-0.651)
DVDPO 0.924
DPS 0.972
CA/LTD (-0.604)
CA/STD (-0.309)
CA/TA 0.867
EBITDEP/TA 0.869
CURRAT 0.968
QUIRAT 0.99
CASRAT 0.999
WCRAT 0.573
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Chapter 5
Capital Structure In Non-Financial firms
5.1 Introduction
T
he original work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) sets the starting point for
research in capital structure.They argued that under several assump-
tions the capital structure have no effect on the value of the company.
For the last half of the century since their propositions and the debate continue .
The importance of the problem is what fuels more researcher to study what deter-
mine a company capital structure. The reason behind such a substantial interest is
the importance of the problem to both academics,financial analysts and managers.
As initiated before the propose of this chapter is to present the results and findings
of the MENA countries using the different models.
Furthermore, despite the importance of the MENA region countries which include
countries like Saudi Arabia the largest oil producers in the world limited number of
studies compared the capital structure of MENA countries.Al-Sakran (2001) inves-
tigated the Saudi Arabian listed companies but he used a data range from 1993 to
1997. Sbeti and Moosa (2011) covered only four countries out of the GCC coun-
tries. As well as their role they also represent a very unique characteristic where
there are neither corporate taxes nor personal taxes, only Zakat. As argued by
Barakat and Rao (2003) this uniqueness may result in different determinants of
capital structure. Furthermore, financial institutions are excluded in the literature
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due to the fact that they are under the government regulations and therefore they
don’t have a choice to make in regards to their capital structure.However,despite
existence of regulations which control the banks leverage behavior bankers still
have some flexibility within a specific range were they could determine their capital
structure. This chapter will include only the non-financial firms.
The objective of this chapter is to investigate empirically the capital structure the-
ories which are the trade off-theory and the pecking order theory in MENA coun-
tries by three different methods namely the Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Panel
data models and Tobit model, Dynamical models, Structural equation modelling
and GRNN. This chapter will also compare these models and their results for the
different capital structure theories. This chapter is structured as follows. Section
(5.2) provides a brief literature review of the determinants of capital structure. Sec-
tion (5.3) provides the model. In section (5.4) the empirical results are presented.
Finally, section (6.5) concludes this chapter with a discussion of the findings and
main results.
5.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Since the starting point set by the Modigliani and Miller (1958) work where they
show that under specific assumption the capital structure relation to firms value is
irrelevant. This assumption opened the door for further investigation towards what
factors are relevant in the capital structure choice. In a later paper Modigliani and
Miller (1963) they proposed a second idea, which is adding taxes to their model
and as a result they argued that from a tax point firms should use as much as debt
as they can to take advantage of the net debt tax shield. After their work several
theories tried to relax the assumptions which are the trade-off theory, pecking order
theory.
A group of empirical studies focus on cross-country comparison of the capital
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structure determinants. For instance, Wald (1999) used a sample from five devel-
oped countries namely France, UK, Germany, Japan and USA. He concluded that
although similarities of the leverage mean and factors, substantial differences exist.
Furthermore, Rajan and Zingales (1995) used a sample from the G-7 countries and
advised that after deeper analysis the theoretical foundation for the correlations are
still unanswered. In contrast De Jong et al. (2008)used a sample of 42 countries
around the world and they found that firm specific factors are not the same. They
also added that the country factors have a significant influence on how companies
chose their capital structure. The MENA region countries include the largest oil
producers and their emerging markets are growing rapidly, they also make a very
interesting area of research as the absence of taxes might have a large impact on
the other determinants of capital structure. Few research papers have addressed
and focused on the comparison between the countries in this region.
Sbeti (2010) study addressed a comparison of the GCC countries but the sam-
ple included only 4 out of the 6 countries forming the GCC which all have Zakat
only system. This study covered the period from 1998 to 2005 and employed an
adjustments model which would show speed and costs. They concluded that since
there is a not tax in these countries the effect of the tax is less vital. It is also
worth mentioning that industrial effects and government ownership were not inves-
tigated.Another study by Barakat and Rao (2003) addressed a comparison between
taxed and Zakat Arab countries. However, there study did not differentiate the sam-
ple and results base on countries, instead they pooled the data based on the tax
system.
A couple of studies were conducted on a specific country only such as Al-Sakran
(2001) and Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) which is Saudi Arabia. The first did focus on the
differences between sectors and suggested that the low benefits of debt tax shield
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contributed to the low level of leverage. On the other hand the later tested the
determinants of capital structure in Saudi Arabia and argued that companies try to
minimize their debt below 33% to be included in Sahria compliance portfolios. He
also concluded that the Saudi companies rely heavily on banks as they do not have
any other source of debt and therfore tend to borrow less and short term rather than
long term. They also suggest that future research should use other methodologies
and specifically use the surveys approach.
Different methodologies are used in the research of capital structure. The major-
ity used the OLS regression, some use the ordinary regression such as De Jong
et al. (2008), others used panel data models like Zeitun and Tian (2007), Al-Ajmi
et al. (2009), Sbeti and Moosa (2011), Sheikh and Wang (2011) . In contrast stud-
ies recommend the use of Tobit proposed by James Tobin (1958) model which is a
censored regression model like Wald (1999) and Rajan and Zingales (1995). When
researchers try to answer how firms decide on their capital structure they tend to
hypotheses several determinants and then test them empirically to reject or accept
their assumptions.The theories we are interested in testing propose a specific sign
for each proxy which might be the same in some proxies and could differ in others.
5.2.1 Leverage
The dependent variables are defined using either by using market or book leverage.
Although there is no strong evidence about the short or long term of debt it is ac-
cepted to test for the different measure in the capital structure literature. Therefore,
this study would use the following measures of leverage:
1. Short-Term debt in market values
2. Long-Term debt in market values
3. Total debt in market values
163
CHAPTER 5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS
4. Short-Term debt in book values
5. Long-Term debt book values
6. Total debt book values
5.2.2 Profitability
In basic business terms the existence of firms is to generate profits and increase
the firm value. The relation between the profitability and the leverage is positive
as suggested by the trade-off theory, bankruptcy costs, taxes and agency theory.
When the firms generate more profits its bankruptcy expectation costs drop and
therefore they have more incentive to utilize the non-debt tax shield thus using more
debt.
Furthermore, as suggested by the agency theory in Jensen and Meckling (1976)
and Jensen (1986) using leverage excessively will work as a control factor forcing
managers to pay more of the surplus cash towards the firms debt. On the other
hand, the pecking order theory argue that higher earnings or more profitable firms
will have enough to finance their need as they prefer to use their internal funds be-
fore issuing debt thus the relation according to Myers and Majluf (1984) is negative
. For this reason an inverse relation between the leverage and profitability would
suggest a strong evidence of the pecking order theory since it is the only theory
with this relation.
In general terms, the mainstream empirical studies of capital structure find a
strong negative relation between leverage and profitability as the findings of Titman
and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001) and Frank and
Goyal (2009) suggest. Rajan and Zingales (1995) conclude that the relation is also
linked with a third factor which is size, as they find that large firms will tend to issue
less equity in comparison with the small firms and hence they conclude that the
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relation gets stronger with the increase of the firms size. Furthermore, Booth et al.
(2001) finds a strong negative relationship with both total debt and long term debt
in both market and book values in the developing countries.
On the contrast, a few studies did find a support of the pecking order relation
which is that highly profitable firms would use less debt such as Fama and French
(2002). Fama and French (2002) concluded that when controlling for investment op-
portunities their findings support the pecking order theory in both book and market
leverage and that the trade-off theory model fail as their results show.
As discussed In chapter 4 because this thesis use the SEM measure we would
need to use more than one measure for profitability. Therefore, we use the ratio of
operating income to total assets (OI/TA) for the panel data models as suggested by
De Jong et al. (2008), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Jandik and Makhija (2001).
We also use the following measures:
1. Return on Assets (ROA) as suggested by Ozkan (2001), Rajan and Zingales
(1995) and Wald (1999).
2. Return on Equity (ROE) as suggested by Chiarella et al. (1991) and Chen and
Jiang (2001).
3. Profit Margin (PM) as suggested by Eldomiaty (2007) and Al-Sakran (2001).
4. Operating Income to Sales (OI/SAL) as suggested by Jairo (2009) and Dro-
betz and Fix (2005).
5. EBIT to Total assets (EBIT/TA) as suggested by Qian et al. (2007), Song
(2005) and Chen (2004).
Therefore and based on both the theoretical and empirical literature we suggest
the following hypothesis following the trade-off theory:
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H1: There is a significant negative relation between the profitability of the firm and
its financial leverage
5.2.3 Tangibility
Assets tangibility or collateral is the measure of how much of the firm assets could
be offered to debtors as collateral to secure debt. Although the differences in busi-
ness industries need for fixed assets it is accepted that the higher the amount of
valuables assets the firm own the less risky is the company in the eye of the debtor
and the easier for it to issue debt. From a debtors point of view the firm assets could
be liquidated in the case of financial distress such as bankruptcy and therefore they
have a secure repayment on their loans.
According to the agency costs as explained byJensen and Meckling (1976) that
if the existing collateral could be used as a guarantee for creditors against the is-
suance of debt then they will have higher chances of repayments. Therefore, the
trade-off theory suggests a positive relation between tangibility and leverage based
on the lower expected distress costs and less agency problems between debt hold-
ers and managers.
On the other hand, Grossman and Hart (1982) suggest that issuance of bonds
(debt) could be used as a monitoring tools for managers. They state that there is a
positive relation between the firm size and the bonds issuance and thus argue that
large firms would use more debt since they own more collateral in relation to small
firms. Therefore, managers of firms with high value of collateral would have less
to spend on themselves while in firms with low collateral would have less debt thus
suggest that managers would use the cash excessive as perquisites. As explained
by Baker and Martin (2011) the notion of this debate is that the pecking order theory
suggests a negative relation.
Different results were reported in the previous studies but the majority confirms
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the trade-off theory positive relation such as Kayhan and Titman (2007), Fan et al.
(2011) and Titman and Wessels (1988). On the other hand, Goyal et al. (2002)
found a support for the pecking order theory in the fact that there is a negative
relation between the leverage and tangibility.
We use several measures to represent the tangibility as we need more than one
for using the PLS-SEM method. The first one we use for panel data is the net fixed
assets to total assets as suggested in the previous studies by Matjaz and Dusan
(2009),Huang and Song (2006) and Kakani and Reddy (1998). Furthermore, this
study will use the following measures:
1. Inventory and gross Plant and equipment to total assets (INVP/TA) as sug-
gested by Chang et al. (2009), Wald (1999) and Al-Ajmi et al. (2009). This
measure would have an inverse relationship as explained by Titman and Wes-
sels (1988).
2. Intangible Assets to Total Assets (IN/TA) as argued by Jairo (2009) and Sogorb-
Mira (2005).
3. Tangible Assets to Total assets Tang/TA) as used by Friend and Lang (1988),
Nikolaos and Maria (2007) and Barakat and Rao (2003).
Based on the previous literature we propose to test the following hypothesis:
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between the tangibility of the firm
assets and its financial leverage
5.2.4 Risk
It is expected that firms with volatile returns would face higher costs of financial
distress and the debt agency problems are also stronger when the volatility of the
firms increase. Theoretically, both the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory
predict a negative relationship between the risk and leverage. Jandik and Makhija
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(2001) argue that the volatility factor is ignored in the early research such as Ra-
jan and Zingales (1995) due to unavailability of data. Higher risk means that the
probability of paying their debt is less and hence lenders will ask for higher return.
Bradley et al. (1984) debate that companies with higher volatility are expected to
have less leverage.
Furthermore, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that companies with high vari-
ability of earnings are expected to have higher cost of debt and lenders might not
lend these companies.Several studies such as Bradley et al. (1984) finds a negative
relation between volatility and leverage. We follow Bradley et al. (1984) and mea-
sure risk by the standard deviation of earning divided by total assets. We suggest
the following hypothesis:
H3: There is a significant positive relationship between the risk of the firm and its
financial leverage
5.2.5 Non-debt tax shield
The first factor to be used as a determinants of capital structure is non-deb tax
shield. The static trade-off theory state that the main hypothesis are the taxes and
the bankruptcy costs. Therefore, under the trade-off theory it is expected that a
negative relation exist between leverage and non-debt tax shield. Furthermore,
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that firms with low leverage ratio would have
a low utilization of the non-debt tax shields and therefore would suggest a negative
relationship between the tax and leverage.
On the other hand, as discussed previously in Chapter 4, firms who have a sub-
stantial non debt tax shield would have a high collateral assets. Therefore, this
collateral could be used to secure debt which is less risk and therefore it could be
expected that a positive relation exist between leverage and non-debt tax shield.
For the panel data this study will use the ratio of total depreciation to total assets
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(DEP/TA) as used by Drobetz and Fix (2005) ,Titman and Wessels (1988) and
Bradley et al. (1984). This study also intend to use the following measures:
• Depreciation to Operating Income (DEP/OP) as suggested by Drobetz and
Fix (2005).
• Effective Tax Rate (ETR) as suggested by Eldomiaty (2007) and Sogorb-Mira
(2005) .
Therefore, this study would suggest the following hypothesis:
H4: There is a significant negative relationship between the tax shield of the firm
and its financial leverage
5.2.6 Growth
Growth opportunities Growth opportunities also called growth rate are a discerption
used in the capital structure literature to describe a firm which is in the growth stage.
It is thought that these firms would need more investment and therefore would use
debt heavily to grow fast. Several agency problems could arise from these situa-
tions. Myers (1977) argue that the existence of debt in the firm’s capital structure
change the firms action where it creates a state where managers would make sub-
optimal decisions to better serve the shareholder interest. Thus leverage would
create a problem of underinvestment or asset substation and therefore firms with
higher growth rates would experience high costs. Therefore, the trade-off theory
would argue that firms would avoid the stock-bond holders conflict because they
have an incentive to not participate in under investments and asset substitution.
Furthermore, Jensen (1986) free cash theory state that firms with high investments
opportunities don’t need the monitoring and the disciplinary of using debt. Therefore
the expected relation between leverage and growth in the context of the trade-off
theory is negative. On the other hand, the pecking order theory would suggest a
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positive relation between leverage and growth. The theory suggest that firms with
more investment opportunities would use more debt over time when the profitability
is fixed as suggested by Frank and Goyal (2005).
Empirical results in the literature which find a negative relation with leverage and
therefore support the trade-off theory include Frank and Goyal (2009), Rajan and
Zingales (1995), Ozkan (2001) and Huang and Song (2006). In contrast Booth et al.
(2001) found a positive for the majority of the countries in his sample when using
the total debt. However, when using the long-term debt almost all of the results
were negative which they claim could be the results of having the market value in
the market to book ratio and in the market leverage which might be due to superior
correlation. This study will use different ratios to represent growth opportunities,
first for the panel data regression the percentage growth of the total assets (GTA)
as suggested by Chang et al. (2009), Wald (1999), Fakher et al. (2009) and Kakani
and Reddy (1998).Then for the PLS-SEM the study will use the following:
Growth of Total Sales (GTS) used by Wald (1999) and Kakani and Reddy (1998).
Market to book ratio (MTB) such as Gaud et al. (2005), Ozkan (2001), Rajan and
Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001) and Goyal et al. (2002).
Capital Expenditure to Total assets (CE/TA) such as Titman and Wessels (1988)
and Chang et al. (2009). Several previous studies suggest the use of the research
and development (R&D) either to total assets or total sales as a proxy of growth
opportunities. However, due to firms in the MENA countries not obliged to report
such figures it is not possible to use them. For all the previous reasons this study
hypothesis for the growth opportunities is as follow:
H5: : There is a significant negative relationship between the growth opportunities
of the firm and financial leverage
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5.2.7 Dividends
In the light of the pecking-order theory it is suggested that companies finance their
project in an order where internal funds are their first choice. Therefore they tend
to retain earnings and not pay them as dividends to shareholders. The relation
between the dividends paid and the leverage is negative as Frank and Goyal (2007)
found in their analysis. They argued that more investigation need to be done in
this area as results are ambiguous.They found a negative relationship between the
amount of dividends paid and the leverage. We define dividends as follow:
• cash dividends paid divided to net income.
• dividends payout ratio
• dividends per share
The hypothesis is: .
H6: : There is a significant negative relationship between the dividends paid by the
firm and financial leverage
5.2.8 Free Cash flow
Jensen (1986) agency theory claims that the debt reduces the free cash flow. How-
ever, the pecking order theory assumes that if the free cash flow is a measure of the
firm capacity to produce internal funds then a negative relationship is predictable.
Free Cash Flow is negatively correlated with total debt ratio, and positively corre-
lated with the long-term debt ratio.
This study define the free cash flow as follow:
• Cash and bank deposits and marketable securities to long term debt
• Cash and bank deposits and marketable securities to short term debt
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• Cash and bank deposits and marketable securities to total assets
• EBIT plus depreciation and amortization to total assets
H7: There is a significant negative relationship between the free cash flow by the
firm and financial leverage
5.2.9 Size
Although several empirical findings state that the firm size relation to the capital
structure is important this relation is still unclear.Ozkan (2001) argue that it is be-
lieved that there is a positive relation between the firm size and the leverage by a
number of studies. For example, Chen and Jiang (2001), De Jong et al. (2008) and
Wald (1999). There is main facts behind this belief as listed by Ozkan (2001) which
are:
• The ratio of direct bankruptcy costs to the firms value decrease as the firms
value increase which shows that the costs of borrowing are very low as the
evidence of Warner (1977) and Ang et al. (1982) prove.
• Large firms are in general more diversified and have more firm cash flows
which would results in lower probability of bankruptcy as Titman and Wessels
(1988) suggest.
• Large firms have easier access to capital markets and borrow at lower interest
rates in comparison to small firms as argued by Ferri and Jones (1979).
Based on the previous facts we could argue that the trade-off theory suggest a
positive relation between the firm size and leverage. On the other hand, Baker and
Martin (2011) argue that size could be used as a proxy for information asymmetry
between the managers and the capital markets. Therefore, the pecking order theory
suggest a negative relation between leverage and size. There is a number of ratios
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used to represent the size attribute in the literature and we use the logarithmic
transformation of the Sales (LnSAL) as suggested by Gaud et al. (2005), Kayhan
and Titman (2007) and Drobetz and Fix (2005).
However, several measures were also suggested and this study intend to use
which are:
1. Logarithmic transformation of Total Assets Ln(TA) as suggested by Goyal
et al. (2002), Frank and Goyal (2009) and Wald (1999).
2. Logarithmic transformation of Market Value Ln(MV) as suggested by Chen
and Jiang (2001)
Furthermore, two additional measures suggested in the literature are logarithmic
transformation of number of workers Ln(Workers) as used by Song (2005) and the
quit ratio used by Titman and Wessels (1988) which this study couldn’t use due to
lack of data for both variables. Based on the previous discussion we hypothesize
the following relation between size and leverage:
H8: There is a significant positive relation between firm size and leverage
5.2.10 Liquidity
Liquidity ratios are used to measure the firm ability to pay its short-term debt obliga-
tions. The impact on capital structure is mixed to some extent as argued by Ozkan
(2001). According to Deesomsak et al. (2004) the agency theory both the cost of
debt and the free cash flow theory would suggest a negative relation with lever-
age. In addition, the pecking order theory would also suggest a negative relation
as the firm would use the internal funds then debt and therefore would also suggest
a negative relation. Empirical findings from previous study overall finds a negative
relation such as Ozkan (2001). In addition, De Jong et al. (2008) also find a nega-
tive relation between leverage and liquidity but it is only significant in the advanced
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economies. Furthermore, Nikolaos and Maria (2007) also finds a negative relation
in his study about Greece.
In this study we use the current ratio which is the current assets to current liabil-
ities (CA/CL) for the panel data regression as suggested by De Jong et al. (2008)
and Ozkan (2001) as the measure of liquidity. We also use the following ratios:
1. Quick Ratio (QR) as suggested by Nikolaos and Maria (2007) and Suhaila
and Wan Mahmood (2008).
2. Working Capital Ratio as suggested by Eldomiaty (2007).
3. Cash Ratio as used by Eldomiaty (2007).
Based on the previous discussion we hypothesize the following relation between
liquidity ratios and leverage:
H8: There is a significant negative relation between liquidity and leverage
5.2.11 Ownership Structure
5.2.12 Industry Classification
5.3 The Model
This chapter will examine the determinants of capital structure as discussed in the
previous section and the main variable of this study is the leverage ratio, which is
the dependent variable. The model can be presented as the following:
Leverage = β0 + β1Prof + β2Liq + β3Risk + β4Size+ β5Tang + β6Tax
+β7Dividends+ β8Growth+ β9cash+ β10Ownership+ β11Industry.
(5.1)
Where, Leverage is defined using 6 ratios based on both book value and market
value, the ratios this study use for book value leverage are:
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1.
STDBV A = Short term debt
Total Assets
(5.2)
2.
LTDBV A = Long term debt
Total Assets
(5.3)
3.
TDBV A = Total debt
Total Assets
(5.4)
On the other hand, the following measures are used to represent the market value
leverage:
STDMV A = Short term debt
Market Value
(5.5)
LTDMV A = Long term debt
Market Value
(5.6)
TDMV A = Total debt
Market Value
(5.7)
and the independent variables are as follow:
Prof is the profitability proxy which is defined with the following ratios which are
used int this study are :
ROA = Net Income
Total Assets
(5.8)
ROE = Net Income
Common Equity
(5.9)
PM = Net Income
Net Sales
(5.10)
OP/TS = Operating Income
Total Sales
(5.11)
OP/TA = Operating Income
Total Assets
(5.12)
EBIT/TA = EBIT
Total Assets
(5.13)
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EBIT/TS = EBIT
Total SALES
(5.14)
Furthermore, Liq which is the liquidity attribute is defined as follow:
Currat = Current liabilities
Current Assets
(5.15)
Quirat = Current assets - inventories
Current liabilities
(5.16)
Casrat = Cash+Cash equivalent+ invested funds
Current liabilities
(5.17)
Wcrat = Current Assets
Current liabilities
(5.18)
In addition the risk attribute is defined as :
V ola = Standard Deviation of the share price (5.19)
STDROE = Standard Deviation of the ROE (5.20)
STDROA = Standard Deviation of the ROA (5.21)
Beta = Beta coefficient calculated using the CAPM (5.22)
The size attribute is defined as :
Ln(SAL) = logarithmic transformation of the Total Sales (5.23)
Ln(TA) = logarithmic transformation of the Total Assets (5.24)
Ln(MV ) = logarithmic transformation of the Market Value (5.25)
The Tangibility attribute is represented using the following variables:
INV P/TA = Inventory and gross plant and equipment
Total assets
(5.26)
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INA/TA = Intangible Assets
Total Assets
(5.27)
NFA/TA = Net fixed assets
Total Assets
(5.28)
Tang/TA = Tangible Assets
Total Assets
(5.29)
Furthermore, the Non debt Tax shield is defined using the following:
DEP/TA = Depreciation expense
Total Assets
(5.30)
DEP/OP = Depreciation expense
Operating income
(5.31)
EFFTAX = Total tax expenses
Taxable income
(5.32)
In addition, Dividends is defined using the following :
DEP/TA = Depreciation expense
Total Assets
(5.33)
DEP/OP = Depreciation expense
Operating income
(5.34)
EFFTAX = Total tax expenses
Taxable income
(5.35)
Moreover, Growth attribute is defined using :
TAGR = percentage change in total assets value in comparison to last year (5.36)
GTS = percentage change in total sales value in comparison to last year (5.37)
MTB = Market value of firm
Book value of firm
(5.38)
CE/TA = Capital expenditure
Total assets
(5.39)
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In addition, Cash flow is defined as the following :
CA/LTD = Cash and bank deposits and marketable securities
Long term debt
(5.40)
CA/STD = Cash and bank deposits and marketable securities
Short term debt
(5.41)
CA/TA = Cash and bank deposits and marketable securities
Total assets
(5.42)
EBITDEP/TA = EBIT+ Depreciation and Amortization
Total assets
(5.43)
The Ownership attributes is defined in two ways. First as a dummy were the
ultimate owner (Largest share holder) takes a 1 and 0 other wise. On the other hand
the percentage of the ownership is used as a measure only in the SEM results.
The Industry dummies are added to the model to see if there is a difference in the
capital structure in different industries. To test this the dummy variables are used to
see if there is a significant relation with leverage.
5.4 Main Results
This section will present the results for the MENA countries using the the three
models as explained in the methodology chapter. The results are presented in six
tables for each country. The four tables in the begining are for the results of the
panel data models. The fifth table will present the results using the SEM results.
The sixth table will present the ANN results.It is worth mentioning that the industry
dummy variables in the majority of the results were problematic causing several
issues were it did cause the model to be unstable. Therefore this study provide the
results with dummies and without dummies. Furthermore, several countries with
small samples did suffer from collinearity if this is the case it will be mentioned in
the discussion of the results.
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in Bahrain using Panel Data,
SEM, ANN ?
The first country presented is Bahrain which is one of the GCC countries. The
first table present the short term debt panel data results. The R2 is high above
60% across the models. The Wald test is not significant and therefore it can be
concluded that there is no heteroskedasticiy. The table show that the Hausman test
is not significant and therefore it is safe to use the random effect model.
From the Table 5.1 the following conclusions could be drawn:
• Liquidity is negatively significant to the short term leverage for book and mar-
ket values across all the models.
• Cash flow is negatively related to the short term debt in book term leverage
across the models.
• Tangibility is positively significant with the short term debt in market value
positively. But it is only negatively significant using the book value of the short
term debt.
• The tax is significant with the short term debt in market value except for the
tobit model.
• The ownership institutional variables is positively related to the market short
term debt and significant. The ownership government variable is significant in
the tobit model and positive to the book short term debt.
• The industrial classification shows that firms in the consumer goods are pos-
itively significant with the short term debt in booth market and book values.
The basic materials variables is positively significant with the short term debt
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in book value and the Industrials variable is positively significant with the short
term debt in market value.
The second Table 5.2 show the long term debt using panel data. The Wald test
is significant for the fixed effect and therefore the robust results are used. The R2 is
higher than 40% indicating and shows that the fixed effect model have the highest
R2. The following could be concluded:
• The size variable is significant and positive for both the long term debt in
market and book value except for the tobit model.
• Tangibility is significant and negative only under the tobit for the long term
debt in book values terms.
• the dividends variable is significant under the fixed effect model only for the
book value of the long term debt.
• the ownership government variable is significant and positive for both the long
term debt in market and book value except for the tobit model.
• the basic materials variables is positively significant with the short term debt
in book value except for the tobit model.
The third tables which is Table 5.3 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in Bahrain. The Wald test for the total debt for book
value is not significant and significant for the book values at the .05 only. The
Lagrange test shows that the OLS could also be used. The Hausman test is not
significant and therefore would indicate that it is possible to use the Random effect.
The R2 is higher than 63% for both the book and market value. From the Table 5.3
the following conclusions could be drawn:
• Liquidity is negatively significant for both the market and book total debt.
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• Size is positively significant for the total debt book value across the models
and only significant for the market value using the tobit model.
• Tangibility is significant positively with the total debt using market and book
total debt except when using tobit model for the book value.
• Non debt tax shield is significant and negative for the total debt in market
value except for the fixed effects model.
• Dividends is also negative and significant with both the book and market value
when the tobit model is applied.
• Cash flow is significant negatively with the total debt in book values.
• The ownership variables of government is significant and positive with the
total market value of debt and institutional variable is positively significant
with both the market and book value except for the tobit model. The individual
variable is positively significant with the tobit model only.
• Industry classification variables of the basic materials and consumer goods
both significant and positive. Also, the consumer goods variable is significant
positively with the market value by the tobit model.
The only interest from Table 5.4 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio. As it
shows that the dependent variable lagged variable is significant for the short term
debt of book value and for both the total debt either in book values or market values.
Which, indicate that firms in this country do adjust their capital structure for both the
total debt and the short term debt.
Table 5.5 show the SEM results for Bahrain using the PLS approach. The model
fits at the bottom of the model shows that the model fit is good without the dummy
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variables and acceptable with the dummy variables. The R2 is overall higher that
44% for all the models. From this table the following could be concluded:
• Profitability attribute is significantly negative in relation to all the measures of
leverage.
• Size attribute is significantly positive in relation to all the measures of lever-
age.
• Growth is negatively significant to the short term and total debt in market
values.
• Liquidity is negatively significant to the short term and total debt in market
value and the short term debt in book value.
• Cash flow is only negatively significant in relation to the short term debt in
book value.
• Ownership variable government is positively significant to all the market val-
ues measures. Additionally, the individual variable is significantly positive to
the short and total debt in market value.
• In the industry classification the results show that only industrial firms have
a positive relation with the short term debt in book values. Moreover, con-
sumer goods variable is positively significant to the short term and total debt
in market values.
Table 5.6 show the ANN results for Bahrain. The model fit is provided at the
end of the table and the models are good. The good prediction is high with values
more 40% for both measures without the dummies variables. When the dummies
are added the value is lower than before but is still within accepted range. It is
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worth mentioning that the only result the ANN give is a percentage of importance.
It doesn’t provide a sign of coefficient or a significant value. From this table the
following could be concluded:
• Profitability is an important determinants for the market leverage measures.
• Size is an important determinants for both the book value measures in addi-
tion to the total debt in market values.
• Tangibility is an important determinants for both the long term and total debt
in book values.
• Both liquidity and cash flow are important for the short term debt in book
value.
• the only ownership important variable is the government variable in relation
to the long term debt in market value.
• The industry classification is only slightly important when the firm is in the
basic materials industry and it will affect the long term debt in book value. On
the other hand, the telecommunication variable is slightly important for the
short term debt in book values and the same for the long term value of debt
in market value.
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Table 5.1: Bahrain Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
BAHRAIN STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant 0.1175 .1461442* 0.1175 0.0637 0.0171 0.0478 0.0171 -.4278126**
S.E. 1.6781 2.0201 1.6781 0.5600 0.2015 0.5453 0.2015 -3.2510
Profitability 0.0315 0.0479 0.0315 -0.1126 -0.0660 -0.0560 -0.0660 -0.1118
S.E 0.6764 0.9853 0.6764 -1.5425 -1.1673 -0.9515 -1.1673 -1.2718
Liquidty -.0075305*** -.0075207*** -.0075305*** -.0710751*** -.0087733*** -.0087266*** -.0087733*** -.0416071***
S.E -6.6118 -6.5246 -6.6118 -4.3696 -6.3396 -6.2532 -6.3396 -4.6968
Risk 0.0048 0.0021 0.0048 0.0126 0.0005 -0.0035 0.0005 -0.0196
S.E 0.4064 0.1678 0.4064 0.5504 0.0378 -0.2314 0.0378 -0.6971
Size -0.0049 -0.0067 -0.0049 0.0081 -0.0010 -0.0028 -0.0010 0.0101
S.E -1.2417 -1.6300 -1.2417 1.2121 -0.2070 -0.5668 -0.2070 1.2369
Tangibilty 0.0333 0.0351 0.0333 -.2113108** .0995438** .104555** .0995438** -0.0625
S.E 1.2641 1.3107 1.2641 -3.2644 3.1082 3.2284 3.1082 -0.8791
Tax -0.2524 -0.1502 -0.2524 -0.0722 -.6528895* -.5734711* -.6528895* -0.7124
S.E -1.1643 -0.6608 -1.1643 -0.2201 -2.4789 -2.0838 -2.4789 -1.7783
Dividends -0.0201 -0.0033 -0.0201 -0.1611 -0.0291 -0.0027 -0.0291 -0.4229
S.E -0.2698 -0.0432 -0.2698 -0.6258 -0.3225 -0.0286 -0.3225 -1.4079
Growth 0.0251 0.3013 0.0251 -0.5347 -0.3925 -0.3153 -0.3925 -0.6669
S.E 0.0432 0.4600 0.0432 -0.6998 -0.5560 -0.3975 -0.5560 -0.6957
Cash Flow -.0996854* -.1122592** -.0996854** -.3606356* -0.0615 -0.0756 -0.0615 -0.2228
S.E -2.5827 -2.7180 -2.5827 -2.2424 -1.4280 -1.6568 -1.4280 -1.4510
Government -0.0157 -0.0154 -0.0157 .144827** -0.0104 -0.0118 -0.0104 -0.0166
S.E -0.7579 -0.7379 -0.7579 2.6556 -0.4134 -0.4681 -0.4134 -0.6245
Instituional 0.0182 0.0198 0.0182 -0.0089 .0594162*** .0604751*** .0594162*** .0606872***
S.E 1.6494 1.7637 1.6494 -0.4007 4.4266 4.4579 4.4266 3.9992
Indivdual 0.0067 0.0108 0.0067 0.0684 0.0200 0.0232 0.0200 0.0336
S.E 0.4751 0.7469 0.4751 1.6103 1.1568 1.3209 1.1568 1.6587
Oil 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
B Materials .0834121*** .083908*** .0834121*** .1432427*** 0.0329 0.0323 0.0329 -0.0032
S.E 5.5544 5.5450 5.5544 7.6732 1.8011 1.7654 1.8011 -0.1121
Industrials 0.0154 0.0140 0.0154 -0.0601 .0784174*** .0774202*** .0784174*** .062133*
S.E 0.8714 0.7865 0.8714 -1.3265 3.6503 3.5911 3.6503 2.3416
C Goods .1035976*** .106237*** .1035976*** .1269293*** .1488259*** .1499476*** .1488259*** .1540388***
S.E 5.9811 6.0547 5.9811 5.7884 7.0715 7.0587 7.0715 6.5404
Health 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
C Servicses -0.0193 -0.0238 -0.0193 -.0860956* -0.0127 -0.0171 -0.0127 -0.0228
S.E -1.2371 -1.4977 -1.2371 -2.4903 -0.6691 -0.8895 -0.6691 -1.0378
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
R2 67% 68% 70% 70%
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 128
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 12.39 Prob2 0.1347 chi2 (8) 8.55 Prob2 0.3814
Hausman chi2(15) 4.06 Prob2 0.9975 chi2(15) 5.01 Prob2 0.992
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Table 5.2: Bahrain Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
BAHRAIN LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -.2022818** -.2006235** -.2022818** -0.7311 -.2011154** -.1790255* -.2011154** -0.7980
S.E. -2.8501 -2.7588 -2.8501 . -2.7669 -2.3773 -2.7669 .
Profitability -0.0242 -0.0260 -0.0242 -0.1126 -0.0448 -0.0316 -0.0448 -0.3204
S.E -0.5122 -0.5326 -0.5122 -1.5425 -0.9274 -0.6247 -0.9274 .
Liquidity 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 -.0710751*** -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0256
S.E 0.6039 0.7581 0.6039 -4.3696 -0.6232 -0.6011 -0.6232 .
Risk 0.0072 0.0018 0.0072 0.0126 0.0102 0.0056 0.0102 0.0396
S.E 0.5985 0.1412 0.5985 0.5504 0.8222 0.4266 0.8222 .
Size .0120176** .0121868** .0120176** 0.0081 .0127479** .0115842** .0127479** 0.0534
S.E 2.9995 2.9652 2.9995 1.2121 3.1068 2.7219 3.1068 .
Tangibility 0.0154 0.0152 0.0154 -.2113108** -0.0039 -0.0073 -0.0039 -0.2822
S.E 0.5750 0.5669 0.5750 -3.2644 -0.1430 -0.2614 -0.1430 .
Tax 0.1539 0.1438 0.1539 -0.0722 -0.2841 -0.1703 -0.2841 -0.6947
S.E 0.7002 0.6294 0.7002 -0.2201 -1.2624 -0.7197 -1.2624 .
Dividends -0.1445 -.1680979* -0.1445 -0.1611 -0.1110 -0.1130 -0.1110 -0.4450
S.E -1.9163 -2.1813 -1.9163 -0.6258 -1.4379 -1.4164 -1.4379 .
Growth 1.1319 0.6315 1.1319 -0.5347 0.8768 0.8794 0.8768 1.2698
S.E 1.9219 0.9590 1.9219 -0.6998 1.4537 1.2896 1.4537 .
Cash Flow -0.0416 -0.0328 -0.0416 -0.1840 -0.0199 -0.0081 -0.0199 0.0335
S.E -1.2234 -0.9159 -1.2234 -1.6305 -0.6137 -0.2339 -0.6137 0.2909
Government .0479398* .0475084* .0479398* 0.4304 .0874485*** .0892727*** .0874485*** 0.6463
S.E 2.2868 2.2666 2.2868 . 4.0730 4.1130 4.0730 .
Instituional 0.0086 0.0084 0.0086 -0.0562 0.0129 0.0135 0.0129 -0.0405
S.E 0.7709 0.7418 0.7709 . 1.1286 1.1555 1.1286 .
Indivdual -0.0034 -0.0036 -0.0034 0.3440 -0.0073 -0.0034 -0.0073 0.3685
S.E -0.2344 -0.2465 -0.2344 . -0.4956 -0.2240 -0.4956 .
Oil 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
B Materials .0759785*** .075656*** .0759785*** 0.1179 0.0268 0.0283 0.0268 0.0897
S.E 4.9907 4.9738 4.9907 . 1.7211 1.7955 1.7211 .
Industrials -0.0135 -0.0133 -0.0135 -0.3703 -0.0073 -0.0091 -0.0073 -0.4468
S.E -0.7558 -0.7410 -0.7558 . -0.3952 -0.4920 -0.3952 .
C Goods -0.0022 -0.0035 -0.0022 0.0380 -0.0017 0.0000 -0.0017 -0.0243
S.E -0.1251 -0.1992 -0.1251 . -0.0964 -0.0023 -0.0964 .
Health 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
C Servicses -0.0149 -0.0137 -0.0149 -0.3367 -0.0138 -0.0166 -0.0138 -0.3948
S.E -0.9403 -0.8564 -0.9403 . -0.8526 -1.0051 -0.8526 .
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 55% 57% 42% 42%
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 59.61 Prob2 0 chi2 (8) 116.57 Prob2 0
Hausman chi2(15) 3.99 Prob2 0.9978 chi2(15) 2.9 Prob2 0.9997
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Table 5.3: Bahrain Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
BAHRAIN TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -.2693971* -.2561586* -.2693971* -.6453697*** -0.1840 -0.1313 -0.1840 -.5666432**
S.E. -2.4618 -2.2445 -2.4618 -3.8533 -1.5346 -1.0668 -1.5346 -2.8392
Profitability 0.0107 0.0113 0.0107 -0.0069 -0.1108 -0.0876 -0.1108 -0.2338
S.E 0.1469 0.1479 0.1469 -0.0659 -1.3906 -1.0596 -1.3906 -1.8891
Liquidty -.0052083** -.0049881** -.0052083** -.0270741*** -.0095102*** -.0094477*** -.0095102*** -.0540679***
S.E -2.9256 -2.7432 -2.9256 -5.9448 -4.8762 -4.8192 -4.8762 -4.2712
Risk 0.0072 0.0011 0.0072 -0.0531 0.0107 0.0021 0.0107 0.0032
S.E 0.3877 0.0572 0.3877 -1.5806 0.5253 0.0963 0.5253 0.0819
Size .0148619* .0142911* .0148619* .038829*** 0.0118 0.0088 0.0118 .0436443***
S.E 2.4058 2.2157 2.4058 3.9706 1.7368 1.2624 1.7368 3.6530
Tangibilty .0849356* .0895473* .0849356* 0.0125 .0956295* .0972758* .0956295* -.2451439*
S.E 2.0616 2.1220 2.0616 0.1962 2.1187 2.1381 2.1187 -2.3635
Tax -0.0855 -0.0911 -0.0855 0.7853 -.9369942* -0.7438 -.9369942* -1.281349*
S.E -0.2524 -0.2540 -0.2524 1.6375 -2.5244 -1.9238 -2.5244 -2.3068
Dividends -0.1903 -0.1970 -0.1903 -1.110435** -0.1402 -0.1157 -0.1402 -1.053088*
S.E -1.6370 -1.6286 -1.6370 -3.2536 -1.1006 -0.8872 -1.1006 -2.5719
Growth 0.3679 -0.1492 0.3679 1.8073 0.4843 0.5642 0.4843 0.7298
S.E 0.4052 -0.1443 0.4052 1.6076 0.4869 0.5063 0.4869 0.5496
Cash Flow -.1059143* -.1152619* -.1059143* -.3745039* -0.0814 -0.0837 -0.0814 -0.1706
S.E -1.9828 -2.0338 -1.9828 -2.4644 -1.4010 -1.3578 -1.4010 -0.9004
Government 0.0323 0.0305 0.0323 .1359372* .0770624* .0774543* .0770624* .4038859***
S.E 0.9988 0.9265 0.9988 2.5485 2.1762 2.1840 2.1762 4.8400
Instituional .0476243** .0479488** .0476243** 0.0206 .0723601*** .0739527*** .0723601*** 0.0680
S.E 2.7582 2.7126 2.7582 0.6092 3.8253 3.8806 3.8253 1.7646
Indivdual 0.0048 0.0054 0.0048 .1033953* 0.0127 0.0198 0.0127 .1298822*
S.E 0.2149 0.2339 0.2149 2.2083 0.5203 0.8032 0.5203 2.1313
Oil 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
B Materials .0986826*** .0974487*** .0986826*** .1321158*** .0596995* .0606257* .0596995* .1318513***
S.E 4.2041 4.0822 4.2041 5.0481 2.3215 2.3556 2.3215 4.2521
Industrials 0.0401 0.0404 0.0401 -0.0556 .0711636* .0683003* .0711636* -0.0600
S.E 1.4523 1.4389 1.4523 -1.0577 2.3505 2.2552 2.3505 -0.8239
C Goods .1341524*** .1330051*** .1341524*** .2281287*** .1470922*** .1499052*** .1470922*** .1939172***
S.E 4.9551 4.8051 4.9551 6.8988 4.9592 5.0233 4.9592 5.0921
Health 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
C Servicses -0.0076 -0.0083 -0.0076 -0.0460 -0.0265 -0.0337 -0.0265 -.1439255**
S.E -0.3127 -0.3300 -0.3127 -1.1305 -0.9917 -1.2484 -0.9917 -3.0086
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 63% 63% 0% 66% 67% 0%
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 13.67 Prob2 0.0907 chi2 (8) 16.24 Prob2 0.0391
Hausman chi2(15) 1.61 Prob2 1 chi2(15) 3.55 Prob2 0.9989
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Table 5.4: Bahrain Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
BAHRAIN
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged .2915239** 0.0931151 0.0464074 11.86% .3136564*** .3012022***
S.E. 2.936249 0.9716964 0.8030452 146.84% 4.486546 3.486985
Constant 0.0819905 0.122 0.067 -0.0036737 0.1088188 0.0272972
S.E. 0.8613451 1.012 0.878 -0.0366875 0.8893476 0.1647743
Profitability 0.058 -0.034 0.021 -0.0103742 0.0368727 -0.0816342
S.E 1.124 -0.516 0.501 -0.1872953 0.5398988 -0.8900287
Liquidty -.0090984*** -.0103392*** -0.001 -0.002122 -.0116741*** -.0139133***
S.E -6.921 -6.201 -1.252 -1.597 -6.742119 -6.267875
Risk -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 0.0004737 -0.0155617 -0.0093084
S.E -0.559 -0.481 -0.531 0.0314913 -0.854196 -0.3812187
Size -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 0.003302 -0.0026803 0.0015867
S.E -0.872 -1.000 -0.211 0.6135892 -0.4078182 0.177713
Tangibilty 0.022 .0960546* -0.017 -0.0496603 0.0053315 0.0237102
S.E 0.700 2.509 -0.703 -1.588773 0.1367245 0.4526135
Tax 0.047 -0.628 -0.017 0.0312224 0.1429678 -0.3842625
S.E 0.171 -1.874 -0.086 0.1160057 0.4243945 -0.8528157
Dividends 0.000 0.018 -0.034 -0.060903 0.0114358 -0.0450792
S.E -0.002 0.158 -0.501 -0.6403597 0.1021647 -0.2910988
Growth 0.431 -0.172 2.269617*** 2.295235** 2.672261** 2.474829
S.E 0.570 -0.179 3.702 2.824052 2.705147 1.859176
Cash Flow -.1171421** -0.0833498 -0.023104 -0.0048356 -.3745039* -0.0820031
S.E -2.770173 -1.639937 -0.8007961 -0.1271639 -2.46438 -1.272986
Government -0.0103574 -0.0166088 .0500106** .0996831*** 0.0398689 .0772622*
S.E -0.4862499 -0.6244618 2.944101 4.452657 1.448195 2.131547
Instituional .0305819* .0606872*** -0.0030603 0.0027392 0.0204158 .0661837**
S.E 2.550824 3.999161 -0.3238179 0.2158809 1.313884 3.191095
Indivdual .0333292* 0.0335796 0.0048481 0.0095816 .040193* .0655008*
S.E 2.000461 1.658738 0.4075881 0.608051 2.012511 2.407232
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Materials .0732309** -0.0032445 -0.0002725 -0.0283521 -.0816254** -0.060614
S.E 3.289926 -0.1120708 -0.0157644 -1.230608 -2.733784 -1.559653
Industrials 0.0186284 .062133* -.0471676** -0.0383987 -0.0293029 0.0016725
S.E 0.9633281 2.341645 -3.043661 -1.86593 -1.149716 0.0483674
C Goods .1403855*** .1540388*** -0.020859 -0.0166923 .1130853*** .1420244***
S.E 6.956321 6.540414 -1.427458 -0.8581489 4.708173 4.47947
Health 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Servicses -0.0050755 -0.0227673 -.0442546** -.0404287* -.0544792* -.0587763*
S.E -0.2827558 -1.037813 -3.225621 -2.22467 -2.440168 -1.980018
Telecom 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
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Table 5.5: Bahrain SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
Prof -0.404 -0.216 -0.365 -0.233 -0.21 -0.298 -0.673 -0.189 -0.559 -0.247 0.104 -0.137
<0.001 0.004 <0.001 0.001 0.133 <0.001 <0.001 0.01 <0.001 0.092 0.271 0.117
Size 0.131 0.459 0.297 0.176 0.418 0.392 -0.122 0.204 0.062 -0.135 -0.067 -0.019
0.054 <0.001 <0.001 0.009 <0.001 <0.001 0.067 0.006 0.227 0.187 0.356 0.43
Growth -0.272 0.044 -0.202 0.069 0.19 0.062 -0.014 0.164 0.049 -0.042 0.182 -0.032
<0.001 0.297 0.006 0.302 0.06 0.268 0.432 0.021 0.276 0.294 0.037 0.362
Tang 0.032 -0.024 0.076 0.022 -0.031 -0.077 0.131 -0.119 0.019 0.15 0.012 0.01
0.349 0.386 0.178 0.426 0.419 0.3 0.053 0.072 0.411 0.035 0.463 0.461
Tax 0.032 -0.082 -0.03 -0.09 0.126 0.072 0.009 -0.017 -0.032 0.015 0.047 -0.007
0.351 0.158 0.361 0.165 0.226 0.281 0.456 0.421 0.35 0.43 0.333 0.47
Risk 0.012 0.019 -0.001 -0.021 -0.017 -0.015 -0.039 -0.035 -0.009 -0.054 -0.013 0.043
0.444 0.41 0.495 0.411 0.434 0.397 0.32 0.338 0.455 0.217 0.43 0.284
Div 0.016 0.08 -0.05 -0.034 0.015 -0.054 -0.035 -0.058 -0.076 0.026 0.039 0.049
0.424 0.165 0.273 0.335 0.42 0.23 0.338 0.24 0.178 0.37 0.311 0.282
Liqud -0.347 -0.18 -0.372 -0.332 -0.022 -0.12 -0.441 -0.162 -0.469 0.183 -0.124 0.11
<0.001 0.013 <0.001 <0.001 0.423 0.22 <0.001 0.023 <0.001 0.224 0.069 0.136
Cash Flow -0.167 -0.026 -0.125 -0.314 -0.208 -0.278 -0.412 -0.03 -0.434 -0.36 -0.454 -0.545
0.019 0.379 0.062 <0.001 0.042 0.008 <0.001 0.357 <0.001 0.007 <0.001 <0.001
Ownership
Gov 0.496 0.255 0.357 -0.485 0.76 0.356
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.029 0.176 0.229
indv 0.252 -0.221 0.273 -0.1 -0.043 -0.071
<0.001 0.003 <0.001 0.214 0.311 0.194
Inst -0.236 0.126 -0.052 -0.142 -0.252 0.091
0.002 0.061 0.264 0.201 0.137 0.239
Industry
Oil 0 0 0 -0.211 0.023 -0.419
0 0 0 0.005 0.412 0.005
Mater -0.064 -0.141 -0.04 0.128 -0.088 -0.162
0.218 0.041 0.313 0.031 0.093 0.167
Indust 0.11 -0.082 0.011 0.36 -0.042 0
0.088 0.158 0.449 <0.001 0.305 0
Cgoods 0.487 0 0.386 0 0 -0.262
<0.001 0 <0.001 0 0 0.163
Health 0 0 0 0.092 0.126 -0.042
0 0 0 0.119 0.125 0.379
Cserv 0 -0.072 0 0 0 0
0 0.19 0 0 0 0
Telec 0.016 -0.046 -0.014 0 0 0
0.423 0.291 0.435 0 0 0
Techno 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
R2 44 41 46 51 31 53 73 41 84 51 31 53
Model Fit
(APC) 0.144 P<0.001 0.144 P<0.001 0.661, P<0.001 0.679, P=0.130
(ARS) 0.437 P<0.001 0.437 P<0.001 0.618, P<0.001 0.638, P=0.633
(AARS) 0.399 P<0.001 0.399 P<0.001
(AVIF) 1.385 1.385 Inf Inf
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Table 5.6: Bahrain ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Bahrain Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 7.76% 2.06% 0.00% 52.68% 11.24% 37.61%
Size 35.34% 31.93% 27.97% 5.97% 12.55% 28.24%
Growth 0.00% 17.28% 0.22% 0.00% 15.62% 0.00%
Tangibility 0.00% 35.12% 32.97% 19.52% 13.60% 1.28%
Non-Debt Tax shield 10.14% 4.21% 0.00% 3.79% 8.02% 13.01%
Volatility 3.08% 7.43% 5.32% 0.10% 11.79% 0.18%
Dividends 0.88% 0.18% 16.22% 5.43% 8.92% 14.34%
Liquidity 21.49% 0.04% 0.00% 5.12% 10.70% 4.64%
Cash Flow 21.31% 1.76% 17.29% 7.41% 7.57% 0.70%
Good prediction % 76.36% 84.55% 39.09% 50.91% 98.18% 60.00%
S.D of abs errors 0.04 0.03 0.0318 0.0259 0.0805 0.0735
RMSE 0.04 0.04 0.0396 0.0293 0.0884 0.0803
MAE 0.02 0.02 0.02362 0.01370 0.03646 0.0325
N 144 144 144 144 144 144
Adding Dummies
Profitability 0.76% 0.04% 45.35% 0.02% 8.39% 0.60%
Size 7.52% 0.08% 8.92% 0.06% 7.75% 0.19%
Growth 1.41% 0.02% 7.85% 0.00% 7.59% 29.96%
Tangibility 36.40% 6.32% 2.76% 33.16% 0.10% 9.52%
Non-Debt Tax shield 8.11% 20.20% 2.51% 8.61% 0.02% 5.50%
Volatility 0.00% 0.59% 0.72% 0.03% 2.22% 9.76%
Dividends 24.32% 15.31% 11.14% 22.37% 10.32% 12.66%
Liquidity 5.01% 12.55% 15.86% 16.57% 35.87% 19.13%
Cash Flow 2.37% 19.40% 1.59% 15.61% 0.00% 0.00%
Ownership Dummies
Government 0.27% 0.10% 2.07% 0.00% 11.75% 2.94%
Institutional 0.01% 3.83% 0.00% 3.57% 0.04% 2.00%
Individual 0.29% 0.47% 0.05% 0.00% 0.03% 1.39%
Industry Dummies
Oil 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Basic Materials 0.08% 15.04% 0.43% 0.00% 0.14% 0.32%
Consumer Goods 0.63% 0.13% 0.02% 0.00% 2.45% 4.46%
Consumer Services 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.01%
Health Care 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Industrials 0.15% 0.08% 0.40% 0.00% 0.00% 1.37%
Technology 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Telecommunications 12.67% 5.71% 0.33% 0.00% 13.28% 0.19%
Good prediction % 37.27% 28.18% 47.27% 71.82% 51.82% 41.82%
RMSE 0.0095 0.0132 0.0067 0.0050 0.0033 0.0110
MAE 0.0046 0.0048 0.0022 0.0015 0.0010 0.0041
S.D of abs errors 0.0084 0.0123 0.0063 0.0048 0.0031 0.0102
N 144 144 144 144 144 144
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in Egypt using Panel Data, SEM,
ANN ?
The Second country presented is Egypt which is one of the largest countries in the
sample of the MENA countries. First, the table of the short term debt panel data
results is presented. The R2 is low and in the range of 10% across the models.
The Wald test is not significant and therefore it can be concluded that there is no
heteroskedasticiy. The table show that the Hausman test is not significant and
therefore it is safe to use the random effect model. From the Table 5.7 the following
conclusions could be drawn:
• Liquidity is negatively significant with the short term debt in book value.
• Size is negatively significant with the short term debt in book value.
• Tangibility is positively significant across the models for both short term debt
in book and market value.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the short term debt in market
value.
• Growth is negative and significant for both the fixed effect and tobit model.
• The ownership structure show that the individual and institutional using the
tobit model are negatively significant.
• The industry classification as the health is significant and positive in the panel
data models for the book debt only. While the technology variable is signifi-
cant for the short term debt in market value using the tobit model.
The second Table 5.8 show the long term debt using panel data models. The
Wald test is not significant for the fixed effect. The R2 is high for the book debt
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with 20% and lower for the market value with 10% only. The Lagrange test is not
significant and the following could be concluded:
• Profitability is positively significant for the long term debt in book values.
• Liquidity is negatively significant in by using the tobit model only.
• Size is negatively significant in for the long term debt in book values.
• Tangibility is positively significant for the long term debt in book and market
values.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the long term debt in book and
market values.
• Dividends is positively significant for the long term debt in book values.
• Growth is negatively significant in for the long term debt in book and market
values.
• Ownership government is positively significant for both the long term in book
and market values. On the other hand, individual is negatively significant for
the long term debt in book values. It is also negative and significant for the
tobit model in the long term debt in market value.
• industry classification variable which is the consumer services is positive sig-
nificant for the long term debt in the market value except for the tobit model.
Telecomincation is only significant using the tobit model for the book value
long term debt and is negative.
The third tables which is Table 5.9 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in Bahrain. The Wald test for the total debt for book
value is not significant. The Lagrange test shows that the OLS could also be used.
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The Hausman test is not significant for total debt and significant for the total market
value and therefore would indicate that it is possible to use the Random effect. The
R2 is higher than 18% for both the book and market value. From the Table 5.9 the
following conclusions could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market val-
ues.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market values.
• Risk is positively significant for the total debt in book values.
• Size is positively significant for the total debt in book and market values.
• Tangibility is positively significant for the total debt in book value under the
fixed effect and tobit model. Likewise, it is also positively significant for the
total debt in market value.
• Non-debt tax shield is negatively significant for the total debt in market values.
It is also significant for tobit model using the book value measures.
• Dividends is negatively significant in for the total debt in book and market
values.
• Cash flow is positively significant for total debt for both book and market val-
ues.
• Ownership government is negatively significant for the total debt in book val-
ues. Institutional variable is negatively significant for total debt in book and
market values. On the other hand, individual is positively significant for the
total debt in book values.
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• industry classification variable which is the basic materials is significantly pos-
itive for the total debt in book values. Technology on the other hand is posi-
tively significant using the market total debt. The health variable is also neg-
atively significant using the OLS model and the random model only.
The only interest from Table 5.10 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio. As
it shows that the dependent variable lagged variable is significant for the short term
debt of book value and for both the long term debt either in book values or market
values. Which, indicate that firms in this Egypt might adjust their capital structure
for both the long term debt and the short term debt.
Table 5.11 show the SEM results for Egypt using the PLS approach. The model
fits at the bottom of the model shows that the model fit is good without the dummy
variables and with the dummy variables. The R2 is acceptable except for the short
term debt in market value where it is only 6%. With the dummies added the long
term debt in market values dropped from 23% to 8%. From this table the following
could be concluded:
• Profitability attribute is significantly negative in relation to total debt in both
market and book leverage.
• Size attribute is significantly positive in relation to total debt in both market
and book leverage. It is also negatively significant to the short and long term
debt in market values.
• Growth is negatively significant to the short term and long term debt in market
values and book values.
• Tangibility is significantly positive in relation to long term debt in both market
and book leverage. Likewise, it is also significant to short term debt market
leverage.
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• Non-debt tax shield is significant for both short and long term debt in book
and market values.
• Risk is only positively significant to the short term debt in market values.
• Dividends is negatively significant to the total debt in market values and book
values.
• Liquidity is negatively significant to the total debt in market values and book
values. It is also significant to long term debt in market values.
• Cash flow is only positively significant in relation to the total debt in book and
market values.
• Ownership variable government is positively significant to the long term debt
of the market and book values. It is also negatively significant to the total
debt in both market and book values. Moreover, the individual variable is
significantly negative with all the 6 leverage ratios. Institutional variable is
positively significant to the short term debt in book and market values.
• In the industry classification the results show that all the industry variables
are significant. The oil and the consumer services variables are positively
significant to the short term and long term in both market and book leverage.
The material variable is positive and significant with long term debt in book
and market value. It is also positive significant with the short term debt in
market leverage. The industrial variable is positive and significant with both
short and long term debt in book and market value. The consumer goods
and the health sectors are positively significant with both short term and long
term in book and market values. On the other hand, both are negatively
significant with the total debt in market and book values. The technology
194
CHAPTER 5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS
sector is positively significant to the short term debt in both market and book
values.
Table 5.12 show the ANN results for Egypt. The model fit is provided at the end
of the table and the models are good. The good prediction is high with values more
46% for both measures without the dummies variables. From this table the following
could be concluded:
• Profitability is an important determinants for the book value short term debt
only.
• Size is slightly important determinant for the short term and total debt in book
value.
• Tangibility is an important determinants for both the short term in book values.
It is also important for both the short term and long term in market values.
• Non debt tax shield is apparently the only substantial variable for the long
term debt of book value, short term debt and long term debt both in market
value.
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Table 5.7: Egypt Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
EGYPT STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant .2378728*** .2394245*** .2378728*** .250916*** .1144399* .1172102* .1144399* .1658005*
S.E. 5.2288 5.2532 5.2288 3.4928 2.0265 2.0710 2.0265 2.4517
Profitability -0.0336 -0.0350 -0.0336 -0.0639 0.0462 0.0436 0.0462 0.1180
S.E -0.9024 -0.9352 -0.9024 -1.0086 1.0006 0.9391 1.0006 1.5501
Liquidty -.002659** -.002592** -.002659** -.0049118** -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0021 -.0054154*
S.E -2.8929 -2.8105 -2.8929 -2.8469 -1.8220 -1.7864 -1.8220 -2.3744
Risk 0.0014 -0.0019 0.0014 -0.0091 -0.0013 -0.0057 -0.0013 -0.0117
S.E 0.1985 -0.2582 0.1985 -0.8129 -0.1581 -0.6350 -0.1581 -0.8382
Size -.0106671*** -.0106048*** -.0106671*** -.0114355*** -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0054
S.E -5.2033 -5.1555 -5.2033 -3.4752 -1.7653 -1.7455 -1.7653 -1.3274
Tangibilty .1168598*** .117951*** .1168598*** .2639806*** .1745225*** .1755768*** .1745225*** .3467158***
S.E 6.4152 6.4645 6.4152 9.3987 7.7180 7.7495 7.7180 9.8774
Tax 0.0857 0.0848 0.0857 .2333705** .3838377*** .3836113*** .3838377*** .572831***
S.E 1.7970 1.7745 1.7970 3.2554 6.4857 6.4683 6.4857 6.4291
Dividends 0.0039 -0.0005 0.0039 -0.1518 -0.0486 -0.0462 -0.0486 -0.2099
S.E 0.0518 -0.0072 0.0518 -1.1514 -0.5207 -0.4924 -0.5207 -1.3687
Growth -0.2413 -0.2738 -0.2413 -0.3954 -0.4992 -.5287793* -0.4992 -1.570433**
S.E -1.1475 -1.2828 -1.1475 -1.1977 -1.9122 -1.9952 -1.9122 -2.9507
Cash Flow -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0013
S.E -0.5221 -0.5559 -0.5221 -0.6379 -0.8031 -0.8227 -0.8031 -0.8576
Government -0.0364 -0.0360 -0.0364 -0.0783 -0.0354 -0.0349 -0.0354 -0.0416
S.E -1.3778 -1.3623 -1.3778 -1.7117 -1.0802 -1.0644 -1.0802 -1.2689
Instituional -0.0079 -0.0077 -0.0079 -.0438624*** 0.0065 0.0067 0.0065 0.0041
S.E -1.0597 -1.0425 -1.0597 -3.7074 0.7054 0.7214 0.7054 0.4359
Indivdual -0.0158 -0.0158 -0.0158 -.0348992* 0.0068 0.0069 0.0068 0.0048
S.E -1.6657 -1.6657 -1.6657 -2.3713 0.5785 0.5800 0.5785 0.4024
Oil -0.0160 -0.0170 -0.0160 -0.0634 0.0062 0.0051 0.0062 0.0043
S.E -0.5382 -0.5679 -0.5382 -1.4245 0.1675 0.1387 0.1675 0.1164
B Materials -0.0052 -0.0062 -0.0052 -0.0702 -0.0258 -0.0273 -0.0258 -0.0278
S.E -0.1775 -0.2140 -0.1775 -1.6171 -0.7166 -0.7549 -0.7166 -0.7695
Industrials -0.0109 -0.0118 -0.0109 -0.0765 0.0127 0.0116 0.0127 0.0124
S.E -0.3920 -0.4231 -0.3920 -1.8527 0.3670 0.3363 0.3670 0.3603
C Goods 0.0050 0.0042 0.0050 -0.0520 -0.0053 -0.0062 -0.0053 -0.0060
S.E 0.1793 0.1491 0.1793 -1.2519 -0.1530 -0.1793 -0.1530 -0.1731
Health .0681417* .0672599* .0681417* 0.0235 0.0600 0.0590 0.0600 0.0582
S.E 2.3242 2.2910 2.3242 0.5391 1.6477 1.6191 1.6477 1.5985
C Servicses -0.0229 -0.0238 -0.0229 -0.0678 0.0359 0.0347 0.0359 0.0331
S.E -0.7986 -0.8315 -0.7986 -1.5924 1.0107 0.9753 1.0107 0.9310
Telecom 0.0011 -0.0002 0.0011 -0.1032 -0.0147 -0.0163 -0.0147 -0.0022
S.E 0.0331 -0.0066 0.0331 -1.9612 -0.3541 -0.3912 -0.3541 -0.0519
Technology 0.0070 0.0060 0.0070 -0.0116 0.0633 0.0622 0.0633 .0920606*
S.E 0.2093 0.1785 0.2093 -0.2334 1.5148 1.4862 1.5148 2.1180
R2 10% 10% 10% 11% 11% 11%
N 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1448
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 4.01 Prob2 0.8566 chi2 (8) 2.09 Prob2 0.9782
Hausman chi2(19) 3.22 Prob2 1 chi2(19) 3.22 Prob2 1
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Table 5.8: Egypt Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
EGYPT LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant .3450284*** .3465082*** .3450284*** .2599808* 0.0798 0.0801 0.0798 0.0068
S.E. 5.6976 5.7070 5.6976 2.4746 1.6155 1.6169 1.6155 0.0799
Profitability .2265286*** .2284111*** .2265286*** -0.0639 -0.0201 -0.0240 -0.0201 -0.0299
S.E 4.5768 4.5876 4.5768 -1.0086 -0.4968 -0.5911 -0.4968 -0.4095
Liquidty -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -.0049118** 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0027
S.E -0.1649 -0.1798 -0.1649 -2.8469 1.3624 1.4133 1.3624 1.5935
Risk 0.0026 0.0018 0.0026 -0.0091 0.0063 0.0035 0.0063 0.0070
S.E 0.2867 0.1874 0.2867 -0.8129 0.8489 0.4422 0.8489 0.5287
Size -.0181521*** -.0181731*** -.0181521*** -.0114355*** -0.0039 -0.0038 -0.0039 -0.0036
S.E -6.6517 -6.6319 -6.6517 -3.4752 -1.7680 -1.6950 -1.7680 -0.9358
Tangibilty .0668796** .0669044** .0668796** .2639806*** .1040894*** .1049271*** .1040894*** .2845372***
S.E 2.7581 2.7525 2.7581 9.3987 5.2598 5.2898 5.2598 8.3089
Tax .7875206*** .7886585*** .7875206*** .2333705** .3162332*** .3156052*** .3162332*** .5999296***
S.E 12.4090 12.3952 12.4090 3.2554 6.1056 6.0783 6.1056 7.2466
Dividends .2807152** .2790782** .2807152** -0.1518 -0.0168 -0.0137 -0.0168 -0.0459
S.E 2.8068 2.7724 2.8068 -1.1514 -0.2053 -0.1665 -0.2053 -0.3110
Growth -1.341728*** -1.357796*** -1.341728*** -0.3954 -.5680391* -.6075937** -.5680391* -1.130195**
S.E -4.7929 -4.7755 -4.7929 -1.1977 -2.4863 -2.6186 -2.4863 -2.6056
Cash Flow -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0029
S.E -0.3947 -0.3867 -0.3947 -1.1069 -1.1931 -1.2064 -1.1931 -1.6337
Government .1907028*** .1906735*** .1907028*** .2571346*** .0826717** .0830069** .0826717** .1313744**
S.E 5.4284 5.4186 5.4284 4.3907 2.8835 2.8906 2.8835 2.7283
Instituional -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0021 -.0525584** 0.0144 0.0145 0.0144 -0.0234
S.E -0.2149 -0.2101 -0.2149 -2.9721 1.7820 1.7909 1.7820 -1.6342
Indivdual -.0407954** -.0407753** -.0407954** -.0947684*** -0.0037 -0.0034 -0.0037 -.0405496*
S.E -3.2246 -3.2173 -3.2246 -4.2521 -0.3577 -0.3327 -0.3577 -2.2688
Oil 0.0267 0.0259 0.0267 0.0262 0.0126 0.0114 0.0126 0.0161
S.E 0.6736 0.6517 0.6736 0.4037 0.3896 0.3519 0.3896 0.3062
B Materials 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0675 0.0169 0.0152 0.0169 -0.0256
S.E 0.0181 -0.0050 0.0181 -1.0595 0.5344 0.4816 0.5344 -0.4974
Industrials -0.0097 -0.0104 -0.0097 -0.0816 0.0184 0.0172 0.0184 -0.0292
S.E -0.2615 -0.2810 -0.2615 -1.3454 0.6103 0.5683 0.6103 -0.5963
C Goods 0.0208 0.0202 0.0208 -0.0420 -0.0071 -0.0084 -0.0071 -0.0596
S.E 0.5592 0.5406 0.5592 -0.6876 -0.2344 -0.2744 -0.2344 -1.2078
Health 0.0258 0.0250 0.0258 -0.0478 0.0513 0.0502 0.0513 -0.0047
S.E 0.6617 0.6403 0.6617 -0.7416 1.6095 1.5719 1.6095 -0.0898
C Servicses -0.0219 -0.0227 -0.0219 -0.0469 .0649501* .0638107* .0649501* 0.0614
S.E -0.5762 -0.5957 -0.5762 -0.7491 2.0892 2.0483 2.0892 1.2180
Telecom -0.0364 -0.0373 -0.0364 -.1728516* -0.0126 -0.0144 -0.0126 -0.1144
S.E -0.8153 -0.8330 -0.8153 -2.2294 -0.3467 -0.3950 -0.3467 -1.8223
Technology -0.0152 -0.0160 -0.0152 0.0052 0.0485 0.0474 0.0485 0.0688
S.E -0.3387 -0.3563 -0.3387 0.0722 1.3261 1.2940 1.3261 1.1694
R2 20% 20% 20% 10% 10% 10%
N 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 4.29 Prob2 0.8296 chi2 (8) 2.94 Prob2 0.9379
Hausman chi2(19) 0.91 Prob2 1 chi2(19) 2.02 Prob2 1
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Table 5.9: Egypt Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
EGYPT TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -.1096492* -.1142599* -.1096492* -0.1184 -.1886812** -.1919815*** -.1886812** -.2138884**
S.E. -2.1553 -2.2421 -2.1553 -1.8851 -3.2391 -3.2983 -3.2391 -2.9973
Profitability -.198266*** -.2027466*** -.198266*** -.19796*** -.2471882*** -.244086*** -.2471882*** -.2602039***
S.E -4.7682 -4.8516 -4.7682 -3.9690 -5.1919 -5.1139 -5.1919 -4.6112
Liquidty -.0064035*** -.0063328*** -.0064035*** -.0195753*** -.0057806*** -.0059391*** -.0057806*** -.019307***
S.E -6.2298 -6.1409 -6.2298 -8.3414 -4.9116 -5.0424 -4.9116 -7.3793
Risk .0174772* .0175796* .0174772* .022639* 0.0094 0.0134 0.0094 0.0142
S.E 2.2745 2.1742 2.2745 2.4729 1.0686 1.4505 1.0686 1.3653
Size .0165311*** .0167947*** .0165311*** .0168011*** .0237581*** .0236244*** .0237581*** .0247138***
S.E 7.2107 7.3020 7.2107 6.1210 9.0507 8.9931 9.0507 7.9258
Tangibilty 0.0398 .0406387* 0.0398 .0598353* .0887397*** .0879694*** .0887397*** .1166395***
S.E 1.9536 1.9919 1.9536 2.4854 3.8045 3.7752 3.8045 4.2848
Tax -0.0964 -0.1004 -0.0964 -.1476512* -.1408582* -.1443461* -.1408582* -.2647903***
S.E -1.8076 -1.8794 -1.8076 -2.2898 -2.3074 -2.3665 -2.3074 -3.4991
Dividends -.3154927*** -.3091238*** -.3154927*** -.3895021*** -.4036369*** -.3740944*** -.4036369*** -.4868197***
S.E -3.7549 -3.6586 -3.7549 -3.8216 -4.1956 -3.8765 -4.1956 -4.2237
Growth 0.1270 0.1191 0.1270 -0.2885 0.0993 0.2043 0.0993 -0.3608
S.E 0.5400 0.4989 0.5400 -0.7811 0.3687 0.7497 0.3687 -0.8623
Cash Flow .0017935* .0017767* .0017935* .0022712* .0025244** .002553** .0025244** .0029243**
S.E 2.1623 2.1395 2.1623 2.3580 2.6787 2.7126 2.6787 2.6940
Government -.1050158*** -.1049562*** -.1050158*** -.1193672*** -0.0397 -0.0404 -0.0397 -0.0424
S.E -3.5582 -3.5536 -3.5582 -3.3056 -1.1746 -1.1975 -1.1746 -1.0602
Instituional -.0357341*** -.0357928*** -.0357341*** -.0590828*** -.042618*** -.0428186*** -.042618*** -.064678***
S.E -4.3030 -4.3070 -4.3030 -5.9573 -4.4821 -4.5111 -4.4821 -5.7669
Indivdual .0295969** .0299841** .0295969** .0299006* -0.0061 -0.0059 -0.0061 -0.0051
S.E 2.7847 2.8187 2.7847 2.3986 -0.4990 -0.4872 -0.4990 -0.3604
Oil 0.0238 0.0239 0.0238 0.0397 -0.0395 -0.0368 -0.0395 -0.0245
S.E 0.7144 0.7155 0.7144 0.9583 -1.0344 -0.9648 -1.0344 -0.5203
B Materials .0671215* .0669346* .0671215* .0973788* 0.0425 0.0451 0.0425 0.0824
S.E 2.0666 2.0577 2.0666 2.4186 1.1428 1.2151 1.1428 1.8001
Industrials -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0162 -0.0030 -0.0003 -0.0030 0.0225
S.E -0.0282 -0.0304 -0.0282 0.4187 -0.0846 -0.0098 -0.0846 0.5110
C Goods -0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0021 0.0209 -0.0334 -0.0305 -0.0334 -0.0093
S.E -0.0686 -0.0743 -0.0686 0.5340 -0.9323 -0.8521 -0.9323 -0.2080
Health -0.0617 -0.0616 -0.0617 -0.0676 -.0761579* -0.0734 -.0761579* -0.0761
S.E -1.8808 -1.8759 -1.8808 -1.6447 -2.0287 -1.9582 -2.0287 -1.6319
C Servicses 0.0176 0.0179 0.0176 0.0520 0.0209 0.0235 0.0209 0.0606
S.E 0.5510 0.5593 0.5510 1.2904 0.5696 0.6428 0.5696 1.3238
Telecom 0.0554 0.0549 0.0554 0.0844 -0.0379 -0.0347 -0.0379 -0.0061
S.E 1.4762 1.4603 1.4762 1.8547 -0.8812 -0.8077 -0.8812 -0.1187
Technology 0.0515 0.0519 0.0515 .0951321* .1173125** .1205561** .1173125** .1680579**
S.E 1.3687 1.3769 1.3687 2.0711 2.7233 2.8023 2.7233 3.2200
R2 18% 18% 0% 18% 18% 0%
N 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 6.69 Prob2 0.5708 chi2 (8) 21.17 Prob2 0.0067
Hausman chi2(19) 3.94 Prob2 0.9999 chi2(19) -8.67 chi2<0
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Table 5.10: Egypt Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
EGYPT
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged -.0825831** -0.0030561 .1073939*** .0680275** -0.0111362 -0.0018675
S.E. -3.228473 -0.1200545 4.34679 262.92% -0.4600474 -0.0784879
Constant .2609913*** .1272386* .3644236*** 0.0864823 -.0992585* -.1963867***
S.E. 5.669661 2.240 5.872 1.731895 -1.96903 -3.487527
Profitability -0.030 0.043 .2499174*** -0.0313895 -.1963297*** -.2726761***
S.E -0.778 0.907 4.855 -0.7588405 -4.69005 -5.836113
Liquidty -.0027974** -0.002 0.000 0.0014483 -.0065038*** -.0057551***
S.E -3.009 -1.789 -0.259 1.432503 -6.360496 -5.044918
Risk -0.004 -0.005 0.000 0.0037807 .0180445* 0.0158709
S.E -0.525 -0.579 -0.025 0.4808103 2.263731 1.783248
Size -.0113251*** -0.005 -.0195657*** -.0044694* .0161907*** .023773***
S.E -5.441 -1.931 -6.947 -1.965137 7.096237 9.249081
Tangibilty .1214543*** .1697328*** .0758618** .0900501*** 0.027831 0.0375118
S.E 6.423 7.247 2.967 4.392348 1.341326 1.609951
Tax 0.075 .3854356*** .7620426*** .3242535*** -.1041255* -.1289677*
S.E 1.569 6.511 11.706 6.233358 -1.971512 -2.187694
Dividends -0.020 -0.039 .2671867* 0.0204258 -.3084765*** -.3206981***
S.E -0.262 -0.412 2.558 0.2435647 -3.627606 -3.391638
Growth -0.270 -.5661601* -1.36393*** -.6113045* 0.1218577 0.2291944
S.E -1.256 -2.082 -4.512 -2.52682 0.5174227 0.8514161
Cash Flow -0.0004305 -0.0007493 -0.0009165 -0.0011526 .0022712* .0024749**
S.E -0.5965662 -0.8365135 -0.9250722 -1.44969 2.357954 2.675699
Government -0.0443231 -0.0415966 .186214*** .0807744** -.1171393*** -0.0554024
S.E -1.670332 -1.268931 5.208565 2.817123 -4.031802 -1.706026
Instituional -0.009656 0.0040893 -0.0095781 0.0143141 -.043107*** -.0476896***
S.E -1.277916 0.4359031 -0.9383016 1.755021 -5.194977 -5.161167
Indivdual -.0213708* 0.0047953 -.0463498*** -0.0031427 .0245899* -0.0050899
S.E -2.216683 0.4023864 -3.567672 -0.3011557 2.332106 -0.4316515
Oil -0.0169708 0.0043106 0.0241694 0.0146959 0.023365 -0.0305156
S.E -0.5673625 0.1164452 0.5979206 0.4530991 0.7127312 -0.832126
B Materials -0.0065629 -0.0277725 0.0034578 0.0148126 .0676376* 0.0498635
S.E -0.2252054 -0.7695142 0.0877158 0.468457 2.117922 1.394633
Industrials -0.0147252 0.0124474 -0.0100656 0.0205236 0.0010767 0.0085035
S.E -0.5275068 0.3603053 -0.2668932 0.6781974 0.0352187 0.2485153
C Goods 0.0027054 -0.0060214 0.0158815 -0.0086498 0.0019258 -0.0192631
S.E 0.0962531 -0.1730682 0.4179957 -0.2836668 0.0625261 -0.5586449
Health .0654365* 0.0582233 0.0258593 0.0545975 -0.062453 -0.0643074
S.E 2.223609 1.598502 0.6499607 1.710896 -1.936532 -1.781417
C Servicses -0.0259496 0.0331075 -0.0158141 0.0607177 0.0179239 0.0150311
S.E -0.9029097 0.9309546 -0.4073455 1.950708 0.5691465 0.426759
Telecom 0.0100212 -0.0021878 -0.018763 -0.0012954 .0761003* 0.0002372
S.E 0.2944893 -0.051927 -0.4078562 -0.035115 2.041325 0.005685
Technology 0.0301445 .0920606* 0.0079516 0.0604399 .0985875* .1976766***
S.E 0.8577618 2.117957 0.1675651 1.581895 2.561361 4.591704
N 1448 1448 1448 1448 1448 1448
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Table 5.11: Egypt SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
Prof -0.003 0.019 -0.199 0.045 0.017 -0.17 0.019 0.043 -0.206 0.018 0.041 -0.206
0.459 0.232 <0.001 0.043 0.255 <0.001 0.228 0.047 <0.001 0.242 0.057 <0.001
Size -0.063 -0.055 0.102 -0.133 -0.082 0.201 -0.012 -0.051 0.137 -0.015 -0.083 0.138
0.007 0.018 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.321 0.025 <0.001 0.286 <0.001 <0.001
Growth -0.125 -0.127 -0.027 -0.102 -0.218 -0.032 -0.105 -0.105 0.002 -0.118 -0.187 -0.024
<0.001 <0.001 0.152 <0.001 <0.001 0.112 <0.001 <0.001 0.472 <0.001 <0.001 0.176
Tang 0.173 0.171 0.006 0.055 0.211 0.001 0.14 0.105 -0.023 0.181 0.216 -0.01
<0.001 <0.001 0.402 0.017 <0.001 0.492 <0.001 <0.001 0.184 <0.001 <0.001 0.357
Tax 0.121 0.143 -0.068 0.131 0.234 -0.036 0.141 0.151 -0.075 0.13 0.225 -0.076
<0.001 <0.001 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 0.08 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 0.002
Risk 0.116 0.027 0.044 -0.017 -0.004 0.048 0.106 0.016 0.027 0.106 -0.009 0.024
<0.001 0.147 0.046 0.259 0.443 0.033 <0.001 0.275 0.152 <0.001 0.369 0.174
Div -0.024 -0.001 -0.163 -0.007 0.115 -0.208 -0.019 0.008 -0.147 -0.017 0.12 -0.146
0.175 0.491 <0.001 0.389 <0.001 <0.001 0.228 0.38 <0.001 0.252 <0.001 <0.001
Liqud -0.057 0.08 -0.223 -0.063 -0.048 -0.252 -0.051 0.067 -0.205 -0.045 -0.058 -0.203
0.014 <0.001 <0.001 0.008 0.033 <0.001 0.026 0.005 <0.001 0.041 0.013 <0.001
Cash Flow -0.017 -0.034 0.174 -0.009 -0.034 0.138 -0.04 -0.058 0.114 -0.03 -0.04 0.115
0.251 0.095 <0.001 0.361 0.094 <0.001 0.06 0.012 <0.001 0.122 0.061 <0.001
Ownership
Gov -0.027 0.15 -0.175 -0.022 0.227 -0.175
0.148 <0.001 <0.001 0.2 <0.001 <0.001
indv -0.106 -0.124 -0.105 -0.101 -0.078 -0.105
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001
Inst 0.121 0.032 -0.064 0.119 0.032 -0.064
<0.001 0.112 0.007 <0.001 0.106 0.007
Industry
Oil 0.118 0.103 -0.034 0.099 0.139 -0.041
<0.001 <0.001 0.094 <0.001 <0.001 0.055
Mater 0.087 0.159 0.055 0.068 0.127 0.046
<0.001 <0.001 0.017 0.004 <0.001 0.039
Indust 0.241 0.229 0.013 0.207 0.164 0
<0.001 <0.001 0.305 <0.001 <0.001 0.492
Cgoods 0.203 0.174 -0.088 0.174 0.222 -0.1
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Health 0.24 0.198 -0.109 0.222 0.139 -0.116
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Cserv 0.239 0.294 0.037 0.226 0.122 0.028
<0.001 <0.001 0.076 <0.001 <0.001 0.138
Telec 0.072 0.067 -0.025 0.06 0.041 -0.03
0.003 0.005 0.166 0.01 0.057 0.122
Techno 0.121 0.078 0.036 0.104 0.012 0.03
<0.001 0.001 0.085 <0.001 0.318 0.122
N 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480
R2 6 23 26 11 11 22 10 8 29 11 30 29
Model Fit
(APC) 0.092 P<0.001 0.092 P<0.001 0.102 P<0.001 0.1 P<0.001
(ARS) 0.166 P<0.001 0.166 P<0.001 0.157 P<0.001 0.234 P<0.001
(AARS) 0.161 P<0.001 0.161 P<0.001 0.145 P<0.001 0.224 P<0.001
(AVIF) 1.159 1.159 3.766 3.73
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Table 5.12: Egypt ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Egypt Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 22.17% 8.46% 9.80% 9.30% 6.25% 13.55%
Size 17.26% 8.33% 17.85% 12.92% 12.48% 11.66%
Growth 9.92% 9.88% 13.70% 7.32% 4.81% 11.12%
Tangibility 20.01% 9.17% 8.26% 18.45% 16.43% 8.20%
Non-Debt Tax shield 10.30% 22.66% 7.21% 22.27% 32.43% 10.31%
Volatility 0.74% 9.00% 10.95% 9.74% 5.75% 6.85%
Dividends 6.71% 18.55% 7.86% 6.51% 2.99% 12.27%
Liquidity 6.57% 3.07% 12.43% 6.70% 9.88% 12.16%
Cash Flow 6.33% 10.87% 11.95% 6.80% 8.98% 13.89%
Good prediction % 56.37% 52.04% 73.68% 50.00% 46.77% 65.87%
S.D of abs errors 0.07 0.14 0.0775 0.1080 0.0846 0.1207
RMSE 0.08 0.15 0.0907 0.1171 0.0908 0.1448
MAE 0.02 0.05 0.04703 0.04527 0.03280 0.0800
N 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472
Adding Dummies
Profitability 21.84% 2.70% 2.72% 5.63% 4.42% 5.57%
Size 9.21% 8.29% 10.29% 14.32% 9.54% 11.05%
Growth 3.66% 6.32% 4.30% 6.28% 3.23% 6.04%
Tangibility 11.03% 7.66% 5.75% 20.80% 8.26% 13.11%
Non-Debt Tax shield 13.22% 21.35% 7.88% 18.01% 16.14% 7.11%
Volatility 1.30% 1.96% 7.84% 0.27% 6.15% 2.58%
Dividends 1.66% 7.00% 7.12% 4.73% 11.60% 3.10%
Liquidity 4.80% 7.68% 11.40% 4.00% 8.48% 9.04%
Cash Flow 4.09% 5.44% 9.14% 3.62% 7.02% 8.45%
Ownership Dummies
Government 2.39% 5.79% 5.47% 1.86% 6.16% 5.66%
Institutional 3.31% 2.92% 4.06% 3.69% 1.91% 2.37%
Individual 3.70% 2.73% 2.05% 0.01% 4.50% 3.53%
Industry Dummies
Oil 1.83% 3.24% 3.06% 1.13% 1.16% 3.00%
Basic Materials 2.74% 1.63% 3.33% 3.11% 0.16% 0.23%
Consumer Goods 0.33% 1.19% 0.20% 0.01% 0.93% 2.59%
Consumer Services 1.51% 2.10% 1.76% 1.71% 0.24% 1.87%
Health Care 6.17% 1.80% 2.09% 2.61% 1.24% 2.84%
Industrials 0.11% 0.43% 1.40% 0.81% 1.81% 0.17%
Technology 5.37% 6.54% 6.61% 6.49% 5.55% 8.26%
Telecommunications 1.74% 3.24% 3.50% 0.90% 1.50% 3.43%
Good prediction % 46.86% 66.13% 70.63% 53.74% 51.61% 67.57%
RMSE 0.0332 0.0175 0.0370 0.0353 0.0300 0.0527
MAE 0.0090 0.0023 0.0163 0.0091 0.0060 0.0255
S.D of abs errors 0.0319 0.0173 0.0332 0.0341 0.0294 0.0461
N 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in Jordan using Panel Data,
SEM, ANN ?
The third country in this chapter is Jordan which is one of the largest countries in
the sample of the MENA countries. First, the table of the short term debt panel
data results is presented. The R2 is low and in the range of 10% across the mod-
els. The Wald test is not significant and therefore it can be concluded that there
is no heteroskedasticiy. The table show that the Hausman test is not significant
and therefore it is safe to use the random effect model. From the Table 5.13 the
following conclusions could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant with the short term debt in book value.
• Liquidity is negatively significant with the short term debt in book and market
value.
• Size is positively significant with the short term debt in book and market value.
• Tangibility is negatively significant across the models for both short term debt
in book and market value.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the short term debt in market
value.
• Dividends is significantly negative for both short term debt in book and market
value.
• Growth is negative and significant for both the tobit model in the book value.
• Cash flow is significantly negative for both short term debt in book and market
value.
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• The ownership structure show that the gooverment variable is negative and
significant for both market value and book value of short term debt. On
the other hand, individual variable also significantly negative using the tobit
model.
• The industry classification show that only the oil sector is positive and signifi-
cant.
The second Table 5.14 show the long term debt using panel data models. The
Wald test is not significant for the fixed effect. The R2 is acceptable for the book
debt with 15% and lower for the market value with 8% only. The Lagrange test is
not significant and the following could be concluded:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the long term debt in book values.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the long term debt in market values.
• Size is positively significant for the long term debt in book values using the
tobit model.
• Tangibility is negatively significant in for the long term debt in book values
using the tobit model.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the long term debt in book and
market values.
• Dividends is negatively significant for the long term debt in book and market
values using the tobit model only.
• Growth is negatively significant in for the long term debt in market values using
tobit.
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• Ownership individual is negatively significant for the long term debt in book
values. It is also negative and significant for institutional variable for both the
long term debt in market value and book value.
• industry classification variable which is the oil is significantly negative using
the tobit model.
The third tables which is Table 5.15 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in Jordan. The Wald test for the total debt for book
value is not significant but significant for the market total debt and therefore the
errors reported are robust. The Lagrange test is not significant and therefore the
random effect could be used. The Hausman test is not significant for total debt and
significant for the total market value and therefore would indicate that it is possible
to use the Random effect. The R2 is higher than 25% for both the book and market
value. From the Table 5.15 the following conclusions could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market val-
ues.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market values.
• Size is positively significant for the total debt in book and market values.
• Tangibility is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market values
across all the models.
• Non-debt tax shield is negatively significant for the total debt book and market
values across all the models.
• Dividends is negatively significant in for the total debt in book and market
values.
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• Growth is negatively significant in for the total debt in book and market values
except for the fixed effect model with the book values.
• Cash flow is negatively significant for total debt for book value.
• Ownership government is negatively significant for the total debt in book and
market values. Institutional variable is negatively significant for total debt in
book values and only using the tobit model for the market value. On the other
hand, individual negatively significant for total debt in book values,
• industry classification variable which is the oil positively significant using both
market and book total debt.
The only interest from Table 5.16 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio. As
it shows that the dependent variable lagged variable is negatively significant for the
long term debt of book and market value. Which, indicate that firms in this Jordan
might adjust their capital structure for both the long term debt.
Table 5.17 show the SEM results for Jordan using the PLS approach. The model
fits at the bottom of the model shows that the model fit is good without the dummy
variables and not fit with the dummy variables. The R2 is acceptable except for the
long term debt in both market value and book values. From this table the following
could be concluded:
• Profitability attribute is significantly negative to long term debt in market value.
On the other hand, it is positively significant to the short term debt in books
value
• Growth is negatively significant to the long term debt in book values.
• Tangibility is significantly positive in relation to short term debt book leverage.
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• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for long term debt in book and
market values. Similarly, it is positively significant to short term debt in book
value.
• Dividends is negatively significant to the total debt in book values and short
term debt in book values.
• Liquidity is negatively significant to the total debt in market values and book
values. It is also significant to long term debt in book values and short term
debt in market values.
• Cash flow is negatively significant in relation all debt variables in book and
market values.
• Ownership variable government is positively significant to the long term debt
book values. It is also negatively significant to the short term debt in book
values. In addition, the individual variable is significantly negative with the
long term debt in book values. Institutional variable is negatively significant to
the three measures of debt in book values.
• industry variables of consumer services and the health sectors are negatively
significant with total debt in book value. It is also negatively significant short
term debt in book values.
In addition, Table 5.18 show the ANN results for Jordan. Overall the good predic-
tion is high with values higher than 41% without dummies and 45% with dummies.
From this table the following could be concluded:
• Profitability measure is slightly important for both the total debt in market and
book values.
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• Non debt tax shield is substantially important in relation to both the long term
debt in market and book values.
• Volatility is slightly important for the long term and total debt in book values.
• Liquidity is substantially important in relation short term debt in book value,
short term and long term debt in market value.
• Cash flow is only substantially important for the total debt in market value.
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Table 5.13: Jordan Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
JORDAN STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -0.1555 -0.1519 -0.1555 -.2226235* -0.0681 -0.0593 -0.0681 -0.0771
S.E. -1.8973 -1.8477 -1.8973 -2.2838 -0.8242 -0.7184 -0.8242 -1.3246
Profitability -0.0611 -0.0495 -0.0611 -0.0707 -.3092574*** -.283172*** -.3092574*** -.335566***
S.E -0.7975 -0.6384 -0.7975 -0.7745 -4.0035 -3.6380 -4.0035 -3.8126
Liquidty -.0032614* -.0031635* -.0032614* -.0074067*** -.0075037*** -.0072603*** -.0075037*** -.0088681***
S.E -2.2775 -2.1980 -2.2775 -3.5432 -5.2001 -5.0251 -5.2001 -5.4581
Risk 0.0055 0.0045 0.0055 0.0058 -0.0021 -0.0033 -0.0021 -0.0068
S.E 0.4754 0.3923 0.4754 0.4343 -0.1810 -0.2836 -0.1810 -0.5135
Size .019093*** .0189167*** .019093*** .0277607*** .0175238*** .017133*** .0175238*** .0211121***
S.E 5.9489 5.8733 5.9489 7.0150 5.4185 5.2992 5.4185 5.7818
Tangibilty -.128091*** -.127932*** -.128091*** -.1303067*** -.1312641*** -.1320287*** -.1312641*** -.1257089***
S.E -6.2755 -6.2436 -6.2755 -5.3869 -6.3821 -6.4190 -6.3821 -5.3747
Tax .3364587*** .3391821*** .3364587*** .4578499*** -0.0649 -0.0615 -0.0649 -0.0157
S.E 4.0475 4.0661 4.0475 4.7500 -0.7754 -0.7343 -0.7754 -0.1688
Dividends -.7142422*** -.7301185*** -.7142422*** -1.119206*** -.6427842*** -.6721812*** -.6427842*** -1.03565***
S.E -3.9450 -4.0084 -3.9450 -4.8564 -3.5233 -3.6762 -3.5233 -4.5726
Growth -0.5509 -0.5766 -0.5509 -.8535814* -0.5366 -0.5172 -0.5366 -0.6416
S.E -1.7512 -1.8069 -1.7512 -2.1371 -1.6928 -1.6144 -1.6928 -1.7775
Cash Flow -.2533697*** -.2531289*** -.2533697*** -.4797422*** -.2002205*** -.2005003*** -.2002205*** -.3355396***
S.E -7.4887 -7.4533 -7.4887 -9.1969 -5.7248 -5.7329 -5.7248 -7.0560
Government -.1043207** -.1046249** -.1043207** -.1624971*** -.0906961** -.0926465** -.0906961** -.1074825**
S.E -3.1512 -3.1504 -3.1512 -3.8879 -2.7189 -2.7790 -2.7189 -3.1713
Instituional -0.0246 -0.0246 -0.0246 -0.0280 -0.0210 -0.0210 -0.0210 -0.0203
S.E -1.7711 -1.7637 -1.7711 -1.7358 -1.5026 -1.5041 -1.5026 -1.4598
Indivdual -0.0244 -0.0245 -0.0244 -.0369062* -0.0236 -0.0245 -0.0236 -0.0257
S.E -1.7776 -1.7814 -1.7776 -2.3059 -1.7101 -1.7764 -1.7101 -1.8590
Oil 0.0616 0.0616 0.0616 0.0363 .1791718*** .1794259*** .1791718*** .2769011***
S.E 1.2729 1.2690 1.2729 0.5972 3.6715 3.6816 3.6715 4.4221
B Materials 0.0764 0.0759 0.0764 0.0181 0.0833 0.0815 0.0833 0.0772
S.E 1.2748 1.2633 1.2748 0.2569 1.3800 1.3523 1.3800 1.2916
Industrials 0.0874 0.0868 0.0874 0.0217 0.0700 0.0679 0.0700 0.0644
S.E 1.4424 1.4285 1.4424 0.3018 1.1464 1.1131 1.1464 1.0639
C Goods 0.0477 0.0474 0.0477 -0.0299 0.0219 0.0202 0.0219 0.0103
S.E 0.7812 0.7743 0.7812 -0.4142 0.3558 0.3292 0.3558 0.1691
Health 0.0266 0.0260 0.0266 -0.0406 -0.0119 -0.0144 -0.0119 -0.0346
S.E 0.4250 0.4138 0.4250 -0.5487 -0.1894 -0.2282 -0.1894 -0.5527
C Servicses 0.0279 0.0273 0.0279 -0.0477 0.0126 0.0106 0.0126 0.0061
S.E 0.4678 0.4566 0.4678 -0.6712 0.2089 0.1760 0.2089 0.1019
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
R2 15% 15% 10% 21% 21% 11%
N 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 3.39 Prob2 0.9079 chi2 (8) 6.92 Prob2 0.5452
Hausman chi2(17) 1.96 Prob2 1 chi2(17) 14.7 Prob2 0.6169
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Table 5.14: Jordan Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
JORDAN LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -0.0029 -0.0006 -0.0029 -0.1377 0.0275 0.0335 0.0275 0.0343
S.E. -0.0512 -0.0105 -0.0512 -1.4706 0.3915 0.4767 0.3915 0.3160
Profitability -0.0643 -0.0546 -0.0643 -0.0707 -.2128158** -.1916461** -.2128158** -.2171555*
S.E -1.2106 -1.0178 -1.2106 -0.7745 -3.2444 -2.8962 -3.2444 -2.0386
Liquidty -.0039886*** -.0039657*** -.0039886*** -.0074067*** -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0022 -.0081907**
S.E -4.0210 -3.9792 -4.0210 -3.5432 -1.7703 -1.5982 -1.7703 -3.0639
Risk .032788*** .0336229*** .032788*** 0.0058 0.0044 0.0048 0.0044 0.0154
S.E 4.1269 4.2035 4.1269 0.4343 0.4474 0.4870 0.4474 0.9689
Size 0.0026 0.0025 0.0026 .0277607*** 0.0028 0.0025 0.0028 0.0018
S.E 1.1761 1.1377 1.1761 7.0150 1.0185 0.9224 1.0185 0.3981
Tangibilty 0.0100 0.0092 0.0100 -.1303067*** 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0216
S.E 0.7050 0.6512 0.7050 -5.3869 0.0174 -0.0277 0.0174 0.7636
Tax .4023031*** .4019845*** .4023031*** .4578499*** .288891*** .2907504*** .288891*** .4471265***
S.E 6.9868 6.9595 6.9868 4.7500 4.0616 4.0843 4.0616 4.0444
Dividends -0.1808 -0.1942 -0.1808 -1.119206*** -0.1359 -0.1586 -0.1359 -.6377373*
S.E -1.4414 -1.5395 -1.4414 -4.8564 -0.8772 -1.0204 -0.8772 -2.2243
Growth 0.1090 0.1328 0.1090 -.8535814* 0.2688 0.2992 0.2688 0.3483
S.E 0.5002 0.6012 0.5002 -2.1371 0.9985 1.0986 0.9985 0.7977
Cash Flow 0.0274 0.0267 0.0274 -0.0498 -0.0190 -0.0195 -0.0190 -.1197028*
S.E 1.1403 1.1042 1.1403 -1.0918 -0.6450 -0.6599 -0.6450 -2.1756
Government -0.0233 -0.0240 -0.0233 0.0097 -0.0315 -0.0334 -0.0315 0.0327
S.E -1.0141 -1.0440 -1.0141 0.2482 -1.1123 -1.1794 -1.1123 0.7011
Instituional -.0264371** -.026477** -.0264371** -.0426454** -.027463* -.0275059* -.027463* -.0403288*
S.E -2.7475 -2.7461 -2.7475 -2.6782 -2.3105 -2.3148 -2.3105 -2.1048
Indivdual -.0366178*** -.0372149*** -.0366178*** -.0552562*** -0.0219 -0.0229 -0.0219 -0.0286
S.E -3.8567 -3.9082 -3.8567 -3.5241 -1.8707 -1.9511 -1.8707 -1.5275
Oil -0.0311 -0.0313 -0.0311 -.2252559** 0.0093 0.0095 0.0093 0.0010
S.E -0.9272 -0.9303 -0.9272 -2.8177 0.2235 0.2302 0.2235 0.0149
B Materials 0.0219 0.0211 0.0219 -0.0217 0.0158 0.0140 0.0158 -0.0644
S.E 0.5272 0.5067 0.5272 -0.3390 0.3072 0.2731 0.3072 -0.8318
Industrials 0.0464 0.0454 0.0464 0.0435 0.0371 0.0351 0.0371 0.0174
S.E 1.1062 1.0807 1.1062 0.6666 0.7153 0.6778 0.7153 0.2212
C Goods 0.0108 0.0096 0.0108 -0.0558 0.0000 -0.0019 0.0000 -0.0978
S.E 0.2546 0.2272 0.2546 -0.8444 0.0002 -0.0363 0.0002 -1.2256
Health 0.0145 0.0133 0.0145 0.0326 0.0018 -0.0005 0.0018 0.0049
S.E 0.3356 0.3057 0.3356 0.4824 0.0343 -0.0094 0.0343 0.0607
C Servicses 0.0305 0.0296 0.0305 0.0092 0.0236 0.0218 0.0236 -0.0178
S.E 0.7363 0.7131 0.7363 0.1428 0.4627 0.4259 0.4627 -0.2287
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 15% 15% 8% 8%
N 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 4.07 Prob2 0.8508 chi2 (8) 12.58 Prob2 0.1273
Hausman chi2(17) 2.53 Prob2 1 chi2(17) 7.46 Prob2 0.9767
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Table 5.15: Jordan Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
JORDAN TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant 0.0078 0.0149 0.0078 0.0940 -0.1174 -0.1047 -0.1174 -0.0817
S.E. 0.0981 0.1861 0.0981 1.0652 -1.2400 -1.1098 -1.2400 -0.7998
Profitability -.1932536** -.1700635* -.1932536** -0.0936 -.4772154*** -.4359042*** -.4772154*** -.480185***
S.E -2.5873 -2.2561 -2.5873 -1.1202 -5.3876 -4.9005 -5.3876 -5.0282
Liquidty -.012059*** -.011853*** -.012059*** -.0261425*** -.0125057*** -.0121405*** -.0125057*** -.0161687***
S.E -8.6428 -8.4716 -8.6428 -11.2333 -7.5581 -7.3531 -7.5581 -8.6933
Risk 0.0078 0.0076 0.0078 0.0122 0.0039 0.0032 0.0039 0.0049
S.E 0.6947 0.6799 0.6947 0.9912 0.2936 0.2398 0.2936 0.3433
Size .0161643*** .0158723*** .0161643*** .0158715*** .0273273*** .0267872*** .0273273*** .0329264***
S.E 5.1691 5.0695 5.1691 4.5222 7.3692 7.2502 7.3692 8.2461
Tangibilty -.1235096*** -.1242597*** -.1235096*** -.1413768*** -.1721724*** -.1739346*** -.1721724*** -.1788995***
S.E -6.2105 -6.2384 -6.2105 -6.4515 -7.3005 -7.3999 -7.3005 -7.0518
Tax -.2347219** -.2346632** -.2347219** -.1941224* -.3487603*** -.3446654*** -.3487603*** -.4325256***
S.E -2.8981 -2.8938 -2.8981 -2.0345 -3.6311 -3.6018 -3.6311 -3.8551
Dividends -.8566488*** -.8813773*** -.8566488*** -1.206744*** -.9927813*** -1.038311*** -.9927813*** -1.498028***
S.E -4.8562 -4.9776 -4.8562 -5.6233 -4.7458 -4.9692 -4.7458 -6.0079
Growth -.6353319* -0.5920 -.6353319* -1.144487** -.8094482* -.7526461* -.8094482* -1.144578**
S.E -2.0728 -1.9083 -2.0728 -3.0778 -2.2269 -2.0559 -2.2269 -2.8265
Cash Flow -.1145043*** -.1154679*** -.1145043*** -.1582394*** -0.0155 -0.0158 -0.0155 -0.0317
S.E -3.3754 -3.3984 -3.3754 -4.1506 -0.3798 -0.3887 -0.3798 -0.7114
Government -.0905818** -.0928101** -.0905818** -.1188416** -.110369** -.1139792** -.110369** -.1841462***
S.E -2.8083 -2.8748 -2.8083 -3.1104 -2.8855 -2.9918 -2.8855 -4.0910
Instituional -.0430878** -.0431791** -.0430878** -.0463266** -0.0273 -0.0274 -0.0273 -.0366262*
S.E -3.1835 -3.1899 -3.1835 -3.1109 -1.7008 -1.7131 -1.7008 -2.1213
Indivdual -.0452145*** -.0463279*** -.0452145*** -.0532079*** -0.0199 -0.0217 -0.0199 -0.0318
S.E -3.3855 -3.4655 -3.3855 -3.6419 -1.2583 -1.3745 -1.2583 -1.8716
Oil .1388575** .1392293** .1388575** .2000812*** .1843384** .1847551*** .1843384*** .2440595***
S.E 2.9427 2.9501 2.9427 3.8193 3.2942 3.3174 3.2942 3.9769
B Materials 0.0517 0.0498 0.0517 0.0188 0.0796 0.0766 0.0796 -0.0180
S.E 0.8852 0.8524 0.8852 0.2904 1.1503 1.1114 1.1503 -0.2384
Industrials 0.0784 0.0762 0.0784 0.0359 0.0979 0.0943 0.0979 -0.0027
S.E 1.3274 1.2904 1.3274 0.5440 1.3988 1.3538 1.3988 -0.0344
C Goods 0.0167 0.0147 0.0167 -0.0389 0.0194 0.0163 0.0194 -0.0923
S.E 0.2807 0.2464 0.2807 -0.5863 0.2758 0.2317 0.2758 -1.1864
Health 0.0026 0.0000 0.0026 -0.0455 -0.0251 -0.0294 -0.0251 -0.1396
S.E 0.0427 -0.0001 0.0427 -0.6677 -0.3471 -0.4082 -0.3471 -1.7497
C Servicses 0.0406 0.0385 0.0406 -0.0206 0.0278 0.0244 0.0278 -0.0900
S.E 0.6972 0.6612 0.6972 -0.3153 0.4032 0.3558 0.4032 -1.1736
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 25% 25% 0% 30% 29% 0%
N 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 7.78 Prob2 0.4554 chi2 (8) 17.91 Prob2 0.0219
Hausman chi2(17) 6.76 Prob2 0.9865 chi2(17) 54.15 Prob2 0
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Table 5.16: Jordan Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
JORDAN
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged -0.0420104 0.0397705 -.0893221** -.0748131* 0.0102283 0.0029305
S.E. -1.303087 1.272381 -2.71488 -222.44% 0.336592 0.0971596
Constant -0.0900788 -0.026 0.007 0.0302422 0.0223465 -0.085699
S.E. -1.070937 -0.311 0.110 0.4182185 0.2714943 -0.8744235
Profitability -0.019 -.2726191*** -0.054 -.1958952** -.1757114* -.4304253***
S.E -0.241 -3.454 -0.959 -2.864843 -2.272382 -4.658102
Liquidty -0.003 -.0064575*** -.0041404*** -0.002275 -.011708*** -.0119674***
S.E -1.726 -4.419 -3.991 -1.799209 -8.202046 -7.007559
Risk 0.002 -0.003 .0336619*** 0.0056113 0.0068295 0.0014211
S.E 0.198 -0.301 4.099 0.5614315 0.6036562 0.1050588
Size .0161944*** .0154775*** 0.003 0.0034335 .0160932*** .0261201***
S.E 4.781 4.594 1.249 1.177916 4.877126 6.624997
Tangibilty -.1443107*** -.1494297*** 0.001 -0.0101205 -.1502928*** -.1890372***
S.E -6.755 -7.037 0.044 -0.5466262 -7.23144 -7.612005
Tax .3751539*** -0.005 .4085815*** .3014406*** -.1945679* -.3226886**
S.E 4.376 -0.056 6.778 4.10186 -2.337906 -3.236783
Dividends -.8325089*** -.7396958*** -0.215 -0.1606034 -.9535894*** -1.102963***
S.E -4.489 -4.004 -1.648 -1.010041 -5.275329 -5.101913
Growth -.6679288* -0.618 0.114 0.2941051 -.7007462* -.9103887*
S.E -1.999 -1.859 0.479 1.021734 -2.1483 -2.352908
Cash Flow -.2455085*** -.2050755*** 0.0505043 -0.0190072 -.1582394*** -0.0235185
S.E -6.692258 -5.525978 1.946897 -0.6158604 -4.150555 -0.5476333
Government -.1052125** -.1074825** -0.0314294 -0.0416532 -.1070591** -.1185825**
S.E -3.109185 -3.171283 -1.320521 -1.435158 -3.246011 -3.00203
Instituional -0.0250824 -0.0203105 -.0278677** -.0293425* -.0449542*** -0.0278387
S.E -1.795933 -1.45979 -2.833763 -2.446278 -3.312198 -1.714448
Indivdual -0.023656 -0.0256615 -.0404495*** -.0267235* -.0470583*** -0.0205676
S.E -1.705148 -1.858977 -4.120981 -2.228865 -3.486492 -1.274251
Oil .1842213** .2769011*** -0.0261938 -0.0027337 .1320569* .207633**
S.E 2.925276 4.422106 -0.5896486 -0.0503644 2.154623 2.826413
B Materials 0.0692886 0.0772405 0.0208338 0.0161476 0.0501979 0.0751259
S.E 1.152533 1.291599 0.4919715 0.3127297 0.8580431 1.073918
Industrials 0.0856963 0.0643739 0.0424048 0.0364607 0.0824306 0.0973207
S.E 1.409941 1.063872 0.9898982 0.6983252 1.393964 1.374547
C Goods 0.0424238 0.0103109 0.0060835 -0.0030425 0.0122033 0.0134379
S.E 0.6930475 0.1690879 0.1410358 -0.0578577 0.2049452 0.1886203
Health 0.0090394 -0.0345965 0.0039376 -0.0063765 -0.015099 -0.0396079
S.E 0.1437698 -0.5527425 0.0887756 -0.1179684 -0.2467545 -0.5413157
C Servicses 0.0211023 0.0060766 0.0263854 0.0230539 0.0400754 0.0239906
S.E 0.352106 0.1019341 0.6248607 0.4479392 0.6869422 0.3440822
Telecom 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 872 872 872 872 872 872
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Table 5.17: Jordan SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
Profit -0.022 -0.127 -0.06 0.119 -0.064 0.005 -0.078 -0.248 -0.162 -0.048 -0.07 -0.101
0.256 <0.001 0.034 <0.001 0.026 0.443 0.367 0.265 0.294 0.075 0.017 0.001
Size 0.032 -0.072 0.009 0.04 0.029 0.043 0.027 -0.102 0.083 -0.013 0.007 0.054
0.169 0.015 0.39 0.115 0.194 0.097 0.459 0.43 0.391 0.351 0.413 0.05
Growth 0.004 0.076 -0.005 -0.041 0.107 -0.012 -0.021 0.046 -0.001 0.022 0.111 0.026
0.452 0.011 0.442 0.108 <0.001 0.354 0.478 0.468 0.499 0.252 <0.001 0.215
Tang -0.042 0.044 -0.07 0.137 0.077 -0.092 0.044 0.102 -0.032 -0.035 -0.102 -0.073
0.102 0.09 0.017 <0.001 0.01 0.003 0.474 0.339 0.479 0.144 <0.001 0.014
Tax 0 0.185 -0.061 0.17 0.254 -0.033 0.106 0.001 0.132 0.021 0.226 -0.055
0.499 <0.001 0.034 <0.001 <0.001 0.159 0.213 0.498 0.207 0.261 <0.001 0.047
Risk -0.037 -0.041 -0.059 -0.035 -0.037 -0.062 -0.044 -0.021 -0.062 -0.049 -0.045 -0.047
0.13 0.11 0.037 0.145 0.133 0.031 0.352 0.444 0.246 0.071 0.087 0.077
Div -0.087 -0.055 -0.115 -0.114 -0.016 -0.085 -0.039 0.013 -0.072 -0.05 0.021 -0.067
0.004 0.049 <0.001 <0.001 0.31 0.005 0.399 0.472 0.33 0.066 0.263 0.021
Liqud -0.137 -0.04 -0.222 -0.047 -0.128 -0.22 -0.217 -0.004 -0.302 -0.133 -0.106 -0.223
<0.001 0.112 <0.001 0.079 <0.001 <0.001 0.213 0.493 0.083 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Cash Flow -0.273 -0.149 -0.247 -0.349 -0.166 -0.336 -0.086 0.015 0.008 -0.296 -0.136 -0.23
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.378 0.489 0.492 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Ownership
Gov -0.068 0.094 0.043 -0.127 0.168 -0.02
0.389 0.38 0.435 <0.001 <0.001 0.278
indv -0.102 -0.185 -0.13 -0.08 -0.115 -0.099
0.471 0.24 0.282 0.008 <0.001 0.001
Inst -0.1 -0.087 -0.116 -0.112 -0.123 -0.115
0.431 0.375 0.285 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Industry
Oil 0.178 0.033 0.172 0.161 0.067 0.169
0.311 0.451 0.261 <0.001 0.021 <0.001
Mater 0.015 -0.098 -0.049 0.068 -0.075 -0.013
0.48 0.375 0.497 0.02 0.011 0.353
Indust 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
Cgoods -0.052 -0.149 -0.077 -0.008 -0.096 -0.06
0.469 0.273 0.493 0.4 0.002 0.036
Health -0.067 -0.147 -0.127 -0.055 -0.096 -0.117
0.342 0.282 0.316 0.049 0.002 <0.001
Cserv -0.186 -0.053 -0.204 -0.159 -0.02 -0.166
0.234 0.493 0.276 <0.001 0.27 <0.001
Telec -0.043 -0.044 -0.061 -0.005 -0.068 -0.022
0.378 0.436 0.359 0.442 0.02 0.251
Techno 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5
N 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904
R2 14 16 26 16 12 24 22 11 29 22 11 29
Model Fit
(APC) 0.094 P<0.001 0.094 P<0.001 0.088 P=1.000 0.083 P=0.003
(ARS) 0.181 P<0.001 0.181 P<0.001 0.206 P=1.000 0.236 P<0.001
(AARS) 0.173 P<0.001 0.173 P<0.001 0.19 P=1.000 0.219 P<0.001
(AVIF) 1.38 1.38 1.432 Inf
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Table 5.18: Jordan ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Jordan Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 8.91% 8.48% 16.12% 9.18% 8.75% 16.99%
Size 13.30% 1.36% 9.34% 14.64% 7.91% 5.39%
Growth 6.19% 5.13% 2.80% 11.71% 0.59% 0.17%
Tangibility 10.24% 8.33% 9.99% 8.83% 6.41% 11.80%
Non-Debt Tax shield 13.97% 39.06% 13.15% 9.03% 31.13% 14.41%
Volatility 8.14% 15.56% 15.68% 12.67% 12.67% 7.76%
Dividends 6.03% 3.83% 9.22% 8.86% 1.79% 9.19%
Liquidity 23.10% 8.17% 12.64% 17.79% 23.31% 12.10%
Cash Flow 10.13% 10.08% 11.05% 7.29% 7.46% 22.21%
Good prediction % 73.17% 41.08% 80.91% 78.98% 48.55% 82.43%
S.D of abs errors 0.09 0.08 0.0892 0.0931 0.0975 0.1039
RMSE 0.11 0.09 0.1191 0.1181 0.1099 0.1333
MAE 0.06 0.04 0.07888 0.07268 0.05081 0.0835
N 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472
Adding Dummies
Profitability 6.40% 6.16% 0.19% 8.54% 1.19% 8.80%
Size 12.66% 6.91% 17.71% 16.15% 10.87% 13.62%
Growth 14.34% 5.44% 5.61% 1.68% 13.30% 10.19%
Tangibility 6.95% 7.17% 13.28% 3.26% 19.92% 5.25%
Non-Debt Tax shield 10.90% 5.43% 12.97% 2.13% 21.09% 8.40%
Volatility 0.02% 5.44% 15.74% 1.87% 12.66% 11.59%
Dividends 0.20% 5.46% 0.99% 7.02% 2.35% 0.65%
Liquidity 18.93% 5.46% 16.15% 21.39% 0.51% 9.77%
Cash Flow 0.17% 5.26% 0.21% 0.00% 0.04% 9.28%
Ownership Dummies
Government 1.17% 4.68% 0.45% 0.08% 0.44% 0.98%
Institutional 3.30% 5.22% 1.16% 4.38% 5.28% 2.22%
Individual 7.16% 4.75% 4.52% 7.37% 1.91% 1.77%
Industry Dummies
Oil 2.32% 4.66% 0.98% 0.93% 1.96% 1.95%
Basic Materials 0.87% 4.66% 0.50% 2.58% 0.33% 4.63%
Consumer Goods 0.45% 4.66% 0.28% 0.04% 0.17% 2.43%
Consumer Services 1.89% 4.66% 0.14% 7.60% 2.26% 0.22%
Health Care 4.34% 4.66% 2.20% 7.07% 3.22% 1.88%
Industrials 0.02% 4.66% 0.01% 0.83% 0.22% 0.17%
Technology 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Telecommunications 7.92% 4.66% 6.92% 7.10% 2.28% 6.19%
Good prediction % 78.01% 96.68% 81.47% 78.28% 45.64% 77.32%
RMSE 0.0217 0.0002 0.0199 0.0296 0.0274 0.0455
MAE 0.0088 0.0000 0.0075 0.0134 0.0123 0.0222
S.D of abs errors 0.0198 0.0002 0.0184 0.0264 0.0244 0.0397
N 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in Kuwait using Panel Data, SEM,
ANN ?
The fourth country in this chapter is Kuwait which is one of the GCC countries in
the sample of the MENA countries. First, the table of the short term debt panel
data results is presented. The R2 is acceptable and in the range of 19% across the
models. The Wald test is not significant and therefore it can be concluded that there
is no heteroskedasticiy. The table show that the Hausman test is not significant and
therefore it is safe to use the random effect model. From the Table 5.19 the following
conclusions could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant with the short term debt in book and mar-
ket value.
• Liquidity is negatively significant with the short term debt in book and market
value.
• Size is positively significant with the short term debt in book and market value.
• Tangibility is negatively significant across the models for short term debt in
market value.
• Non-debt tax shield is negatively significant for the short term debt in market
value except the tobit model.
• Dividends is significantly negative for short term debt market value models
except the tobit.
• Growth is negative and significant for the market value of short term debt.
• Cash flow is significantly negative for both short term debt in book and market
value.
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• The industry classification show that the oil sector is negative and significant.
However, the basic materials is positive and significant across all the models.
In addition, the industrials variable shows that for the book value all models
are significant and positive except the random model. The consumer services
sector is also significant and positive across all the models.
The second Table 5.20 show the long term debt using panel data models. The
Wald test is not significant for the book value but significant for the market value
and therefore the fixed effect can not be used. The R2 is acceptable for the book
debt with 16% and lower for the market value with 10% only. The Lagrange test is
not significant and the following could be concluded:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the long term debt in book values using
tobit model only.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the long term debt in market and book
values.
• Size is positively significant for the long term debt in book values using the
tobit model and for all the models using the market value.
• Tangibility is positively significant for the long term debt in book values except
when using the tobit model and for all the models in market value.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the long term debt in book and
market values.
• Dividends is negatively significant for the long term debt in book and market
values using the tobit model only.
• Growth is negatively significant in for the long term debt in market values using
tobit.
215
CHAPTER 5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS
• Ownership individual is negatively significant for the long term debt in book
values. It is also negative and significant for institutional variable for both the
long term debt in market value and book value.
• industry classification variable which is the oil is significantly negative using
the tobit model.
The third tables which is Table 5.21 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in Jordan. The Wald test for the total debt for book
value is not significant for both book and market and. The Lagrange test is not
significant and therefore the random effect could be used. The Hausman test is not
significant for both book and market total debt and therefore would indicate that it
is possible to use the Random effect. The R2 is higher than 28% for both the book
and market value. From the Table5.21 the following conclusions could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market val-
ues except for the tobit model using total debt book value.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market values.
• Size is positively significant for the total debt in book and market values.
• Tangibility is positively significant for the total debt in book values across all
the models.
• Dividends is negatively significant in for the total debt in book and market
values.
• Growth is negatively significant in for the total debt in market values except
for the fixed effect model.
• Cash flow is negatively significant for total debt for book value and market
value.
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• Ownership government is negatively significant for the total debt in book and
market values.
• industry classification which is the oil negatively significant using book total
debt. Basic materials is positively significant across all models. Industrials,
Health, Consumer services are all positively significant using OLS and fixed
model.
The only interest from Table 5.22 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio. As
it shows that the dependent variable lagged variable is negatively significant for the
short term debt only. Which, indicate that firms in Kuwait do not have a target capital
structure.
Table 5.23 show the SEM results for Kuwait using the PLS approach. The model
fits at the bottom of the model shows that the model fit is good without the dummy
variables and with the dummy variables. However, caution should be taken with
the results of the book value with the dummy variables as the dummies cause the
model to have a high variance inflation factor. The R2 is good except for the long
term debt in book values without the dummies. From this table the following could
be concluded:
• Profitability attribute is significantly negative to short term debt in market value.
• Size attribute is significantly positive to all the 6 debt measures.
• Tangibility is significantly positive in relation to short term debt market and
book leverage. It is also significant to the long term debt in book values.
• Dividends is only negatively significant to the total debt in book values.
• Liquidity is negatively significant to the 6 dependent variables of debt.
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• Cash flow is negatively significant in relation all debt variables in book and
market values.
• Ownership variable government is positively significant to the long term debt
book values. It is also negatively significant to the long term debt in market
values. Similarly, the individual variable is significantly positive to the long
term debt in market values. Institutional variable is negatively significant to
the total debt in book values.
• industry variables of basic materials is positively significant with three debt
measures in book value.
In Kuwait Table 5.24 show the ANN results. Again the prediction percentage is
high more than 57% without dummies and 61% with dummy variables. Therefore,
from the table we could present the important results as follow:
• Size substantially important for all the measures of both market and book
leverage.
• Tangibility is also important for the long term debt in book value.
• Volatility is slightly important for the total debt in market value.
• Liquidity is slightly important for the short term debt in book value as well as
the total debt.
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Table 5.19: Kuwait Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
KUWAIT STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -.1769373* -.182219* -.1510389* -.1816995* -0.0235 -0.0251 -0.0060 0.1297
S.E. -2.4615 -2.5185 -2.2232 -2.2798 -0.2399 -0.2540 -0.0649 1.4670
Profitability -.2987079*** -.3084883*** -.2987079*** -.2578441** -.4381915*** -.4408119*** -.4381915*** -.4978515***
S.E -3.6018 -3.6880 -3.6018 -2.6758 -3.8785 -3.8646 -3.8785 -3.8605
Liquidty -.0080992*** -.008148*** -.0080992*** -.0275161*** -.0107891*** -.0108423*** -.0107891*** -.0241294***
S.E -4.7126 -4.7273 -4.7126 -9.4326 -4.6082 -4.6130 -4.6082 -7.4241
Risk -0.0042 -0.0043 -0.0042 -0.0015 0.0098 0.0097 0.0098 0.0115
S.E -0.3791 -0.3846 -0.3791 -0.1219 0.6482 0.6331 0.6482 0.6848
Size .015001*** .0153175*** .015001*** .017419*** .0120351* .0121715* .0120351* .0174428**
S.E 4.3246 4.3805 4.3246 4.3661 2.5469 2.5526 2.5469 3.2154
Tangibilty 0.0168 0.0175 0.0168 0.0178 -.1359265*** -.1356313*** -.1359265*** -.1271946***
S.E 0.7820 0.8143 0.7820 0.7535 -4.6566 -4.6287 -4.6566 -3.9293
Tax -0.2784 -0.2943 -0.2784 -0.2476 -.6261661* -.6385846* -.6261661* -0.6620
S.E -1.2356 -1.2937 -1.2356 -0.9911 -2.0403 -2.0583 -2.0403 -1.9340
Dividends -0.2533 -0.2383 -0.2533 -.5209356** -.503414** -.4972627** -.503414** -.5241746*
S.E -1.9570 -1.8125 -1.9570 -3.1607 -2.8548 -2.7738 -2.8548 -2.4969
Growth -0.0209 -0.0792 -0.0209 -0.1278 -1.123362* -1.204331* -1.123362* -1.387992*
S.E -0.0568 -0.2063 -0.0568 -0.3097 -2.2383 -2.3010 -2.2383 -2.4509
Cash Flow -.1520496*** -.1528458*** -.1520496*** -.2325647*** -.2473277*** -.2498717*** -.2473277*** -.4352242***
S.E -3.3919 -3.3958 -3.3919 -3.8932 -4.0717 -4.0942 -4.0717 -5.7203
Government -0.0594 -0.0606 -0.0594 -0.0702 -0.0652 -0.0660 -0.0652 -0.0717
S.E -1.9051 -1.9382 -1.9051 -1.8212 -1.5354 -1.5476 -1.5354 -1.7051
Instituional 0.0127 0.0126 0.0127 0.0211 -0.0070 -0.0071 -0.0070 -0.0085
S.E 1.1329 1.1210 1.1329 1.6449 -0.4578 -0.4605 -0.4578 -0.5612
Indivdual -0.0059 -0.0061 -0.0059 -0.0050 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0043
S.E -0.3304 -0.3438 -0.3304 -0.2520 0.0000 -0.0031 0.0000 -0.1726
Oil -.0553011* -.0554823* -.0553011* -.0722353* 0.0087 0.0089 0.0087 0.0113
S.E -2.1405 -2.1422 -2.1405 -2.4187 0.2483 0.2520 0.2483 0.3254
B Materials .1193493*** .1196512*** .0934509** .1185565*** .1019912* .1017701* .08451* .0895047*
S.E 3.8628 3.8626 3.1727 3.3175 2.4232 2.4093 2.1061 2.2579
Industrials .0582957* .0582226* 0.0324 .0588818* 0.0411 0.0407 0.0236 0.0283
S.E 2.3410 2.3314 1.3747 2.0449 1.2124 1.1937 0.7366 0.8905
C Goods 0.0288 0.0291 0.0029 -0.0346 0.0223 0.0221 0.0049 0.0094
S.E 0.9798 0.9855 0.1014 -0.9382 0.5574 0.5498 0.1236 0.2426
Health 0.0598 0.0601 0.0339 0.0298 0.0432 0.0430 0.0257 0.0324
S.E 1.8386 1.8406 1.0856 0.8055 0.9757 0.9666 0.6053 0.7694
C Servicses .0759744** .0761539** .050076* .0606766* .0934548** .0930421** .0759736* .0801255*
S.E 2.9024 2.9008 2.0356 2.0216 2.6207 2.5990 2.2670 2.4244
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0259 -0.0339 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0175 -0.0128
S.E . . -0.7978 -0.8871 . . -0.3953 -0.2943
Technology 0.0259 0.0259 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 0.0171 0.0000 0.0000
S.E 0.7978 0.7965 . . 0.3953 0.3859 . 0.0000
R2 19% 19% 21% 21%
N 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 704
Lagrange chibar2(01) = 0 Prob >chibar2 = 1 chibar2(01) = 0 Prob >chibar2 = 1
Wald chi2 (8) = 10.17 Prob2 = 0.253 chi2 (8) = 1.23 Prob2 = 0.9963
Hausman chi2(17) 1.67 Prob2 = 1 chi2(17) 0.54 Prob2 = 1
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Table 5.20: Kuwait Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
KUWAIT LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant 0.0536 0.0523 0.0434 -0.1086 -0.0806 -0.0735 -0.0566 -.2738795**
S.E. 0.8466 0.8193 0.7249 -1.2467 -1.2270 -1.1109 -0.9123 -3.1182
Profitability 0.1255 0.1290 0.1255 -.2578441** 0.0013 0.0082 0.0013 -0.0160
S.E 1.7170 1.7480 1.7170 -2.6758 0.0167 0.1074 0.0167 -0.1539
Liquidty -.0041512** -.0041786** -.0041512** -.0275161*** -.0040336* -.0040107* -.0040336* -.0090556***
S.E -2.7414 -2.7471 -2.7414 -9.4326 -2.5688 -2.5438 -2.5688 -3.7385
Risk -.0222517* -.0225153* -.0222517* -0.0015 -.020828* -.0217655* -.020828* -.0358681*
S.E -2.2829 -2.2779 -2.2829 -0.1219 -2.0607 -2.1244 -2.0607 -2.4612
Size 0.0022 0.0023 0.0022 .017419*** .0094843** .0090621** .0094843** .0192951***
S.E 0.7157 0.7540 0.7157 4.3661 2.9926 2.8331 2.9926 4.3210
Tangibilty .1365406*** .1366589*** .1365406*** 0.0178 .1537072*** .1528761*** .1537072*** .2124285***
S.E 7.2323 7.2065 7.2323 0.7535 7.8514 7.7775 7.8514 8.1137
Tax -0.1166 -0.1320 -0.1166 -0.2476 -0.1908 -0.1675 -0.1908 -0.1349
S.E -0.5875 -0.6575 -0.5875 -0.9911 -0.9270 -0.8046 -0.9270 -0.4886
Dividends -.3275075** -.3369289** -.3275075** -.5209356** -.4173978*** -.4199587*** -.4173978*** -.6144162***
S.E -2.8716 -2.9041 -2.8716 -3.1607 -3.5293 -3.4921 -3.5293 -3.6150
Growth -0.0944 -0.1561 -0.0944 -0.1278 -0.5235 -0.4257 -0.5235 -0.6775
S.E -0.2908 -0.4609 -0.2908 -0.3097 -1.5553 -1.2124 -1.5553 -1.4289
Cash Flow -.1802401*** -.1804122*** -.1802401*** -.3475043*** -.1334018** -.1348685*** -.1334018*** -.3294644***
S.E -4.6216 -4.6007 -4.6216 -5.5028 -3.3031 -3.3236 -3.3031 -5.3494
Government 0.0102 0.0095 0.0102 -0.0110 -0.0006 0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0246
S.E 0.3719 0.3428 0.3719 -0.2780 -0.0207 0.0274 -0.0207 -0.6160
Instituional -.0274917** -.0277325** -.0274917** -.0374497** -0.0174 -0.0173 -0.0174 -0.0151
S.E -2.7790 -2.7914 -2.7790 -2.6563 -1.6966 -1.6758 -1.6966 -1.0635
Indivdual -0.0175 -0.0177 -0.0175 -0.0149 0.0063 0.0065 0.0063 0.0131
S.E -1.1181 -1.1280 -1.1181 -0.6952 0.3917 0.4019 0.3917 0.6068
Oil -.0527914* -.0528001* -.0527914* -.0937565** -0.0323 -0.0321 -0.0323 -0.0509
S.E -2.3191 -2.3100 -2.3191 -2.9538 -1.3699 -1.3539 -1.3699 -1.5990
B Materials 0.0512 0.0511 .0614686* .1056223** 0.0388 0.0387 0.0149 0.0493
S.E 1.8822 1.8684 2.3685 2.7967 1.3748 1.3658 0.5520 1.2952
Industrials -0.0089 -0.0092 0.0013 0.0215 0.0059 0.0064 -0.0180 0.0076
S.E -0.4059 -0.4190 0.0638 0.6959 0.2596 0.2794 -0.8383 0.2451
C Goods -0.0274 -0.0274 -0.0172 -0.0320 -0.0216 -0.0215 -0.0455 -.0840686*
S.E -1.0566 -1.0521 -0.6742 -0.8223 -0.8033 -0.7954 -1.7256 -2.1417
Health -0.0304 -0.0306 -0.0201 -0.0088 -0.0234 -0.0223 -0.0474 -0.0137
S.E -1.0599 -1.0629 -0.7323 -0.2198 -0.7879 -0.7456 -1.6616 -0.3419
C Servicses 0.0113 0.0110 0.0215 0.0221 0.0045 0.0048 -0.0195 -0.0174
S.E 0.4893 0.4731 0.9927 0.6830 0.1864 0.1989 -0.8674 -0.5352
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0102 0.0280 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0240 -0.0028
S.E . . 0.3577 0.6889 . . -0.8077 -0.0699
Technology -0.0102 -0.0104 0.0000 0.0000 0.0240 0.0240 0.0000 0.0000
S.E -0.3577 -0.3625 . . 0.8077 0.8069 . .
R2 16% 16% 20% 19% 18% 10%
N 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720
Lagrange chibar2(01) = 0 Prob >chibar2 = 1 chibar2(01) = 0 Prob >chibar2 = 1
Wald chi2 (8) = 2.25 Prob2 = 0.9723 chi2 (8) = 67.5 Prob2 = 0
Hausman chi2(17) 0.9 Prob2 = 1 chi2(17) = (b-B) 1.53 Prob2 = 1
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Table 5.21: Kuwait Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
KUWAIT TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -.3445776*** -.3533364*** -.3178267*** -.3711384*** -.3824303*** -.3797241*** -.3143413** -.4499591***
S.E. -4.2476 -4.3297 -4.1453 -4.3549 -3.5662 -3.5158 -3.1015 -3.9957
Profitability -.1873633* -.1921614* -.1873633* -0.1397 -.5299386*** -.530593*** -.5299386*** -.6314662***
S.E -2.0019 -2.0367 -2.0019 -1.3426 -4.2832 -4.2493 -4.2832 -4.6484
Liquidty -.0121189*** -.0122064*** -.0121189*** -.029564*** -.0139158*** -.0139467*** -.0139158*** -.026305***
S.E -6.2483 -6.2786 -6.2483 -10.8095 -5.4276 -5.4205 -5.4276 -8.1157
Risk -0.0050 -0.0046 -0.0050 -0.0026 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0000
S.E -0.4025 -0.3643 -0.4025 -0.1952 0.0253 0.0144 0.0253 0.0002
Size .027627*** .0281923*** .027627*** .0317091*** .0342527*** .0340809*** .0342527*** .0412849***
S.E 7.0574 7.1478 7.0574 7.3794 6.6191 6.5290 6.6191 7.2128
Tangibilty .0933226*** .0938815*** .0933226*** .0884987*** 0.0140 0.0136 0.0140 0.0161
S.E 3.8593 3.8734 3.8593 3.4469 0.4395 0.4247 0.4395 0.4723
Tax 0.1057 0.0730 0.1057 0.0908 -0.2910 -0.2686 -0.2910 -0.3923
S.E 0.4157 0.2846 0.4157 0.3348 -0.8659 -0.7907 -0.8659 -1.0853
Dividends -.449829** -.4500241** -.449829** -.8372222*** -.7271855*** -.7269287*** -.7271855*** -.7704492***
S.E -3.0793 -3.0348 -3.0793 -4.7092 -3.7657 -3.7041 -3.7657 -3.4888
Growth 0.0982 -0.0261 0.0982 0.0567 -1.109434* -1.0857 -1.109434* -1.429932*
S.E 0.2362 -0.0604 0.2362 0.1257 -2.0186 -1.8949 -2.0186 -2.3633
Cash Flow -.2838237*** -.2829898*** -.2838237*** -.4301421*** -.3268001*** -.329461*** -.3268001*** -.5531578***
S.E -5.6038 -5.5656 -5.6038 -6.6984 -4.9073 -4.9263 -4.9073 -6.9088
Government -.0766276* -.0788414* -.0766276* -.0877622* -.1043852* -.1038539* -.1043852* -.1310634*
S.E -2.1786 -2.2358 -2.1786 -2.1420 -2.2451 -2.2253 -2.2451 -2.4394
Institutional -0.0075 -0.0079 -0.0075 -0.0082 -0.0218 -0.0216 -0.0218 -0.0161
S.E -0.5897 -0.6215 -0.5897 -0.5958 -1.2997 -1.2846 -1.2997 -0.8781
Individual -0.0039 -0.0045 -0.0039 -0.0047 0.0191 0.0193 0.0191 0.0159
S.E -0.1973 -0.2233 -0.1973 -0.2195 0.7226 0.7279 0.7226 0.5597
Oil -.111322*** -.111686*** -.111322*** -.151568*** -0.0383 -0.0382 -0.0383 -0.0505
S.E -3.8181 -3.8230 -3.8181 -4.8169 -0.9932 -0.9877 -0.9932 -1.2124
B Materials .1894904*** .1898003*** .1627395*** .2121743*** .1749369*** .1750421*** .1068479* .1491085**
S.E 5.4345 5.4322 4.8958 5.6435 3.7953 3.7854 2.4316 3.0263
Industrials .059979* .0596375* 0.0332 0.0603 .0791567* .079393* 0.0111 0.0483
S.E 2.1342 2.1172 1.2494 1.9610 2.1307 2.1297 0.3148 1.2091
C Goods 0.0271 0.0276 0.0004 -0.0448 0.0330 0.0332 -0.0350 -.105033*
S.E 0.8170 0.8287 0.0116 -1.1382 0.7528 0.7547 -0.8131 -2.0533
Health .0911621* .0904449* 0.0644 0.0628 0.0937 0.0940 0.0256 0.0553
S.E 2.4853 2.4572 1.8299 1.5868 1.9322 1.9300 0.5502 1.0715
C Services .0694601* .069254* 0.0427 0.0550 0.0662 0.0662 -0.0019 0.0297
S.E 2.3513 2.3388 1.5383 1.7184 1.6956 1.6904 -0.0510 0.7156
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0268 -0.0371 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0681 -0.0567
S.E . . -0.7302 -0.9002 . . -1.4059 -1.0568
Technology 0.0268 0.0267 0.0000 0.0000 0.0681 0.0683 0.0000 0.0000
S.E 0.7302 0.7279 . . 1.4059 1.4058 . .
R2 31% 31% 0% 28% 28% 0%
N 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720
Lagrange chibar2(01) = 0 Prob >chibar2 = 1 chibar2(01) = 0 Prob >chibar2 = 1
Wald chi2 (8) = 4.28 Prob2 = 0.8313 chi2 (8) = 3.86 Prob2 = 0.8695
Hausman chi2(17) = (b-B) 2.14 Prob2 = 1 chi2(17) = (b-B) 0.27 Prob2 = 1
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Table 5.22: Kuwait Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
KUWAIT
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged -.1379509*** -0.0458691 -0.064629 -1.81% -0.0074311 -0.0202601
S.E. -3.819883 -1.186313 -1.750353 -52.16% -0.2228875 -0.5877999
Constant -.1787509** -0.017 0.042 -0.0607445 -.3393992*** -.2935405**
S.E. -2.751835 -0.181 0.785 -1.01836 -4.527203 -2.82226
Profitability -.2930488*** -.4321572*** .1386635* 0.0043796 -.1922555* -.5300387***
S.E -3.698 -3.858 2.116 0.0596461 -2.084214 -4.219925
Liquidty -.0067904*** -.0099979*** -.0032467* -.003028* -.0111045*** -.0126701***
S.E -4.086 -4.199 -2.426 -2.008666 -5.781209 -4.810282
Risk -0.006 0.009 -.0216527* -.0199431* -0.0018136 0.0018253
S.E -0.580 0.611 -2.483 -2.037171 -0.1462888 0.1087211
Size .0167596*** .0126721** 0.002 .009322** .0284916*** .0344435***
S.E 5.034 2.698 0.773 3.059713 7.444657 6.598961
Tangibilty 0.010 -.1394165*** .1422113*** .1615557*** .0983924*** 0.0180197
S.E 0.491 -4.835 8.456 8.571342 4.139738 0.5581388
Tax -0.198 -0.568 -0.081 -0.1174669 0.1424237 -0.1885525
S.E -0.912 -1.842 -0.455 -0.5911622 0.5652413 -0.5489566
Dividends -0.244 -.5088038** -.3178286** -.3995821*** -.4437424** -.7181138***
S.E -1.956 -2.889 -3.118 -3.492772 -3.077105 -3.649322
Growth -0.150 -1.236137* -0.168 -0.4530026 -0.1095617 -1.146771*
S.E -0.412 -2.404 -0.563 -1.354055 -0.2602073 -1.993239
Cash Flow -.1677576*** -.2613984*** -.1777831*** -.1271608** -.4301421*** -.3223607***
S.E -3.840717 -4.329275 -5.09113 -3.274775 -6.698359 -4.816064
Government -.0765705* -0.0717424 0.0110643 0.00343 -.0771214* -.1045203*
S.E -2.566839 -1.705057 0.4564372 0.1262106 -2.237314 -2.233132
Instituional 0.0078636 -0.008476 -.0267005** -0.0153185 -0.0061277 -0.0199609
S.E 0.7336339 -0.5612492 -3.063113 -1.568967 -0.4917726 -1.188642
Indivdual -0.0098633 -0.0042535 -.048498*** -0.0243585 -.0403583* -0.0131157
S.E -0.5656697 -0.1726422 -3.39875 -1.523617 -2.000476 -0.4766317
Oil -.0674599** 0.0112635 -.0459753* -0.0273368 -.1046218*** -0.0318171
S.E -2.724445 0.3254302 -2.289675 -1.216821 -3.691757 -0.8230238
B Materials .1197733*** .0895047* .0611193** 0.0136767 .1627199*** 0.0779685
S.E 4.17155 2.257917 2.6779 0.5348905 5.010517 1.71479
Industrials .0456492* 0.0283198 0.000126 -0.0214367 0.0294487 -0.0203305
S.E 2.019726 0.8905129 0.006862 -1.045255 1.120967 -0.5941902
C Goods 0.0135411 0.0094301 -0.021137 -.0512555* -0.0044435 -0.0692735
S.E 0.4923477 0.2426454 -0.9431239 -2.042041 -0.139665 -1.579296
Health 0.0508612 0.0323583 -0.0146432 -0.0455107 0.0646961 0
S.E 1.700114 0.7693956 -0.5938002 -1.65077 1.849043 0
C Servicses .0595367* .0801255* 0.0275808 -0.0143032 0.0491475 -0.024957
S.E 2.543966 2.42439 1.444184 -0.6687203 1.812363 -0.7219095
Telecom -0.0165959 -0.0128164 0.012106 -0.0247523 -0.0255504 -.0964398*
S.E -0.5386392 -0.294278 0.4804764 -0.8778169 -0.714691 -1.974003
Technology 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0297792
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 -0.6309666
N 704 704 704 704 704 704
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Table 5.23: Kuwait SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
Profit -0.123 0.021 -0.082 -0.033 0.035 0.032 -0.109 0.003 -0.063 -0.11 0.02 -0.063
<0.001 0.284 0.013 0.185 0.175 0.197 0.002 0.466 0.044 0.001 0.294 0.045
Size 0.108 0.128 0.153 0.222 0.168 0.218 0.097 0.134 0.173 0.093 0.125 0.155
0.002 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 0.006 <0.001 <0.001
Growth -0.037 -0.057 -0.025 -0.016 -0.071 -0.061 -0.072 -0.105 -0.104 -0.079 -0.075 -0.104
0.16 0.061 0.251 0.331 0.027 0.049 0.026 0.002 0.002 0.017 0.022 0.002
Tang 0.291 0.074 -0.013 0.168 0.369 -0.053 0.286 0.091 -0.02 0.282 0.356 -0.003
<0.001 0.023 0.365 <0.001 <0.001 0.078 <0.001 0.007 0.295 <0.001 <0.001 0.465
Tax -0.078 0.009 0.053 -0.011 0.079 0.071 -0.072 0.006 0.039 -0.078 0.077 0.039
0.018 0.401 0.078 0.382 0.016 0.027 0.026 0.432 0.147 0.017 0.019 0.147
Risk 0.014 -0.048 -0.003 0.004 -0.075 -0.046 0.012 -0.048 0.009 0.015 -0.064 0.005
0.35 0.1 0.47 0.456 0.022 0.109 0.378 0.098 0.407 0.343 0.041 0.446
Div -0.076 -0.106 -0.101 -0.093 -0.076 -0.12 -0.086 -0.107 -0.119 -0.075 -0.086 -0.122
0.02 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.02 <0.001 0.01 0.002 <0.001 0.022 0.01 <0.001
Liqud -0.264 -0.177 -0.3 -0.253 -0.093 -0.34 -0.241 -0.153 -0.265 -0.244 -0.115 -0.309
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.006 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Cash Flow -0.151 -0.114 -0.214 -0.203 -0.2 -0.218 -0.139 -0.088 -0.207 -0.156 -0.168 -0.183
<0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.009 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Ownership
Gov -0.03 -0.124 -0.059 -0.009 0.156 -0.044
0.207 <0.001 0.055 0.407 <0.001 0.119
indv 0.074 0.151 0.096 0.069 -0.113 0.096
0.022 <0.001 0.005 0.031 0.001 0.005
Inst -0.079 -0.11 -0.121 0.078 -0.098 -0.113
0.016 0.001 <0.001 0.018 0.004 0.001
Industry
Oil 0.051 0.032 0.057 -0.037 -0.061 -0.053
0.085 0.198 0.064 0.158 0.051 0.075
Mater 0 0 0 0.127 0.133 0.138
0 0 0 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Indust 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
Cgoods 0 0 0 -0.029 0.049 -0.029
0 0 0 0.221 0.094 0.218
Health 0 0 0 -0.028 -0.055 0.009
0 0 0 0.228 0.069 0.405
Cserv 0 0 0 0.08 0.014 -0.025
0 0 0 0.015 0.349 0.247
Telec 0 0 0 -0.005 -0.032 -0.031
0 0 0 0.449 0.195 0.203
Techno 0 0 0 0.035 0.011 0.046
0 0 0 0.177 0.387 0.109
N 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720
R2 31 24 39 32 14 35 33 45 39 35 25 40
Model Fit
(APC) 0.114 P<0.001 0.114 P<0.001 0.098 P=0.002 0.088 P<0.001
(ARS) 0.292 P<0.001 0.292 P<0.001 0.293 P<0.001 0.331 P<0.001
(AARS) 0.283 P<0.001 0.283 P<0.001 0.28 P<0.001 0.313 P<0.001
(AVIF) 1.322 1.322 1.282 Inf
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Table 5.24: Kuwait ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Kuwait Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 9.71% 7.24% 12.17% 5.65% 9.89% 7.81%
Size 19.03% 19.78% 22.14% 21.59% 19.34% 22.99%
Growth 4.22% 2.78% 3.96% 12.73% 13.55% 11.64%
Tangibility 9.94% 24.66% 10.95% 8.39% 9.94% 10.07%
Non-Debt Tax shield 10.79% 9.59% 3.67% 10.42% 8.59% 10.74%
Volatility 9.30% 8.87% 15.04% 11.53% 7.59% 10.02%
Dividends 9.18% 0.22% 8.51% 9.18% 6.48% 8.90%
Liquidity 16.94% 12.72% 15.31% 10.04% 13.13% 12.92%
Cash Flow 10.90% 14.15% 8.25% 10.46% 11.49% 4.92%
Good prediction % 68.40% 68.23% 81.08% 62.15% 57.64% 78.30%
S.D of abs errors 0.09 0.06 0.1007 0.1052 0.0562 0.1134
RMSE 0.11 0.07 0.1236 0.1298 0.0704 0.1443
MAE 0.06 0.04 0.07157 0.07602 0.04240 0.0892
N 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472
Adding Dummies
Profitability 4.47% 8.74% 5.45% 5.78% 4.66% 7.30%
Size 19.02% 18.91% 17.34% 16.30% 15.37% 18.01%
Growth 8.24% 1.52% 7.15% 1.30% 6.19% 6.36%
Tangibility 5.66% 4.06% 0.39% 8.08% 11.75% 6.49%
Non-Debt Tax shield 6.69% 11.96% 0.04% 8.68% 5.21% 6.57%
Volatility 1.28% 7.33% 12.23% 1.34% 2.35% 7.03%
Dividends 7.29% 8.74% 9.15% 11.64% 8.82% 10.34%
Liquidity 12.40% 11.80% 14.32% 10.72% 10.81% 11.00%
Cash Flow 5.87% 10.55% 10.67% 7.55% 7.72% 6.87%
Ownership Dummies
Government 0.00% 0.37% 0.51% 0.51% 0.55% 0.70%
Institutional 7.69% 2.42% 0.95% 6.11% 1.42% 1.29%
Individual 1.43% 3.03% 3.47% 0.97% 4.04% 2.23%
Industry Dummies
Oil 3.26% 0.68% 1.40% 1.64% 7.31% 1.85%
Basic Materials 10.55% 1.24% 3.61% 3.64% 0.99% 1.71%
Consumer Goods 0.43% 1.33% 2.79% 0.90% 1.81% 1.11%
Consumer Services 0.03% 0.01% 0.77% 3.27% 0.92% 4.65%
Health Care 1.63% 2.38% 2.39% 2.04% 3.55% 2.10%
Industrials 0.33% 0.29% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00%
Technology 2.08% 2.79% 3.21% 3.18% 3.70% 2.61%
Telecommunications 1.65% 1.84% 4.14% 6.36% 2.82% 1.77%
Good prediction % 82.12% 66.32% 80.38% 76.22% 61.98% 80.73%
RMSE 0.0118 0.0127 0.0206 0.0284 0.0232 0.0349
MAE 0.0054 0.0045 0.0097 0.0123 0.0088 0.0165
S.D of abs errors 0.0105 0.0119 0.0182 0.0256 0.0215 0.0308
N 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472 1472
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in Morocco using Panel Data,
SEM, ANN ?
The fifth country in this chapter is Morocco which is one of the largest countries in
the sample of the MENA countries. First, the table of the short term debt panel data
results is presented. The R2 is low and in the range of 27% across the models. The
Wald test is significant for the short term debt in market leverage and therefore the
robust errors are reported. The table show that the Hausman test is not significant
and therefore it is safe to use the random effect model. From the Table 5.25 the
following conclusions could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant with the short term debt. in book and
market value.
• Liquidity is positively significant with the short term debt in book and market
value.
• Size is positively significant with the short term debt in book and market value
except for market value using fixed effect.
• Tangibility is negatively significant across the models for both short term debt
in book and market value.
• Dividends is significantly positive for both short term debt in book except for
tobit model and only significant using the fixed effect for the market value.
• Cash flow is significantly negative for short term debt in book value using OLS
and random effects only..
• The ownership structure show that the Institutional is positive and significant
for both book and market values.
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• The industry classification show that only the industrial sector is positive and
significant using the random effect.
The second Table 5.26 show the long term debt using panel data models. The
Wald test is significant for the fixed effect for the market value and therefore robust
errors are provided. The R2 is high for the book debt with 45% and lower for the
market value with 44% only. The Lagrange test is not significant and the following
could be concluded:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the long term debt in market values
and book values.
• Liquidity is positively significant for the long term debt in market values and
book values. except for the tobit model using the book value which shows a
negative sign.
• Risk is positively significant for the long term debt in book values.
• Size is positively significant for the long term debt in book values using the
tobit model.
• Tangibility is positively significant in for the long term debt in book and market
values and negative for book values only when using the tobit model.
• Growth is negatively significant in for the long term debt in market values using
tobit.
• Ownership government variable is positively significant for the long term debt
in market values only. Institutional is negatively significant for both the book
and market values.
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• industry classification basic materials is only positive and significant using the
OLS and fixed effect and the same with the industrials. Consumer goods
is negative and significant using only the random and tobit models. Health
variable is the same as consumer goods with the exception of random for the
book value. Technology is significantly positive using the OLS and fixed effect
model for the market value.
The third tables which is Table 5.27 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in Morroco. The Wald test for the total debt for is
not significant. The Lagrange test is not significant and therefore the random effect
could be used. The Hausman test is not significant for total debt and therefore would
indicate that it is possible to use the Random effect. The R2 is higher than 39% for
both the book and market value. From the Table 5.27 the following conclusions
could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market val-
ues.
• Size is positively significant for the total debt in book and only using tobit for
market values.
• Tangibility is positively significant for the total debt in book values across all
the models.
• Cash flow is negatively significant for total debt for book value.
• Ownership government is positive and significant for the total debt in market
values using OLS and fixed models. On the other hand, individual negatively
significant for total debt in book values using the tobit model.
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• industry classification variable which industrials is positive and significant for
the market value total debt only. Consumer goods is negative and significant
for both measures using only the random and tobit models. Health is signif-
icant and negative using the tobit model for market values only. Consumer
services is significant using the OLS and fixed model for market values and
positive.
The only interest from Table 5.28 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio.
As it shows that the dependent variable lagged variable is not significant for all
the measures and therefore would indicate that firms don’t have a target capital
structure.
Table 5.29 show the SEM results for Morocco using the PLS approach. The
model fits at the bottom of the model shows that the model fit is good without the
dummy variables and with the dummy variables. However, caution should be taken
with the results of the book value with the dummy variables as the dummies cause
the model to have a high variance inflation factor. The R2 is good except for the
long term debt in book values without the dummies. From this table the following
could be concluded:
• Profitability attribute is significantly negative to all debt variables except for
the long term debt in book values.
• Size attribute is significantly positive to short term and total debt in book val-
ues.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant with the long term debt in books
value.
• Liquidity is negatively significant to short term debt in both market and book
values. It is also significant to positively to total debt in book values.
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• Cash flow is negatively significant in relation to long term and total debt in
book and market value.
• None of the ownership or the industry variable are significant.
Table 5.30 show the important variable using the ANN approach. The good pre-
diction is high with values of higher than 59%. From this table we could conclude
the following:
• Profitability is important for the book total debt. It is also important for both
the market short term debt and total debt.
• Size is important for book short term debt and the total debt. It is also impor-
tant for the long term debt and total debt in market values.
• Growth is important only for long term debt in book value.
• Tangibility is important for long term debt and total debt in book values. It Is
also important for the long term debt in market value.
• Volatility is important for the short term debt in market value.
• Liquidity is important for both the long term and total debt in book values.
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Table 5.25: Morocco Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
MOROCCO STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -0.0377 -0.0260 -0.0421 0.0170 0.0075 0.0299 0.0248 0.1302
S.E. -0.4231 -0.2914 -0.4996 0.1682 0.0685 0.2726 0.2384 1.2964
Profitability -.4451517*** -.4090426*** -.4451517*** -.4216428*** -.6856868*** -.6417852*** -.6856868*** -.5604098***
S.E -5.8337 -5.2760 -5.8337 -4.5240 -7.2843 -6.7343 -7.2843 -5.2735
Liquidty -.0274358*** -.0286942*** -.0274358*** -.0716946*** -.028698*** -.0310285*** -.028698*** -.0850997***
S.E -5.8028 -6.0070 -5.8028 -8.8748 -4.9203 -5.2844 -4.9203 -9.1953
Risk 0.0082 0.0348 0.0082 -0.0002 0.0216 0.0499 0.0216 0.0225
S.E 0.1960 0.7988 0.1960 -0.0034 0.4175 0.9315 0.4175 0.4042
Size .0139275** .0127434** .0139275** .0152784** .0123755* 0.0106 .0123755* 0.0115
S.E 2.9572 2.6957 2.9572 2.7604 2.1301 1.8248 2.1301 1.7943
Tangibilty -.1268033*** -.1323769*** -.1268033*** -.1699022*** -.2084701*** -.2167539*** -.2084701*** -.2567577***
S.E -3.6563 -3.8165 -3.6563 -4.2879 -4.8728 -5.0838 -4.8728 -5.5877
Tax 0.1212 0.2010 0.1212 -0.0177 -0.1766 -0.0929 -0.1766 -0.5165
S.E 0.4217 0.6961 0.4217 -0.0530 -0.4981 -0.2618 -0.4981 -1.2921
Dividends .3063006** .3029549* .3063006** 0.2389 0.2568 .2930899* 0.2568 -0.0145
S.E 2.6343 2.5452 2.6343 1.5400 1.7904 2.0031 1.7904 -0.0808
Growth -0.6749 -0.3761 -0.6749 -0.7961 -0.7253 -0.3032 -0.7253 -0.7832
S.E -1.4662 -0.7789 -1.4662 -1.5215 -1.2773 -0.5109 -1.2773 -1.2871
Cash Flow -.1927034* -0.1632 -.1927034* -0.1843 -0.1301 -0.0976 -0.1301 -0.0213
S.E -2.0720 -1.7023 -2.0720 -1.5906 -1.1053 -0.8076 -1.1053 -0.1586
Government -0.0485 -0.0536 -0.0441 -0.0643 0.0360 0.0242 0.0187 0.0000
S.E -0.8993 -0.9936 -0.8729 -1.1125 0.5407 0.3651 0.3003 0.0000
Instituional .025528* .0255646* .025528* 0.0143 .0456599** .0462629** .0456599** .0540679***
S.E 2.0476 2.0519 2.0476 0.9859 2.9688 3.0207 2.9688 3.3963
Indivdual 0.0371 0.0357 0.0371 0.0227 0.0371 0.0351 0.0371 0.0358
S.E 1.9505 1.8762 1.9505 1.0011 1.5789 1.5037 1.5789 1.5294
Oil -0.0380 -0.0324 -0.0380 -0.0541 -0.0059 0.0013 -0.0059 0.0062
S.E -1.2227 -1.0416 -1.2227 -1.5641 -0.1546 0.0344 -0.1546 0.1628
B Materials 0.0196 0.0181 0.0240 0.0210 0.0548 0.0523 0.0375 0.0181
S.E 0.6748 0.6238 1.2585 0.9486 1.5298 1.4698 1.5972 0.2970
Industrials -0.0194 -0.0219 -0.0150 -0.0225 0.0641 0.0605 .0468559* 0.0193
S.E -0.6825 -0.7726 -0.8410 -1.0964 1.8319 1.7363 2.1324 0.3196
C Goods -0.0224 -0.0239 -0.0180 -0.0028 -0.0041 -0.0065 -0.0214 -0.0475
S.E -0.7896 -0.8460 -0.8497 -0.1150 -0.1175 -0.1884 -0.8182 -0.8096
Health 0.0000 0.0000 0.0044 0.0323 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0172 -0.0476
S.E . . 0.1450 0.8514 . . -0.4627 -0.7077
C Servicses -0.0227 -0.0242 -0.0184 -0.0224 -0.0264 -0.0287 -0.0436 -0.0701
S.E -0.7344 -0.7832 -0.7853 -0.8342 -0.6899 -0.7567 -1.5119 -1.1181
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
Technology -0.0044 -0.0092 0.0000 0.0000 0.0172 0.0104 0.0000 -0.0358
S.E -0.1450 -0.3036 . . 0.4627 0.2812 . -0.5692
R2 27% 27% 10% 38% 38% 11%
N 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 368
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 1.06 Prob2 0.9978 chi2 (8) 15.98 Prob2 0.0426
Hausman chi2(16) 9.78 Prob2 0.8777 chi2(16) 3.62 Prob2 0.9994
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Table 5.26: Morocco Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
MORROCO LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -0.0772 -0.0916 -0.0290 -0.1572 -0.0396 -0.0337 0.0291 -0.0967
S.E. -0.9047 -1.0639 -0.3597 -1.5152 -0.4255 -0.3589 0.3300 -0.8764
Profitability -.6584098*** -.6675765*** -.6584098*** -.4216428*** -.8217161*** -.8161018*** -.8217161*** -1.062642***
S.E -9.0159 -8.9370 -9.0159 -4.5240 -10.3099 -10.0111 -10.3099 -10.4055
Liquidty .0302652*** .0312761*** .0302652*** -.0716946*** .0278952*** .0274549*** .0278952*** .0350739***
S.E 6.6887 6.7957 6.6887 -8.8748 5.6486 5.4662 5.6486 5.7513
Risk .0879021* .0950527* .0879021* -0.0002 .1179686** .1289061** .1179686** .1120964*
S.E 2.1893 2.2622 2.1893 -0.0034 2.6921 2.8111 2.6921 2.0758
Size 0.0021 0.0027 0.0021 .0152784** 0.0007 0.0001 0.0007 0.0071
S.E 0.4624 0.5940 0.4624 2.7604 0.1331 0.0213 0.1331 1.1500
Tangibilty .3569678*** .3591697*** .3569678*** -.1699022*** .28506*** .2837357*** .28506*** .3391101***
S.E 10.7551 10.7476 10.7551 -4.2879 7.8693 7.7798 7.8693 7.5049
Tax -0.2911 -0.2917 -0.2911 -0.0177 -0.5151 -0.4822 -0.5151 -0.5357
S.E -1.0584 -1.0481 -1.0584 -0.0530 -1.7159 -1.5878 -1.7159 -1.4864
Dividends -0.1197 -0.1500 -0.1197 0.2389 -0.1871 -0.1740 -0.1871 -0.2234
S.E -1.0761 -1.3077 -1.0761 1.5400 -1.5403 -1.3901 -1.5403 -1.4421
Growth 1.335953** 1.327825** 1.335953** -0.7961 1.019706* 1.148526* 1.019706* 1.330477*
S.E 3.0326 2.8545 3.0326 -1.5215 2.1209 2.2624 2.1209 2.2841
Cash Flow -.2413971** -.2366064* -.2413971** -.4439671*** -.2488211* -.2408069* -.2488211* -.4717024***
S.E -2.6169 -2.4711 -2.6169 -3.5127 -2.4411 -2.2801 -2.4411 -3.4451
Government 0.0795 0.0854 0.0314 0.0608 .1622051** .1598036** 0.0935 .125707*
S.E 1.5411 1.6420 0.6486 1.0210 2.8794 2.8158 1.7718 1.9720
Instituional -.0407315*** -.0415695*** -.0407315*** -.0490343** -.0308396* -.0306973* -.0308396* -.0405179*
S.E -3.4137 -3.4629 -3.4137 -3.2960 -2.3682 -2.3432 -2.3682 -2.5524
Indivdual 0.0091 0.0099 0.0091 0.0143 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0010
S.E 0.5006 0.5386 0.5006 0.6129 -0.0904 -0.0967 -0.0904 -0.0389
Oil -0.0161 -0.0176 -0.0161 -0.0259 0.0184 0.0207 0.0184 0.0100
S.E -0.5393 -0.5882 -0.5393 -0.7234 0.5669 0.6315 0.5669 0.2616
B Materials 0.0409 0.0413 -0.0073 -0.0138 .0609495* .0600995* -0.0077 -0.0203
S.E 1.4728 1.4802 -0.3984 -0.5963 2.0105 1.9732 -0.3879 -0.8293
Industrials 0.0415 0.0418 -0.0067 -0.0087 .0835749** .0826025** 0.0149 0.0112
S.E 1.5291 1.5321 -0.3906 -0.4049 2.8206 2.7736 0.8014 0.4948
C Goods -0.0083 -0.0081 -.0565172** -.0561844* 0.0128 0.0120 -.0558658* -.0590031*
S.E -0.3079 -0.2988 -2.7914 -2.1963 0.4328 0.4055 -2.5282 -2.1643
Health 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0482 -.076424* 0.0000 0.0000 -.0686659* -.1096637**
S.E . . -1.6656 -1.9942 . . -2.1754 -2.6233
C Servicses .0937197** .0938657** .0455474* 0.0166 .1354978*** .1348686*** .0668319** 0.0353
S.E 3.1626 3.1522 2.0359 0.5684 4.1895 4.1501 2.7371 1.1409
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0482 0.0491 0.0000 0.0000 .0686659* .0668094* 0.0000 0.0000
S.E 1.6656 1.6863 . . 2.1754 2.1032 . .
R2 45% 45% 45% 44%
N 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 30.42 Prob2 0.0002 chi2 (8) 10.11 Prob2 0.2572
Hausman chi2(16) 2.61 Prob2 0 chi2(16) 1.68 Prob2 1
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Table 5.27: Morocco Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
MORROCO TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -0.1070 -0.1073 -0.0600 -0.1702 -0.0321 -0.0038 0.0538 -0.0513
S.E. -0.8529 -0.8504 -0.5063 -1.3107 -0.2184 -0.0258 0.3877 -0.3540
Profitability -1.126432*** -1.090066*** -1.126432*** -1.225051*** -1.507403*** -1.457887*** -1.507403*** -1.579146***
S.E -10.4917 -9.9554 -10.4917 -10.4780 -11.9897 -11.4710 -11.9897 -12.1556
Liquidty 0.0056 0.0048 0.0056 0.0043 -0.0008 -0.0036 -0.0008 -0.0029
S.E 0.8411 0.7100 0.8411 0.5967 -0.1031 -0.4564 -0.1031 -0.3620
Risk 0.1006 .1398289* 0.1006 0.1091 .139575* .1788405* .139575* .1488587*
S.E 1.7047 2.2702 1.7047 1.7028 2.0192 2.5016 2.0192 2.0809
Size .0144517* .0136739* .0144517* .0203263** 0.0130 0.0107 0.0130 .019226*
S.E 2.1809 2.0481 2.1809 2.7992 1.6792 1.3820 1.6792 2.3713
Tangibilty .2670733*** .261741*** .2670733*** .2738215*** 0.0766 0.0670 0.0766 0.0760
S.E 5.4732 5.3431 5.4732 5.1940 1.3404 1.1780 1.3404 1.2952
Tax -0.1970 -0.1189 -0.1970 -0.1369 -0.6917 -0.5751 -0.6917 -0.5801
S.E -0.4871 -0.2914 -0.4871 -0.3148 -1.4607 -1.2147 -1.4607 -1.1929
Dividends 0.1699 0.1465 0.1699 0.2646 0.0697 0.1191 0.0697 0.1527
S.E 1.0388 0.8713 1.0388 1.4861 0.3640 0.6104 0.3640 0.7691
Growth 0.6580 1.0117 0.6580 0.7637 0.2944 0.8453 0.2944 0.4086
S.E 1.0160 1.4837 1.0160 1.0991 0.3882 1.0681 0.3882 0.5258
Cash Flow -.4446259*** -.4125832** -.4446259*** -.6708025*** -.3789272* -.3384551* -.3789272* -.5303363**
S.E -3.4015 -3.0491 -3.4015 -4.4126 -2.4109 -2.0995 -2.4109 -3.1361
Government 0.0483 0.0467 0.0014 -0.0156 .1981808* .1840246* 0.1123 0.0776
S.E 0.6370 0.6126 0.0198 -0.2032 2.2302 2.0799 1.3481 0.9060
Instituional -0.0140 -0.0147 -0.0140 -0.0252 0.0148 0.0156 0.0148 0.0033
S.E -0.7999 -0.8330 -0.7999 -1.3231 0.7215 0.7621 0.7215 0.1529
Indivdual 0.0520 0.0510 0.0520 .0682502* 0.0353 0.0332 0.0353 0.0548
S.E 1.9425 1.9012 1.9425 2.3415 1.1248 1.0655 1.1248 1.6912
Oil -0.0505 -0.0456 -0.0505 -0.0628 0.0125 0.0220 0.0125 -0.0006
S.E -1.1541 -1.0361 -1.1541 -1.3404 0.2436 0.4309 0.2436 -0.0110
B Materials 0.0639 0.0623 0.0170 0.0189 .1157254* .1124341* 0.0298 0.0233
S.E 1.5649 1.5231 0.6335 0.6490 2.4199 2.3677 0.9500 0.7193
Industrials 0.0235 0.0205 -0.0234 -0.0188 .1476801** .1430526** .061765* .0611921*
S.E 0.5896 0.5120 -0.9335 -0.6911 3.1596 3.0810 2.1046 2.0325
C Goods -0.0281 -0.0300 -.0750628* -.0718897* 0.0087 0.0055 -.0772179* -.0859905*
S.E -0.7061 -0.7504 -2.5217 -2.2321 0.1864 0.1188 -2.2153 -2.4008
Health 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0469 -0.0786 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0859 -.1362925*
S.E . . -1.1037 -1.6324 . . -1.7255 -2.5228
C Servicses 0.0594 0.0575 0.0125 0.0105 .1091463* .1061192* 0.0232 0.0150
S.E 1.3631 1.3164 0.3787 0.2915 2.1394 2.0945 0.6032 0.3758
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0469 0.0416 0.0000 0.0000 0.0859 0.0773 0.0000 0.0000
S.E 1.1037 0.9761 . . 1.7255 1.5600 . .
R2 39% 39% 0% 47% 47% 0%
N 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 7.69 Prob2 0.464 chi2 (8) 14.76 Prob2 0.0639
Hausman chi2(16) 5.52 Prob2 0.9925 chi2(16) 9.99 Prob2 0.8669
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Table 5.28: Morocco Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
MORROCO
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged -0.0718281 -0.0508286 -0.0108496 -2.60% -0.0074977 -0.0155476
S.E. -1.529822 -1.140193 -0.2586314 -62.78% -0.1736952 -0.3944677
Constant 0.002815 0.166 0.055 0.1918748 0.0537555 0.341812
S.E. 0.0252827 1.215 0.549 1.760036 0.3444552 1.938911
Profitability -.3891938*** -.6117051*** -.6553508*** -.8075547*** -1.064167*** -1.415483***
S.E -4.908 -6.299 -9.013 -10.24046 -9.515804 -11.18057
Liquidty -.0286072*** -.0309491*** .0323128*** .0285132*** 0.0061125 -0.0022402
S.E -5.947 -5.242 7.326 6.002889 0.8987083 -0.2911575
Risk 0.020 0.033 0.080 .111022* 0.117611 .1471119*
S.E 0.456 0.607 1.950 2.49626 1.866607 2.053291
Size 0.009 0.006 0.000 -0.0026494 0.0087572 0.0036721
S.E 1.856 0.932 0.043 -0.5323175 1.235561 0.4579949
Tangibilty -.1313506*** -.2163265*** .3681139*** .2959733*** .2769351*** 0.0840225
S.E -3.738 -4.993 11.369 8.458619 5.597076 1.502941
Tax 0.186 -0.113 -0.303 -0.4547825 -0.147193 -0.5943132
S.E 0.643 -0.317 -1.132 -1.563068 -0.3584176 -1.270031
Dividends .2964749* 0.265 -0.192 -0.2132166 0.0860382 0.0389591
S.E 2.436 1.780 -1.719 -1.758528 0.5002077 0.200422
Growth -0.445 -0.350 1.263164** 1.084143* 0.9080254 0.6959627
S.E -0.914 -0.585 2.823 2.243753 1.315053 0.8913455
Cash Flow -0.1707708 -0.0911696 -.247073** -.2460712* -.6708025*** -.3536219*
S.E -1.692693 -0.7185365 -2.595099 -2.335181 -4.412575 -2.133007
Government 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instituional .0300451* .0540679*** -.0355891** -0.02356 -0.0038761 0.0308523
S.E 2.313324 3.396308 -2.97914 -1.838715 -0.2110697 1.486051
Indivdual 0.0346657 0.0358034 0.0094819 -0.0005589 0.0494488 0.0324617
S.E 1.822834 1.529417 0.5395454 -0.0291782 1.832498 1.049841
Oil -0.0274857 0.0062359 -0.0149396 0.0236088 -0.0433523 0.0273365
S.E -0.8785409 0.1627943 -0.5200572 0.7668307 -0.9804906 0.5479151
B Materials 0.0627532 0.0181231 -0.0547933 -.1075438* -0.0015736 -0.0908415
S.E 1.259449 0.2970228 -1.188572 -2.187536 -0.0221979 -1.140561
Industrials 0.0199852 0.0192995 -0.0597698 -0.0919676 -0.0527263 -0.0743742
S.E 0.4055523 0.3195524 -1.307444 -1.889438 -0.752283 -0.9433507
C Goods 0.0190892 -0.0475413 -.108961* -.1624405*** -0.1023375 -.2108654**
S.E 0.3984818 -0.8096246 -2.442898 -3.431677 -1.498444 -2.75015
Health 0.0405675 -0.0475781 -.1048831* -.1800157*** -0.0776665 -.2256703*
S.E 0.7403233 -0.7076594 -2.065168 -3.320968 -0.9975339 -2.56831
C Servicses 0.0185747 -0.070087 -0.0087589 -0.0419252 -0.0185765 -0.114233
S.E 0.3631586 -1.118118 -0.1829366 -0.8282289 -0.2544296 -1.39529
Telecom 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology 0.0282863 -0.0358197 -0.052685 -.1067379* -0.0323764 -0.1421049
S.E 0.5502094 -0.5691709 -1.115201 -2.104658 -0.4444612 -1.731837
N 368 368 368 368 368 368
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Table 5.29: Morocco SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
Profit -0.324 -0.379 -0.489 -0.273 -0.132 -0.282 -0.273 -0.143 -0.286 -0.255 -0.103 -0.269
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.004 <0.001 0.005 0.326 0.025 <0.001 0.126 <0.001
Size -0.262 0.115 0.233 0.173 0.145 0.158 -0.263 0.177 -0.317 -0.275 0.093 -0.302
0.066 0.037 0.144 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 0.073 0.007 0.003 0.106 0.195
Growth -0.087 0.05 0.065 -0.143 0.06 0.059 0.104 0.001 0.053 0.1 0.029 0.05
0.257 0.165 0.164 0.002 0.119 0.123 0.357 0.498 0.176 0.255 0.296 0.161
Tang 0.242 -0.127 -0.015 -0.128 0.154 0.048 0.252 0.169 0.035 0.199 0.09 -0.035
0.204 0.18 0.425 0.006 0.001 0.171 0.399 0.311 0.421 0.166 0.202 0.306
Tax -0.111 0.171 -0.088 -0.025 0.198 0.085 -0.079 0.174 0.102 -0.103 0.185 0.076
0.055 0.167 0.225 0.313 <0.001 0.046 0.135 0.244 0.488 0.07 0.104 0.262
Risk 0.034 0.05 0.032 -0.04 0.047 -0.051 0.009 0.031 0.015 0.02 0.044 0.019
0.216 0.319 0.306 0.216 0.178 0.156 0.491 0.488 0.488 0.402 0.304 0.418
Div 0.022 -0.064 -0.039 -0.021 0.042 -0.022 -0.023 -0.081 -0.053 -0.02 -0.058 -0.078
0.353 0.021 0.133 0.34 0.204 0.335 0.332 0.079 0.324 0.322 0.204 0.104
Liqud -0.499 -0.046 0.264 -0.476 0.067 0.247 -0.495 -0.053 -0.237 -0.481 0.088 -0.223
<0.001 0.225 0.278 <0.001 0.094 <0.001 <0.001 0.33 0.313 <0.001 0.094 0.236
Cash Flow 0.103 -0.35 -0.118 0.07 -0.321 -0.263 -0.008 -0.421 -0.267 0.005 -0.335 -0.266
0.161 <0.001 <0.001 0.083 <0.001 <0.001 0.456 <0.001 <0.001 0.471 <0.001 <0.001
Ownership
Gov 0.075 -0.091 0.04 -0.089 -0.086 -0.202
0.075 0.488 0.411 0.011 0.056 0.012
indv 0.038 -0.127 -0.142 0.062 -0.016 0.11
0.302 0.115 0.06 0.225 0.354 0.241
Inst 0.161 0.074 0.029 0.115 -0.067 0.005
0.024 0.17 0.4 0.076 0.165 0.457
Industry
Oil 0.047 0.034 0.081 0.032 -0.019 0.089
0.175 0.407 0.117 0.248 0.305 0.015
Mater 0 0 0 0.002 0.045 0
0 0 0 0.483 0.229 0
Indust 0 0 0 0 0 0.075
0 0 0 0 0 0.122
Cgoods 0 0 0 -0.092 -0.071 -0.128
0 0 0 0.042 0.128 0.023
Health 0 0 0 -0.038 0.041 -0.061
0 0 0 0.081 0.097 0.029
Cserv 0 0 0 -0.124 0.132 0.006
0 0 0 0.007 0.018 0.453
Telec 0 0 0 0.033 0.043 0.16
0 0 0 0.339 0.241 0.092
Techno 0 0 0 -0.018 -0.035 -0.046
0 0 0 0.38 0.267 0.211
N 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384
R2 32 30 22 32 14 35 37 45 56 46 26 58
Model Fit
(APC) 0.138 P=0.002 0.138 P=0.002 0.13 P<0.001 0.102 P<0.001
(ARS) 0.278 P<0.001 0.278 P<0.001 0.46 P=0.004 0.459 P<0.001
(AARS) 0.26 P<0.001 0.26 P<0.001 0.441 P=0.012 0.431 P<0.001
(AVIF) 1.409 1.409 1.47 Inf
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Table 5.30: Morocco ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Morocco Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 11.19% 8.45% 19.76% 20.71% 14.27% 20.42%
Size 22.61% 12.71% 17.06% 13.63% 17.96% 21.40%
Growth 11.62% 16.70% 3.67% 3.70% 6.25% 2.58%
Tangibility 4.60% 16.18% 18.71% 14.30% 16.01% 14.63%
Non-Debt Tax shield 13.79% 12.05% 6.44% 11.72% 4.23% 9.17%
Volatility 12.92% 1.16% 0.24% 20.83% 8.87% 12.29%
Dividends 0.50% 6.98% 0.52% 0.23% 7.23% 1.15%
Liquidity 14.60% 15.91% 21.16% 14.51% 15.64% 15.16%
Cash Flow 8.17% 9.85% 12.44% 0.37% 9.54% 3.19%
Good prediction % 69.06% 59.28% 78.50% 70.68% 60.91% 82.41%
S.D of abs errors 0.07 0.08 0.0841 0.0603 0.0862 0.1020
RMSE 0.09 0.10 0.1185 0.0771 0.1024 0.1294
MAE 0.05 0.05 0.08350 0.04806 0.05531 0.0795
N 384 384 384 384 384 384
Adding Dummies
Profitability 6.50% 6.55% 5.34% 15.72% 25.67% 13.94%
Size 12.28% 3.96% 13.65% 15.79% 21.50% 26.14%
Growth 0.02% 0.34% 8.51% 1.95% 2.28% 1.29%
Tangibility 17.55% 23.40% 18.17% 4.65% 0.93% 13.58%
Non-Debt Tax shield 1.05% 8.70% 7.76% 11.29% 0.00% 0.01%
Volatility 0.03% 13.94% 0.24% 3.62% 1.31% 0.40%
Dividends 7.11% 0.22% 6.87% 0.42% 0.51% 11.95%
Liquidity 22.59% 22.26% 18.84% 17.26% 19.75% 19.14%
Cash Flow 14.23% 10.45% 10.83% 0.32% 15.68% 5.72%
Ownership Dummies
Government 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Institutional 0.62% 4.07% 0.56% 6.29% 0.65% 2.78%
Individual 1.15% 0.32% 0.52% 1.42% 0.34% 0.18%
Industry Dummies
Oil 4.28% 1.78% 2.29% 3.52% 1.52% 0.39%
Basic Materials 0.06% 0.84% 0.10% 0.00% 0.47% 0.05%
Consumer Goods 5.65% 0.06% 0.15% 7.88% 0.05% 0.07%
Consumer Services 2.88% 0.74% 1.01% 4.87% 8.76% 3.51%
Health Care 1.98% 2.08% 1.58% 1.43% 0.34% 0.38%
Industrials 0.97% 0.06% 3.55% 1.66% 0.15% 0.39%
Technology 1.04% 0.22% 0.01% 1.91% 0.08% 0.09%
Telecommunications 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Good prediction % 62.21% 65.15% 75.24% 67.10% 65.47% 85.34%
RMSE 0.0319 0.0141 0.0382 0.0358 0.0183 0.0333
MAE 0.0175 0.0065 0.0214 0.0182 0.0088 0.0186
S.D of abs errors 0.0267 0.0126 0.0317 0.0309 0.0161 0.0276
N 384 384 384 384 384 384
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in Oman using Panel Data, SEM,
ANN ?
The sixth country in this chapter is Oman. First, the table of the short term debt
panel data results is presented. The R2 is low and in the range of 10% across the
models. The Wald test is not significant and therefore it can be concluded that there
is no heteroskedasticiy. The table show that the Hausman test is not significant and
therefore it is safe to use the random effect model also the Lagrange multiplier is
not significant. From the Table 5.31 the following conclusions could be drawn:
• Liquidity is negatively significant with the short term debt in book and market
value.
• Risk is only significant using the fixed model for the book value.
• Size is negatively significant with the short term debt in book and market
value.
• Tangibility is positively significant across the models for both short term debt
in book and market value.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the short term in book values
and significantly negative in market values.
• The ownership structure show that the government variable is positive and
significant for market value. However, individual variable also significantly
negative using the tobit model.
• The industry classification show that only the oil sector is negative and sig-
nificant for book values. Basic materials is positive and significant for book
values and only for the fixed model in the market value.
236
CHAPTER 5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS
The second Table 5.32 show the long term debt using panel data models. The
Wald test is not significant for the fixed effect. The R2 is acceptable for the book
debt with 29% and lower for the market value with 30% only. The Lagrange test is
not significant and the following could be concluded:
• Profitability is positive for the the long term debt in book values except for tobit
model.
• Liquidity is positive and significant for the long term debt in market values.
And negative using the tobit model for book values.
• Size is positively significant for the long term debt in book values and market
values except for the tobit model in book values which is negative.
• Tangibility is positively significant in for the long term debt in book values and
market values.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the long term debt in market
values and only negative using the tobit for book value.
• Growth is positively significant in for the long term debt in market values using
tobit and for all the book value models.
• Ownership individual is negatively significant for the long term debt in market
values but the individual variable is significant and negative for both market
and book.
• industry classification variable which is the oil is significantly negative for the
book debt and only significant for the market debt using fixed model. Basic
materials is positive and significant for both debt measures. Industrials vari-
able is positive for the market and book using the fixed model. Consumer
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goods and consumer services are positive for the market and book using the
fixed model and tobit models.
The third tables which is Table 5.33 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in Oman. The Wald test for the total debt for market
and book value is not significant. The Lagrange test is not significant and therefore
the random effect could be used. The Hausman test is not and therefore would
indicate that it is possible to use the Random effect. The R2 is higher than 41%
for both the book and market value. From the Table 5.33 the following conclusions
could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market val-
ues.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market values.
• Size is significant and negative for the total debt market values.
• Non-debt tax shield is significant and negative for the total debt market values.
• Dividends is negatively significant in for the total debt in book and market
values.
• Cash flow is negatively significant for total debt for market value using OLS
and tobit.
• Ownership government, institutional and individual are negatively significant
for the total debt in book values.
• industry classification variable which are basic materials, industrials and con-
sumer goods are negative and significant using the fixed effects only.
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The only interest from Table 5.34 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio. As it
shows that the lagged dependent variable is negatively significant for the total debt
of book and market value. Which, indicate that firms in Oman might adjust their
capital structure.
Table 5.35 show the SEM results for Oman using the PLS approach. The model
fits at the bottom of the model shows that the model fit is good without the dummy
variables and with the dummy variables. However, as with the previous result cau-
tion should be taken in interpreting the results of the book value with the dummy
variables as the dummies cause the model to have a high variance inflation factor.
The R2 is good for all the models with or without the dummies. From this table the
following could be concluded:
• Profitability attribute is significantly negative to total debt in market value and
book values. It also significantly positive to long term debt in book values.
• Size attribute is significantly negative to short term debt in market value and
book values. It also significantly negative to total debt in market values.
• Tangibility is significantly positive in relation to short and long term debt market
and book leverage. It is also negatively significant to the total debt in book and
market values.
• Dividends is negatively significant to the total debt in book and market values.
• Liquidity is negatively significant to total debt in both market and book value.
It is also negatively significant to short term debt in book values and positively
significant to long term debt in market value.
• Cash flow is negatively significant in relation long and total debt variables in
book and market values.
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• Ownership variable individual and institutional variables are significantly neg-
ative to the long term debt in market values. It is also negatively significant to
total debt in market value only for individual.
• industry variables of oil, basic materials and health services are significantly
negative to short term debt in book values.
Table 5.36 show the important variable using the ANN approach. The good pre-
diction percentage is high with the lowest model is 49%. From the table we conclude
the following results:
• Profitability is important for the short term debt in market value. It is important
for the short term debt and total debt in book value as well.
• Tangibility is considerably important for the long term debt in market value
leverage and slightly important for the total debt market leverage.
• Volatility is substantially important for the short term debt and long term debt
book leverage. It is also slightly important for both short term debt and total
debt in market value.
• Liquidity is important for both the short term debt in market values and in book
values as well.
• Cash flow is significantly important for the total debt in book values with a
variable impact of almost a half. It is also important for both the long term
debt in market value and book value.
• Technology as an industry classification is important for the short term debt
in market values.
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Table 5.31: Oman Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
OMAN STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant .2454647** 0.1458 .2454647** 0.0903 .4493603*** .3428974** .4493603*** .4512155***
S.E. 2.7932 1.5785 2.7932 0.7680 3.8539 2.7996 3.8539 4.0981
Profitability -0.0120 -0.0010 -0.0120 -0.0754 -0.1066 -0.0995 -0.1066 -0.1585
S.E -0.1786 -0.0147 -0.1786 -0.9301 -1.1950 -1.0955 -1.1950 -1.5120
Liquidty -.0112769*** -.0111585*** -.0112769*** -.0114496*** -.0153653*** -.0151729*** -.0153653*** -.0160145***
S.E -4.3976 -4.3275 -4.3976 -3.8167 -4.5161 -4.4362 -4.5161 -4.0714
Risk 0.0136 .0152879* 0.0136 0.0141 0.0138 0.0166 0.0138 0.0174
S.E 1.9063 2.0943 1.9063 1.6582 1.4596 1.7181 1.4596 1.5780
Size -.0122059** -.0130676** -.0122059** -.0112979* -.022101*** -.0231116*** -.022101*** -.0211572**
S.E -2.8594 -3.0111 -2.8594 -2.1722 -3.9022 -4.0150 -3.9022 -3.1204
Tangibilty .1721843*** .1712269*** .1721843*** .2293807*** .114869*** .1130672*** .114869*** .1805516***
S.E 7.9792 7.8952 7.9792 8.7911 4.0120 3.9305 4.0120 5.3198
Tax -.1267474* -.1297481* -.1267474* -.1474623* .44921*** .4472011*** .44921*** .4624478***
S.E -2.4396 -2.4842 -2.4396 -2.3445 6.5165 6.4551 6.5165 5.7951
Dividends 0.0162 0.0082 0.0162 0.0511 -0.1631 -0.1761 -0.1631 -0.1532
S.E 0.1564 0.0781 0.1564 0.4206 -1.1835 -1.2687 -1.1835 -0.9646
Growth -0.6460 -0.6368 -0.6460 -0.3959 -1.1615 -1.1338 -1.1615 -0.8260
S.E -1.3653 -1.3139 -1.3653 -0.7047 -1.8502 -1.7637 -1.8502 -1.1239
Cash Flow -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0080 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0084
S.E -0.2459 -0.2721 -0.2459 -0.9180 1.5884 1.5653 1.5884 1.7743
Government 0.0049 0.0049 0.0049 0.0138 .0861421** .0862973** .0861421** .0871706**
S.E 0.1989 0.1961 0.1989 0.4720 2.6178 2.6130 2.6178 2.6646
Instituional 0.0054 0.0057 0.0054 0.0025 0.0155 0.0160 0.0155 0.0150
S.E 0.3560 0.3723 0.3560 0.1390 0.7660 0.7894 0.7660 0.7382
Indivdual -0.0329 -0.0327 -0.0329 -.0475584* -0.0108 -0.0108 -0.0108 -0.0140
S.E -1.6560 -1.6356 -1.6560 -1.9886 -0.4111 -0.4073 -0.4111 -0.5234
Oil -.1483278*** -.1449416*** -.1483278*** -.1344726** -0.1009 -0.0967 -0.1009 -0.1038
S.E -3.6055 -3.5028 -3.6055 -2.7847 -1.8484 -1.7610 -1.8484 -1.8749
B Materials .1577526** .2696125*** .1577526** .2758394*** 0.1297 .250513*** 0.1297 0.1287
S.E 3.0940 5.1753 3.0940 3.5851 1.9173 3.6253 1.9173 1.9161
Industrials -0.0060 .1074368* -0.0060 0.0766 0.0111 .1336699* 0.0111 0.0077
S.E -0.1202 2.1544 -0.1202 1.0115 0.1676 2.0208 0.1676 0.1163
C Goods 0.0288 .1421752** 0.0288 0.1328 0.0089 .1311012* 0.0089 0.0070
S.E 0.5768 2.8743 0.5768 1.7543 0.1342 1.9982 0.1342 0.1053
Health -0.1137 0.0000 -0.1137 -0.1468 -0.1229 0.0000 -0.1229 -0.1248
S.E -1.6460 . -1.6460 -1.3930 -1.3407 . -1.3407 -1.3690
C Servicses -0.0075 .1051631* -0.0075 0.0896 -0.0078 0.1140 -0.0078 -0.0110
S.E -0.1489 2.0679 -0.1489 1.1744 -0.1166 1.6894 -0.1166 -0.1654
Telecom 0.0106 .1255347* 0.0106 0.1276 0.0013 0.1266 0.0013 -0.0013
S.E 0.1716 2.0020 0.1716 1.4693 0.0161 1.5218 0.0161 -0.0154
Technology 0.0000 0.1121 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1212 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . 1.6153 . . . 1.3172 . 0.0000
R2 28% 28% 29% 29%
N 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 632
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 2.87 Prob2 0.9423 chi2 (8) 0.7003 Prob2 0.7003
Hausman chi2(17) 0.94 Prob2 1 chi2(17) 1.68 Prob2 1
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Table 5.32: Oman Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
OMAN LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -.4569322*** -.623031*** -.4569322*** -1.11193*** -.3493647** -.4844545*** -.3493647** -.9418656***
S.E. -3.8159 -4.9804 -3.8159 -5.5400 -2.8869 -3.8214 -2.8869 -4.8024
Profitability .2058207* .1989706* .2058207* -0.0754 0.0363 0.0235 0.0363 0.0883
S.E 2.2465 2.1450 2.2465 -0.9301 0.3919 0.2500 0.3919 0.7225
Liquidty 0.0011 0.0008 0.0011 -.0114496*** .0111062** .0110353** .0111062** .0137141**
S.E 0.3286 0.2392 0.3286 -3.8167 3.1450 3.1172 3.1450 3.0514
Risk -0.0077 -0.0129 -0.0077 0.0141 -0.0049 -0.0084 -0.0049 -0.0026
S.E -0.7961 -1.3056 -0.7961 1.6582 -0.5033 -0.8421 -0.5033 -0.1982
Size .0207335*** .0222445*** .0207335*** -.0112979* .0148945* .0160809** .0148945* .0302036***
S.E 3.5646 3.7836 3.5646 -2.1722 2.5337 2.6990 2.5337 3.7459
Tangibilty .3675366*** .3705723*** .3675366*** .2293807*** .2888177*** .2905725*** .2888177*** .41601***
S.E 12.4997 12.6127 12.4997 8.7911 9.7190 9.7588 9.7190 10.3888
Tax 0.0927 0.0988 0.0927 -.1474623* .4782895*** .4826067*** .4782895*** .5677458***
S.E 1.3098 1.3963 1.3098 -2.3445 6.6849 6.7302 6.6849 6.2302
Dividends 0.0700 0.0875 0.0700 0.0511 -0.1355 -0.1307 -0.1355 -0.1213
S.E 0.4943 0.6172 0.4943 0.4206 -0.9474 -0.9100 -0.9474 -0.6719
Growth 1.668068** 1.592623* 1.668068** -0.3959 1.1294 1.0338 1.1294 1.933809*
S.E 2.5873 2.4256 2.5873 -0.7047 1.7332 1.5537 1.7332 2.2889
Cash Flow -0.0035 -0.0039 -0.0035 -.0510888* -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0013
S.E -0.8187 -0.8980 -0.8187 -2.5576 -0.1387 -0.1970 -0.1387 0.2451
Government -0.0477 -0.0480 -0.0477 -0.0467 -.0740848* -.0744504* -.0740848* -0.0863
S.E -1.4115 -1.4234 -1.4115 -1.0302 -2.1692 -2.1779 -2.1692 -1.9326
Instituional 0.0046 0.0037 0.0046 -0.0014 0.0037 0.0032 0.0037 -0.0135
S.E 0.2238 0.1776 0.2238 -0.0485 0.1776 0.1529 0.1776 -0.4907
Indivdual -.0567917* -.056834* -.0567917* -.0764508* -.0831233** -.0833723** -.0831233** -.1121168**
S.E -2.0954 -2.1007 -2.0954 -2.0828 -3.0346 -3.0408 -3.0346 -3.1196
Oil -.1635737** -.1698436** -.1635737** -.1574668* -0.1098 -.1140274* -0.1098 -0.0934
S.E -2.9180 -3.0298 -2.9180 -2.1694 -1.9374 -2.0072 -1.9374 -1.2969
B Materials .1693396* .3143764*** .1693396* .4253168** .1390196* .2582608*** .1390196* .3821659**
S.E 2.4375 4.4544 2.4375 3.0188 1.9799 3.6108 1.9799 2.7782
Industrials 0.0360 .1779948** 0.0360 0.2285 0.0651 .1817718** 0.0651 .2709085*
S.E 0.5305 2.6346 0.5305 1.6403 0.9492 2.6549 0.9492 1.9932
C Goods 0.1284 .2712482*** 0.1284 .3723237** 0.1158 .232757*** 0.1158 .35629**
S.E 1.8888 4.0478 1.8888 2.6734 1.6864 3.4274 1.6864 2.6211
Health -0.1417 0.0000 -0.1417 -0.1709 -0.1161 0.0000 -0.1161 -0.1464
S.E -1.5056 . -1.5056 -0.8945 -1.2198 . -1.2198 -0.7754
C Servicses 0.0694 .2130089** 0.0694 .3094* 0.0932 .2114781** 0.0932 .3280617*
S.E 1.0108 3.0918 1.0108 2.2094 1.3439 3.0289 1.3439 2.3995
Telecom 0.0000 0.1379 0.0000 0.1777 0.0685 .1835659* 0.0685 0.2437
S.E -0.0003 1.6235 -0.0003 1.1471 0.8080 2.1323 0.8080 1.6047
Technology 0.0000 0.1444 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1191 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . 1.5363 . . . 1.2504 . .
R2 29% 30% 30% 30%
N 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 11.76 Prob2 0.1621 chi2 (8) 4.76 Prob2 0.7826
Hausman chi2(17) 5.3 Prob2 0 chi2(17) 3.86 Prob2 0.9996
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Table 5.33: Oman Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
OMAN TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant .3908411** .6575316*** .3908411** .4388071** .7846055*** 1.071315*** .7846055*** .9138242***
S.E. 3.2653 5.2683 3.2653 3.2961 5.8042 7.5663 5.8042 6.1520
Profitability -.6840823*** -.7200563*** -.6840823*** -.705687*** -.5967336*** -.6217477*** -.5967336*** -.5515445***
S.E -7.4696 -7.7803 -7.4696 -6.9318 -5.7694 -5.9219 -5.7694 -4.8406
Liquidty -.0205626*** -.0207906*** -.0205626*** -.0277406*** -.034794*** -.0347722*** -.034794*** -.0557023***
S.E -5.8873 -5.9653 -5.8873 -6.0977 -8.8207 -8.7946 -8.8207 -9.6081
Risk -0.0114 -0.0174 -0.0114 -0.0142 0.0182 0.0145 0.0182 0.0185
S.E -1.1771 -1.7600 -1.1771 -1.3250 1.6646 1.2931 1.6646 1.5711
Size 0.0028 0.0058 0.0028 0.0024 -.019418** -.0174924** -.019418** -.0220854**
S.E 0.4840 0.9940 0.4840 0.3726 -2.9572 -2.6287 -2.9572 -3.0595
Tangibilty -0.0124 -0.0087 -0.0124 -0.0277 0.0402 0.0425 0.0402 0.0268
S.E -0.4212 -0.2981 -0.4212 -0.8454 1.2111 1.2781 1.2111 0.7324
Tax 0.0405 0.0454 0.0405 0.0465 -.3247412*** -.3252039*** -.3247412*** -.3762555***
S.E 0.5716 0.6437 0.5716 0.5994 -4.0634 -4.0606 -4.0634 -4.2454
Dividends -.6614904*** -.6569457*** -.6614904*** -.7684991*** -.837849*** -.8416341*** -.837849*** -.9690544***
S.E -4.6759 -4.6459 -4.6759 -4.8833 -5.2441 -5.2466 -5.2441 -5.4428
Growth 0.9286 0.6532 0.9286 1.2410 0.2140 -0.0450 0.2140 0.3743
S.E 1.4409 0.9972 1.4409 1.7449 0.2941 -0.0605 0.2941 0.4723
Cash Flow -0.0026 -0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0032 -.0100617* -0.0094 -.0100617* -.050112**
S.E -0.5722 -0.4736 -0.5722 -0.6409 -2.0415 -1.8978 -2.0415 -3.0694
Government -.1711282*** -.1711605*** -.1711282*** -.1910759*** -0.0697 -0.0702 -0.0697 -0.0449
S.E -5.0660 -5.0858 -5.0660 -4.9797 -1.8277 -1.8378 -1.8277 -1.0618
Instituional -.0498642* -.0504878* -.0498642* -.0553216* -0.0258 -0.0261 -0.0258 -0.0292
S.E -2.4033 -2.4424 -2.4033 -2.4120 -1.0994 -1.1112 -1.0994 -1.1409
Indivdual -.176766*** -.177196*** -.176766*** -.1822152*** -0.0594 -0.0595 -0.0594 -0.0566
S.E -6.5246 -6.5647 -6.5246 -6.0958 -1.9403 -1.9422 -1.9403 -1.7064
Oil 0.0328 0.0218 0.0328 0.0483 0.0363 0.0298 0.0363 0.0331
S.E 0.5850 0.3895 0.5850 0.7666 0.5742 0.4693 0.5742 0.4721
B Materials 0.0048 -.3026237*** 0.0048 -0.0497 0.0591 -.2530555** 0.0591 -0.0064
S.E 0.0695 -4.2977 0.0695 -0.6508 0.7533 -3.1679 0.7533 -0.0748
Industrials 0.0242 -.2893347*** 0.0242 0.0050 0.0208 -.2953111*** 0.0208 -0.0260
S.E 0.3568 -4.2925 0.3568 0.0675 0.2711 -3.8619 0.2711 -0.3159
C Goods 0.0533 -.2601113*** 0.0533 0.0286 0.0583 -.2578824*** 0.0583 0.0086
S.E 0.7846 -3.8905 0.7846 0.3855 0.7592 -3.4001 0.7592 0.1047
Health .315236*** 0.0000 .315236*** .3015637** .3175912** 0.0000 .3175912** .2810639*
S.E 3.3499 . 3.3499 2.9364 2.9883 . 2.9883 2.4626
C Servicses -0.0933 -.4031811*** -0.0933 -0.1265 -0.1161 -.4295318*** -0.1161 -.1826299*
S.E -1.3597 -5.8655 -1.3597 -1.6837 -1.4977 -5.5083 -1.4977 -2.1854
Telecom 0.0312 -.2865278*** 0.0312 0.0230 -0.0491 -.3669936*** -0.0491 -0.1151
S.E 0.3719 -3.3808 0.3719 0.2495 -0.5178 -3.8170 -0.5178 -1.1198
Technology 0.0000 -.3072745** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -.3116723** 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . -3.2768 . . . -2.9298 . .
R2 41% 41% 44% 44%
N 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 11.14 Prob2 0.194 chi2 (8) 2.01 Prob2 0.9806
Hausman chi2(17) 19.29 Prob2 0.3119 chi2(17) 4.95 Prob2 0.9979
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Table 5.34: Oman Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
OMAN
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged -0.0329641 -0.0234319 -0.0122102 -4.83% -.2145016*** -.1340322***
S.E. -0.8898188 -0.628172 -0.3262576 -135.46% -7.031306 -4.400952
Constant .2636595** .4623496*** -.4640578*** -.3615135** .45741*** .8385028***
S.E. 3.038362 3.956 -3.768 -2.956645 4.047406 6.440753
Profitability 0.001 -0.101 .2038793* 0.0286456 -.7073015*** -.6060145***
S.E 0.022 -1.113 2.131 0.3017949 -8.078615 -6.021176
Liquidty -.0115919*** -.0155939*** 0.001 .0105828** -.0219411*** -.0360749***
S.E -4.521 -4.473 0.167 2.971287 -6.73084 -9.59659
Risk .0163799* 0.018 -0.016 -0.0116977 -.0221669* 0.0130579
S.E 2.290 1.837 -1.533 -1.136223 -2.348102 1.201998
Size -.0127369** -.0224502*** .0217155*** .0166401** 0.0072531 -.0176796**
S.E -3.029 -3.899 3.607 2.762003 1.317019 -2.796723
Tangibilty .171366*** .1123348*** .3657079*** .2829122*** -0.0229598 0.0272018
S.E 8.087 3.875 12.129 9.43735 -0.8333631 0.8555099
Tax -.1315889** .4455678*** 0.101 .4835468*** 0.0551573 -.3176461***
S.E -2.609 6.494 1.399 6.732436 0.8360548 -4.182489
Dividends 0.004 -0.179 0.094 -0.1238205 -.7176698*** -.904447***
S.E 0.043 -1.303 0.650 -0.8592059 -5.39801 -5.892197
Growth -0.673 -1.182 1.568159* 1.058144 0.5324478 -0.1285339
S.E -1.428 -1.847 2.315 1.567424 0.8558096 -0.1808802
Cash Flow -0.0008553 0.0065784 -0.0040467 -0.0010919 -0.0032142 -.0100237*
S.E -0.2753083 1.603039 -0.9257808 -0.2550926 -0.6408949 -2.11744
Government 0.0067894 .0871706** -0.04592 -.0705669* -.1529074*** -0.065689
S.E 0.2811579 2.664604 -1.297567 -2.052718 -4.851755 -1.815614
Instituional 0.0053537 0.0150032 0.0024294 0.0009444 -0.0377769 -0.019766
S.E 0.3606066 0.7381809 0.113974 0.044981 -1.938825 -0.8843687
Indivdual -0.0357892 -0.014025 -.0572357* -.0876454** -.1745047*** -.0650047*
S.E -1.820059 -0.5234072 -2.07431 -3.177983 -6.92611 -2.23885
Oil -.1502136*** -0.1038231 -.1668444** -0.1102865 0.0250331 0.0061111
S.E -3.728072 -1.874888 -2.910858 -1.944208 0.4795642 0.1012244
B Materials .1545669** 0.128668 .1693627* .137548* -0.0703254 0.0375967
S.E 3.125324 1.916142 2.397252 1.960905 -1.075032 0.5048291
Industrials -0.0123881 0.0076697 0.0334848 0.062518 -0.0469244 -0.0045572
S.E -0.252988 0.1162953 0.4854736 0.913183 -0.7369423 -0.0626556
C Goods 0.0239908 0.0069594 0.1234178 0.110212 -0.0404502 0.0135415
S.E 0.4877626 0.1052803 1.780283 1.603781 -0.6299164 0.1847664
Health -0.1189567 -0.124777 -0.1432761 -0.1166991 .2354019** .2441757*
S.E -1.767523 -1.369042 -1.495925 -1.227831 2.671678 2.393981
C Servicses -0.0138549 -0.011022 0.0683352 0.0931459 -.151817* -0.1327238
S.E -0.2801552 -0.1654387 0.9797701 1.344753 -2.363639 -1.805341
Telecom 0.0088662 -0.0012604 -0.0078782 0.0563712 -0.1055143 -0.1078316
S.E 0.1479701 -0.0153878 -0.0922502 0.6635752 -1.317824 -1.189578
Technology 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 632 632 632 632 632 632
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Table 5.35: Oman SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
Profit -0.01 -0.001 -0.155 -0.103 0.193 -0.193 -0.015 0.012 -0.185 -0.039 0.154 -0.119
0.401 0.486 <0.001 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 0.351 0.38 <0.001 0.266 0.006 0.003
Size -0.201 -0.02 -0.137 -0.333 -0.012 0.006 -0.203 0.049 -0.185 -0.152 0.061 -0.157
<0.001 0.308 <0.001 <0.001 0.382 0.436 <0.001 0.107 <0.001 0.01 0.272 <0.001
Growth -0.024 -0.114 -0.014 -0.006 -0.099 0.039 -0.053 -0.017 0.034 -0.032 -0.077 -0.017
0.266 0.002 0.358 0.436 0.006 0.159 0.09 0.335 0.195 0.22 0.165 0.4
Tang 0.271 0.487 -0.111 0.221 0.535 -0.133 0.187 0.443 -0.105 0.293 0.527 -0.111
<0.001 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.004 0.023 <0.001 0.153
Tax -0.085 -0.083 -0.019 -0.072 0.046 -0.077 0.172 0.152 -0.08 -0.093 0.036 -0.011
0.014 0.017 0.313 0.033 0.122 0.024 <0.001 <0.001 0.021 0.154 0.24 0.425
Risk 0.026 0.014 -0.006 0.007 0.015 -0.026 0.019 0.018 -0.022 0.026 0.064 -0.011
0.256 0.364 0.435 0.43 0.349 0.257 0.312 0.323 0.284 0.244 0.138 0.288
Div -0.102 0.013 -0.216 -0.078 -0.003 -0.187 -0.104 -0.038 -0.165 -0.113 0.019 -0.171
0.005 0.375 <0.001 0.023 0.471 <0.001 0.004 0.164 <0.001 0.002 0.348 0.05
Liqud -0.119 0.15 -0.216 -0.131 0.058 -0.152 -0.093 0.176 -0.173 -0.121 0.062 -0.195
0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.07 <0.001 0.008 <0.001 <0.001 0.005 0.132 <0.001
Cash Flow 0.104 -0.164 -0.179 0.097 -0.194 -0.326 0.096 -0.144 -0.184 0.079 -0.205 -0.174
0.004 <0.001 <0.001 0.007 <0.001 <0.001 0.007 <0.001 <0.001 0.03 0.125 <0.001
Ownership
Gov 0.113 -0.115 -0.061 0.14 -0.029 -0.03
0.002 0.002 0.058 0.011 0.256 0.178
indv -0.036 -0.163 -0.128 -0.056 -0.122 -0.148
0.176 <0.001 <0.001 0.21 0.004 0.114
Inst -0.083 -0.148 0.083 -0.046 -0.153 -0.085
0.016 <0.001 0.017 0.134 0.007 0.253
Industry
Oil -0.004 -0.011 0.042 -0.077 -0.05 0.014
0.457 0.392 0.141 <0.001 0.042 0.28
Mater 0 0 0 0.192 0.175 -0.006
0 0 0 <0.001 0.076 0.465
Indust 0 0 0 0.044 0 -0.134
0 0 0 0.135 0 0.043
Cgoods 0 0 0 0 0.221 0
0 0 0 0 0.089 0
Health 0 0 0 -0.06 -0.027 0.075
0 0 0 <0.001 0.284 0.003
Cserv 0 0 0 0.037 0.066 -0.2
0 0 0 0.168 0.287 0.002
Telec 0 0 0 0.028 0.011 -0.085
0 0 0 0.162 0.421 0.011
Techno 0 0 0 -0.004 -0.044 -0.009
0 0 0 0.414 0.124 0.345
N 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648
R2 26 27 33 25 26 35 26 37 36 26 36 35
Model Fit
(APC) 0.118 P<0.001 0.118 P<0.001 0.105 P=0.002 0.096 P<0.001
(ARS) 0.287 P<0.001 0.287 P<0.001 0.329 P<0.001 0.322 P<0.001
(AARS) 0.277 P<0.001 0.277 P<0.001 0.316 P<0.001 0.302 P<0.001
(AVIF) 1.285 1.285 1.305 Inf
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Table 5.36: Oman ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Oman Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 14.56% 9.31% 14.10% 18.60% 8.36% 13.30%
Size 6.31% 8.88% 0.51% 9.89% 14.39% 7.30%
Growth 7.09% 2.61% 0.04% 1.63% 4.60% 2.58%
Tangibility 10.84% 14.04% 8.23% 12.09% 37.39% 16.41%
Non-Debt Tax shield 12.68% 1.75% 10.63% 13.16% 5.06% 13.38%
Volatility 20.62% 28.01% 10.36% 17.17% 9.04% 22.42%
Dividends 1.93% 8.74% 0.38% 0.24% 0.56% 10.95%
Liquidity 15.94% 11.87% 5.76% 18.63% 2.28% 4.58%
Cash Flow 10.04% 14.79% 49.99% 8.59% 18.32% 9.08%
Good prediction % 79.12% 65.76% 57.20% 73.90% 49.06% 79.54%
S.D of abs errors 0.13 0.12 0.0716 0.1329 0.1115 0.0857
RMSE 0.18 0.14 0.0788 0.1861 0.1318 0.1057
MAE 0.12 0.07 0.03295 0.13026 0.07013 0.0619
N 648 648 648 648 648 648
Adding Dummies
Profitability 14.76% 4.61% 6.33% 14.77% 13.37% 24.91%
Size 1.51% 19.22% 1.73% 4.16% 0.00% 2.68%
Growth 0.35% 4.43% 5.75% 0.51% 0.24% 0.83%
Tangibility 16.84% 26.69% 7.91% 16.04% 7.56% 0.05%
Non-Debt Tax shield 11.00% 1.39% 5.08% 13.47% 0.12% 12.09%
Volatility 20.72% 20.19% 0.73% 10.41% 24.86% 17.78%
Dividends 0.01% 3.80% 6.66% 0.40% 0.04% 10.39%
Liquidity 1.21% 0.56% 0.01% 1.19% 0.53% 0.89%
Cash Flow 1.11% 0.21% 17.83% 2.89% 25.20% 1.52%
Ownership Dummies
Government 4.14% 0.40% 0.30% 5.40% 3.99% 0.80%
Institutional 7.24% 0.66% 4.84% 0.31% 1.10% 3.34%
Individual 0.61% 0.00% 6.34% 0.94% 1.89% 1.85%
Industry Dummies
Oil 0.07% 8.97% 5.48% 0.65% 0.23% 2.05%
Basic Materials 1.99% 0.48% 0.17% 0.60% 3.71% 3.32%
Consumer Goods 7.42% 2.24% 6.33% 8.06% 3.45% 5.68%
Consumer Services 0.40% 0.11% 6.31% 0.07% 2.24% 3.00%
Health Care 0.00% 3.84% 5.17% 0.01% 5.54% 0.61%
Industrials 2.89% 0.18% 0.00% 1.59% 0.80% 0.01%
Technology 3.87% 0.76% 6.70% 13.19% 1.04% 1.99%
Telecommunications 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Good prediction % 82.67% 61.17% 90.40% 83.30% 41.34% 85.18%
RMSE 0.0370 0.0420 0.0002 0.0448 0.0836 0.0150
MAE 0.0191 0.0174 0.0000 0.0224 0.0416 0.0086
S.D of abs errors 0.0317 0.0382 0.0002 0.0387 0.0726 0.0124
N 648 648 648 648 648 648
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in Palestine using Panel Data,
SEM, ANN ?
The seventh country in this chapter is Palestine. First, the table of the short term
debt panel data results is presented. The R2 is substantially high and in the range
of 76% across the models. The Wald test is significant and therefore it can be
concluded that there is heteroskedasticiy and robust errors are presnted. The ta-
ble show that the Hausman test is not significant and therefore it is safe to use
the random effect model. From the Table 5.37 the following conclusions could be
drawn:
• Profitability is positive and significant with the short term debt in market value
using tobit.
• Liquidity is negatively significant with the short term debt in book and market
value.
• Risk is significantly positive for short term debt market value.
• Size is positively significant with the short term debt in market value and vice
versa for the book.
• Tangibility is positively significant across the models for both short term debt
in book and market value.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the short term debt in market
value.
• Dividends is significantly positively short term debt in book value.
• Growth is negative and significant for book value debt and vice versa for the
market debt.
247
CHAPTER 5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS
• Cash flow is significantly negative for both short term debt in market value.
• The ownership structure show that the individual variable is negative and sig-
nificant for both market value and book value of short term debt. On the other
hand, institutional is positive and significant for the book value and vice versa
for the market.
• The industry classification show that only the consumer services is positive
and significant for the market value. The health variable is only positive sig-
nificant using the tobit model for the book value.
The second Table 5.38 show the long term debt using panel data models. The
Wald test is not significant for the fixed effect. The R2 is good for the book debt with
20% and problematic with the market where it is 92% and therefore would indicate
a high collinearity and will be ignored. The Lagrange test is not significant and the
following could be concluded:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the long term debt in book values and
the inverse for the tobit model.
• Size is positively significant for the long term debt in book except for the fixed
effect model and negative for the tobit.
• Tangibility is positively significant in for the long term debt in book values.
• Dividends is positive significant for the long term debt in book using tobit
model only.
• Growth is negatively significant in for the long term debt in book values.
• Ownership individual is positively y significant for the long term debt in book
values.
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The third tables which is Table 5.39 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in Palestine. The Wald test for the total debt is not
significant. The Lagrange test is not significant and therefore the random effect
could be used. The Hausman test is not significant for total debt and significant
for the total market value and therefore would indicate that it is possible to use the
Random effect. The R2 is higher than 50% for both the book and market value.
The market R2 is problematic where it is 80% and therefore would indicate a high
collinearity and will be ignored From the Table 5.39 the following conclusions could
be drawn:
• Size is negatively significant for the total debt in book values.
• Dividends is positively significant in for the total debt in book.
• Growth is negatively significant in for the total debt in book.
• Cash flow is negatively significant for total debt for book value using tobit
model.
• Ownership individual is negatively significant for the total debt in book values.
Institutional variable is positively significant for total debt in book values.
• industry classification variable which is the oil positively significant using both
market and book total debt.
The only interest from Table 5.40 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio. As
it shows that the dependent variable lagged variable is negatively significant for the
short, long and total debt of book value. Which, indicate that firms might adjust their
capital structure for both the long term debt and total debt.
Table 5.41 show the SEM-PLS results for Oman. The model fits at the bottom of
the model shows that the model fit is good without the dummy variables but doesn’t
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hold when the dummy variables are added. The R2 is good for all the models with
or without the dummies except for the short term debt in market values. From the
previous table the following could be concluded:
• Profitability attribute is significantly negative to long term debt in book values.
• Size attribute is significantly positive to long term debt in market values.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant to the three measure of the market
value.
• Dividends is negatively significant to the total debt and short term debt in
market values.
Table 5.42 show the important variable using the ANN approach. It shows the
variable impact factor as a percentage. The good prediction is high with values of
higher than 69%. From the ANN results table we could conclude the following:
• Profitability is substantially important for the total debt in market value (TD-
MVE).
• Size is significantly important for long term debt in book value (LTDBVA) and
slightly important for the total debt in book value (TDBVA).
• Growth is important for the short term debt in book value (STDBVA).
• Tangibility is the most important variable especially for the market leverage
ratios which are the short term, long term and total debt in market leverage.
• Non debt tax shield is only important for the long term debt in market value.
• Volatility is significantly important for the short term debt in market value and
slightly important for the short term debt in book values.
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• Liquidity is marginally important for the short term debt in book value and for
the total debt in market value.
• Ownership structure shows that the individual variable is somewhat important
for the short term debt of book value.
• Industry classification shows that oil variable is somewhat important for the
short term debt of book value.
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Table 5.37: Palestine Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
PALESTINE STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant .4199938*** .4309323*** .4199938*** .6273545*** -.4002474*** -.398771*** -.4002474*** -0.0446
S.E. 5.9061 5.8461 5.9061 5.9220 -4.8222 -4.6451 -4.8222 -0.5111
Profitability 0.0253 0.0270 0.0253 .2502637** -0.0751 -0.0696 -0.0751 .3153194***
S.E 0.4367 0.4492 0.4367 2.6384 -1.1095 -0.9934 -1.1095 4.5746
Liquidity -.0081767** -.0082312** -.0081767*** -.0090787** -.006124* -.0062818* -.006124* -.0542946***
S.E -3.3129 -3.2610 -3.3129 -2.9629 -2.1258 -2.1369 -2.1258 -16.0711
Risk -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0019 .007884** .0081118** .007884** 0.0011
S.E -1.8079 -1.7778 -1.8079 -0.6514 2.7287 2.7255 2.7287 0.7939
Size -.0230226*** -.0236689*** -.0230226*** -.0362451*** .0231621*** .023088*** .0231621*** .04901***
S.E -5.6983 -5.6574 -5.6983 -5.8328 4.9117 4.7385 4.9117 5.6028
Tangibilty .0915398*** .0899837*** .0915398*** .0699598*** .0909452*** .0919164*** .0909452*** .2751288***
S.E 7.2672 6.9876 7.2672 4.1623 6.1858 6.1288 6.1858 15.4506
Tax -0.5168 -0.4534 -0.5168 0.6550 4.325539*** 4.308625*** 4.325539*** 2.23007***
S.E -0.9927 -0.8511 -0.9927 0.9759 7.1193 6.9448 7.1193 5.8565
Dividends .4019609*** .4124872** .4019609*** .3225444* -0.1297 -0.1437 -0.1297 2.808148***
S.E 3.3614 3.3265 3.3614 2.1471 -0.9295 -0.9950 -0.9295 6.5521
Growth -5.302995*** -5.402376*** -5.302995*** -7.174382*** 7.282517*** 7.470277*** 7.282517*** 17.31727***
S.E -7.7096 -7.6270 -7.7096 -7.7149 9.0710 9.0556 9.0710 17.1282
Cash Flow -0.0063 -0.0069 -0.0063 0.0194 -.3655342*** -.3671684*** -.3655342*** -.7815127***
S.E -0.1300 -0.1404 -0.1300 0.2901 -6.4612 -6.3975 -6.4612 -8.1688
Government 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
Instituional .0535231*** .054746*** .0535231*** .0855996*** -.0505778*** -.0509938*** -.0505778*** -.0695263***
S.E 6.2300 6.2293 6.2300 6.9733 -5.0439 -4.9822 -5.0439 -6.0770
Indivdual -0.0236 -0.0251 -0.0236 -.047913* -.0893447*** -.0903309*** -.0893447*** -.0881953***
S.E -1.5956 -1.6670 -1.5956 -2.3164 -5.1799 -5.1415 -5.1799 -4.9557
Oil 0.0118 0.0118 0.0118 0.0200 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0097
S.E 1.4087 1.3915 1.4087 1.9479 -0.1775 -0.1806 -0.1775 -0.9689
B Materials -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0017 0.0079 0.0076 0.0079 0.0102
S.E -0.2421 -0.2787 -0.2421 -0.1858 0.9345 0.8862 0.9345 1.1937
Industrials -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0012 0.0000 0.0082 0.0078 0.0082 0.0049
S.E -0.2004 -0.2394 -0.2004 0.0045 1.1633 1.0959 1.1633 0.6411
C Goods -0.0032 -0.0035 -0.0032 -0.0026 0.0104 0.0100 0.0104 0.0120
S.E -0.4849 -0.5117 -0.4849 -0.3205 1.3311 1.2523 1.3311 1.4788
Health 0.0093 0.0092 0.0093 .0176298* 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0061
S.E 1.2826 1.2539 1.2826 2.0092 0.0444 -0.0065 0.0444 0.6958
C Servicses -0.0083 -0.0086 -0.0083 -0.0091 .0175844* .0172033* .0175844* .0169576*
S.E -1.1581 -1.1757 -1.1581 -0.9907 2.1029 2.0255 2.1029 1.9887
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
R2 77% 77% 75% 76%
N 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 168
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 41.65 Prob2 0 chi2 (8) 54.34 Prob2 0
Hausman chi2(16) 1.24 Prob2 1 chi2(16) 1.58 Prob2 1
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Table 5.38: Palestine Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
PALESTINE LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -0.2298 -0.1968 -0.2298 -0.2965 -0.1078 -0.1027 -0.1078 -5.060663***
S.E. -1.6500 -1.3646 -1.6500 -1.4798 -1.6962 -1.5554 -1.6962 -13.5848
Profitability -.3566912** -.3378757** -.3566912** .2502637** -0.0638 -0.0603 -0.0638 -3.470663***
S.E -3.1404 -2.8703 -3.1404 2.6384 -1.2314 -1.1194 -1.2314 -11.7562
Liquidty 0.0039 0.0036 0.0039 -.0090787** -.0168099*** -.0169003*** -.0168099*** -.3698161***
S.E 0.8025 0.7384 0.8025 -2.9629 -7.6209 -7.4755 -7.6209 -14.5699
Risk -0.0021 -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0019 .0050194* .0052247* .0050194* 0.0004
S.E -0.4366 -0.2601 -0.4366 -0.6514 2.2689 2.2826 2.2689 0.4622
Size .0173218* 0.0154 .0173218* -.0362451*** .0075197* 0.0072 .0075197* .2782032***
S.E 2.1894 1.8838 2.1894 -5.8328 2.0826 1.9260 2.0826 13.7533
Tangibilty .0761862** .0719015** .0761862** .0699598*** .1515738*** .151386*** .1515738*** 1.365177***
S.E 3.0888 2.8545 3.0888 4.1623 13.4645 13.1253 13.4645 15.7274
Tax -1.2077 -1.0741 -1.2077 0.6550 4.564453*** 4.590597*** 4.564453*** -.6618907*
S.E -1.1848 -1.0308 -1.1848 0.9759 9.8115 9.6213 9.8115 -2.2649
Dividends 0.2842 0.2655 0.2842 .3225444* .2232754* .2205733* .2232754* 42.12432***
S.E 1.2135 1.0945 1.2135 2.1471 2.0892 1.9860 2.0892 13.1848
Growth -10.18856*** -10.28096*** -10.18856*** -7.174382*** 4.227153*** 4.296755*** 4.227153*** 36.6714***
S.E -7.5644 -7.4203 -7.5644 -7.7149 6.8765 6.7728 6.8765 16.5607
Cash Flow .6705327*** .6673161*** .6705327*** .8047845*** -.5272842*** -.5284151*** -.5272842*** -.7843191***
S.E 7.4535 7.3234 7.4535 6.2901 -11.7372 -11.5680 -11.7372 -9.9292
Government 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Instituional 0.0108 0.0139 0.0108 0.0290 -.0367756*** -.0364889*** -.0367756*** -5.7938
S.E 0.6437 0.8110 0.6437 1.2409 -4.7898 -4.6356 -4.7898 .
Indivdual .223967*** .2200126*** .223967*** .253936*** -.1382091*** -.1395986*** -.1382091*** -3.9890
S.E 7.7398 7.4559 7.7398 6.2351 -10.4651 -10.3318 -10.4651 .
Oil 0.0215 0.0214 0.0215 0.0406 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0001
S.E 1.3095 1.2825 1.3095 1.8399 -0.1476 -0.1513 -0.1476 -0.0308
B Materials -0.0088 -0.0100 -0.0088 -0.0150 .0154457* .0151436* .0154457* 0.0023
S.E -0.6196 -0.6997 -0.6196 -0.7720 2.3962 2.3038 2.3962 0.8266
Industrials -0.0072 -0.0087 -0.0072 -0.0110 .0159201** .0155985** .0159201** 0.0022
S.E -0.6117 -0.7216 -0.6117 -0.6843 2.9605 2.8372 2.9605 0.8889
C Goods -0.0034 -0.0050 -0.0034 -0.0091 0.0094 0.0091 0.0094 -0.0004
S.E -0.2620 -0.3732 -0.2620 -0.5164 1.5775 1.4839 1.5775 -0.1297
Health 0.0113 0.0103 0.0113 0.0248 0.0052 0.0049 0.0052 0.0017
S.E 0.7940 0.7135 0.7940 1.3243 0.7976 0.7395 0.7976 0.6290
C Servicses -0.0149 -0.0162 -0.0149 -0.0260 .022284*** .0219299*** .022284*** 0.0026
S.E -1.0587 -1.1385 -1.0587 -1.3378 3.4805 3.3574 3.4805 0.9533
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 58% 58% 20% 92% 92%
N 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 15.88 Prob2 0.0442 chi2 (8) 86.36 Prob2 0
Hausman chi2(16) 1.46 Prob2 1 chi2(16) 0.68 Prob2 1
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Table 5.39: Palestine Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
PALESTINE TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant 1.007215*** 1.057004*** 1.007215*** 1.116862*** -.4903367** -.4797942** -.4903367** -.3702834*
S.E. 4.9198 5.0009 4.9198 5.2565 -2.7644 -2.6159 -2.7644 -2.3001
Profitability -0.1395 -0.1213 -0.1395 -0.0046 -.6394235*** -.6137936*** -.6394235*** -.4404184**
S.E -0.8353 -0.7028 -0.8353 -0.0259 -4.4195 -4.0990 -4.4195 -3.2166
Liquidty .014313* 0.0140 .014313* 0.0139 -.0350172*** -.0351821*** -.0350172*** -.0359963***
S.E 2.0143 1.9336 2.0143 1.9674 -5.6880 -5.6017 -5.6880 -5.6895
Risk -0.0102 -0.0094 -0.0102 -0.0086 .0135874* .0144677* .0135874* .0110926*
S.E -1.4274 -1.2792 -1.4274 -1.2134 2.2006 2.2752 2.2006 1.9941
Size -.0528447*** -.0557784*** -.0528447*** -.0596218*** .0390578*** .0385403*** .0390578*** .0330944***
S.E -4.5432 -4.6497 -4.5432 -4.9183 3.8757 3.7022 3.8757 3.6260
Tangibilty 0.0388 0.0323 0.0388 0.0225 0.0291 0.0285 0.0291 -0.0005
S.E 1.0694 0.8749 1.0694 0.6021 0.9249 0.8899 0.9249 -0.0169
Tax -1.0382 -0.7663 -1.0382 -1.1411 6.997*** 6.952341*** 6.997*** 8.484474***
S.E -0.6928 -0.5017 -0.6928 -0.7393 5.3889 5.2450 5.3889 6.6025
Dividends 1.53767*** 1.549491*** 1.53767*** 1.486552*** -1.51562*** -1.594157*** -1.51562*** -2.288991***
S.E 4.4665 4.3580 4.4665 4.3122 -5.0813 -5.1667 -5.0813 -7.1043
Growth -13.77938*** -13.972*** -13.77938*** -15.07694*** 9.522216*** 9.734045*** 9.522216*** 10.58198***
S.E -6.9584 -6.8793 -6.9584 -7.2294 5.5500 5.5229 5.5500 5.6017
Cash Flow -0.2539 -0.2602 -0.2539 -.2694582* -.2575877* -.2574751* -.2575877* -.9341956***
S.E -1.9448 -1.9622 -1.9448 -2.0181 -2.0221 -1.9969 -2.0221 -4.6389
Government 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Instituional .112456*** .1174499*** .112456*** .1230338*** .0941989*** .0944509*** .0941989*** .1119274***
S.E 4.5467 4.6608 4.5467 4.8447 4.3958 4.3192 4.3958 5.5278
Indivdual -.0913826* -.0992603* -.0913826* -.0972809* -.0890506* -.0885756* -.0890506* -0.5918
S.E -2.1480 -2.2947 -2.1480 -2.2715 -2.4159 -2.3597 -2.4159 .
Oil 0.0022 0.0021 0.0022 0.0019 -0.0030 -0.0032 -0.0030 -0.0024
S.E 0.0929 0.0848 0.0929 0.0793 -0.1432 -0.1508 -0.1432 -0.1303
B Materials 0.0207 0.0189 0.0207 0.0261 .0743434*** .07337*** .0743434*** .0611023***
S.E 0.9974 0.8980 0.9974 1.2599 4.1323 4.0177 4.1323 3.7262
Industrials 0.0192 0.0174 0.0192 0.0249 .0859173*** .0846206*** .0859173*** .0699649***
S.E 1.1103 0.9862 1.1103 1.4348 5.7245 5.5403 5.7245 5.0287
C Goods 0.0126 0.0107 0.0126 0.0164 .0606202*** .0591053*** .0606202*** .0478544**
S.E 0.6527 0.5446 0.6527 0.8523 3.6272 3.4704 3.6272 3.1434
Health 0.0115 0.0104 0.0115 0.0160 .0649627*** .063519*** .0649627*** .0476798**
S.E 0.5498 0.4928 0.5498 0.7693 3.5914 3.4611 3.5914 2.8645
C Servicses 0.0111 0.0092 0.0111 0.0168 .0875501*** .0864129*** .0875501*** .0733848***
S.E 0.5381 0.4395 0.5381 0.8141 4.8994 4.7621 4.8994 4.5030
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 50% 50% 80% 80%
N 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 13.48 Prob2 0.0964 chi2 (8) 7.35 Prob2 0.4998
Hausman chi2(16) 2.12 Prob2 1 chi2(16) 1.82 Prob2 1
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Table 5.40: Palestine Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
PALESTINE
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged -.6212725*** -.3298414** -.378996* 0.0825 -.5982674*** 0.0554235
S.E. -14.87281 -3.145242 -2.383864 123.30% -6.437171 0.874466
Constant .2198338*** -.6042551*** -0.055 0.011439 .8180975*** -0.3934514
S.E. 4.548435 -5.907 -0.394 0.1204898 4.605069 -1.879691
Profitability 0.005 -0.049 -.2747183* -0.0715023 -.6052175*** -.5470476**
S.E 0.138 -0.598 -2.531 -1.056155 -3.876319 -3.101901
Liquidty -.0128697*** 0.008 -0.004 -.0253362*** -0.0033307 -.0378757***
S.E -8.088 1.402 -0.732 -6.125806 -0.5027913 -4.694343
Risk 0.000 .0087417* -0.001 0.0047132 -0.0025104 .0161016*
S.E -0.087 2.444 -0.226 1.558913 -0.3501799 1.999971
Size -.0112832*** .0341781*** 0.008 0.0009958 -.0344935*** .0337426**
S.E -4.111 5.961 1.010 0.1874468 -3.330512 2.844405
Tangibilty .1499756*** .139511*** .0958021*** .1489361*** .0652042* 0.0042008
S.E 16.896 7.191 3.337 8.268159 2.133476 0.1153035
Tax 1.028063** 3.678757*** 0.654 4.599654*** 0.5044279 8.289431***
S.E 3.042 5.201 0.643 8.127798 0.4039953 5.496675
Dividends .3454707*** -.4623305* 0.356 .3477783* 1.662543*** -1.960202***
S.E 4.354 -2.438 1.593 2.064941 5.490485 -5.371879
Growth -1.026 9.624922*** -10.08612*** 6.036927*** -8.969896*** 10.12349***
S.E -1.874 10.191 -7.278 5.826998 -4.576373 4.796005
Cash Flow -.2092916*** -.3967616*** .4278694*** -.5720052*** -.2694582* -.3030736*
S.E -7.410597 -6.231582 4.238074 -12.36569 -2.018053 -2.410285
Government 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instituional .0212344*** -.0695263*** 0.0117236 -.0323393** .0679656** .1090238***
S.E 3.652349 -6.076966 0.7191126 -3.269915 3.088064 4.378443
Indivdual -.0665957*** -.0881953*** .1616766*** -.1590741*** -.0682142* -.0943604*
S.E -7.147818 -4.955714 5.219976 -10.32704 -1.970367 -2.351061
Oil .0108796* -0.0096886 0.0213244 0.0028883 0.0005542 0.0055744
S.E 2.193418 -0.9688518 1.557853 0.3298742 0.0290359 0.22929
B Materials 0.0021969 0.0102467 -0.0106087 0.0114969 0.0239061 .0635447***
S.E 0.5049597 1.193719 -0.8613673 1.582633 1.434701 3.30139
Industrials 0.0067642 0.0048941 -0.0017954 .0137357* 0.0228266 .0729532***
S.E 1.777177 0.6411279 -0.164693 2.119762 1.568139 4.254777
C Goods 0.0009949 0.0120402 -0.0091271 0.0042648 0.0223856 .0501707**
S.E 0.2427654 1.478769 -0.7871566 0.6102378 1.425498 2.763114
Health .009038* 0.0060926 0.0091745 0.0029817 0.0061305 .0524273**
S.E 2.074788 0.6957748 0.7567667 0.4063536 0.3649803 2.707932
C Servicses 0.0013051 .0169576* -0.0145276 .0159948* 0.0249224 .0750105***
S.E 0.2984475 1.988748 -1.167101 2.20237 1.494217 3.916181
Telecom 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 168 168 168 168 168 168
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Table 5.41: Palestine SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
Profit -0.012 -0.128 0.067 -0.191 -0.539 -0.407 0.136 -0.022 0.101 -0.077 -0.343 0.21
0.454 0.109 0.404 0.07 <0.001 0.033 0.197 0.393 0.18 0.364 0.001 0.13
Size -0.027 -0.016 0.447 0.185 0.07 -0.256 -0.28 -0.158 0.238 -0.338 -0.035 0.248
0.43 0.462 <0.001 0.449 0.372 0.095 0.072 0.208 0.087 0.198 0.419 0.414
Growth 0.004 -0.058 -0.106 -0.041 -0.21 -0.05 0.22 -0.231 0.053 0.019 -0.112 -0.073
0.484 0.403 0.368 0.375 0.077 0.408 0.149 0.256 0.357 0.465 0.043 0.42
Tang -0.24 -0.403 -0.182 -0.265 -0.067 -0.017 -0.098 -0.577 0.057 -0.227 -0.018 -0.019
0.047 0.017 0.032 0.202 0.417 0.475 0.35 0.009 0.373 0.42 0.471 0.494
Tax 0.508 0.574 0.334 0.365 0.37 -0.21 0.537 0.327 0.448 0.621 0.191 0.387
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.003 0.006 0.232 0.032 0.028 0.012 0.006 0.06 0.02
Risk 0.165 0.124 0.057 -0.022 -0.055 0.064 0.129 0.046 0.052 0.12 0.07 0.055
0.148 0.079 0.373 0.392 0.432 0.242 0.195 0.23 0.303 0.38 0.342 0.414
Div -0.292 -0.258 -0.429 0.179 0.006 0.487 -0.231 -0.148 -0.013 -0.299 -0.22 -0.245
<0.001 0.032 <0.001 0.33 0.493 0.004 0.079 0.187 0.466 0.011 0.181 0.286
Liqud 0.01 -0.006 -0.183 0.042 0.182 -0.114 -0.011 -0.088 -0.171 0.026 -0.116 0.237
0.455 0.476 0.015 0.441 0.383 0.387 0.459 0.185 0.22 0.483 0.283 0.14
Cash Flow -0.048 -0.018 0.035 0.028 0.036 0.048 0.155 0.156 -0.118 -0.034 -0.005 -0.109
0.204 0.385 0.234 0.395 0.338 0.27 0.235 0.196 0.232 0.47 0.484 0.245
Ownership
Gov 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.462 0.16 0.288 0.5 0.5 0.5
indv -0.396 -0.397 -0.068 -0.266 0.478 -0.13
0.011 0.002 0.333 0.448 0.327 0.464
Inst -0.213 -0.135 -0.576 -0.304 -0.009 0.434
0.185 0.194 0.188 0.404 0.498 0.014
Industry
Oil 0 0.12 0.198 -0.014 0.113 0.02
0 0.088 0.072 0.485 0.484 0.472
Mater -0.003 0.007 0.002 0 -0.064 -0.022
0.478 0.407 0.477 0 0.488 0.485
Indust -0.097 0 -0.012 -0.029 0 0
0.16 0 0.454 0.441 0 0
Cgoods -0.106 0.011 0 -0.075 -0.026 -0.079
0.207 0.448 0 0.385 0.492 0.451
Health -0.223 -0.091 0.002 -0.044 0.143 -0.109
0.046 0.107 0.49 0.429 0.483 0.434
Cserv -0.116 -0.006 -0.032 0.029 0.145 0.104
0.199 0.469 0.38 0.468 0.471 0.475
Telec -0.096 -0.077 -0.087 -0.202 0.116 -0.082
0.212 0.133 0.151 0.368 0.472 0.453
Techno 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
N 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
R2 6 37 46 42 32 54 26 37 36 73 42 15
Model Fit
(APC) 0.167 P<0.001 0.175 P<0.001 0.139 P=1.000 0.139 P=1.000
(ARS) 0.297 P=1.000 0.428 P=0.134 0.386 P=1.000 0.433 P=1.000
(AARS) 0.26 P=1.000 0.399 P=0.370 0.319 P=1.000 0.371 P=1.000
(AVIF) 1.477 1.569 Inf Inf
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Table 5.42: Palestine ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Palestine Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 13.05% 10.40% 12.96% 3.56% 5.54% 19.08%
Size 4.02% 28.68% 15.43% 3.05% 6.54% 3.62%
Growth 17.21% 14.32% 11.99% 5.83% 6.69% 11.50%
Tangibility 10.72% 10.44% 11.74% 30.54% 36.47% 48.46%
Non-Debt Tax shield 6.46% 10.47% 11.74% 13.44% 33.92% 1.51%
Volatility 15.11% 12.75% 0.00% 36.58% 1.70% 0.00%
Dividends 9.15% 7.24% 11.74% 2.64% 0.47% 0.75%
Liquidity 14.92% 5.71% 12.65% 4.14% 8.60% 15.03%
Cash Flow 9.36% 0.00% 11.74% 0.22% 0.07% 0.06%
Good prediction % 72.79% 69.39% 93.88% 72.11% 73.47% 97.28%
S.D of abs errors 0.01 0.01 0.0600 0.0002 0.0345 0.0045
RMSE 0.01 0.01 0.0668 0.0002 0.0349 0.0046
MAE 0.01 0.01 0.02954 0.00009 0.00574 0.0008
N 184 184 184 184 184 184
Adding Dummies
Profitability 7.04% 3.09% 2.30% 3.72% 0.74% 2.57%
Size 6.36% 4.37% 12.38% 1.73% 0.36% 0.58%
Growth 10.83% 12.97% 14.27% 12.39% 4.16% 11.41%
Tangibility 0.59% 1.20% 21.58% 18.10% 24.60% 33.04%
Non-Debt Tax shield 4.80% 10.21% 4.02% 39.13% 27.24% 0.00%
Volatility 11.37% 15.10% 36.57% 0.88% 30.88% 33.29%
Dividends 9.86% 5.19% 2.01% 5.96% 1.18% 0.17%
Liquidity 7.44% 6.94% 5.30% 10.26% 7.60% 11.64%
Cash Flow 10.36% 11.99% 0.01% 3.23% 0.00% 0.03%
Ownership Dummies
Government 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Institutional 1.20% 1.75% 0.00% 3.88% 1.77% 6.79%
Individual 9.97% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Industry Dummies
Oil 9.96% 11.47% 0.65% 0.70% 1.49% 0.45%
Basic Materials 0.16% 2.62% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Consumer Goods 1.69% 2.76% 0.26% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02%
Consumer Services 2.47% 3.13% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Health Care 3.07% 3.65% 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
Industrials 0.16% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Technology 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Telecommunications 2.68% 3.54% 0.48% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Good prediction % 78.23% 80.27% 91.84% 72.11% 85.03% 95.92%
RMSE 0.0043 0.0051 0.0064 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018
MAE 0.0011 0.0015 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005
S.D of abs errors 0.0041 0.0049 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017
N 184 184 184 184 184 184
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in Qatar using Panel Data, SEM,
ANN ?
The eighth country in this chapter is Qatar. First, the table of the short term debt
panel data results is presented. The R2 is low and in the range of 22% across the
models. The Wald test is significant and therefore it can be concluded that there
is no heteroskedasticiy and robust errors should be provided. The table show that
the Hausman test is not significant and therefore it is safe to use the random effect
model. From the Table 5.43 the following conclusions could be drawn:
• Size is negative and significant with the short term debt in book value.
• Non-debt tax shield is negative and significant for the short term debt in mar-
ket and book debt.
• Dividends is significantly positive for both short term debt in book and market
value.
• Cash flow is significantly positive for short term debt in market value.
• The ownership structure show that the Institutional variable is negative and
significant for book value of short term debt.
• The industry classification show that oil sector is negative and significant for
book debt. The same apply to the health and consumer goods as well. Con-
sumer services is positive and significant for market debt except tobit.
The second Table 5.44 show the long term debt using panel data models. The
Wald test is significant for the fixed effect. The R2 is acceptable for the book debt
with 31% and lower for the market value with 22% only. The Lagrange test is not
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significant for the book and significant for the market debt. The following could be
concluded:
• Liquidity is negative and significant with the long term debt in book value.
• Risk is negative and significant with the long term debt in book value.
• Size is negative and significant with the long term debt in book value.
• Non-debt tax shield is negative and significant with long term debt in book
value and only for the tobit model in the market leverage.
• Dividends is significantly positive for long term debt in book values.
• The ownership structure show that the Institutional variable is negative and
significant for book value of short term debt. Government is only positive for
long term debt in book values using tobit.
• The industry classification show that oil sector is positive and significant for
market debt. Health and consumer goods are negative and significant using
book debt only. Health is also positive and significant for the market value.
The third tables which is Table 5.45 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in Qatar. The Wald test for the total debt for book value
is not significant. The Lagrange test is not significant and therefore the random
effect could be used. The Hausman test is not significant for total. The R2 is higher
than 33% for both the book and market value. From the Table 5.45 the following
conclusions could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the total debt market values.
• Risk is positively significant for the total debt in market values.
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• Size is positively significant for the total debt in market values.
• Tangibility is negatively significant for the total debt in book value.
• Non-debt tax shield is negatively significant for the total debt book tobit mode.
• Dividends is negatively significant in for the total debt for market values.
• Growth is negatively significant in for the total debt in book and market values
.
• Cash flow is negatively significant for total debt for market value.
• Ownership government is negatively significant for the total debt in market
values and vice versa for book values. Institutional variable is negatively sig-
nificant for total debt in market value.
• industry classification variable which is the oil, industry and consumer servic-
ses are positively significant using both market and book total debt.
The only interest from Table 5.46 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio. As
it shows that the dependent variable lagged variable is not significant for all models
and therefore we could not concluded that there is a target capital ratio.
Table 5.47 show the results for Qatar using the SEM-PLS approach. The model
fits at the bottom of the model shows that the model fit is acceptable without the
dummy variables but the average path coefficient is not significant. This could be
because the sample is small. Therefore, caution should be taken in interpreting
the results of the country. The R2 is good for all the models with or without the
dummies except for the long term debt in market value. As the table of the results
the following could be concluded:
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• Size attribute is significantly positive to total debt in both market and book
values. On the other hand, it is significantly negative to long term debt in
book values.
• Tangibility is significantly negative in relation to long term debt in market val-
ues.
• Non-debt tax shield is significantly negative in relation to short term debt in
market values.
• Dividends is negatively significant to the total debt in market values.
• Cash flow is negatively significant in relation long and total debt variables in
market values. Similarly it is also negatively significant to short term debt in
book values.
• Ownership variable government is positively significant with the short term
debt measure in book value. In contrast, individual variable is significantly
negative to the long term and total debt in book values. It is also negatively
significant to long term debt and short term debt in market value for institu-
tional.
• industry variables of consumer goods, health services, consumer services
and telecommunication all are significantly negative to total debt in book val-
ues. Only health is positively significant with the short term debt in book
values.
Table 5.48 show the important variables using the ANN approach by showing
variable impact factor in percentages. The good prediction is high with values of
higher than 56%. From this table we could understand the following:
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• Profitability variable is important for the total debt in book value and long term
debt in market value.
• Size is substantially important epically for the all the book leverage variables.
It is also important for the total debt in market leverage.
• Growth is important for the long term debt in book value.
• Tangibility variable is important for both the total debt in book value in addition
to long term debt in market leverage.
• Non-debt tax shield is important for the long term debt in book leverage. Sim-
ilarly it is important to long term and total debt in market leverage values.
• Dividends is significantly important for the short term debt in book value.
• Liquidity is only important for the total debt in book values.
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Table 5.43: Qatar Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
QATAR STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant .6227586*** .6435081*** .6227586*** .8310934*** 0.0971 0.0659 0.0971 .2275687*
S.E. 5.5758 5.4674 5.5758 6.2935 0.7948 0.5042 0.7948 2.0983
Profitability -0.0768 -0.0692 -0.0768 0.0692 -0.0567 -0.0697 -0.0567 -0.1475
S.E -1.0231 -0.8927 -1.0231 0.6301 -0.6902 -0.8095 -0.6902 -1.4821
Liquidty -0.0018 -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0067
S.E -1.4411 -1.6560 -1.4411 -1.7061 -1.6012 -1.5996 -1.6012 -1.7744
Risk -0.0695 -0.0648 -0.0695 -.1788595* 0.0962 0.0768 0.0962 0.1474
S.E -1.1797 -0.8715 -1.1797 -2.5424 1.4924 0.9286 1.4924 1.8904
Size -.0251797*** -.0263185*** -.0251797*** -.0342647*** -0.0087 -0.0066 -0.0087 -0.0077
S.E -4.7439 -4.3993 -4.7439 -5.5551 -1.5034 -0.9856 -1.5034 -1.1221
Tangibilty 0.0069 0.0034 0.0069 0.0261 -0.0356 -0.0290 -0.0356 -0.0011
S.E 0.1732 0.0830 0.1732 0.5480 -0.8179 -0.6418 -0.8179 -0.0211
Tax -.2946489** -.3003155** -.2946489*** -.3785265*** -.2784722** -.2653756** -.2784722** -.5649934***
S.E -3.3145 -3.3096 -3.3145 -3.7748 -2.8632 -2.6320 -2.8632 -3.7274
Dividends .7308897*** .7526384*** .7308897*** .7145871** .5109507* .4934613* .5109507* .7470434**
S.E 3.6907 3.7627 3.6907 3.0745 2.3582 2.2202 2.3582 2.7995
Growth -0.3715 -0.5542 -0.3715 -0.4578 -0.0466 -0.0972 -0.0466 -0.6620
S.E -0.6624 -0.9475 -0.6624 -0.7088 -0.0759 -0.1496 -0.0759 -0.7714
Cash Flow -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0011 .0071305*** .0070498*** .0071305*** .0082133***
S.E -0.8850 -0.7906 -0.8850 -0.4555 3.6432 3.5322 3.6432 3.5605
Government 0.0468 0.0492 0.0468 0.0606 0.0400 0.0345 0.0400 0.0351
S.E 1.5070 1.5344 1.5070 1.7207 1.1786 0.9686 1.1786 0.9331
Instituional -.074698** -.0726032* -.074698** -.1004425** 0.0515 0.0473 0.0515 0.0470
S.E -2.6979 -2.5458 -2.6979 -3.2130 1.7004 1.4940 1.7004 1.4007
Indivdual 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
Oil -.0947336** -.0952416** -.0947336** -.1315642** 0.0498 0.0484 0.0498 -0.0318
S.E -2.7325 -2.6891 -2.7325 -3.1397 1.3118 1.2290 1.3118 -0.7560
B Materials 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
Industrials -0.0342 -0.0345 -0.0342 -0.0474 0.0500 0.0505 0.0500 -0.0270
S.E -1.1285 -1.1183 -1.1285 -1.2966 1.5086 1.4740 1.5086 -0.7091
C Goods -.137058*** -.1375102*** -.137058*** -.1625499*** -0.0101 -0.0089 -0.0101 -.0988176*
S.E -4.2590 -4.2229 -4.2590 -4.3201 -0.2876 -0.2464 -0.2876 -2.1013
Health -.1291618** -.1315597** -.1291618** -.1731612** 0.0760 0.0796 0.0760 0.0000
S.E -2.8504 -2.8546 -2.8504 -3.2398 1.5335 1.5541 1.5335 0.0000
C Servicses -0.0070 -0.0060 -0.0070 0.0095 .1861318*** .1817672*** .1861318*** 0.1012
S.E -0.1644 -0.1389 -0.1644 0.1959 4.0078 3.7893 4.0078 1.7156
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0882
S.E . . . . . . . -1.6008
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
R2 39% 41% 23% 22%
N 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 136
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 395.16 Prob2 0 chi2 (8) 644.75 Prob2 0
Hausman chi2(15) 3.87 Prob2 0.9981 chi2(15) 0.84 Prob2 1
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Table 5.44: Qatar Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
QATAR LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant .7865709*** .9019512*** .7865709*** 1.036153*** 0.1411 0.1960 0.1411 0.1860
S.E. 4.8983 5.3981 4.8983 5.1870 0.9917 1.3133 0.9917 1.0403
Profitability -0.0829 -0.0166 -0.0829 0.0692 -0.0694 -0.0413 -0.0694 -0.1392
S.E -0.7688 -0.1508 -0.7688 0.6301 -0.7257 -0.4206 -0.7257 -1.1738
Liquidty -.0054859** -.0055972** -.0054859** -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0033
S.E -3.0877 -3.1313 -3.0877 -1.7061 -1.0781 -0.9012 -1.0781 -1.4120
Risk -.2225963** -0.0846 -.2225963** -.1788595* -0.0736 -0.0374 -0.0736 -0.1436
S.E -2.6267 -0.8014 -2.6267 -2.5424 -0.9798 -0.3970 -0.9798 -1.4960
Size -.0276055*** -.0371209*** -.0276055*** -.0342647*** -0.0057 -0.0094 -0.0057 -0.0080
S.E -3.6174 -4.3709 -3.6174 -5.5551 -0.8452 -1.2409 -0.8452 -0.9462
Tangibilty 0.0335 0.0279 0.0335 0.0261 0.0217 0.0275 0.0217 0.0780
S.E 0.5859 0.4837 0.5859 0.5480 0.4280 0.5339 0.4280 1.2222
Tax -.3614717** -.4120981** -.3614717** -.3785265*** -0.1579 -0.1869 -0.1579 -.548781**
S.E -2.8282 -3.1991 -2.8282 -3.7748 -1.3944 -1.6243 -1.3944 -2.8069
Dividends -0.1026 -0.0883 -0.1026 .7145871** 0.3104 0.3125 0.3104 0.4343
S.E -0.3605 -0.3109 -0.3605 3.0745 1.2304 1.2323 1.2304 1.3739
Growth -1.4697 -1.2138 -1.4697 -0.4578 0.0185 0.2640 0.0185 -0.5522
S.E -1.8228 -1.4618 -1.8228 -0.7088 0.0259 0.3560 0.0259 -0.5262
Cash Flow -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0032 0.0016 0.0014 0.0016 0.0036
S.E -1.7363 -1.7297 -1.7363 -0.9464 0.7008 0.6348 0.7008 1.3057
Government 0.0649 0.0865 0.0649 .1089214* -0.0022 0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0460
S.E 1.4544 1.9013 1.4544 2.0153 -0.0564 0.0615 -0.0564 -0.9536
Instituional -.0905157* -0.0738 -.0905157* -.0956451* 0.0207 0.0235 0.0207 0.0020
S.E -2.2738 -1.8222 -2.2738 -2.0151 0.5864 0.6490 0.5864 0.0464
Indivdual 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Oil -0.0314 -0.0216 -0.0314 -0.0533 .1021902* .1001014* .1021902* .1469746**
S.E -0.6294 -0.4293 -0.6294 -0.8408 2.3136 2.2290 2.3136 2.6719
B Materials 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Industrials 0.0105 0.0118 0.0105 0.0391 0.0702 0.0649 0.0702 .1037274*
S.E 0.2420 0.2702 0.2420 0.7121 1.8186 1.6603 1.8186 2.1035
C Goods -.0953933* -.0956018* -.0953933* -0.0967 0.0173 0.0135 0.0173 0.0037
S.E -2.0618 -2.0681 -2.0618 -1.6766 0.4223 0.3264 0.4223 0.0679
Health -.1684915* -.1888617** -.1684915** -.1814066* .1209444* 0.1054 .1209444* 0.1272
S.E -2.5863 -2.8866 -2.5863 -2.2699 2.0950 1.8045 2.0950 1.7694
C Servicses 0.0268 0.0454 0.0268 0.0933 0.0573 0.0603 0.0573 0.1205
S.E 0.4392 0.7401 0.4392 1.2421 1.0596 1.1018 1.0596 1.7722
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 31% 33% 22% 23%
N 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chi2 (8) 17.25 Prob2 0.0277
Wald chi2 (8) 88.84 Prob2 0 chi2 (8) 20.54 Prob2 0.0085
Hausman chi2(15) 6.1 Prob2 0.9781 chi2(15) 8.44 Prob2 0.905
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Table 5.45: Qatar Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
QATAR TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -0.0113 0.0147 -0.0113 0.0272 -.445201** -.3630681* -.445201** -.4168535*
S.E. -0.0829 0.1010 -0.0829 0.1915 -2.7842 -2.1922 -2.7842 -2.5033
Profitability -0.0493 -0.0265 -0.0493 -0.0405 -.3096174** -.2500148* -.3096174** -.3714998**
S.E -0.5397 -0.2767 -0.5397 -0.4282 -2.8824 -2.2920 -2.8824 -3.3186
Liquidty -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007
S.E -0.6014 -0.7030 -0.6014 -0.7597 -0.1178 -0.1344 -0.1178 -0.3624
Risk 0.0383 0.1046 0.0383 0.0222 .2046476* .358497*** .2046476* .2520846**
S.E 0.5334 1.1397 0.5334 0.2942 2.4252 3.4250 2.4252 2.8371
Size 0.0030 -0.0001 0.0030 0.0009 .0448059*** .036532*** .0448059*** .0429091***
S.E 0.4577 -0.0143 0.4577 0.1415 5.8963 4.3397 5.8963 5.4236
Tangibilty -.1395696** -.1446753** -.1395696** -.1433659** -0.0848 -0.0922 -0.0848 -0.0830
S.E -2.8854 -2.8852 -2.8854 -2.8089 -1.4911 -1.6129 -1.4911 -1.4237
Tax -0.1731 -0.1799 -0.1731 -.4502713** 0.0443 0.0114 0.0443 0.1403
S.E -1.6002 -1.6064 -1.6002 -2.7767 0.3481 0.0891 0.3481 0.9971
Dividends -0.2772 -0.2799 -0.2772 -0.2923 -2.005741*** -2.013795*** -2.005741*** -2.07424***
S.E -1.1502 -1.1337 -1.1502 -1.1690 -7.0745 -7.1548 -7.0745 -7.0336
Growth -1.6942* -1.745957* -1.6942* -2.31124** 2.691039** 2.922199*** 2.691039*** 2.91399***
S.E -2.4820 -2.4184 -2.4820 -2.9739 3.3517 3.5503 3.3517 3.5362
Cash Flow -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0005 -.0108597*** -.0106982*** -.0108597*** -.0222209***
S.E -0.5718 -0.5852 -0.5718 -0.1972 -3.4003 -3.4279 -3.4003 -3.8674
Government .1113705** .1208816** .1113705** .1158909** -.2519908*** -.23001*** -.2519908*** -.2592865***
S.E 2.9492 3.0558 2.9492 2.9912 -5.6731 -5.1001 -5.6731 -5.6934
Instituional 0.0508 0.0590 0.0508 0.0549 -.2813005*** -.2633428*** -.2813005*** -.293538***
S.E 1.5067 1.6774 1.5067 1.5796 -7.0965 -6.5622 -7.0965 -7.2003
Indivdual 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Oil .1703912*** .1786021*** .1703912*** .1834012*** .1179938* .1336984** .1179938* .126785*
S.E 4.0380 4.0857 4.0380 4.1766 2.3773 2.6827 2.3773 2.4943
B Materials 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Industrials .1258107*** .1308329*** .1258107*** .136375*** .1067132* .1134677** .1067132* .1132252*
S.E 3.4137 3.4393 3.4137 3.5317 2.4617 2.6163 2.4617 2.5460
C Goods 0.0700 0.0738 0.0700 0.0770 -0.0271 -0.0225 -0.0271 -0.0574
S.E 1.7874 1.8368 1.7874 1.8749 -0.5882 -0.4914 -0.5882 -1.2022
Health 0.0757 0.0745 0.0757 0.0833 0.0298 0.0187 0.0298 -0.0012
S.E 1.3726 1.3095 1.3726 1.4384 0.4601 0.2876 0.4601 -0.0174
C Services .1287659* .1375874* .1287659* .1594643** -.1391814* -0.1188 -.1391814* -.2383663**
S.E 2.4923 2.5822 2.4923 2.9665 -2.2903 -1.9564 -2.2903 -3.2771
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 32% 33% 0% 65% 67% 0%
N 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 136
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 8.33 Prob2 0.402 chi2 (8) 11.37 Prob2 0.1817
Hausman chi2(15) 1.47 Prob2 1 chi2(15) 6.59 Prob2 0.9681
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Table 5.46: Qatar Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
QATAR
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged -0.1640631 -0.0822833 -.2107067* -0.1752207 -0.1728459 -0.1003153
S.E. -1.867701 -0.9026862 -2.475583 -1.782622 -1.811562 -1.176557
Constant .5679572*** 0.143 .7715937*** .3407986** 0.0967571 -0.2767118
S.E. 5.314661 1.296 5.700 2.852493 0.8302613 -1.593055
Profitability -0.035 -0.088 -0.096 -0.1053429 -0.1390226 -.2683717*
S.E -0.372 -0.895 -0.806 -1.003886 -1.329183 -2.124926
Liquidity -0.002 -0.002 -.0058016** -0.0019512 -0.0016342 -0.0004169
S.E -1.704 -1.572 -3.219 -1.211484 -1.017356 -0.218987
Risk -0.056 0.100 -0.021 0.0246053 0.1763542 .3347691**
S.E -0.628 1.059 -0.184 0.2455779 1.813516 2.795972
Size -.0294534*** -0.006 -.0419134*** -0.0133486 -0.0007299 .0349525***
S.E -4.280 -0.893 -4.803 -1.705966 -0.0968899 3.476685
Tangibility -0.005 -0.039 0.053 0.0168842 -.1492582** -0.0822066
S.E -0.098 -0.798 0.902 0.3250029 -2.936132 -1.319953
Tax -.3147911** -.2702367* -.4901597*** -.2298531* -0.1705611 0.0537458
S.E -3.087 -2.529 -3.765 -1.995641 -1.504178 0.3876086
Dividends 1.049646*** .516417* 0.171 0.4049771 -0.3427194 -2.093451***
S.E 4.049 2.057 0.537 1.499222 -1.250486 -6.182336
Growth -0.418 -0.077 -1.107 0.2193974 -1.325129 3.081435***
S.E -0.600 -0.107 -1.273 0.2851143 -1.623922 3.325225
Cash Flow -0.0017457 .006734** -0.0043558 0.0003626 -0.0004708 -.0113225***
S.E -0.7943649 3.233865 -1.565276 0.1540537 -0.1972237 -3.657408
Government 0.0475577 0.0351014 0.0890055 0.0310146 .1285786** -.2307765***
S.E 1.322788 0.9331175 1.948992 0.7295597 3.251494 -4.736966
Instituional -.0666204* 0.0469663 -0.0598848 0.0400886 .0718314* -.2696632***
S.E -2.055591 1.40066 -1.462997 1.100784 2.033947 -6.167828
Indivdual 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oil 0.0320109 -0.0317714 .1883693*** 0.0112524 .1201176** 0.0984345
S.E 0.7988024 -0.7559792 3.711523 0.2453023 2.71908 1.780108
B Materials 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
Industrials .092294* -0.0270382 .2180175*** -0.0124659 0.0691924 0.0838234
S.E 2.545496 -0.7091208 4.736168 -0.2816671 1.719773 1.677238
C Goods -0.0024143 -.0988176* 0.0506662 -.1304884** -0.057407 -0.0620586
S.E -0.0536683 -2.101299 0.8901872 -2.596799 -1.162085 -1.01106
Health 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Servicses .116186* 0.1012442 .2595423*** -0.0214405 0.0552626 -0.1492121
S.E 2.060716 1.715556 3.637735 -0.3349035 0.8747291 -1.955645
Telecom .1306435* -0.0881862 .1916969** -0.0950513 -0.0906913 -0.0167814
S.E 2.511561 -1.600788 2.907037 -1.602441 -1.590057 -0.235589
Technology 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 136 136 136 136 136 136
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Table 5.47: Qatar SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
Profit 0.163 0.062 -0.194 0.036 0.136 0.045 0.19 0.14 -0.126 -0.12 -0.032 -0.167
0.019 0.22 0.007 0.328 0.043 0.289 0.008 0.038 0.057 0.066 0.345 0.017
Size -0.151 -0.24 0.425 -0.143 -0.333 0.365 -0.074 -0.13 0.274 -0.041 -0.29 0.277
0.028 0.001 <0.001 0.035 <0.001 <0.001 0.177 0.05 <0.001 0.307 <0.001 <0.001
Growth -0.025 -0.035 -0.01 0.095 0.19 -0.131 0.049 0.008 -0.007 0.007 -0.146 0.101
0.378 0.333 0.451 0.116 0.008 0.05 0.269 0.459 0.466 0.468 0.033 0.103
Tang 0.104 -0.357 0.014 -0.052 -0.139 -0.2 0.037 -0.315 -0.003 0.059 -0.208 -0.033
0.096 <0.001 0.433 0.261 0.039 0.005 0.323 <0.001 0.486 0.233 0.004 0.343
Tax -0.263 0.018 -0.074 -0.057 0.134 0.065 -0.251 -0.005 -0.063 -0.302 0.121 -0.111
<0.001 0.414 0.177 0.238 0.046 0.207 <0.001 0.476 0.217 <0.001 0.064 0.081
Risk -0.049 -0.207 0.057 -0.086 -0.016 0.13 -0.007 -0.222 0.007 0.005 -0.114 0.132
0.271 0.004 0.239 0.141 0.421 0.05 0.464 0.002 0.467 0.476 0.076 0.048
Div -0.017 0.059 -0.355 0.05 -0.029 0.157 -0.072 0.069 -0.325 -0.069 -0.175 -0.341
0.417 0.231 <0.001 0.268 0.358 0.024 0.183 0.194 <0.001 0.194 0.013 <0.001
Liqud -0.096 -0.087 -0.021 0.123 -0.062 0.067 -0.156 -0.104 0.038 -0.062 -0.012 -0.198
0.115 0.139 0.399 0.061 0.219 0.203 0.024 0.095 0.318 0.218 0.442 0.006
Cash Flow 0.163 -0.362 -0.347 -0.46 -0.192 0.094 0.172 -0.351 -0.384 -0.283 0 -0.074
0.02 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.007 0.121 0.015 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.5 0.178
Ownership
Gov -0.075 -0.169 -0.042 0.247 -0.006 -0.104
0.173 0.016 0.3 <0.001 0.472 0.097
indv -0.011 -0.033 0.171 0.094 -0.259 0.338
0.448 0.339 0.015 0.12 <0.001 <0.001
Inst 0.2 0.234 -0.025 0.25 -0.416 -0.187
0.005 0.001 0.377 <0.001 <0.001 0.009
Industry
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
Mater 0 0 0 0.177 0.01 -0.128
0 0 0 0.012 0.453 0.053
Indust 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
Cgoods 0 0 0 0.086 -0.036 -0.285
0 0 0 0.141 0.326 <0.001
Health 0 0 0 0.248 -0.094 -0.297
0 0 0 <0.001 0.119 <0.001
Cserv 0 0 0 0.136 -0.066 -0.267
0 0 0 0.043 0.205 <0.001
Telec 0 0 0 -0.023 0.194 -0.414
0 0 0 0.389 0.007 <0.001
Techno 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
N 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
R2 34 13 27 16 36 55 24 43 56 25 61 41
Model Fit
(APC) 0.140, P=0.019 0.140, P=0.019 0.116, P=0.036 =
(ARS) 0.301, P<0.001 0.301, P<0.001 0.411, P<0.001 =
(AARS) 0.257, P<0.001 0.257, P<0.001 0.356, P<0.001 =
(AVIF) 1.272 1.272 1.89 Inf
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Table 5.48: Qatar ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Qatar Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 10.09% 6.05% 21.12% 9.90% 19.64% 8.43%
Size 43.97% 47.31% 26.20% 10.56% 0.03% 18.31%
Growth 0.01% 0.20% 0.32% 11.24% 17.25% 13.51%
Tangibility 0.13% 0.06% 19.83% 12.52% 24.65% 11.98%
Non-Debt Tax shield 2.66% 17.95% 4.15% 9.27% 14.81% 15.87%
Volatility 10.81% 6.48% 0.10% 12.88% 3.77% 7.41%
Dividends 30.50% 5.90% 0.20% 13.13% 9.36% 13.09%
Liquidity 0.54% 10.79% 15.68% 9.30% 7.79% 2.37%
Cash Flow 1.30% 5.26% 12.41% 11.21% 2.70% 9.03%
Good prediction % 62.30% 56.56% 62.30% 100.00% 63.11% 86.07%
S.D of abs errors 0.09 0.11 0.0540 0.0308 0.0705 0.1140
RMSE 0.11 0.14 0.0796 0.0444 0.0821 0.1379
MAE 0.07 0.08 0.05850 0.03197 0.04214 0.0776
N 152 152 152 152 152 152
Adding Dummies
Profitability 19.92% 0.47% 13.09% 5.84% 4.86% 18.36%
Size 30.39% 34.49% 24.57% 7.17% 15.46% 43.69%
Growth 0.04% 0.05% 0.01% 7.83% 25.98% 7.93%
Tangibility 0.00% 0.01% 0.75% 7.06% 18.74% 6.73%
Non-Debt Tax shield 1.11% 6.38% 1.13% 0.00% 1.60% 0.72%
Volatility 17.30% 7.84% 13.29% 0.01% 5.73% 3.85%
Dividends 0.18% 25.83% 0.21% 7.84% 1.08% 0.12%
Liquidity 18.67% 0.03% 0.11% 5.55% 15.82% 3.81%
Cash Flow 0.02% 0.28% 0.29% 7.85% 1.84% 0.05%
Ownership Dummies
Government 0.00% 0.13% 20.49% 5.65% 0.25% 0.00%
Institutional 10.78% 1.37% 0.02% 5.66% 4.18% 14.01%
Individual 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Industry Dummies
Oil 0.06% 1.27% 0.16% 5.65% 0.11% 0.01%
Basic Materials 0.06% 1.27% 0.16% 5.65% 0.11% 0.01%
Consumer Goods 0.01% 10.08% 20.77% 5.65% 2.34% 0.23%
Consumer Services 0.00% 0.07% 0.18% 5.65% 0.12% 0.00%
Health Care 1.43% 10.36% 0.09% 5.65% 0.17% 0.01%
Industrials 0.01% 0.05% 4.59% 5.65% 0.00% 0.00%
Technology 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Telecommunications 0.00% 0.02% 0.09% 5.65% 1.62% 0.48%
Good prediction % 72.95% 54.10% 63.11% 71.31% 59.84% 86.89%
RMSE 0.0207 0.0557 0.0743 0.0001 0.0289 0.0095
MAE 0.0062 0.0293 0.0434 0.0000 0.0142 0.0039
S.D of abs errors 0.0198 0.0474 0.0603 0.0001 0.0251 0.0086
N 152 152 152 152 152 152
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in Saudi Arabia using Panel
Data, SEM, ANN ?
The ninth country in this chapter is Saudi Arabia which is one of the largest coun-
tries in the sample of the MENA countries. First, the table of the short term debt
panel data results is presented. The R2 is low and in the range of 14% across the
models of book debt and In the range of 25% in the market debt. The Wald test is
not significant and therefore it can be concluded that there is no heteroskedasticiy.
The table show that the Hausman test is not significant and therefore it is safe to
use the random effect model. From the Table 5.49 the following conclusions could
be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant with the short term debt in market value.
• Liquidity is negatively significant with the short term debt in book.
• Size is negatively significant with the short term debt in book using tobit model
• Tangibility is positive and significant for the short term debt in market value.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the short term debt in market
value and vice versa for the book values.
• Growth is positive and significant in the short term debt of book value.
• Cash flow is significantly positive for short term debt in book value using tobit.
• The ownership structure show that the government variable is positive and
significant for both book value of short term debt. On the other hand, individ-
ual variable also significantly positive for all the models. The institutional is
positive for the book value and negative for the market value and significant.
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• The industry classification show that only the oil sector is negative and signif-
icant for both and the same apply for the consumer services. Basic materials
is positive and significant for the book value only. Consumer goods is positive
for the market value short term debt and the industrials is positive with book
value using only tobit model.
The second Table 5.50 show the long term debt using panel data models. The
Wald test is not significant for the fixed effect. The R2 is acceptable for the book
debt with 13% and higher for the market value with 21% only. The Lagrange test is
not significant and the following could be concluded:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the long term debt in book values.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the long term debt in market values.
• Risk is positive using the fixed effect for book and negative for market using
tobit.
• Size is negatively significant for the long term debt in book values using the
tobit model.
• Tangibility is negatively significant in for the long term debt in book values
except using the tobit model and vice versa for the market debt.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the long term debt in market
values and vice versa for the book values.
• Dividends is positively significant for the long term debt in market values.
• Cash is positive and significant in for the long term debt in book.
• Ownership individual is negatively significant for the long term debt in book
values and positive for the market values. Institutional variable is significant
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and negative for the long term debt in book value. Government is negative
with both measures.
• industry classification variable oil is negative with both measures. Basic ma-
terials, industrials, consumer goods, health, consumer services telecom are
all significant for book values.
The third tables which is Table 5.51 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in Saudi Arabia. The Wald test is not significant. The
Lagrange test is not significant and therefore the random effect could be used. The
Hausman test is not significant as well. The R2 is higher than 25% for the market
value and below 10% for book. From the Table 5.51 the following conclusions could
be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market val-
ues.
• Liquidity is positive and significant for the total debt in book and negative for
market values.
• Size is positively significant for the total debt in book and market values.
• Non-debt tax shield is positive and significant for the total debt book.
• Dividends is negatively significant in for the total debt in market values and
vice versa for the book value.
• Growth is positive and significant in for the total debt in market values.
• Cash flow is negatively significant for total debt for book value and market
value.
• Ownership government, Institutional and individual positive with TDBVA.
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• industry classification variable which are consumer goods, health and con-
sumer services are negative with TDMVE and health is positively significant
with TDBVA.
The only interest from Table 5.52 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio. As
it shows that the dependent variable lagged variable is positively significant for the
long term debt of book and market value. It is also positive and significant for the
STDBVA. Which, indicate that firms in this Jordan might adjust their capital structure
for both the long term debt.
Table 5.53 show the results for Saudi Arabia using the SEM-PLS approach. The
model fits at the bottom of the model shows that the model fit is good with or without
the dummy variables. However, the use of dummies increase the average variable
inflation factor to infinity and therefore the results of the ownership and industry are
handled with caution. The R2 is good for all the models with or without the dummies
except for the 3 market leverage measures.As the table of the results the following
could be concluded:
• Profitability is negatively significant to both the short term and total debt in
market values.
• Size attribute is significantly positive to total debt in both market and book
values as well as the short term debt in book value. On the other hand, it is
significantly negative to long term debt in book values.
• Growth is significantly positive with short and long term debt market leverage.
• Tangibility is significantly negative in relation to short term debt in market val-
ues.
• Non-debt tax shield is significantly positive to short term and long term debt
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in market value as well as total debt in book values. It is also significant
negatively in relation to long term debt in book values.
• Risk is negatively significant to the long term debt in market value.
• Dividends variable is negatively significant to the long term debt in market
value.
• Cash flow is negatively significant to the long term debt in book value.
• Ownership variable individual variable is significantly positive to the short term
debt in book and market leverage. It is also negatively significant to long term
debt and total debt in book values.
• industry variables of oil, consumer services and telecommunication are all
negatively significant to total debt in market values. On the other hand, Health
is significantly positive to the long term and total debt in market value. Fur-
thermore, consumer services is negatively significant to the total debt in book
values. In addition, technology is negatively significant in relation to the total
debt in market values.
As Table 5.54 shows the importance of the variables using the ANN approach.
The good prediction is high with values higher than 37%. For all dependent vari-
ables of leverage. From this table we could draw the following conclusions:
• Profitability is important for the long term debt book leverage as well as the
total debt market leverage.
• Size variable is significantly important for both the short term debt and long
term debt in book values. Similarly, it is important for both the long term and
total debt in market values.
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• Non-debt tax shield is interestingly largely important for both the short term
and long term debt market leverage. Likewise, it is important for the total debt
in book values.
• Liquidity variable is important for the total debt in both market and book val-
ues.
• Industry classification where a firm is in the basic materials is slightly impor-
tant in comparison to firms in other industries for short term debt in book
values.
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Table 5.49: Saudi Arabia Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
SAUDI ARABIA STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant 0.0296 0.0302 0.0296 0.0137 0.0517 0.0538 0.0517 0.1437
S.E. 0.3467 0.3522 0.3467 0.1114 0.6029 0.6261 0.6029 1.6177
Profitability -0.1120 -0.0913 -0.1120 -0.1087 -.2329719** -.2105855** -.2329719** -.287447**
S.E -1.4725 -1.1708 -1.4725 -1.0231 -3.0516 -2.6986 -3.0516 -2.9506
Liquidty -.0025746* -0.0026 -.0025746* -0.0035 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0027
S.E -1.9666 -1.9501 -1.9666 -1.9196 -1.4901 -1.4348 -1.4901 -1.4967
Risk -0.0172 0.0038 -0.0172 -0.0081 -0.0429 -0.0236 -0.0429 -0.0170
S.E -0.7111 0.1338 -0.7111 -0.2363 -1.7671 -0.8217 -1.7671 -0.5508
Size -0.0056 -0.0060 -0.0056 -.0113374* -0.0020 -0.0024 -0.0020 0.0023
S.E -1.6389 -1.7274 -1.6389 -2.3422 -0.5902 -0.7027 -0.5902 0.4949
Tangibilty 0.0124 0.0094 0.0124 0.0423 .090135*** .0866345*** .090135*** .1988267***
S.E 0.5150 0.3867 0.5150 1.2770 3.7347 3.5780 3.7347 6.2902
Tax -.1175928** -.1168712** -.1175928** -.2317151*** .468759*** .4684498*** .468759*** .5223258***
S.E -2.7282 -2.7036 -2.7282 -3.4163 10.8328 10.8287 10.8328 9.8774
Dividends 0.1680 0.1543 0.1680 0.0482 -0.0882 -0.1045 -0.0882 -0.1188
S.E 1.4830 1.3473 1.4830 0.3047 -0.7753 -0.9116 -0.7753 -0.8188
Growth 1.371947* 1.376031* 1.371947* 1.80622* -0.1633 -0.2204 -0.1633 -0.1998
S.E 2.1701 2.1372 2.1701 2.0598 -0.2574 -0.3420 -0.2574 -0.2430
Cash Flow 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 .0021167* -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003
S.E 1.7808 1.7281 1.7808 2.0182 -0.2446 -0.2857 -0.2446 0.3024
Government .0738035*** .0726785*** .0738035*** .0819968** -0.0134 -0.0144 -0.0134 -0.0166
S.E 4.0423 3.9660 4.0423 3.2188 -0.7320 -0.7854 -0.7320 -0.9036
Instituional .0625291*** .0613197*** .0625291*** .081453*** -.041325** -.0423368** -.041325** -.0435582**
S.E 4.1492 4.0522 4.1492 3.9273 -2.7314 -2.7957 -2.7314 -2.8496
Indivdual .0413999** .0401507** .0413999** .068415*** .0466233*** .0454296*** .0466233*** .0435004**
S.E 3.0851 2.9784 3.0851 3.6838 3.4606 3.3675 3.4606 3.1923
Oil -.1166799** -.1148066** -.1166799** -.2300102*** -.1040208** -.1022866** -.1040208** -.0994864**
S.E -3.0259 -2.9686 -3.0259 -3.7741 -2.6870 -2.6429 -2.6870 -2.5783
B Materials .1822771** .1806179** .1822771** .2651853** 0.0712 0.0696 0.0712 0.0663
S.E 3.2264 3.1881 3.2264 3.2096 1.2560 1.2282 1.2560 1.1722
Industrials 0.1058 0.1040 0.1058 .1641837* 0.0752 0.0735 0.0752 0.0719
S.E 1.8925 1.8548 1.8925 2.0006 1.3396 1.3090 1.3396 1.2837
C Goods 0.0830 0.0827 0.0830 0.1041 .113912* .113427* .113912* .1119692*
S.E 1.4915 1.4812 1.4915 1.2719 2.0383 2.0309 2.0383 2.0101
Health 0.1013 0.0968 0.1013 0.0984 0.0470 0.0431 0.0470 0.0339
S.E 1.6642 1.5825 1.6642 1.0998 0.7700 0.7039 0.7700 0.5542
C Servicses .208848*** .2077557*** .208848*** .2938242*** .1237734* .1228278* .1237734* .1224905*
S.E 3.6836 3.6542 3.6836 3.5390 2.1745 2.1588 2.1745 2.1624
Telecom 0.0857 0.0855 0.0857 .1737148* 0.0688 0.0685 0.0688 0.0614
S.E 1.4159 1.4089 1.4159 1.9830 1.1322 1.1285 1.1322 1.0143
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
R2 14% 14% 25% 24%
N 856 856 856 856 856 856 856 840
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 5.29 Prob2 0.7258 chi2 (8) 13.13 Prob2 0.1075
Hausman chi2(18) 2.16 Prob2 1 chi2(18) 1.07 Prob2 1
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Table 5.50: Saudi Arabia Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
SAUDI ARABIA LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant 0.0618 0.0681 0.0618 -1.6422 0.0462 0.0457 0.0462 -0.0205
S.E. 0.5438 0.5989 0.5438 . 0.4944 0.4886 0.4944 -0.1464
Profitability -.3398868*** -.2745225** -.3398868*** -0.1087 -.2761549*** -.2605234** -.2761549*** -.3072501*
S.E -3.3561 -2.6579 -3.3561 -1.0231 -3.3192 -3.0635 -3.3192 -2.5415
Liquidty -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0035 -.0053937*** -.0053798*** -.0053937*** -.0148311***
S.E -1.6434 -1.6672 -1.6434 -1.9196 -3.7656 -3.7463 -3.7656 -3.8204
Risk 0.0464 .1104643** 0.0464 -0.0081 -0.0497 -0.0346 -0.0497 -.0874437*
S.E 1.4408 2.9047 1.4408 -0.2363 -1.8816 -1.1049 -1.8816 -2.1041
Size -0.0037 -0.0050 -0.0037 -.0113374* -0.0026 -0.0028 -0.0026 0.0008
S.E -0.8073 -1.0919 -0.8073 -2.3422 -0.6952 -0.7428 -0.6952 0.1259
Tangibilty -.0985238** -.1063023*** -.0985238** 0.0423 .0900008*** .0877348*** .0900008*** .2285818***
S.E -3.0773 -3.3170 -3.0773 1.2770 3.4218 3.3250 3.4218 5.9632
Tax -.1425411* -.1387761* -.1425411* -.2317151*** .4781645*** .4785468*** .4781645*** .5808576***
S.E -2.4832 -2.4237 -2.4832 -3.4163 10.1397 10.1510 10.1397 9.1935
Dividends 0.1170 0.0728 0.1170 0.0482 .3549984** .3482748** .3549984** .4060642*
S.E 0.7753 0.4796 0.7753 0.3047 2.8638 2.7887 2.8638 2.3438
Growth 0.5146 0.6217 0.5146 1.80622* 0.4658 0.4741 0.4658 0.5873
S.E 0.6112 0.7290 0.6112 2.0598 0.6734 0.6752 0.6734 0.5688
Cash Flow .0022687* .0022214* .0022687* 0.0028 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0006
S.E 2.1891 2.1435 2.1891 1.9125 -0.5574 -0.6021 -0.5574 0.5570
Government -.0704739** -.0733823** -.0704739** -0.1168 -.0435207* -.0446044* -.0435207* -.06102*
S.E -2.8983 -3.0232 -2.8983 . -2.1787 -2.2319 -2.1787 -1.9969
Instituional -.0797029*** -.0834748*** -.0797029*** -0.0603 -0.0212 -0.0221 -0.0212 -0.0027
S.E -3.9712 -4.1647 -3.9712 . -1.2833 -1.3406 -1.2833 -0.1141
Indivdual -.0774201*** -.0812668*** -.0774201*** -0.0723 .0347894* .0338431* .0347894* .0799323***
S.E -4.3319 -4.5513 -4.3319 . 2.3695 2.3020 2.3695 3.7509
Oil -.1320147* -.1259775* -.1320147* -0.3666 -.1784248*** -.1769281*** -.1784248*** -1.5260
S.E -2.5707 -2.4593 -2.5707 . -4.2293 -4.1949 -4.2293 .
B Materials .1917839* .1854209* .1917839* 1.8017 .1693234** .1676155** .1693234** 0.1369
S.E 2.5490 2.4709 2.5490 . 2.7394 2.7129 2.7394 1.6657
Industrials .2203357** .2135513** .2203357** 1.8275 0.0704 0.0685 0.0704 -0.0205
S.E 2.9582 2.8746 2.9582 . 1.1500 1.1198 1.1500 -0.2517
C Goods .1898608* .187504* .1898608* 1.7715 0.1034 0.1028 0.1034 -0.0080
S.E 2.5610 2.5365 2.5610 . 1.6978 1.6887 1.6978 -0.0987
Health .1914672* .1755283* .1914672* 1.6832 0.0677 0.0639 0.0677 -0.0844
S.E 2.3622 2.1674 2.3622 . 1.0161 0.9581 1.0161 -0.9181
C Servicses .3222954*** .3173705*** .3222954*** 1.9704 0.1205 0.1192 0.1205 0.0626
S.E 4.2684 4.2144 4.2684 . 1.9422 1.9220 1.9422 0.7588
Telecom .2079983* .2067188* .2079983** 1.8120 0.0761 0.0753 0.0761 0.0231
S.E 2.5810 2.5729 2.5810 . 1.1488 1.1387 1.1488 0.2594
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 13% 14% 21% 21%
N 856 856 856 856 856 856 856 856
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 4.96 Prob2 0.7615 chi2 (8) 13.22 Prob2 0.1045
Hausman chi2(18) 8.37 Prob2 0.9726 chi2(18) -1.38 chi2<0
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Table 5.51: Saudi Arabia Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
SAUDI ARABIA TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant 0.0218 0.0211 0.0218 -0.0315 -.6166219*** -.6100525*** -.6166219*** -.7829687***
S.E. 0.2349 0.2262 0.2349 -0.2974 -8.7265 -8.7377 -8.7265 -9.7094
Profitability -.2602362** -.2556194** -.2602362** -.2974485** -.7133631*** -.6614923*** -.7133631*** -.8152171***
S.E -3.1457 -3.0120 -3.1457 -3.1325 -11.3291 -10.4308 -11.3291 -11.1654
Liquidty .0030148* .0031238* .0030148* .0032283* -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -.0029224*
S.E 2.1167 2.1797 2.1167 2.0125 -0.7891 -0.8660 -0.7891 -2.2940
Risk -0.0040 0.0016 -0.0040 -0.0002 .0569298** .1047259*** .0569298** .0638784**
S.E -0.1533 0.0521 -0.1533 -0.0079 2.8458 4.4851 2.8458 2.8059
Size .0103189** .010229** .0103189** .0128776** .0477679*** .0467216*** .0477679*** .0560075***
S.E 2.7741 2.7183 2.7741 3.0020 16.8717 16.6154 16.8717 17.0362
Tangibilty 0.0439 0.0443 0.0439 0.0571 0.0006 -0.0073 0.0006 0.0114
S.E 1.6771 1.6818 1.6771 1.9274 0.0321 -0.3720 0.0321 0.5075
Tax .1241224** .1250888** .1241224** .1435246** -0.0330 -0.0325 -0.0330 -0.0829
S.E 2.6471 2.6588 2.6471 2.7239 -0.9259 -0.9257 -0.9259 -1.8744
Dividends .3270565** .3257356** .3270565** .3734547** -.4226477*** -.4576875*** -.4226477*** -.4525269***
S.E 2.6534 2.6135 2.6534 2.6590 -4.5050 -4.9143 -4.5050 -4.1349
Growth 1.2173 1.1457 1.2173 1.3302 2.764728*** 2.865644*** 2.764728*** 3.493561***
S.E 1.7699 1.6350 1.7699 1.6934 5.2815 5.4727 5.2815 5.8657
Cash Flow -.0024482** -.002463** -.0024482** -.0030544** -.0024093*** -.0024945*** -.0024093*** -.0027061***
S.E -2.9780 -2.9848 -2.9780 -3.1130 -3.5983 -3.7671 -3.5983 -3.6400
Government .064697** .0644231** .064697** .0610107** -0.0160 -0.0183 -0.0160 -.0342084*
S.E 3.2573 3.2301 3.2573 2.7048 -1.0574 -1.2300 -1.0574 -1.9833
Instituional .0633055*** .0631232*** .0633055*** .0625426*** -0.0133 -0.0162 -0.0133 -0.0113
S.E 3.8614 3.8328 3.8614 3.3472 -1.0655 -1.3127 -1.0655 -0.8001
Indivdual .0500626*** .0497677*** .0500626*** .0521118** -0.0078 -0.0108 -0.0078 -0.0064
S.E 3.4292 3.3921 3.4292 3.1214 -0.7010 -0.9808 -0.7010 -0.5040
Oil 0.0430 0.0436 0.0430 0.0550 -0.0105 -0.0060 -0.0105 -0.0777
S.E 1.0253 1.0366 1.0253 1.1687 -0.3273 -0.1912 -0.3273 -1.9492
B Materials -0.0673 -0.0675 -0.0673 -0.0797 0.0035 -0.0015 0.0035 0.0172
S.E -1.0954 -1.0947 -1.0954 -1.1541 0.0740 -0.0325 0.0740 0.3304
Industrials -0.0720 -0.0722 -0.0720 -0.0834 -0.0628 -0.0682 -0.0628 -0.0615
S.E -1.1841 -1.1830 -1.1841 -1.2188 -1.3571 -1.4951 -1.3571 -1.1946
C Goods -0.1045 -0.1043 -0.1045 -0.1203 -.130477** -.1324724** -.130477** -.1237577*
S.E -1.7256 -1.7178 -1.7256 -1.7658 -2.8308 -2.9187 -2.8308 -2.4135
Health -.1483407* -.1487515* -.1483407* -.162064* -.1719293*** -.1842904*** -.1719293*** -.1596447**
S.E -2.2404 -2.2353 -2.2404 -2.1713 -3.4116 -3.7061 -3.4116 -2.8407
C Servicses -.1279726* -.1278006* -.1279726* -.1508461* -.1413057** -.1452316** -.1413057** -.1410287**
S.E -2.0748 -2.0654 -2.0748 -2.1697 -3.0099 -3.1410 -3.0099 -2.6931
Telecom -0.0822 -0.0817 -0.0822 -0.0974 -0.0925 -0.0940 -0.0925 -0.0940
S.E -1.2492 -1.2372 -1.2492 -1.3142 -1.8451 -1.9054 -1.8451 -1.6871
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 10% 10% 0% 52% 53% 0%
N 856 856 856 856 856 856 856 856
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 4.32 Prob2 0.8271 chi2 (8) 8.48 Prob2 0.3876
Hausman chi2(18) 0.89 Prob2 1 chi2(18) 14.95 Prob2 0.6657
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Table 5.52: Saudi Arabia Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
SAUDI ARABIA
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged .1277014*** 0.0318482 -0.049943 0.0165961 .1494512*** .0644167*
S.E. 3.580947 0.9831692 -1.335193 0.513868 3.312105 2.520354
Constant 0.0199319 0.048 0.077 0.046533 0.1309837 -.5875614***
S.E. 0.2286846 0.560 0.666 0.4972466 1.292591 -8.448999
Profitability -0.088 -.2019796* -.2662012* -.2537893** -.1934848* -.6349897***
S.E -1.102 -2.568 -2.498 -2.956133 -2.123726 -9.848264
Liquidty -.0027301* -0.002 -0.003 -.0053684*** .0044575** -0.0006227
S.E -2.042 -1.408 -1.640 -3.741605 2.955639 -0.5866263
Risk 0.005 -0.022 .1095928** -0.0330379 -0.0033808 .0981364***
S.E 0.186 -0.757 2.807 -1.045878 -0.1056776 4.190992
Size -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.0028589 0.0028693 .0452912***
S.E -1.569 -0.635 -1.163 -0.7593658 0.6494261 16.04397
Tangibilty -0.018 .0922528*** -.1020954** .0885647*** 0.0298111 -0.0151292
S.E -0.687 3.768 -3.046 3.317735 1.097329 -0.7673597
Tax -.1240553** .4675307*** -0.108 .4789344*** .1389682** -0.0303925
S.E -2.825 10.858 -1.739 10.16392 2.900687 -0.8768847
Dividends 0.175 -0.117 0.086 .3476936** .416614** -.4684079***
S.E 1.491 -1.015 0.549 2.734474 3.225698 -5.030417
Growth 1.483101* -0.249 0.587 0.451505 0.6767209 2.905984***
S.E 2.265 -0.386 0.675 0.6408586 0.9345516 5.616205
Cash Flow 0.001383 -0.0002018 .0022094* -0.0005025 -.0030544** -.0024357***
S.E 1.74765 -0.2611168 2.094898 -0.6001869 -3.11301 -3.660821
Government .0711614*** -0.0165528 -.0751655** -.0471178* .0698451*** -0.0167375
S.E 3.815995 -0.9035575 -3.028654 -2.312753 3.435694 -1.13656
Instituional .0647604*** -.0435582** -.082994*** -0.0231667 .0663755*** -0.0149738
S.E 4.171744 -2.849569 -4.022501 -1.39077 3.923686 -1.220201
Indivdual .034644* .0435004** -.0789751*** .0325674* .0530239*** -0.0079808
S.E 2.468721 3.192286 -4.27614 2.187112 3.507354 -0.7279969
Oil -.1203991** -.0994864** -.12966* -.1761727*** 0.0439888 0.00348
S.E -3.067818 -2.578349 -2.483587 -4.184075 1.02928 0.1114774
B Materials .1804123** 0.066293 .1866437* .1664043** -0.0800866 -0.0057723
S.E 3.132227 1.172155 2.438062 2.691164 -1.269321 -0.1265776
Industrials 0.099036 0.0719079 .2159759** 0.0672092 -0.0838486 -0.0743874
S.E 1.736398 1.283707 2.850881 1.09854 -1.343981 -1.646607
C Goods 0.0786343 .1119692* .1894049* 0.1011473 -0.1046698 -.1400067**
S.E 1.386298 2.010149 2.513584 1.662457 -1.693214 -3.113161
Health 0.1025832 0.0339014 .1731358* 0.0612891 -.1444297* -.1898789***
S.E 1.649689 0.5541538 2.092764 0.9182902 -2.130437 -3.854113
C Servicses .1974349*** .1224905* .3176792*** 0.1184436 -.1318831* -.152503***
S.E 3.41813 2.162351 4.143807 1.913409 -2.096929 -3.33849
Telecom 0.0815426 0.0614442 .2072694* 0.0741775 -0.0865654 -.1003622*
S.E 1.323144 1.014256 2.531318 1.121828 -1.287672 -2.056332
Technology 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 840 840 840 840 840 840
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Table 5.53: Saudi Arabia SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
Profit -0.125 -0.034 -0.316 0.051 -0.018 0.024 -0.131 -0.009 -0.297 -0.143 -0.078 -0.287
<0.001 0.158 <0.001 0.067 0.303 0.24 <0.001 0.397 <0.001 0.125 0.088 <0.001
Size -0.075 -0.035 0.554 0.133 -0.143 0.244 0.03 0.011 0.448 0.006 0.161 0.423
0.013 0.155 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.193 0.379 <0.001 0.447 0.232 <0.001
Growth 0.176 0.127 -0.004 0.005 0.048 -0.046 -0.005 0.024 0.092 0.071 -0.008 0.013
<0.001 <0.001 0.454 0.437 0.077 0.089 0.437 0.241 0.004 0.289 0.46 0.427
Tang -0.111 -0.088 -0.07 0.101 -0.041 -0.031 0.129 0.089 -0.081 -0.093 0.016 -0.091
<0.001 0.005 0.02 0.001 0.115 0.178 <0.001 0.005 0.009 0.278 0.32 <0.001
Tax 0.343 0.351 -0.014 -0.071 -0.147 0.121 0.368 0.354 -0.013 0.377 -0.163 -0.014
<0.001 <0.001 0.341 0.018 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.356 <0.001 <0.001 0.397
Risk -0.071 -0.118 0.037 0.105 -0.048 -0.043 -0.073 -0.127 0.027 -0.091 0.033 0.067
0.019 <0.001 0.14 <0.001 0.081 0.106 0.016 <0.001 0.218 0.078 0.251 0.004
Div -0.003 0.15 -0.259 -0.068 -0.049 0.051 0.008 0.136 -0.257 0.022 -0.03 -0.257
0.464 <0.001 <0.001 0.022 0.077 0.067 0.402 <0.001 <0.001 0.318 0.217 <0.001
Liqud -0.067 -0.103 0.073 -0.061 -0.088 0.084 -0.026 -0.124 -0.113 -0.043 0.024 -0.095
0.025 0.001 0.016 0.038 0.005 0.007 0.227 <0.001 <0.001 0.041 0.263 0.253
Cash Flow -0.025 -0.052 -0.005 -0.082 0.112 -0.067 0.01 -0.032 0.007 -0.003 0.071 -0.07
0.231 0.065 0.437 0.008 <0.001 0.025 0.388 0.171 0.418 0.462 0.222 0.112
Ownership
Gov 0.093 -0.091 0.044 0.084 -0.062 0.048
0.003 0.004 0.097 0.132 0.16 0.075
indv 0.183 0.104 -0.087 0.194 -0.149 -0.099
<0.001 0.001 0.005 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Inst -0.041 0.039 -0.023 -0.05 -0.11 -0.019
0.114 0.127 0.25 0.033 0.002 0.292
Industry
Oil 0.062 0.03 -0.193 -0.063 -0.051 -0.016
0.034 0.193 <0.001 0.002 0.022 0.301
Mater -0.016 -0.027 0.054 -0.034 -0.082 0.109
0.32 0.212 0.057 0.175 0.059 0.025
Indust 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
Cgoods -0.052 -0.024 -0.028 0.062 -0.078 -0.194
0.063 0.237 0.203 0.049 0.06 <0.001
Health -0.045 0.166 0.109 -0.029 -0.056 -0.092
0.094 <0.001 <0.001 0.12 0.104 0.002
Cserv 0.071 0.069 -0.114 0.069 0.159 -0.119
0.018 0.021 <0.001 0.052 0.002 0.01
Telec -0.013 0.007 -0.105 -0.047 -0.038 -0.034
0.355 0.413 <0.001 0.001 0.196 0.167
Techno -0.062 -0.118 -0.018 -0.001 -0.078 0.037
0.034 <0.001 0.302 0.484 0.006 0.148
N 856 856 856 856 856 856 856 856 856 856 856 856
R2 3 8 12 25 19 46 30 24 49 27 11 48
Model Fit
(APC) 0.088 P<0.001 0.088 P<0.001 0.088 P<0.001 0.088 P<0.001
(ARS) 0.194 P<0.001 0.194 P<0.001 0.287 P<0.001 0.287 P<0.001
(AARS) 0.186 P<0.001 0.186 P<0.001 0.271 P<0.001 0.271 P<0.001
(AVIF) 1.238 1.238 Inf Inf
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Table 5.54: Saudi Arabia ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Saudi Arabia Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 12.40% 20.43% 9.12% 11.55% 9.97% 17.60%
Size 33.72% 31.54% 13.58% 14.13% 21.89% 19.88%
Growth 3.74% 3.72% 0.58% 5.30% 0.54% 2.81%
Tangibility 5.00% 10.06% 13.66% 11.12% 12.69% 5.58%
Non-Debt Tax shield 7.53% 6.23% 23.14% 38.03% 34.71% 8.20%
Volatility 5.68% 9.84% 6.82% 1.03% 5.87% 3.35%
Dividends 7.95% 0.09% 3.10% 7.20% 0.47% 8.93%
Liquidity 10.73% 10.86% 17.98% 6.48% 9.13% 22.03%
Cash Flow 13.25% 7.23% 12.03% 5.16% 4.73% 11.63%
Good prediction % 37.81% 49.20% 64.67% 43.36% 58.10% 62.04%
S.D of abs errors 0.10 0.16 0.0737 0.0903 0.1305 0.0695
RMSE 0.13 0.19 0.1074 0.1030 0.1480 0.0959
MAE 0.08 0.10 0.07808 0.04946 0.06980 0.0660
N 856 856 856 856 856 856
Adding Dummies
Profitability 17.30% 16.32% 4.87% 12.00% 11.35% 12.34%
Size 15.73% 10.08% 15.48% 12.80% 15.07% 14.09%
Growth 0.00% 2.24% 0.07% 0.36% 7.95% 0.92%
Tangibility 22.19% 4.39% 11.75% 13.36% 14.39% 7.22%
Non-Debt Tax shield 1.91% 3.96% 11.06% 29.21% 25.76% 6.87%
Volatility 8.62% 12.07% 0.53% 5.03% 0.08% 3.22%
Dividends 0.15% 4.20% 1.45% 0.33% 1.45% 2.49%
Liquidity 0.91% 9.09% 15.15% 7.95% 0.94% 18.33%
Cash Flow 1.63% 10.19% 14.82% 2.27% 2.57% 8.81%
Ownership Dummies
Government 2.14% 2.17% 4.71% 0.67% 0.14% 1.16%
Institutional 7.72% 0.96% 6.92% 4.58% 3.14% 2.46%
Individual 0.76% 3.64% 0.68% 0.55% 1.39% 0.72%
Industry Dummies
Oil 0.74% 3.27% 2.61% 2.81% 3.79% 4.79%
Basic Materials 9.72% 1.03% 0.83% 0.03% 3.39% 0.96%
Consumer Goods 7.00% 1.49% 0.02% 1.30% 1.94% 1.05%
Consumer Services 1.58% 1.17% 0.71% 3.28% 0.00% 1.50%
Health Care 1.05% 4.37% 3.35% 1.41% 2.74% 4.01%
Industrials 0.00% 0.00% 0.95% 0.16% 0.34% 0.01%
Technology 0.18% 3.62% 2.73% 0.59% 1.82% 5.02%
Telecommunications 0.69% 5.75% 1.32% 1.31% 1.74% 4.05%
Good prediction % 71.24% 53.43% 75.04% 66.57% 60.73% 73.28%
RMSE 0.0166 0.0332 0.0348 0.0296 0.0317 0.0301
MAE 0.0058 0.0130 0.0181 0.0103 0.0099 0.0152
S.D of abs errors 0.0156 0.0306 0.0297 0.0277 0.0302 0.0260
N 856 856 856 856 856 856
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in Tunisia using Panel Data,
SEM, ANN ?
The tenth country in this chapter is Tunisia First, the table of the short term debt
panel data results is presented. The R2 is low and in the range of 28% across the
models. The Wald test is not significant and therefore it can be concluded that there
is no heteroskedasticiy. The table show that the Hausman test is not significant and
therefore it is safe to use the random effect model. From the Table 5.55 the following
conclusions could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant with the short term debt in book value.
• Liquidity is negatively significant with the short term debt in market value.
• Risk is positive with STDMVE.
• Size is positively significant with the short term debt in book value.
• Tangibility is negatively for the short term debt in market value.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the short term debt in market
value.
• Dividends is significantly negative for both short term debt in book and market
value.
• Cash flow is significantly negative for short term debt in book value.
• The ownership structure show that the individual is positive with STDMVE,
while institutional is positive with STDBVA.
• The industry classification show that basic materials, industrials, consumer
goods and telecommunication are negative with STDBVA. On the other hand,
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consumer services and consumer goods and industrials are positive with
STDMVE.
The second Table 5.56 show the long term debt using panel data models. The
Wald test is not significant for the fixed effect. The R2 is high for the book debt with
39% and for the market value with 32% only. The Lagrange test is not significant
and the following could be concluded:
• Profitability is positive and significant for the long term debt in book values
and market values.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the long term debt in market values using
tobit.
• Size is positively significant for the long term debt in book values and vice
versa for the market leverage.
• Tangibility is positive and significant in for both.
• Dividends is negatively significant for the long term debt in market values.
• Growth is negatively significant in for the long term debt in book values.
• Ownership individual and intuitional are positive with LTDBVA. On the other
hand, government is negative with LTDMVE
• industry classification variable basic materials and industrials are negative
with LTDBVA using Random and tobit. Consumer services is positive with
LTDMVE.
The third tables which is Table 5.57 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in Tunisia. The Wald test for the total debt for booth
values is not significant. The Lagrange test is not significant and therefore the
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random effect could be used. The Hausman test is not significant for total debt and
significant for the total market value and therefore would indicate that it is possible
to use the Random effect. The R2 is higher than 29% for both the book and market
value. From the Table 5.57 the following conclusions could be drawn:
• Profitability is positive and significant for the total debt in book and market
values.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the total debt in market values.
• Size is positively significant for the total debt in market values.
• Non-debt tax shield is positive and significant for TDMVE.
• Dividends is negatively significant in for the total debt in book and market
values.
• Ownership government is negatively significant for the total debt in book and
market values. Institutional variable is positive and significant for total debt in
book values and institutional is the same.
• industry classification variable which are basic materials, industrials, con-
sumer goods and telecom. Industrials and consumer goods and consumer
services are positive with TDMVE.
The only interest from Table 5.58 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio. As
it shows that the dependent variable lagged variable is negatively significant for the
long term debt of book value. Which, indicate that firms in this Jordan might adjust
their capital structure for both the long term debt.
Table 5.59 show the results of SEM-PLS approach for Tunisia. The model fits
at the bottom of the model shows that the model fit is acceptable with or without
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the dummy variables. However, the use of dummies increase the average variable
inflation factor to infinity and therefore the results of the ownership and industry are
handled with caution. The R2 is good for all the models with or without the dummies
except for the 3 market leverage measures. As the table of the results the following
could be concluded:
• Size attribute is significantly positive to long term debt in market value and
short term debt in book values.
• Non-debt tax shield is significantly positive to short term and total debt in
market value.
• Risk is negatively significant to the short term debt in market value.
• Dividends variable is negatively significant to the all the measures in both
book and market except for long term debt in book values.
• Liquidity is negatively significant to the three market value measures.
• Ownership variable individual variable is significantly positive to the short term
and long term debt in book values. It is also negatively significant to the three
market value variables as well as the total debt in market value. On the other
hand, institutional variable is positively significant to the short term debt and
total debt in market values. Also, it is negatively significant with the long term
debt in market value and the total debt in book values.
• industry variable of basic materials have a negative significant with the short
term and total debt in both market and book values. Consumer goods also
have a negative significant relation to both short term debts in market and
book values. Health care variable is also significant for the short and total debt
in the book and market values. As well as, the telecommunication industry
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variable is negatively significant with all the debt variables except for the long
term debt in book values.
Moreover, Table 5.60 show the importance of the variables using the ANN ap-
proach. The good prediction is high with values of higher than 69%. From this table
we could conclude the following:
• Size is exceptionally important through all of the six measures of leverage.
• Tangibility variables are important for the 3 measures of market value as well
as the short term debt in book values.
• Volatility is exceptionally important for the long term debt in book values.
• Liquidity is important for short term debt in both market and book values.
Likewise, it is important for the long term debt in both market and book values.
• Industry variables of health care, technology and telecommunication are im-
portant in relation to the short term debt in book value.
285
CHAPTER 5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS
Table 5.55: Tunisia Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
TUNISIA STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -.2750892** -.2722159** -.3305779*** -.3549605*** -0.0203 -0.0177 0.0502 0.0285
S.E. -2.8635 -2.8069 -3.7336 -3.6863 -0.2484 -0.2139 0.6660 0.3759
Profitability -0.0807 -0.0779 -0.0807 -0.1231 .171763** .1723592** .171763** .1735898**
S.E -1.0833 -1.0337 -1.0833 -1.5193 2.7062 2.6843 2.7062 2.7069
Liquidty -0.0058 -0.0056 -0.0058 -0.0080 -.0253394*** -.025273*** -.0253394*** -.0352762***
S.E -1.2218 -1.1753 -1.2218 -1.5696 -6.2808 -6.1942 -6.2808 -7.6341
Risk -0.0417 -0.0415 -0.0417 -0.0689 .1851988*** .1845907*** .1851988*** .1845576***
S.E -1.2555 -1.2377 -1.2555 -1.6465 6.5492 6.4549 6.5492 6.4504
Size .0286489*** .028454*** .0286489*** .0297827*** 0.0043 0.0042 0.0043 0.0069
S.E 5.8485 5.7534 5.8485 5.6117 1.0379 0.9941 1.0379 1.6212
Tangibilty 0.0574 0.0575 0.0574 0.0479 -.1448955*** -.1447874*** -.1448955*** -.1717363***
S.E 1.3702 1.3608 1.3702 1.0444 -4.0574 -4.0204 -4.0574 -4.7118
Tax 0.0855 0.0782 0.0855 0.2044 .7540948*** .7515588*** .7540948*** .7759723***
S.E 0.5519 0.4984 0.5519 1.2186 5.7150 5.6216 5.7150 5.8346
Dividends -.4898217* -0.4840 -.4898217* -0.3969 -.7295555*** -.7333988*** -.7295555*** -.8257257***
S.E -2.0011 -1.9450 -2.0011 -1.4993 -3.4978 -3.4587 -3.4978 -3.8831
Growth 0.5578 0.5703 0.5578 0.9764 0.2042 0.2159 0.2042 0.6382
S.E 0.9607 0.9704 0.9607 1.5194 0.4127 0.4310 0.4127 1.2587
Cash Flow -.337395** -.3372095** -.337395** -.5585932*** -0.0436 -0.0429 -0.0436 -0.0483
S.E -3.1402 -3.1124 -3.1402 -4.3855 -0.4825 -0.4709 -0.4825 -0.5155
Government -0.0373 -0.0377 -0.0373 -0.0221 -0.0335 -0.0338 -0.0335 -0.0364
S.E -1.0088 -1.0133 -1.0088 -0.5565 -1.0652 -1.0649 -1.0652 -1.1556
Instituional .0654368*** .0653255*** .0654368*** .0650622*** 0.0269 0.0269 0.0269 .0328027*
S.E 3.8100 3.7732 3.8100 3.4613 1.8410 1.8229 1.8410 2.0604
Indivdual 0.0211 0.0205 0.0211 0.0377 .0536978** .0534639** .0536978** .0526319**
S.E 0.9680 0.9348 0.9680 1.6066 2.8954 2.8573 2.8954 2.8519
Oil -0.0499 -0.0497 -0.0499 -0.0561 0.0296 0.0295 0.0296 0.0300
S.E -1.4669 -1.4488 -1.4669 -1.5326 1.0209 1.0090 1.0209 1.0387
B Materials -.1226371** -.1226843** -0.0671 -0.0484 0.0282 0.0283 -0.0424 0.0396
S.E -2.9158 -2.8940 -1.7211 -1.1471 0.7874 0.7824 -1.2742 1.0693
Industrials -.0968137* -.0967563* -0.0413 -0.0401 .1179055*** .1178328*** 0.0473 .132951***
S.E -2.5681 -2.5462 -1.3088 -1.1694 3.6705 3.6386 1.7592 3.9436
C Goods -.1228943** -.1224349** -.0674056* -.0710094* .0758432* .0760461* 0.0053 .0901668**
S.E -3.1428 -3.1058 -2.0819 -2.0181 2.2762 2.2637 0.1909 2.6659
Health 0.0000 0.0000 0.0555 0.0719 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0706 0.0621
S.E . . 1.1800 1.4180 . . -1.7614 1.2013
C Servicses -0.0104 -0.0101 0.0451 0.0532 .1100806** .1101535** 0.0395 .1278687***
S.E -0.2569 -0.2470 1.3339 1.4567 3.1836 3.1595 1.3724 3.7985
Telecom -.1786224*** -.1779588*** -.1231338* -0.1034 -0.0126 -0.0123 -.0832052* 0.0000
S.E -3.5337 -3.4923 -2.5122 -1.9571 -0.2932 -0.2829 -1.9923 0.0000
Technology -0.0555 -0.0555 0.0000 0.0000 0.0706 0.0703 0.0000 .0834549*
S.E -1.1800 -1.1698 . . 1.7614 1.7408 . 2.0055
R2 28% 28% 38% 38%
N 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 416
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 0.68 Prob2 0.9996 chi2 (8) 1.7 Prob2 0.9889
Hausman chi2(17) 0.07 Prob2 1 chi2(17) -0.29 chi2<0
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Table 5.56: Tunisia Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
TUNISIA LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant .2434198** .2420632** .3109524*** .2417607** -.2310687** -.232865** -.207162** -.2636909***
S.E. 3.2522 3.2217 4.5076 3.1740 -3.0536 -3.0490 -2.9704 -3.5418
Profitability .2115372*** .2222163*** .2115372*** -0.1231 .135482* .1338342* .135482* .1521115*
S.E 3.6451 3.8067 3.6451 -1.5193 2.3092 2.2555 2.3092 2.4534
Liquidty 0.0006 0.0011 0.0006 -0.0080 -0.0060 -0.0061 -0.0060 -.0143392**
S.E 0.1544 0.2880 0.1544 -1.5696 -1.5963 -1.6170 -1.5963 -3.2517
Risk .1420508*** .1455714*** .1420508*** -0.0689 .0918898*** .0918166*** .0918898*** .0945963***
S.E 5.4940 5.5992 5.4940 -1.6465 3.5153 3.4743 3.5153 3.4128
Size -.0101831** -.0103088** -.0101831** .0297827*** .0138462*** .0139706*** .0138462*** .0178753***
S.E -2.6682 -2.6905 -2.6682 5.6117 3.5885 3.5870 3.5885 4.2913
Tangibilty -.2288349*** -.2289009*** -.2288349*** 0.0479 .1963487*** .1967359*** .1963487*** .1837916***
S.E -7.0082 -6.9913 -7.0082 1.0444 5.9479 5.9114 5.9479 5.2100
Tax -0.0876 -0.1041 -0.0876 0.2044 -0.0186 -0.0133 -0.0186 0.0081
S.E -0.7262 -0.8562 -0.7262 1.2186 -0.1529 -0.1074 -0.1529 0.0630
Dividends -0.2637 -0.2226 -0.2637 -0.3969 -.8068727*** -.8124368*** -.8068727*** -.8915347***
S.E -1.3826 -1.1547 -1.3826 -1.4993 -4.1848 -4.1460 -4.1848 -4.3158
Growth -2.037054*** -2.056753*** -2.037054*** 0.9764 -0.2164 -0.2222 -0.2164 0.2505
S.E -4.5034 -4.5171 -4.5034 1.5194 -0.4732 -0.4800 -0.4732 0.5115
Cash Flow -.2921525*** -.2948525*** -.2921525*** -.3986093*** .1976833* .1969123* .1976833* 0.1693
S.E -3.4207 -3.4399 -3.4207 -3.9017 2.3476 2.3192 2.3476 1.8173
Government -0.0366 -0.0375 -0.0366 -.0983702** -.0707562* -.0703893* -.0707562* -.093609**
S.E -1.2708 -1.3011 -1.2708 -2.6234 -2.4318 -2.4000 -2.4318 -2.8466
Instituional .0852701*** .0850222*** .0852701*** .1017934*** -.0342581* -.0342557* -.0342581* -.0405247**
S.E 6.3724 6.3387 6.3724 6.7787 -2.5323 -2.5124 -2.5323 -2.8076
Indivdual .0523082** .0509938** .0523082** .0673695*** -0.0298 -0.0294 -0.0298 -.0403616*
S.E 3.0847 2.9977 3.0847 3.5535 -1.7359 -1.6994 -1.7359 -2.2041
Oil -0.0308 -0.0293 -0.0308 -0.0352 0.0337 0.0335 0.0337 0.0393
S.E -1.1623 -1.1041 -1.1623 -1.2167 1.2571 1.2396 1.2571 1.3385
B Materials -0.0133 -0.0137 -.0807909** -.0695621* 0.0027 0.0028 -0.0212 -0.0381
S.E -0.4046 -0.4158 -2.6579 -2.0757 0.0817 0.0828 -0.6899 -1.1607
Industrials -0.0122 -0.0115 -.0797083** -.0831935** 0.0529 0.0528 0.0290 0.0259
S.E -0.4145 -0.3894 -3.2402 -3.0299 1.7812 1.7636 1.1654 0.9917
C Goods 0.0582 0.0592 -0.0093 -0.0105 0.0329 0.0324 0.0090 0.0097
S.E 1.9112 1.9380 -0.3689 -0.3758 1.0669 1.0445 0.3511 0.3646
Health 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0675 -0.0631 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0239 -0.0189
S.E . . -1.8432 -1.5691 . . -0.6454 -0.4840
C Servicses .0779527* .0792547* 0.0104 0.0245 .1239601*** .1237064*** .1000534*** .1006171***
S.E 2.4656 2.5005 0.3959 0.8436 3.8781 3.8396 3.7602 3.6034
Telecom 0.0089 0.0101 -0.0587 -0.0711 -0.0169 -0.0173 -0.0408 -0.0740
S.E 0.2255 0.2555 -1.5359 -1.6984 -0.4237 -0.4309 -1.0562 -1.7588
Technology 0.0675 0.0690 0.0000 0.0000 0.0239 0.0237 0.0000 0.0000
S.E 1.8432 1.8784 . . 0.6454 0.6357 . .
R2 39% 39% 32% 32%
N 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 12.86 Prob2 0.1167 chi2 (8) 1.38 Prob2 0.9945
Hausman chi2(17) 3.89 Prob2 0.9996 chi2(17) 0.15 Prob2 1
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Table 5.57: Tunisia Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
TUNISIA TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant 0.1795 0.1809 0.1611 0.1623 -.2561084* -.2561137* -0.1610 -0.2063
S.E. 1.6229 1.6223 1.5801 1.5764 -2.1284 -2.1080 -1.4519 -1.8563
Profitability .2410376** .2505602** .2410376** .2458548** .2933657** .292138** .2933657** .3070575**
S.E 2.8103 2.8924 2.8103 2.8304 3.1444 3.0949 3.1444 3.2873
Liquidty -0.0066 -0.0062 -0.0066 -0.0111 -.0306267*** -.0306995*** -.0306267*** -.0438902***
S.E -1.2129 -1.1253 -1.2129 -1.9431 -5.1642 -5.1182 -5.1642 -6.5865
Risk .1174765** .1201811** .1174765** .1218048** .2740747*** .2737146*** .2740747*** .2719598***
S.E 3.0742 3.1150 3.0742 3.1541 6.5933 6.5108 6.5933 6.5220
Size 0.0061 0.0059 0.0061 0.0066 .0184546** .0184724** .0184546** .0224823***
S.E 1.0851 1.0353 1.0851 1.1548 3.0077 2.9814 3.0077 3.6321
Tangibilty -0.0336 -0.0334 -0.0336 -0.0589 0.0524 0.0530 0.0524 0.0302
S.E -0.6971 -0.6864 -0.6971 -1.1968 0.9985 1.0015 0.9985 0.5723
Tax -0.2248 -0.2438 -0.2248 -0.2379 .7386495*** .7436873*** .7386495*** .7659203***
S.E -1.2609 -1.3515 -1.2609 -1.3208 3.8081 3.7839 3.8081 3.9521
Dividends -.5775408* -0.5468 -.5775408* -.5727115* -1.51846*** -1.524987*** -1.51846*** -1.634306***
S.E -2.0490 -1.9113 -2.0490 -2.0036 -4.9525 -4.8921 -4.9525 -5.2878
Growth -0.4330 -0.4338 -0.4330 -0.3306 0.0547 0.0559 0.0547 0.6249
S.E -0.6476 -0.6420 -0.6476 -0.4881 0.0751 0.0759 0.0751 0.8467
Cash Flow -0.1263 -0.1266 -0.1263 -0.0867 0.1346 0.1349 0.1346 0.1565
S.E -0.9733 -0.9678 -0.9733 -0.6456 0.9934 0.9872 0.9934 1.1278
Government -.1169229** -.1178388** -.1169229** -.1928634*** -.1029194* -.1028241* -.1029194* -.1468754**
S.E -2.7488 -2.7521 -2.7488 -3.9741 -2.2243 -2.2039 -2.2243 -2.9347
Instituional .1082821*** .1080007*** .1082821*** .1090445*** -0.0073 -0.0074 -0.0073 -0.0026
S.E 5.4752 5.4258 5.4752 5.4272 -0.3405 -0.3409 -0.3405 -0.1216
Indivdual -0.0256 -0.0269 -0.0256 -0.0191 0.0183 0.0185 0.0183 0.0086
S.E -1.0229 -1.0670 -1.0229 -0.7497 0.6723 0.6732 0.6723 0.3116
Oil .0879353* .0890666* .0879353* .0840236* 0.0622 0.0620 0.0622 0.0663
S.E 2.2448 2.2585 2.2448 2.1215 1.4606 1.4426 1.4606 1.5506
B Materials -.182883*** -.1832153*** -.1644511*** -.158787*** 0.0293 0.0294 -0.0658 -0.0633
S.E -3.7762 -3.7590 -3.6606 -3.4978 0.5562 0.5531 -1.3462 -1.2918
Industrials -.1131462** -.1127234* -.0947143** -.0991062** .169284*** .1691351*** 0.0742 0.0695
S.E -2.6065 -2.5800 -2.6051 -2.6984 3.5850 3.5527 1.8761 1.7604
C Goods -0.0759 -0.0749 -0.0574 -0.0554 .1091277* .1088054* 0.0140 0.0139
S.E -1.6846 -1.6534 -1.5401 -1.4733 2.2280 2.2031 0.3462 0.3429
Health 0.0000 0.0000 0.0184 0.0221 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0951 -0.0999
S.E . . 0.3404 0.4043 . . -1.6143 -1.6918
C Servicses 0.0583 0.0594 .0767665* .0850093* .2268584*** .226721*** .1317702** .1355308**
S.E 1.2484 1.2619 1.9735 2.1620 4.4632 4.4236 3.1141 3.2096
Telecom -.1289236* -.1277152* -0.1105 -.1138571* -0.0304 -0.0305 -.1255114* -.140994*
S.E -2.2150 -2.1799 -1.9577 -1.9966 -0.4805 -0.4775 -2.0444 -2.2998
Technology -0.0184 -0.0176 0.0000 0.0000 0.0951 0.0948 0.0000 0.0000
S.E -0.3404 -0.3221 . . 1.6143 1.5958 . .
R2 29% 30% 0% 42% 42% 0%
N 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 0.65 Prob2 0.9996 chi2 (8) 2.21 Prob2 0.974
Hausman chi2(17) 1.04 Prob2 1 chi2(17) -0.29 chi2<0
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Table 5.58: Tunisia Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
TUNISIA
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged -0.0016264 -0.0460323 .2743865*** -0.0024978 -0.0570479 -0.0843684
S.E. -0.0295268 -0.9869686 6.460195 -0.0535291 -1.212736 -1.868665
Constant -.4414386*** -0.016 .1724615* -.2554754** 0.0580769 -0.240062
S.E. -3.838036 -0.173 2.217 -2.911224 0.4740607 -1.737671
Profitability -0.051 .1923031** .2044601*** .1323371* .315633*** .3224968***
S.E -0.638 2.982 3.764 2.150115 3.588092 3.345921
Liquidty -0.007 -.0257745*** 0.003 -0.0058814 -0.0084529 -.0303158***
S.E -1.315 -6.365 0.946 -1.517686 -1.539518 -5.002428
Risk -0.049 .1837526*** .1326575*** .0997634*** .1352005*** .2684232***
S.E -1.279 6.318 5.455 3.534392 3.346415 6.235288
Size .0282292*** 0.004 -0.006 .0140959*** 0.0058678 .0172905**
S.E 5.287 0.856 -1.694 3.55417 1.050495 2.772985
Tangibilty 0.050 -.1488978*** -.2548676*** .1986629*** -0.0418109 0.0380041
S.E 1.130 -4.179 -8.428 5.775133 -0.8717121 0.7092026
Tax 0.095 .7765159*** -0.058 -0.0083343 -0.2142422 .7883656***
S.E 0.581 5.826 -0.518 -0.066059 -1.194564 3.982486
Dividends -0.381 -.7104128** -0.026 -.8669455*** -0.3991481 -1.58372***
S.E -1.404 -3.237 -0.140 -4.126412 -1.343058 -4.822008
Growth 0.706 0.369 -2.167838*** -0.2248986 -0.401726 0.3983236
S.E 1.145 0.731 -5.160 -0.4687412 -0.5922241 0.5257256
Cash Flow -.3394005** -0.0617982 -.2304374** .1913581* -0.086713 0.1034485
S.E -3.140985 -0.6701718 -2.761541 2.232946 -0.6455587 0.7411683
Government -0.0360539 -0.036394 0.0045411 -.0706628* -.1232127** -.1135943*
S.E -0.9301674 -1.155621 0.167219 -2.359042 -2.902446 -2.410525
Instituional .0651271*** .0328027* .0780841*** -.0344815* .1082342*** 0.0063871
S.E 3.61541 2.06036 6.341463 -2.470182 5.53258 0.2778952
Indivdual 0.0195641 .0526319** .0575081*** -0.0294679 -0.0264477 0.0144029
S.E 0.8559236 2.851943 3.686806 -1.66647 -1.063868 0.5214878
Oil -0.0483668 0.0299549 -0.0446739 0.0328444 .0956791* 0.0595641
S.E -1.347376 1.038731 -1.827458 1.194313 2.46623 1.382957
B Materials 0.0531698 0.0396397 -0.0199926 0.0209976 -0.0586291 0.0473893
S.E 1.161155 1.069292 -0.6393226 0.58247 -1.178885 0.8488423
Industrials 0.0806624 .132951*** -0.0394133 .0707086* 0.0232406 .1971277***
S.E 1.928222 3.943619 -1.384944 2.186856 0.5097882 3.928138
C Goods 0.0548027 .0901668** 0.0282585 0.0488463 0.0545682 .1379922**
S.E 1.312875 2.665905 0.9890139 1.514028 1.203928 2.743621
Health .2820551*** 0.0621298 0.0355632 0.012842 .2658556*** 0.0475523
S.E 4.496111 1.201265 0.8292046 0.2581737 3.895807 0.6056779
C Servicses .1660476*** .1278687*** 0.0179703 .141723*** .1961976*** .2606673***
S.E 4.058956 3.798499 0.6196086 4.4576 4.339407 5.270554
Telecom 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology .1194329* .0834549* 0.0541062 0.0410736 .1147896* .1216256*
S.E 2.326438 2.005474 1.544709 1.033913 2.046593 1.960813
N 416 416 416 416 416 416
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Table 5.59: Tunisia SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
Profit 0.003 0.02 0.013 -0.053 0.067 0.015 -0.001 0.032 0.018 -0.007 -0.021 -0.104
0.471 0.331 0.366 0.268 0.068 0.418 0.495 0.254 0.357 0.446 0.191 0.319
Size -0.089 0.276 0.068 0.229 -0.133 0.126 -0.044 0.241 -0.045 -0.021 -0.104 0.069
0.076 <0.001 0.182 <0.001 0.148 0.032 0.177 <0.001 0.176 0.332 <0.001 0.032
Growth -0.141 0.014 -0.105 -0.077 -0.103 0.038 -0.102 -0.045 0.058 -0.104 -0.13 -0.07
0.082 0.419 0.177 0.217 0.011 0.273 0.016 0.173 0.112 0.015 0.003 0.07
Tang 0.102 0.068 0.095 0.363 0.113 0.316 0.204 -0.028 0.064 0.069 0.084 0.074
0.007 0.238 0.053 0.229 0.004 0.118 <0.001 0.278 0.091 0.074 0.04 0.062
Tax 0.161 0.07 0.147 0.042 -0.048 0.043 0.252 0.09 0.192 0.194 -0.046 0.159
<0.001 0.053 <0.001 0.306 0.277 0.293 <0.001 0.029 <0.001 <0.001 0.166 <0.001
Risk -0.21 -0.113 -0.203 0.071 -0.149 -0.054 -0.029 -0.029 -0.054 -0.234 -0.132 -0.256
<0.001 0.05 0.001 0.139 0.08 0.317 0.27 0.271 0.129 <0.001 0.003 <0.001
Div -0.244 -0.275 -0.312 -0.11 -0.142 -0.179 -0.256 -0.282 -0.329 -0.213 -0.087 -0.288
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.003 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.034 <0.001
Liqud -0.227 -0.155 -0.242 -0.013 -0.095 -0.104 -0.31 -0.193 -0.273 -0.212 0.032 -0.22
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.417 0.075 0.037 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.254 <0.001
Cash Flow -0.072 -0.019 -0.043 -0.142 -0.002 -0.092 -0.022 0.131 0.056 -0.077 0.031 -0.038
0.095 0.377 0.207 0.256 0.486 0.319 0.321 0.003 0.121 0.054 0.258 0.216
Ownership
Gov 0.042 -0.031 -0.007 0.029 -0.109 -0.014
0.188 0.256 0.44 0.275 0.011 0.386
indv -0.313 -0.032 -0.163 0.31 0.195 -0.174
<0.001 0.255 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Inst 0.426 -0.021 0.231 0.386 0.291 -0.203
<0.001 0.334 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Industry
Oil 0.051 0.022 0.049 0.132 -0.113 0.119
0.142 0.321 0.155 0.003 0.009 0.006
Mater -0.191 -0.137 -0.172 -0.258 0.01 -0.257
<0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 0.416 <0.001
Indust 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
Cgoods -0.178 -0.078 -0.105 -0.169 0.1 -0.118
<0.001 0.051 0.014 <0.001 0.018 0.006
Health -0.348 -0.092 -0.238 -0.324 0.015 -0.225
<0.001 0.027 <0.001 <0.001 0.381 <0.001
Cserv -0.129 0.067 0.004 -0.084 0.127 0.024
0.003 0.08 0.467 0.039 0.004 0.31
Telec -0.321 -0.193 -0.24 -0.247 -0.04 -0.211
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.199 <0.001
Techno -0.044 -0.108 -0.077 -0.007 0.089 -0.049
0.177 0.012 0.053 0.439 0.031 0.154
N 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432
R2 8 8 25 30 24 32 27 26 36 16 26 46
Model Fit
(APC) 0.108 P<0.001 0.108 P<0.001 0.111 P=0.005 0.132 P=0.001
(ARS) 0.103 P=1.000 0.103 P=1.000 0.263 P<0.001 0.294 P<0.001
(AARS) 0.084 P=1.000 0.084 P=1.000 0.242 P<0.001 0.261 P<0.001
(AVIF) 1.222 1.222 1.246 Inf
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Table 5.60: Tunisia ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Tunisia Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 11.09% 5.92% 4.92% 11.44% 7.86% 12.06%
Size 24.49% 15.97% 20.52% 16.53% 25.39% 31.44%
Growth 4.04% 4.82% 0.53% 5.34% 1.31% 3.74%
Tangibility 18.28% 10.77% 14.15% 19.21% 19.46% 19.99%
Non-Debt Tax shield 9.18% 7.34% 11.48% 0.83% 11.56% 0.01%
Volatility 5.67% 39.44% 6.57% 0.12% 13.84% 0.04%
Dividends 6.96% 1.68% 9.04% 10.60% 5.60% 5.74%
Liquidity 16.30% 7.20% 19.94% 30.96% 8.01% 26.95%
Cash Flow 4.00% 6.86% 12.86% 4.97% 6.98% 0.02%
Good prediction % 71.97% 69.94% 93.35% 91.04% 89.88% 96.24%
S.D of abs errors 0.08 0.05 0.1147 0.0387 0.0390 0.1003
RMSE 0.09 0.06 0.1230 0.0447 0.0432 0.1110
MAE 0.05 0.03 0.04427 0.02237 0.01846 0.0475
N 433 433 433 433 433 433
Adding Dummies
Profitability 11.45% 1.43% 0.69% 15.46% 0.00% 13.44%
Size 10.99% 18.39% 20.44% 10.04% 33.38% 20.84%
Growth 8.90% 1.82% 0.11% 5.14% 0.04% 1.25%
Tangibility 6.70% 1.75% 11.34% 7.44% 8.18% 20.60%
Non-Debt Tax shield 0.46% 7.54% 7.68% 0.18% 16.39% 10.89%
Volatility 7.94% 37.73% 23.89% 17.25% 14.80% 0.63%
Dividends 8.49% 0.62% 3.98% 3.05% 8.64% 5.08%
Liquidity 7.42% 1.20% 2.28% 17.63% 4.77% 15.65%
Cash Flow 0.41% 0.01% 10.84% 1.67% 2.95% 2.35%
Ownership Dummies
Government 6.04% 3.75% 2.62% 3.77% 1.04% 1.52%
Institutional 3.39% 3.48% 0.81% 0.88% 0.88% 0.31%
Individual 1.66% 2.55% 0.67% 0.60% 0.06% 0.27%
Industry Dummies
Oil 1.49% 0.52% 0.25% 0.56% 0.82% 0.57%
Basic Materials 1.34% 3.64% 4.86% 1.56% 1.50% 0.24%
Consumer Goods 0.34% 0.00% 0.02% 0.16% 0.42% 0.01%
Consumer Services 0.92% 0.37% 0.04% 0.07% 0.30% 0.04%
Health Care 8.96% 5.30% 3.34% 4.75% 2.41% 3.82%
Industrials 0.00% 0.02% 1.54% 0.07% 0.01% 0.01%
Technology 7.18% 4.67% 2.58% 3.39% 0.61% 0.91%
Telecommunications 5.90% 5.21% 2.03% 6.33% 2.79% 1.58%
Good prediction % 87.57% 75.43% 89.60% 88.73% 86.99% 95.09%
RMSE 0.0170 0.0275 0.0284 0.0196 0.0133 0.0148
MAE 0.0059 0.0094 0.0098 0.0083 0.0048 0.0054
S.D of abs errors 0.0159 0.0259 0.0267 0.0178 0.0124 0.0138
N 433 433 433 433 433 433
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in UAE using Panel Data, SEM,
ANN ?
The eleventh country in this chapter is UAE. First, the table of the short term debt
panel data results is presented. The R2 is low and in the range of 14% across the
models. The Wald test is not significant and therefore it can be concluded that there
is no heteroskedasticiy. The table show that the Hausman test is not significant and
therefore it is safe to use the random effect model. From the Table 5.61 the following
conclusions could be drawn:
• Risk is negative with STDMVE.
• Size is positively significant with the short term debt in book and market value.
• Tangibility is negatively significant across the models for short term debt value.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the short term debt in market
value.
• Growth is positive with STDBVA.
• Cash flow is significantly negative for both short term debt in book value using
tobit.
• The ownership structure show that the government variable is positive and
significant for STDMVE. Institutional and individual are both significant and
positive with STDBVA.
• The industry classification of consumer services is positive with STDMV.
The second Table 5.62 show the long term debt using panel data models. The
Wald test is not significant for the fixed effect. The R2 is acceptable for the book
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debt with 18% and lower for the market value with 29% only. The Lagrange test is
not significant and the following could be concluded:
• Profitability is positive and significant for the long term debt in book values.
• Risk is significant with LTDBVA and negative.
• Size is positively significant for the LTDMVE and vice versa for LTDBVA.
• Tangibility is positive and significant in for the LTDMVE.
• Growth is positive and significant in for the long term debt in market values.
• Ownership government is positive and significant for LTDMVE. The other vari-
able which is negative and significant for institutional with LTDMVE.
• industry classification variable which is the oil is significantly positive with LTD-
BVA. Basic materials, industrials consumer goods and health and consumer
services are all negative with LTDBVA. On the other hand, industrials and
consumer goods are positive with LTDMVE.
The third tables which is Table 5.63 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in United Arab Emirates. The Wald test for the total
debt is not significant. The Lagrange test is not significant and therefore the ran-
dom effect could be used. The Hausman test is not significant for total debt and
significant for the total market value and therefore would indicate that it is possible
to use the Random effect. The R2 is higher than 24% for both the book and market
value. From the Table 5.63 the following conclusions could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the total debt market values and vice
versa.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the total debt in market values.
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• Risk is negatively significant for the total debt in book values.
• Size is negative and significant for the total debt in book values.
• Non-debt tax shield is negatively significant for the total debt market values
across all the models.
• Dividends is negatively significant in for the total debt in book and market
values.
• Growth is negatively significant in for the total debt in book values.
• Cash flow is negatively significant for total debt market value and vice versa.
• Ownership government is negatively significant for the total debt in market
values and vice versa.
• industry classification variable which are industrials, consumer goods, con-
sumer services are negative with TDBVA while health is positive. Industrials
is also positive with TDMVE.
The only interest from Table 5.64 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio. As
it shows that the dependent variable lagged variable is negatively significant for the
long term debt of market value and both short term debt values. Which, indicate
that firms might adjust their capital structure for the long term debt.
Table 5.65 show the results for United Arab Emirates using the SEM-PLS ap-
proach. The model fits at the bottom of the model shows that the model fit is ac-
ceptable without dummies and good with the dummies. However, the use of dum-
mies increase the average variable inflation factor to infinity for the book leverage
3 measures with dummies and therefore the results of the ownership and industry
variables are handled with caution. The R2 is good for all the models with or without
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the dummies except for the 3 market leverage measures. As the table of the results
the following could be concluded:
• Profitability is negatively significant to total debt in market values. On the other
hand, it is positively significant to the long term and total debt in book value.
• Size attribute is significantly negative to short term debt in market value and
total debt in market value. Also, for total debt in book values.
• Growth is only significantly positive with short term debt book leverage.
• Tangibility is significantly positive in relation to short term debt in book and
market values.
• Risk is negatively significant to the long term debt in book value. It is also
significantly positive to both short term and long term debt in market values.
• Dividends variable is negatively significant to the total debt in market value.
• Liquidity variable is negatively significant to the total debt in market value.
• Ownership variable government is only positive and significant for the long
term debt in market values. Individual variable is significantly positive to the
total debt in market values and significantly negative to the long term debt in
book values. Institutional variable is only positive and significant for the long
term debt in market values.
• industry variables of oil is significantly positive with the long term debt in book
values. Consumer goods is significantly negative to the total debt in market
values. Health care sector is negatively associated to the long term debt and
total debt in market values. But positively associated to the long term debt
in book value. Consumer services and is negatively associated to the long
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term debt and total debt in market values. Telecommunication is positively
significant in relation to the long term debt in book value and significantly
negative for the long term debt in market values.
In addition, Table 5.66 show the important variables using the ANN approach.
The good prediction is high with values of higher than 56%. From this table we
could draw the following conclusions:
• Profitability is only important for the total debt in market values.
• Size is substantially important for the short term debt in book leverage. Simi-
larly, the long term debt is important for the long term debt in market leverage.
• Tangibility is only important for the short term debt in market values.
• Non-debt tax shield is important for both short term debt and total debt in
market leverage.
• Volatility is important for the three market leverage variables. Also it is impor-
tant for the long term debt in book values.
• Dividends is only important in relation to the long term debt in book values.
• Cash flow is extremely important for the total debt in book values and sub-
stantially important for long term debt in market values.
• Industry variables of health care and technology are important in relation to
the short term debt in book value.
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Table 5.61: United Arab Emirates Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
UAE STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant -0.0818 -0.0502 -0.0818 0.0286 .5582332** .6103014*** .5582332** .6326336***
S.E. -0.5608 -0.3382 -0.5608 0.1518 3.2303 3.4796 3.2303 4.0411
Profitability -0.1632 -0.1331 -0.1632 -0.1845 0.0214 0.0570 0.0214 0.0163
S.E -1.3078 -1.0488 -1.3078 -1.1222 0.1445 0.3805 0.1445 0.0898
Liquidty 0.0008 0.0012 0.0008 0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0015
S.E 0.4738 0.7358 0.4738 0.6032 -0.6200 -0.3113 -0.6200 -0.6363
Risk -0.0284 -0.0285 -0.0284 -0.0432 -.0678369* -.0723391* -.0678369* -.0776573*
S.E -1.0506 -1.0313 -1.0506 -1.2440 -2.1170 -2.2202 -2.1170 -1.9911
Size 0.0042 0.0026 0.0042 -0.0060 -.0269967*** -.0294043*** -.0269967*** -.0205983*
S.E 0.6828 0.4191 0.6828 -0.7492 -3.6903 -3.9563 -3.6903 -2.3312
Tangibilty 0.0635 0.0606 0.0635 0.0838 .0948571* .0917574* .0948571* .1727846***
S.E 1.9219 1.8237 1.9219 1.9356 2.4235 2.3395 2.4235 3.6106
Tax -0.0454 -0.0479 -0.0454 -0.2562 .5552416** .5448458** .5552416** .5166045*
S.E -0.2839 -0.2973 -0.2839 -1.1130 2.9269 2.8613 2.9269 2.2533
Dividends 0.3290 0.3253 0.3290 0.3386 -0.2923 -0.3101 -0.2923 -0.3792
S.E 1.0884 1.0572 1.0884 0.8747 -0.8160 -0.8533 -0.8160 -0.8582
Growth 1.539062* 1.817509* 1.539062* 1.920455* -0.6150 -0.2982 -0.6150 -1.4525
S.E 2.1375 2.4266 2.1375 2.0821 -0.7208 -0.3372 -0.7208 -1.2331
Cash Flow -0.0050 -0.0047 -0.0050 -.018933** -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0004
S.E -1.7297 -1.6048 -1.7297 -2.9202 -0.3774 -0.2332 -0.3774 -0.0964
Government 0.0551 0.0542 0.0551 .0875815* .1025477** .1026102** .1025477** .1452642***
S.E 1.7271 1.6910 1.7271 2.1035 2.7108 2.7090 2.7108 3.5841
Instituional .122096*** .1231141*** .122096*** .1504306*** -0.0392 -0.0374 -0.0392 -0.0191
S.E 4.9835 5.0024 4.9835 4.6308 -1.3497 -1.2872 -1.3497 -0.6412
Indivdual .0702344* .0719794* .0702344* .1062533** -0.0040 -0.0017 -0.0040 -0.0032
S.E 2.4403 2.4892 2.4403 2.8206 -0.1182 -0.0496 -0.1182 -0.0916
Oil -0.0003 -0.0025 -0.0003 0.0179 0.0235 0.0212 0.0235 0.0394
S.E -0.0040 -0.0391 -0.0040 0.2128 0.3082 0.2775 0.3082 0.5114
B Materials 0.0680 0.0626 0.0680 0.0775 0.1348 0.1260 0.1348 0.0851
S.E 0.8064 0.7383 0.8064 0.6941 1.3484 1.2584 1.3484 0.8095
Industrials -0.0219 -0.0265 -0.0219 0.0123 0.1086 0.1011 0.1086 0.0837
S.E -0.4075 -0.4904 -0.4075 0.1694 1.7040 1.5823 1.7040 1.2322
C Goods -0.0111 -0.0183 -0.0111 -0.0538 0.1426 0.1312 0.1426 0.1220
S.E -0.1787 -0.2939 -0.1787 -0.6486 1.9429 1.7816 1.9429 1.5611
Health 0.0286 0.0198 0.0286 0.0619 0.1267 0.1148 0.1267 0.1255
S.E 0.4240 0.2919 0.4240 0.6899 1.5861 1.4318 1.5861 1.5167
C Servicses 0.0920 0.0858 0.0920 0.1280 .1432783* .1333893* .1432783* .1428999*
S.E 1.6348 1.5132 1.6348 1.7007 2.1486 1.9927 2.1486 1.9715
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . 0.0000
R2 14% 14% 19% 19%
N 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 424
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 2.21 Prob2 0.974 chi2 (8) 7.99 Prob2 0.4348
Hausman chi2(17) 3.36 Prob2 0.9998 chi2(17) 5.34 Prob2 0.9966
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Table 5.62: United Arab Emirates Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
UAE LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant .7754752*** .8431591*** .7754752*** 1.278321*** -.3654701** -.3359957** -.3654701** -.5418993**
S.E. 5.4152 5.8103 5.4152 5.7129 -2.8730 -2.5960 -2.8730 -3.1636
Profitability .4083745*** .4533521*** .4083745*** -0.1845 -0.0511 -0.0246 -0.0511 -0.1169
S.E 3.3327 3.6553 3.3327 -1.1222 -0.4694 -0.2221 -0.4694 -0.7870
Liquidty 0.0016 0.0020 0.0016 0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0009
S.E 0.9948 1.2071 0.9948 0.6032 -0.5584 -0.4840 -0.5584 -0.4742
Risk -.0536675* -.0615257* -.0536675* -0.0432 -0.0111 -0.0140 -0.0111 -0.0299
S.E -2.0211 -2.2824 -2.0211 -1.2440 -0.4694 -0.5812 -0.4694 -0.8920
Size -.0228182*** -.0257632*** -.0228182*** -0.0060 .014187** .0128737* .014187** .0204809**
S.E -3.7639 -4.1898 -3.7639 -0.7492 2.6345 2.3474 2.6345 2.8209
Tangibilty 0.0189 0.0158 0.0189 0.0838 .2468592*** .2463107*** .2468592*** .3732811***
S.E 0.5822 0.4869 0.5822 1.9356 8.5678 8.5105 8.5678 9.3148
Tax -0.0745 -0.1010 -0.0745 -0.2562 -0.0040 -0.0134 -0.0040 -0.0398
S.E -0.4740 -0.6409 -0.4740 -1.1130 -0.0288 -0.0954 -0.0288 -0.2007
Dividends -0.4674 -0.5459 -0.4674 0.3386 -0.1252 -0.1547 -0.1252 -0.0523
S.E -1.5746 -1.8152 -1.5746 0.8747 -0.4747 -0.5769 -0.4747 -0.1444
Growth 0.0153 0.3666 0.0153 1.920455* 1.405657* 1.598297* 1.405657* 1.4140
S.E 0.0216 0.5010 0.0216 2.0821 2.2379 2.4485 2.2379 1.5559
Cash Flow -0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0034 -.015169* -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0029 0.0014
S.E -1.1876 -1.0397 -1.1876 -2.1005 -1.1380 -1.0057 -1.1380 0.3930
Government -0.0083 -0.0075 -0.0083 -0.0003 .0622625* .0620437* .0622625* .1049514**
S.E -0.2657 -0.2400 -0.2657 -0.0059 2.2359 2.2198 2.2359 2.8711
Instituional 0.0291 0.0309 0.0291 .0824028* -.0700787** -.0696537** -.0700787** -.1743807***
S.E 1.2074 1.2842 1.2074 2.0925 -3.2789 -3.2474 -3.2789 -5.7064
Indivdual 0.0047 0.0071 0.0047 0.0640 -0.0076 -0.0066 -0.0076 -.0760787*
S.E 0.1654 0.2498 0.1654 1.4237 -0.3025 -0.2630 -0.3025 -2.1068
Oil .1653434** .1633411* .1653434** 0.1850 0.0232 0.0224 0.0232 -0.0173
S.E 2.6154 2.5863 2.6154 1.8631 0.4128 0.3985 0.4128 -0.2396
B Materials -.3614564*** -.3721287*** -.3614564*** -.4778726*** 0.1300 0.1249 0.1300 .229323*
S.E -4.3642 -4.4932 -4.3642 -3.7027 1.7663 1.6914 1.7663 2.4030
Industrials -.2833463*** -.2923753*** -.2833463*** -.3970357*** .158266*** .1543372** .158266*** .1366244*
S.E -5.3667 -5.5333 -5.3667 -4.8334 3.3746 3.2748 3.3746 2.2455
C Goods -.3358469*** -.3495223*** -.3358469*** -.5248781*** .2296561*** .2235028*** .2296561*** .3076784***
S.E -5.5232 -5.7356 -5.5232 -5.5202 4.2518 4.1121 4.2518 4.3154
Health -.164555* -.1790449** -.164555* -.2853704** 0.1128 0.1051 0.1128 .1904622*
S.E -2.4867 -2.6989 -2.4867 -2.7682 1.9195 1.7770 1.9195 2.4659
C Servicses -.2360229*** -.2487494*** -.2360229*** -.3293449*** .114657* .1087141* .114657* 0.0944
S.E -4.2712 -4.4916 -4.2712 -3.8348 2.3358 2.2009 2.3358 1.4614
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 18% 19% 29% 29%
N 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 1.6 Prob2 0.9909 chi2 (8) 5.65 Prob2 0.6863
Hausman chi2(17) 8.39 Prob2 0.9575 chi2(17) 2.87 Prob2 0.9999
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Table 5.63: United Arab Emirates Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
UAE TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant .507615*** .5648414*** .507615*** .5797336*** -0.0233 0.0274 -0.0233 -0.0128
S.E. 5.1779 5.7247 5.1779 5.1718 -0.1511 0.1760 -0.1511 -0.0788
Profitability .2839343*** .322846*** .2839343*** .3200091*** -.6300699*** -.6056708*** -.6300699*** -.7002683***
S.E 3.3848 3.8284 3.3848 3.3347 -4.7792 -4.5461 -4.7792 -4.9042
Liquidity 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001 -.0073169*** -.0068279*** -.0073169*** -.0077532***
S.E 0.2183 0.6340 0.2183 0.0715 -4.2017 -3.8834 -4.2017 -4.1932
Risk -.061842*** -.067574*** -.061842*** -.0718864*** 0.0438 0.0375 0.0438 0.0344
S.E -3.4019 -3.6868 -3.4019 -3.4575 1.5332 1.2950 1.5332 1.1369
Size -.0126315** -.0152004*** -.0126315** -.016367*** .0134256* 0.0111 .0134256* .0141385*
S.E -3.0436 -3.6356 -3.0436 -3.4392 2.0584 1.6740 2.0584 2.0523
Tangibility -0.0376 -0.0410 -0.0376 -.0507886* 0.0412 0.0392 0.0412 0.0703
S.E -1.6935 -1.8589 -1.6935 -1.9785 1.1811 1.1247 1.1811 1.8953
Tax 0.0166 0.0008 0.0166 0.1012 -.5093929** -.5281269** -.5093929** -.564133**
S.E 0.1542 0.0073 0.1542 0.8277 -3.0118 -3.1207 -3.0118 -3.1452
Dividends -0.3877 -.4271155* -0.3877 -0.3593 -.8160288* -.8111548* -.8160288* -.8494001*
S.E -1.9077 -2.0889 -1.9077 -1.5532 -2.5551 -2.5111 -2.5551 -2.5038
Growth -1.580179** -1.275136* -1.580179** -1.906204*** -0.3238 0.1836 -0.3238 -0.7331
S.E -3.2644 -2.5624 -3.2644 -3.3432 -0.4257 0.2336 -0.4257 -0.8706
Cash Flow .0088058*** .0093078*** .0088058*** .0095367*** -.0083072** -.0079688** -.0083072** -.0085011**
S.E 4.0726 4.3199 4.0726 3.8698 -2.7388 -2.6232 -2.7388 -2.6016
Government .0772198*** .0775384*** .0772198*** .0900921*** -.1086169** -.1080392** -.1086169** -.1283951***
S.E 3.5982 3.6390 3.5982 3.6733 -3.2204 -3.2095 -3.2204 -3.5674
Institutional -0.0036 -0.0019 -0.0036 -0.0126 -0.0296 -0.0279 -0.0296 -0.0359
S.E -0.2159 -0.1186 -0.2159 -0.6589 -1.1433 -1.0806 -1.1433 -1.3110
Individual 0.0103 0.0124 0.0103 0.0163 0.0243 0.0270 0.0243 0.0177
S.E 0.5325 0.6446 0.5325 0.7384 0.7998 0.8906 0.7998 0.5500
Oil -0.0290 -0.0312 -0.0290 -0.0414 0.0375 0.0355 0.0375 0.0251
S.E -0.6704 -0.7260 -0.6704 -0.8495 0.5514 0.5234 0.5514 0.3507
B Materials -0.0580 -0.0670 -0.0580 -0.0391 0.0663 0.0582 0.0663 0.0458
S.E -1.0236 -1.1895 -1.0236 -0.6109 0.7439 0.6542 0.7439 0.4860
Industrials -.1200032*** -.1277674*** -.1200032*** -.1311411** .1169403* 0.1105 .1169403* 0.0972
S.E -3.3202 -3.5563 -3.3202 -3.2101 2.0587 1.9475 2.0587 1.6092
C Goods -.1030642* -.1147463** -.1030642* -.1105153* -0.0088 -0.0193 -0.0088 -0.0275
S.E -2.4759 -2.7693 -2.4759 -2.3404 -0.1339 -0.2951 -0.1339 -0.3958
Health .162349*** .1501381*** .162349*** .1682898** 0.0510 0.0401 0.0510 0.0422
S.E 3.5837 3.3285 3.5837 3.2832 0.7166 0.5632 0.7166 0.5607
C Services -.1113052** -.1218586** -.1113052** -.122551** 0.0678 0.0581 0.0678 0.0440
S.E -2.9423 -3.2361 -2.9423 -2.8449 1.1400 0.9762 1.1400 0.6954
Telecom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
Technology 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
S.E . . . . . . . .
R2 36% 37% 24% 23%
N 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
Lagrange chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1 chibar2(01) 0 Prob >chibar2 1
Wald chi2 (8) 2.97 Prob2 0.9359 chi2 (8) 6.47 Prob2 0.5943
Hausman chi2(17) 369.31 Prob2 0 chi2(17) 7.87 Prob2 0.9692
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Table 5.64: United Arab Emirates Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
UAE
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged -.1333847* -.1497263** -0.0972743 0.0111954 0.0252713 -.1918883***
S.E. -2.439018 -2.956816 -1.682211 0.2430214 0.5995582 -3.494324
Constant 0.0041358 .5954729** .6043597*** -.3278002* .717302*** 0.106236
S.E. 0.0261242 3.200 4.425 -2.38218 8.313909 0.7830161
Profitability -0.142 0.085 .4279769** -0.0232694 .3133008*** -.6463028***
S.E -1.092 0.551 3.227 -0.2022597 3.741264 -4.81597
Liquidity 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.000712 0.0007838 -.0060859***
S.E 0.653 -0.031 1.124 -0.4702555 0.7022319 -3.460127
Risk -0.034 -.0853988* -.058726* -0.0159134 -.0703343*** 0.0408876
S.E -1.192 -2.571 -2.035 -0.6311581 -3.822219 1.422361
Size -0.001 -.0271124*** -.0230885*** .0123138* -.0154454*** .0136095*
S.E -0.100 -3.537 -3.469 2.132126 -3.635478 1.997603
Tangibility .0894898* .0979572* 0.055 .2482742*** -0.0392561 0.0101794
S.E 2.509 2.450 1.391 8.132064 -1.777311 0.2905469
Tax -0.093 .6537002*** -0.123 -0.0286146 -0.0019594 -.5398619**
S.E -0.560 3.361 -0.732 -0.1940652 -0.0183958 -3.219065
Dividends 0.233 -0.344 -0.580 -0.1799944 -.4382393* -.8232204*
S.E 0.737 -0.932 -1.812 -0.6448935 -2.155791 -2.566525
Growth 1.984416* -0.744 0.456 1.771123* -1.201526* -0.0628957
S.E 2.494 -0.804 0.565 2.49901 -2.397456 -0.0780106
Cash Flow -0.0046947 -0.0012099 -0.0036566 -0.0025882 .0095367*** -.0079825**
S.E -1.610389 -0.3591203 -1.258976 -0.9718869 3.869795 -2.648863
Government .0799901* .1452642*** 0.0172501 .0656481* .0846649*** -.1357949***
S.E 2.26602 3.584065 0.4844463 2.111661 3.80203 -3.836912
Institutional .1237418*** -0.0190751 0.0330319 -.0684716** -0.0009777 -0.0489358
S.E 4.912751 -0.641247 1.289426 -3.075792 -0.0604299 -1.891548
Individual .0741782* -0.0031567 0.0157828 -0.0046597 0.0110342 0.018819
S.E 2.511297 -0.0915559 0.5221805 -0.1767124 0.5694753 0.6274741
Oil 0.0032755 0.039415 .1694853* 0.0223385 -0.0303016 -0.0726016
S.E 0.0496688 0.5113562 2.531648 0.3842755 -0.7171463 -0.9932846
B Materials 0.071977 0.0850924 -.2021443** 0.1259357 -.2188404*** 0.1183177
S.E 0.8265943 0.809542 -2.83104 1.630477 -4.860056 1.552365
Industrials -0.0130252 0.0836832 -.1131668** .1549278** -.27929*** 0.0502583
S.E -0.232128 1.232224 -2.831596 3.127556 -11.07803 1.239379
C Goods -0.0080909 0.1219617 -.1616*** .223348*** -.2656096*** -.0940336*
S.E -0.1247064 1.561127 -4.06514 3.892234 -10.62895 -2.315357
Health 0.0513077 0.1255114 0 0.1044237 0 0
S.E 0.7232561 1.516674 0 1.683986 0 0
C Servicses 0.1092005 .1428999* -0.0620644 .1086453* -.2700759*** -0.0323292
S.E 1.80658 1.971509 -1.432291 2.04146 -9.961623 -0.7354236
Telecom 0 0 .1537649* 0 -.1559728*** -0.0796367
S.E 0 0 2.147918 0 -3.464202 -1.06851
Technology 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 424 424 424 424 424 424
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Table 5.65: United Arab Emirates SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDLVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
Profit -0.018 -0.007 -0.179 -0.008 0.147 0.176 -0.056 0.024 -0.196 -0.055 -0.121 -0.063
0.35 0.44 <0.001 0.432 <0.001 <0.001 0.12 0.308 <0.001 0.222 0.06 <0.001
Size -0.178 -0.131 -0.189 -0.116 -0.044 -0.182 -0.128 -0.045 0.076 -0.121 -0.063 0.246
<0.001 0.003 <0.001 0.007 0.179 <0.001 0.003 0.174 0.054 0.088 0.166 0.277
Growth -0.074 -0.036 0.048 0.218 0.057 -0.05 -0.054 0.032 -0.125 -0.063 -0.071 -0.122
0.06 0.227 0.155 <0.001 0.114 0.148 0.127 0.248 0.004 0.109 0.285 0.083
Tang 0.178 0.09 -0.131 0.226 -0.123 -0.066 0.238 0.281 -0.068 0.246 0.067 -0.069
<0.001 0.028 0.003 <0.001 0.005 0.08 <0.001 <0.001 0.077 0.002 0.153 0.095
Tax 0.074 0.145 -0.134 0.104 0.136 0.109 -0.192 0.201 0.152 -0.188 -0.106 0.149
0.059 0.001 0.002 0.014 0.002 0.011 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.249 0.223 0.26
Risk 0.204 0.23 -0.067 -0.092 -0.171 0.134 -0.048 -0.166 -0.086 -0.011 -0.124 -0.086
<0.001 <0.001 0.078 0.026 <0.001 0.002 0.157 <0.001 0.035 0.395 0.002 0.02
Div -0.037 -0.041 -0.227 0.107 -0.032 -0.043 -0.022 -0.015 -0.045 -0.021 -0.007 -0.046
0.219 0.191 <0.001 0.012 0.248 0.183 0.32 0.375 0.172 0.351 0.467 0.27
Liqud 0.145 -0.045 -0.258 -0.029 0.055 -0.039 0.137 -0.02 -0.327 0.136 0.024 -0.326
0.001 0.172 <0.001 0.272 0.122 0.203 0.002 0.335 <0.001 0.181 0.365 <0.001
Cash Flow 0.031 -0.062 -0.084 0.116 0.115 0.099 -0.049 -0.131 -0.05 -0.051 -0.214 -0.048
0.254 0.095 0.038 0.007 0.008 0.018 0.15 0.003 0.147 0.134 0.005 0.197
Ownership
Gov 0.106 0.268 -0.122 0.109 -0.09 -0.124
0.012 <0.001 0.005 0.071 0.149 0.004
indv 0.109 0.144 0.163 0.108 -0.24 0.163
0.01 0.001 <0.001 0.215 <0.001 0.007
Inst 0.083 -0.171 0.138 0.083 -0.032 0.138
0.039 <0.001 0.002 0.265 0.296 0.225
Industry
Oil -0.086 0.02 0.127 -0.078 0.311 0.124
0.035 0.334 0.003 0.067 <0.001 0.065
Mater 0.084 -0.1 -0.101 0.078 -0.162 -0.097
0.038 0.017 0.016 0.127 0.025 0.155
Indust 0 -0.091 0 0 0 0
0 0.027 0 0 0 0
Cgoods -0.054 0 -0.191 -0.048 -0.013 -0.19
0.126 0 <0.001 0.246 0.416 0.008
Health -0.041 -0.169 -0.164 -0.036 0.269 -0.164
0.193 <0.001 <0.001 0.303 <0.001 0.017
Cserv 0.061 -0.239 -0.071 0.067 0.116 -0.073
0.101 <0.001 0.067 0.119 0.087 0.147
Telec -0.004 -0.183 -0.073 -0.009 0.363 -0.072
0.465 <0.001 0.06 0.405 <0.001 0.095
Techno 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.487 0.414 0.185
N 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
R2 18 11 13 23 17 19 27 29 31 25 26 36
Model Fit
(APC) 0.106 P=0.006 0.106 P=0.006 0.107 P<0.001 0.108 P<0.001
(ARS) 0.17 P<0.001 0.17 P<0.001 0.288 P<0.001 0.289 P<0.001
(AARS) 0.152 P<0.001 0.152 P<0.001 0.267 P<0.001 0.256 P<0.001
(AVIF) 1.143 1.143 1.226 Inf
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Table 5.66: United Arab Emirates ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
UAE Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 10.63% 11.60% 7.80% 14.13% 1.53% 22.72%
Size 28.35% 5.37% 7.75% 11.57% 22.12% 3.73%
Growth 8.65% 3.19% 3.28% 6.71% 5.06% 8.66%
Tangibility 9.16% 13.70% 14.78% 16.10% 11.43% 10.17%
Non-Debt Tax shield 9.92% 11.37% 1.79% 19.12% 0.18% 17.40%
Volatility 13.04% 16.45% 4.79% 19.29% 23.85% 15.11%
Dividends 0.66% 24.65% 5.26% 0.57% 4.88% 13.88%
Liquidity 11.41% 8.20% 3.50% 8.82% 2.89% 0.22%
Cash Flow 8.17% 5.47% 51.05% 3.68% 28.05% 8.13%
Good prediction % 67.60% 65.16% 70.38% 78.75% 56.45% 70.03%
S.D of abs errors 0.12 0.13 0.0454 0.1375 0.1146 0.0354
RMSE 0.15 0.15 0.0466 0.1735 0.1341 0.0483
MAE 0.08 0.07 0.01039 0.10591 0.06962 0.0329
N 440 440 440 440 440 440
Adding Dummies
Profitability 13.44% 0.29% 6.65% 15.69% 0.20% 10.20%
Size 1.70% 2.14% 11.36% 4.22% 17.43% 11.45%
Growth 4.70% 1.39% 0.30% 0.71% 0.91% 0.03%
Tangibility 9.88% 2.87% 39.42% 15.50% 32.13% 10.26%
Non-Debt Tax shield 11.83% 6.20% 4.47% 11.00% 0.81% 0.03%
Volatility 11.15% 23.90% 20.88% 9.40% 17.54% 14.33%
Dividends 12.35% 21.59% 4.23% 0.04% 2.01% 9.28%
Liquidity 12.29% 25.94% 5.84% 11.30% 0.03% 13.72%
Cash Flow 1.06% 4.66% 0.12% 6.27% 4.71% 0.01%
Ownership Dummies
Government 3.40% 2.72% 0.15% 2.47% 0.02% 2.53%
Institutional 0.30% 0.04% 1.32% 0.89% 5.96% 1.03%
Individual 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.11%
Industry Dummies
Oil 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.11%
Basic Materials 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.29% 0.14%
Consumer Goods 7.65% 3.01% 3.67% 0.18% 0.38% 6.83%
Consumer Services 1.75% 0.04% 0.05% 5.77% 0.53% 1.57%
Health Care 0.16% 1.28% 0.04% 0.00% 9.08% 4.40%
Industrials 6.35% 0.33% 0.02% 0.24% 0.01% 0.06%
Technology 1.80% 3.59% 1.46% 16.28% 7.77% 13.89%
Telecommunications 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Good prediction % 70.03% 58.19% 57.49% 88.50% 61.67% 73.87%
RMSE 0.0496 0.0243 0.0075 0.0208 0.0544 0.0200
MAE 0.0196 0.0096 0.0021 0.0082 0.0189 0.0108
S.D of abs errors 0.0456 0.0223 0.0072 0.0191 0.0510 0.0168
N 440 440 440 440 440 440
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The following tables answer the research question:
What is the determinants of capital structure in MENA using Panel Data, SEM,
ANN ?
Finally, the last results are for the MENA countries pooled sample which include
all the countries which were tested before. First, the table of the short term debt
panel data results is presented. Due to the data being from different countries the
R2 is substantially low and in the range of 5% across the models. The Wald test
is significant and therefore it can be concluded that there is heteroskedasticiy. The
table show that the Hausman test is significant and therefore it is not safe to use
the random effect model. From the Table 5.67 the following conclusions could be
drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant with the short term debt in book and mar-
ket value.
• Liquidity is negatively significant with the short term debt in book and market
value.
• Size is positively significant with the short term debt in book and market value.
• Tangibility is positive and significant across the models for both short term
debt in book and market value.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the short term debt for both
market and book value.
• Dividends is significantly negative for both short term debt in book and market
value.
• Growth is negative and significant for both the tobit and random models in the
market value.
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• Cash flow is significantly negative for both short term debt in book and market
value but not for all models.
The second Table 5.68 show the long term debt using panel data models. The
Wald test is significant for the fixed effect. The R2 is not acceptable for the book
debt with 1% and the same for market value. The Lagrange test is significant and
the following could be concluded:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the long term debt in book and market
values except for the OLS model.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the long term debt in market and book
values for the OLS and tobit model.
• Risk is positive with LTDBVA using fixed and random models and negative
with LTDMVE using fixed and tobit.
• Size is positively significant for the long term debt in market values and for the
LTDBVA only with the tobit model.
• Tangibility is positively significant in for the long term debt in book and market
values.
• Non-debt tax shield is positively significant for the long term debt in book
and market values except for the tobit for LTDBVA and the fixed effect for the
LTDMVE.
• Dividends is negatively significant for the long term debt in book using tobit
and market values for all models except the fixed model.
• Ownership individual and institutional are negatively significant for the long
term debt in book values using tobit and OS but also negative for LTDMVE
using tobit model only.
304
CHAPTER 5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS
The third tables which is Table 5.69 shows the results for the total debt for both
book value and market value in MENA. The Wald test is significant and therefore
the errors reported are robust. The Lagrange test is significant and therefore the
random effect could be not be used. The Hausman test is significant for total debt
and significant for the total market value and therefore would indicate that it is pos-
sible to use the Random effect. The R2 is lower than 18% for both the book and
market value. From the Table 5.69 the following conclusions could be drawn:
• Profitability is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market val-
ues.
• Liquidity is negatively significant for the total debt in book and market values.
• Size is positively significant for the total debt in book and market values.
• Tangibility is positively significant for the total debt in book and market values
across all the models.
• Risk negative and significant using the TDBVA except for fixed and random,
on the other hand it is positive for the TDMVE and significant but not for the
fixed effect.
• Non-debt tax shield is negatively significant for the total debt market values
across all the models and positive with TDBVA only using the tobit and OLS
models.
• Dividends is negatively significant in for the total debt in book and market
values.
• Ownership government is negatively significant for the total debt in market
values. Institutional variable is negatively significant for total debt in market
values using the tobit model only and the same apply to individual.
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• industry classification variable which are basic materials, industrials and tech-
nology are positive and significant for the tobit and random models only.
The only interest from Table 5.70 is the lagged variable of the leverage ratio. As
it shows that the lagged dependent variable is positively significant for all the ratios
except the TDMVE and therefore it would indicate that firms in MENA countries
might adjust their capital structure .
The MENA full sample is tested as the previous table shows. As the model fit fig-
ures show the model does hold since the measures are significant for all the depen-
dent variables. also the (AVIF) is within the recommended value. It is also notable
that the r-square value are very low which is due to different countries included in
the same model.Profitability is negative and significant across all the models except
for the LTBVA. The size attribute is negative and significant with the short term and
long term. Tangibility is positive and significant with short term and long term debt
and negative with total debt. Tax is positively significant with with short term and
long term debt and negative with total debt.
The second table show the results for Pooled data of all the MENA countries
using the SEM-PLS approach. The model fits at the bottom of the model shows
that the model fit is acceptable without dummies and good with dummies. However,
the use of dummies increase the average variable inflation factor to infinity and
therefore the results of the ownership and industry are handled with caution. The
R2 is good for all the models with or without the dummies except for the 3 market
leverage measures. . As the table of the results the following could be concluded:
• Profitability is positively significant to both the long term and total debt in book
values. It is also negatively significant to total debt in market value.
• Size attribute is significantly positive to total debt in both market and book
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values. On the other hand, short term debt for market and book value in
addition to the long term debt in books value are all negatively significant.
• Tangibility is significantly negative in relation to total debt in market and book
values. Inversely, it is significantly positive to the 4 other measures.
• Non-debt tax shield is significantly negative in relation to total debt in market
values. In contrast, it is significantly positive to the 5 other measures.
• Dividends variable is negatively significant to the total debt in market value.
• Liquidity is negatively significant to all the measures of leverage.
• Cash flow positively significant to total debt in market and book values. How-
ever, it is negatively significant to 4 other leverage measures.
• The ownership variable of government is significantly positive with long term
debt in both market and book value. The individual variable is significantly
positive to the short term debt in book and market leverage. It is also nega-
tively significant to long term debt in market value and total debt in book and
market values. Moreover, the institutional variable is positively significant with
short term and long term debt in both market and book values.
• industry variables of basic materials, consumer goods and consumer services
are all significantly positive to all the leverage ratio except the long term debt
in book values. Oil variables is significant with the short term debt in both
market and book value. Industrial is significantly positive for all the measures
except the long term debt in book value which is negatively significant. Health
is positively significant short term debt in book value and market value as well
as the long term debt in market value. Finally, technology is significant and
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positive with the short term debt and long term debt in both market and book
value.
This table 5.72 shows the important variable using the ANN approach for the
pooled sample which include all the countries included in this thesis. The good
prediction is high with values of higher than 40%. From this table we could conclude
the following:
• Size is important for short term debt in both book and market values.
• Non-debt tax shield is important for long term debt in both market and book
values. Similarly, the short term debt in market values are important.
• Liquidity is important only for total debt in book values.
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Table 5.67: MENA Short Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term
debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is
defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market
value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the
current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard
deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility
is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount
to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in
percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership
structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions
where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different
where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
MENA STDBVA STDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant 0.0424 -0.0118 -0.0141 -0.0277 .093252*** -0.0585 -0.0221 .0893323***
S.E. 1.8358 -0.3216 -0.2983 -0.8982 3.4948 -1.3516 -0.4077 3.3520
Profitability -.1169813*** -.079602*** -.0857318*** -.1842948*** -.0869431*** -.1386477*** -.1363492*** -.1110343***
S.E -5.4629 -4.2807 -4.8199 -6.2812 -3.5131 -6.3337 -6.5122 -3.4991
Liquidity -.0030317*** -.0013705*** -.0015253*** -.0054002*** -.0045197*** -.0013298** -.0016513*** -.0080817***
S.E -5.8895 -3.6727 -4.1807 -7.2797 -7.5970 -3.0271 -3.8400 -9.2470
Risk -0.0003 0.0014 0.0013 -0.0063 0.0052 0.0047 0.0045 0.0019
S.E -0.0720 0.5839 0.5394 -1.2016 1.1377 1.6782 1.6254 0.3341
Size 0.0012 .0057358** .0037121* .0033132* -0.0023 .0091047*** .0038309* 0.0004
S.E 1.1500 2.7541 2.2815 2.3696 -1.8788 3.7137 2.0203 0.2641
Tangibility .0600665*** .0346623*** .0403896*** .1139901*** .0599343*** .0789156*** .0780868*** .1284432***
S.E 7.9736 3.5964 4.6324 11.4718 6.8840 6.9554 7.6331 11.5635
Tax 0.0040 .0833225*** .0754104*** 0.0215 .3580486*** .1439219*** .1749941*** .4155924***
S.E 0.1684 3.7274 3.5440 0.6815 13.0921 5.4691 6.9888 12.2036
Dividends -.1475725*** -0.0082 -0.0184 -.2869659*** -.3871492*** -0.0597 -.0822027** -.5291156***
S.E -3.5179 -0.2985 -0.6810 -4.8547 -7.9854 -1.8481 -2.5791 -8.2827
Growth 0.0777 -0.0296 -0.0234 0.2285 -.581125*** -0.1670 -.1983749* -.9061339***
S.E 0.5722 -0.3642 -0.2904 1.2635 -3.7041 -1.7443 -2.0893 -4.1478
Cash Flow -0.0007 0.0013 0.0007 -.001385* -.0017303** -0.0002 -0.0008 -.0021207**
S.E -1.4387 1.7654 1.0643 -2.0331 -2.9667 -0.2862 -1.0456 -2.8151
Government 0.0118 0.0000 0.0017 0.0090 0.0067 0.0000 -0.0167 0.0000
S.E 1.4876 . 0.0871 0.8590 0.7317 . -0.7430 .
Institutional .0137481** 0.0000 0.0112 0.0076 0.0013 0.0000 -0.0030 0.0000
S.E 3.1915 . 1.0326 1.3248 0.2644 . -0.2404 .
Individual .0113876* 0.0000 0.0120 0.0113 .0256168*** 0.0000 0.0260 0.0000
S.E 2.2689 . 0.9487 1.7087 4.4163 . 1.8002 .
Oil -0.0136 0.0000 -0.0095 -0.0109 .0349553** 0.0000 0.0327 0.0000
S.E -1.3383 . -0.3729 -0.8250 2.9844 . 1.1205 .
B Materials .0512466*** 0.0000 0.0544 .0560416** .0595481*** 0.0000 0.0512 0.0000
S.E 3.3916 . 1.4340 2.7909 3.4100 . 1.1811 .
Industrials 0.0146 0.0000 0.0212 0.0144 .058005** 0.0000 0.0546 0.0000
S.E 0.9185 . 0.5319 0.6836 3.1601 . 1.1999 .
C Goods 0.0112 0.0000 0.0207 0.0012 .0528352** 0.0000 0.0531 0.0000
S.E 0.6984 . 0.5153 0.0554 2.8449 . 1.1547 .
Health .0487041** 0.0000 0.0580 .0529143* .0491721* 0.0000 0.0493 0.0000
S.E 2.8564 . 1.3516 2.3445 2.4952 . 1.0049 .
C Services .0349487* 0.0000 0.0435 0.0400 .0677461*** 0.0000 0.0657 0.0000
S.E 2.1687 . 1.0759 1.8750 3.6375 . 1.4211 .
Telecom -0.0181 0.0000 -0.0178 -0.0218 0.0025 0.0000 -0.0103 0.0000
S.E -0.9703 . -0.3834 -0.8784 0.1146 . -0.1931 .
Technology 0.0309 0.0000 0.0367 0.0358 .0730619*** 0.0000 0.0731 0.0000
S.E 1.6317 . 0.7653 1.4218 3.3372 . 1.3352 .
R2 5% 1% 10% 3%
N 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368
Lagrange chibar2(01) 12822.04 Prob >chibar2 0 chibar2(01) 12255.1 Prob >chibar2 0
Wald chi2 (796) 2.7E+17 Prob2 0 chi2 (796) 4E+15 Prob2 0
Hausman chi2(8) 17.23 Prob2 0.0278 chi2(8) 61.83 Prob2 0
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Table 5.68: MENA Long Term Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
MENA LTDBVA LTDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant .122476*** 0.0757 .1057656* -0.0227 -0.0127 -0.0426 -0.0204 -.1578777***
S.E. 4.6989 1.7139 1.9919 -0.5669 -0.5461 -0.9837 -0.4378 -4.6050
Profitability .1192569*** -.071518** -.0446009* -.1842948*** -0.0234 -.1081968*** -.0935607*** -0.0305
S.E 4.9330 -3.2042 -2.1027 -6.2812 -1.0848 -4.9403 -4.5466 -0.9653
Liquidity -.0016822** -0.0008 -.0009057* -.0054002*** -.0012474* 0.0001 -0.0001 -.0032783***
S.E -2.8946 -1.8274 -2.0746 -7.2797 -2.4105 0.1243 -0.1741 -3.8820
Risk -0.0039 .0085381** .0075685** -0.0063 -0.0074 .0064469* 0.0049 -.0162473**
S.E -0.8791 3.0093 2.6940 -1.2016 -1.8721 2.3158 1.7725 -2.7279
Size -0.0022 0.0001 -0.0005 .0033132* .0034349** .0066458** .0043857* .0087239***
S.E -1.8713 0.0251 -0.2484 2.3696 3.2775 2.7095 2.5093 5.6409
Tangibility .0765725*** .0486456*** .057*** .1139901*** .1361247*** .067467*** .0925937*** .2285379***
S.E 9.0037 4.2049 5.5285 11.4718 17.9751 5.9436 9.4148 20.6186
Tax .2141942*** .0567646* .080514** 0.0215 .3878624*** 0.0177 .0915991*** .5045833***
S.E 8.0178 2.1156 3.1757 0.6815 16.3047 0.6739 3.7306 15.2212
Dividends -0.0393 0.0075 0.0098 -.2869659*** -.154497*** -0.0615 -.0683094* -.2430991***
S.E -0.8300 0.2274 0.3020 -4.8547 -3.6636 -1.9033 -2.1535 -3.8930
Growth -0.2533 0.0071 -0.0175 0.2285 0.1115 -0.0134 -0.0021 0.2753
S.E -1.6531 0.0730 -0.1810 1.2635 0.8168 -0.1394 -0.0219 1.3559
Cash Flow 0.0003 0.0014 0.0010 -0.0008 -.0013866** 0.0001 -0.0006 -.0018115*
S.E 0.5381 1.5602 1.3036 -0.8782 -2.7407 0.1064 -0.8645 -2.4113
Government 0.0099 0.0000 0.0110 -0.0059 -0.0087 0.0000 -0.0105 -0.0194
S.E 1.1032 . 0.5038 -0.4375 -1.0924 . -0.5634 -1.6687
Institutional -0.0084 0.0000 -0.0056 -.0262025*** -0.0083 0.0000 -0.0039 -.0310063***
S.E -1.7187 . -0.4640 -3.5384 -1.9257 . -0.3795 -4.8751
Individual -.026804*** 0.0000 -0.0232 -.0468487*** -0.0080 0.0000 -0.0024 -.0231223**
S.E -4.7305 . -1.6555 -5.4228 -1.5861 . -0.1971 -3.1380
Oil 0.0021 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0068 -0.0088 0.0000 -0.0120 0.0045
S.E 0.1877 . -0.1264 0.3951 -0.8652 . -0.4934 0.3085
B Materials -0.0055 0.0000 -0.0112 -0.0250 0.0222 0.0000 0.0218 0.0150
S.E -0.3215 . -0.2666 -0.9728 1.4621 . 0.6061 0.6829
Industrials -0.0226 0.0000 -0.0294 -0.0435 0.0102 0.0000 0.0112 0.0009
S.E -1.2631 . -0.6658 -1.6114 0.6414 . 0.2950 0.0377
C Goods -0.0042 0.0000 -0.0142 -0.0333 0.0102 0.0000 0.0109 -0.0070
S.E -0.2342 . -0.3189 -1.2174 0.6336 . 0.2863 -0.2993
Health -0.0067 0.0000 -0.0110 -0.0214 -0.0012 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0095
S.E -0.3473 . -0.2307 -0.7381 -0.0713 . 0.0028 -0.3799
C Services -0.0020 0.0000 -0.0070 -0.0148 0.0213 0.0000 0.0259 0.0165
S.E -0.1124 . -0.1565 -0.5396 1.3172 . 0.6746 0.7003
Telecom -0.0197 0.0000 -0.0285 -0.0380 -0.0285 0.0000 -0.0355 -0.0447
S.E -0.9352 . -0.5529 -1.1998 -1.5190 . -0.8030 -1.6333
Technology -0.0307 0.0000 -0.0369 -0.0442 0.0188 0.0000 0.0115 0.0384
S.E -1.4367 . -0.6960 -1.3623 0.9868 . 0.2527 1.3924
R2 4% 1% 12% 1%
N 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368
Lagrange chibar2(01) 11706.85 Prob >chibar2 0 chibar2(01) 9606.94 Prob >chibar2 0
Wald chi2 (796) 3.9E+14 Prob2 0 chi2 (796) 1.1E+15 Prob2 0
Hausman chi2(8) 29.9 Prob2 0.0002 chi2(8) 91.91 Prob2 0
310
CHAPTER 5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS
Table 5.69: MENA Total Debt Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
MENA TDBVA TDMVE
Variable OLS Fixed Random Tobit OLS Fixed Random Tobit
Constant 0.0392 0.0646 0.0306 -0.0204 -0.0256 0.0459 -0.0298 -.1022243**
S.E. 1.4670 1.5783 0.5634 -0.6494 -0.8470 0.9236 -0.4890 -2.9369
Profitability -.188295*** -.2279625*** -.2282774*** -.1981616*** -.3681477*** -.3970875*** -.4071675*** -.4036898***
S.E -7.6015 -11.0178 -11.4704 -6.8934 -13.1250 -15.8107 -16.9450 -12.6930
Liquidity -.0078342*** -.0020239*** -.0024383*** -.012183*** -.0100777*** -.0032426*** -.0038492*** -.0156005***
S.E -13.1565 -4.8745 -5.9821 -15.3607 -14.9460 -6.4338 -7.7889 -18.0145
Risk -.0094019* 0.0004 -0.0001 -.0120838* .0152346** 0.0058 .0064896* .015371**
S.E -2.0612 0.1527 -0.0334 -2.2812 2.9496 1.8017 2.0418 2.6446
Size .0103784*** .00759** .0088518*** .0126364*** .015093*** .0107978*** .0126815*** .0184448***
S.E 8.6059 3.2754 4.8078 9.0251 11.0525 3.8388 5.8848 11.9496
Tangibility .0466919*** .027696** .0331749*** .053203*** .0497069*** .0286875* .0349885** .0633208***
S.E 5.3582 2.5826 3.3884 5.2874 5.0375 2.2038 2.9898 5.6970
Tax .0677947* -0.0366 -0.0251 .0737678* -.0712532* -0.0539 -.0575548* -.1234561***
S.E 2.4767 -1.4723 -1.0559 2.3306 -2.2988 -1.7855 -2.0035 -3.3768
Dividends -.3880541*** -.126161*** -.1432648*** -.4944225*** -.8546006*** -.2190379*** -.2705785*** -1.04385***
S.E -7.9969 -4.1301 -4.7468 -8.6313 -15.5529 -5.9073 -7.3840 -16.2243
Growth 0.0822 0.1774 0.1752 -0.0264 0.0705 0.0508 0.0632 -0.0983
S.E 0.5232 1.9602 1.9499 -0.1362 0.3964 0.4626 0.5784 -0.4515
Cash Flow -0.0004 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0005
S.E -0.7414 1.1069 0.8329 -0.8581 -0.4231 0.0078 0.0106 -0.6555
Government -0.0126 0.0000 -0.0218 -0.0186 -.0358719*** 0.0000 -.0559728* -.0510696***
S.E -1.3783 . -0.9602 -1.7442 -3.4583 . -2.2366 -4.3021
Institutional 0.0061 0.0000 0.0072 -0.0041 -0.0077 0.0000 -0.0101 -.0175812**
S.E 1.2249 . 0.5771 -0.7035 -1.3726 . -0.7301 -2.7626
Individual 0.0002 0.0000 0.0024 -0.0001 -.0206458** 0.0000 -0.0191 -.0255338***
S.E 0.0425 . 0.1616 -0.0087 -3.1405 . -1.1883 -3.4490
Oil -0.0086 0.0000 0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0108 0.0000 0.0087 -0.0082
S.E -0.7363 . 0.0374 -0.0264 -0.8148 . 0.2673 -0.5461
B Materials 0.0197 0.0000 0.0304 .0438618* .081352*** 0.0000 .0950643* .1114047***
S.E 1.1287 . 0.6916 2.1207 4.1104 . 1.9638 4.8267
Industrials -0.0102 0.0000 0.0082 0.0133 .0457094* 0.0000 0.0717 .0727508**
S.E -0.5546 . 0.1774 0.6131 2.1972 . 1.4113 3.0002
C Goods -0.0011 0.0000 0.0163 0.0211 0.0206 0.0000 0.0481 0.0440
S.E -0.0570 . 0.3503 0.9586 0.9781 . 0.9369 1.7918
Health -0.0104 0.0000 0.0086 0.0059 -0.0248 0.0000 0.0076 -0.0089
S.E -0.5295 . 0.1732 0.2526 -1.1107 . 0.1393 -0.3442
C Services -0.0284 0.0000 -0.0092 -0.0141 0.0014 0.0000 0.0280 0.0182
S.E -1.5240 . -0.1956 -0.6386 0.0678 . 0.5436 0.7399
Telecom -0.0288 0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0063 -0.0246 0.0000 0.0124 0.0073
S.E -1.3325 . -0.0218 -0.2507 -1.0043 . 0.2097 0.2585
Technology -0.0005 0.0000 0.0138 0.0242 .0610957* 0.0000 0.0838 .0953179***
S.E -0.0243 . 0.2489 0.9400 2.4622 . 1.3715 3.3319
R2 9% 4% 0% 18% 7% 0%
N 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368
Lagrange chibar2(01) 13101.75 Prob >chibar2 0 chibar2(01) 11970.77 Prob >chibar2 0
Wald chi2 (796) 5.9E+19 Prob2 0 chi2 (796) 3.1E+17 Prob2 0
Hausman chi2(8) 57.23 Prob2 0 chi2(9) 112.23 Prob2 0
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Table 5.70: MENA Dynamical Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets,
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value,
long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined
as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is
defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total
assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is
defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes
1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company
in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials,
technology and telecommunications.
MENA
Variable STDBVA STDMVE LTDBVA LTDMVE TDBVA TDMVE
Lagged .2655935*** .2377342*** .3186418*** .374036*** .4607556*** 0.0337109
S.E. 8.912124 7.106954 10.44099 10.91257 11.94997 0.8087084
Constant .1282269* -0.078 .1440087* -.166208* 0.0585529 -0.0873275
S.E. 2.305942 -1.173 2.253 -2.512674 1.057951 -1.424974
Profitability -0.018 -.1150522*** -0.015 -0.0469424 -.1339062*** -.219233***
S.E -0.703 -3.901 -0.532 -1.613169 -5.45851 -8.001189
Liquidty -0.001 0.000 -.0014366** -0.000035 -.0017932*** -.002188***
S.E -1.060 -0.654 -2.593 -0.0623442 -3.765996 -4.112131
Risk -0.002 0.002 .0098517** 0.0050001 -.0075174** 0.0039515
S.E -0.649 0.699 3.051 1.522566 -2.691618 1.273492
Size -0.003 .0093121* -0.005 .01172** 0.0030194 .0171836***
S.E -1.045 2.494 -1.471 3.162514 0.9855986 5.03687
Tangibilty 0.006 0.028 0.031 .062142*** 0.0135821 0.0084506
S.E 0.442 1.705 1.932 3.786069 0.9783793 0.5465515
Tax 0.035 .1018842** -0.002 0.0480803 0.001928 0.0163079
S.E 1.203 2.984 -0.070 1.425466 0.0676256 0.5129737
Dividends -0.004 -0.017 .084205* -.0793163* -0.0623485 -.0880595*
S.E -0.131 -0.439 2.224 -2.071787 -1.920624 -2.429945
Growth 0.082 0.034 0.040 0.1892766 .507906*** .4303884***
S.E 0.948 0.334 0.408 1.887015 5.966843 4.407928
Cash Flow 0.0007607 0.0001319 -.0029987** -0.0002334 -0.0005796 .0021135*
S.E 0.7794825 0.1147617 -2.677467 -0.2059182 -0.8580857 1.973029
Government 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E . . . . . .
Instituional 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E . . . . . .
Indivdual 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E . . . . . .
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E . . . . . .
B Materials 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E . . . . . .
Industrials 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E . . . . . .
C Goods 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E . . . . . .
Health 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E . . . . . .
C Servicses 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E . . . . . .
Telecom 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E . . . . . .
Technology 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.E . . . . . .
N 4776 4776 4776 4776 4776 4776
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Table 5.71: MENA SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results.Book debt ratio is defined
as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as
short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value. Profitability attribute is
defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales,
OI/SAL operating income to total sales, EBIT/SAL EBIT to sales and EBIT/TA which is EBIT to total assets. Size is defined
as logarithmic of sales, total assets and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth of total sales, MTB market to book ratio, CE/TA capital expenditure to total assets.
Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA), INVP/TA inventory and gross plant to to total assets,
intangible assets to total assets (IA/TA)and Tang/TA tangible assets to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA), depreciation to operating income DEP/OI and effective tax rate. Dividend is
defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend payout ratio and dividends per share DPS. Business
risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share, STDV(ROA) standard deviation
of ROA and STDV(ROE) standard deviation of ROE.Liquidity is defined as the current ratio which is the current liability to
current assets, quick ratio, cash ratio and the working capital ratio. Cash flow attribute is defined as Cash to long term debt,
short term debt and total assets. It is also defined as EBIT plus depreciation plus amortization to total assets EBITDEP/TA.
The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are for the major share
holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry dummies are to test the
effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries are Oil, basic materials,
consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
Determinant Market Book Market Book
STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA
ProfIabilty -0.119 -0.059 -0.273 -0.088 0.023 -0.171 -0.083 -0.037 -0.172 -0.078 0.017 -0.174
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.031 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 0.093 <0.001
Size -0.08 -0.008 0.088 -0.064 -0.001 0.08 -0.057 -0.018 0.084 -0.061 -0.006 0.084
<0.001 0.251 <0.001 <0.001 0.481 <0.001 <0.001 0.076 <0.001 <0.001 0.312 <0.001
Growth -0.017 0.033 -0.049 -0.004 -0.028 0.006 -0.011 0.056 -0.034 -0.032 -0.025 -0.045
0.081 0.004 <0.001 0.364 0.012 0.305 0.181 <0.001 0.003 0.005 0.021 <0.001
Tang 0.081 0.063 -0.071 0.043 0.08 -0.034 0.086 0.081 -0.056 0.082 0.09 -0.06
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Tax 0.15 0.233 -0.03 0.068 0.117 0.039 0.148 0.222 -0.032 0.151 0.116 -0.03
<0.001 <0.001 0.008 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.006 <0.001 <0.001 0.008
Risk 0.012 -0.027 0.005 0.006 -0.025 -0.018 0.009 -0.024 0 0.008 -0.022 0
0.168 0.014 0.343 0.321 0.022 0.073 0.241 0.026 0.495 0.255 0.043 0.497
Div -0.038 -0.015 -0.058 -0.025 -0.006 0.032 -0.106 -0.065 -0.229 -0.109 -0.038 -0.227
0.001 0.109 <0.001 0.023 0.312 0.005 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001
Liqud -0.139 -0.06 -0.236 -0.104 -0.056 -0.199 -0.13 -0.058 -0.218 -0.13 -0.059 -0.221
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Cash Flow -0.033 -0.054 0.037 -0.064 -0.066 0.057 -0.029 -0.054 0.028 -0.022 -0.023 0.033
0.004 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.01 <0.001 0.011 0.038 0.031 0.004
Ownership
Gov -0.011 0.04 -0.018 -0.012 0.041 -0.018
0.188 <0.001 0.073 0.169 <0.001 0.08
indv 0.064 -0.004 -0.096 0.066 -0.067 -0.095
<0.001 0.38 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Inst -0.045 -0.034 0.049 -0.045 -0.036 0.049
<0.001 0.003 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 <0.001
Industry
Oil 0.059 0 0.034 0.061 0.008 0.034
<0.001 0.488 0.003 <0.001 0.254 0.003
Mater 0.162 0.111 0.182 0.164 -0.005 0.184
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.35 <0.001
Indust 0.209 0.11 0.191 0.213 -0.049 0.194
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Cgoods 0.159 0.088 0.111 0.163 -0.006 0.113
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.311 <0.001
Health 0.099 0.042 0.015 0.102 0.007 0.016
<0.001 <0.001 0.122 <0.001 0.301 0.1
Cserv 0.191 0.128 0.084 0.195 0.016 0.085
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.095 <0.001
Telec 0.035 -0.009 0.022 0.035 -0.021 0.024
0.002 0.241 0.037 0.002 0.045 0.028
Techno 0.079 0.029 0.076 0.079 -0.031 0.077
<0.001 0.01 <0.001 <0.001 0.007 <0.001
N 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368
R2 % 4 3 10 4 3 10 12 10 19 12 5 21
Model Fit
(APC) 0.082, P<0.001 0.082, P<0.001 0.083 P<0.001 0.127 P<0.001
(ARS) 0.080, P<0.001 0.080, P<0.001 0.135 P<0.001 0.124 P<0.001
(AARS) 1.065 P<0.001 1.065 P<0.001 0.132 P<0.001 0.124 P<0.001
(AVIF) 1.292 1.292 4.035 3.897
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Table 5.72: MENA ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to
total assets and total debt to total assets. Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market
value and total debt to market value. Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined
as the current ratio, which is the current liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the
share price (volatility). Size is defined as the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to
total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined
as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets
in percentages (GTA). The table shows results with and without the dummies variables. Ownership structure dummies are
for the major share holders either governments, individuals or institutions where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. The industry
dummies are to test the effects of being in a different where it takes 0 or 1 if a company in certain industry. The industries
are Oil, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care,industrials, technology and telecommunications.
MENA Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable STDBVA LTDBVA TDBVA STDMVE LTDMVE TDMVE
Profitability 13.73% 11.79% 10.40% 9.29% 8.38% 10.99%
Size 22.13% 13.24% 12.53% 15.60% 11.12% 13.73%
Growth 9.87% 5.70% 7.79% 7.73% 7.84% 8.22%
Tangibility 12.33% 13.07% 10.08% 14.13% 13.07% 10.33%
Non-Debt Tax shield 12.01% 24.97% 14.58% 21.30% 31.08% 12.14%
Volatility 7.01% 7.76% 9.75% 5.90% 7.71% 10.15%
Dividends 4.09% 5.81% 10.80% 5.78% 5.15% 8.61%
Liquidity 9.27% 10.71% 15.23% 8.97% 10.31% 13.98%
Cash Flow 9.55% 6.95% 8.83% 11.28% 5.34% 11.85%
Good prediction % 47.74% 40.28% 65.29% 45.05% 43.55% 64.06%
S.D of abs errors 0.09 0.13 0.1046 0.1204 0.1118 0.1262
RMSE 0.12 0.15 0.1399 0.1489 0.1316 0.1637
MAE 0.07 0.08 0.09288 0.08765 0.06931 0.1042
N 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368
Adding Dummies
Profitability 10.51% 5.88% 7.42% 8.30% 8.10% 10.34%
Size 12.41% 11.21% 10.57% 10.55% 10.88% 12.61%
Growth 3.00% 0.26% 1.42% 1.45% 5.31% 1.15%
Tangibility 11.01% 9.11% 7.85% 10.48% 12.10% 7.61%
Non-Debt Tax shield 8.18% 14.62% 11.23% 19.42% 16.06% 10.99%
Volatility 0.15% 7.47% 9.79% 6.22% 7.31% 3.12%
Dividends 7.03% 7.47% 5.13% 3.06% 3.92% 7.45%
Liquidity 8.92% 7.41% 12.16% 7.97% 9.00% 10.47%
Cash Flow 12.16% 11.50% 8.80% 9.97% 4.95% 9.86%
Ownership Dummies
Government 3.37% 3.71% 3.33% 3.09% 2.77% 0.78%
Institutional 1.34% 3.21% 2.21% 2.61% 1.08% 1.90%
Individual 3.23% 0.89% 3.09% 1.06% 3.18% 4.03%
Industry Dummies
Oil 2.65% 4.64% 3.64% 2.39% 2.65% 2.90%
Basic Materials 4.03% 3.13% 2.90% 2.05% 1.35% 5.09%
Consumer Goods 0.19% 0.48% 0.08% 2.74% 0.11% 0.22%
Consumer Services 0.45% 1.72% 0.45% 0.44% 3.14% 0.25%
Health Care 3.61% 2.46% 3.50% 2.90% 2.73% 2.15%
Industrials 1.65% 0.03% 0.82% 0.09% 0.39% 2.95%
Technology 3.45% 2.19% 3.25% 2.84% 2.69% 3.72%
Telecommunications 2.66% 2.61% 2.35% 2.38% 2.25% 2.41%
Good prediction % 56.62% 45.59% 75.01% 56.62% 49.24% 74.77%
RMSE 0.0441 0.0481 0.0372 0.0487 0.0404 0.0483
MAE 0.0192 0.0186 0.0175 0.0218 0.0154 0.0226
S.D of abs errors 0.0397 0.0443 0.0328 0.0435 0.0374 0.0427
N 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368 6368
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5.5 Discussion
As previously we hypostasized that there is negative relation between leverage and
profitability. The results of the three methods are in agreement to some extent with
a few different cases. However, noticeably differences exist between the measures
of leverage. The pecking order theory suggest that the profitability measure have a
negative relation with leverage while the trade-off theory suggest that it is positive.
Therefore, the results show that Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia all follow the pecking order theory. In this study we notice that the three
methodologies might not point to the same result. For example, Egypt long term
debt have a positive relation with profitability using the panel data models while the
coefficient of the total debt is negative when using the SEM. Oman and UAE both
have a positive relation between the long term debt and profitability and negative
relation with the total debt. Therefore, it is possible to say that they follow both
theories.
The relation between the liquidity measures and the all the definitions of leverage
for all the countries in the sample is negative using the panel data and the SEM
approaches. With the exception of Morocco and Oman who both have a positive
result for the long term debt with liquidity. The notion is that firms would use the
internal cash and therefore would not issue either debt or equity. Therefore based
on our results we could conclude that we accept the hypothesis and find a strong
evidence to support it. Although, the positive results that we encounter with few
countries were the relation is positive, this results does not an interpretation in the
capital structure context. Furthermore, we also find that the total debt in book values
is positive to liquidity for Saudi Arabia using the panel data models. However, this
relation is not confirmed by the SEM approach.
As mentioned in the hypotheses development section before that the firms with
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volatile earnings or unstable share price would face higher costs of financial distress
and thus debt agency problem is stronger. The results for the risk variable are not
strong as expected. In Several countries we find the relation to be no significant at
all such as Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait. In addition, we find also an inverse relation
to what both the pecking order and the trade-off theory suggest which is that the
relation is negative. Most of our results are positive. The only countries with the
negative results are Saudi Arabia and UAE.
Accordant to the trade-off theory the relation between leverage and tangibility
is positive but the pecking order theory suggest that the relation is negative. Our
findings when using the total debt and the long term debt are that Bahrain, Egypt,
Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia and UAE follow the trade-off theory. On the other hand,
based on the short term debt we find that Jordan, Tunisia, Kuwait and Morocco all
follow the pecking order theory. The problem with the theories of capital structure
is that there is no exact definition for the measure of leverage that should be used.
Therefore, based on that we find that the results for tangibility are between both
theories and we can’t reject nor accept the hypothesis.
The pecking order theory suggest that firms prefer to finance their projects using
internal funds. Therefore, they would use the cash profit instead of paying it as
dividends to shareholders. For that reason the expectation is that there is a negative
relation between dividends and leverage. It is worth mentioning that the majority
of firms in the sample of this study don’t pay dividends at all. The results show
that all the countries in the sample have a negative relationship between the long
term debt and dividends. The results for the long term debt on the other hand are
different between the panel data and the SEM model. The SEM shows that all the
relations are significant and negative while the panel data results show that Egypt
and Palestine both have positive relationship. Based on that we could conclude
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that firms that the pecking order theory suggestion for the dividends is strongly
supported in the MENA countries.
As discussed previously the trade-off theory suggest a negative relation between
the leverage and growth opportunities. On the other hand, the pecking order theory
is not clear and it is noted that a positive relation is expected. From the results
we find that the results are either negative for all measures or positive. We find
that Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, Tunisia all have
a negative relation which would suggest that these countries follow the trade-off
theory. On the other hand, Oman and Saudi Arabia have a positive relation and
thus would suggest a pecking order theory in these countries. However, the results
of Oman are not confirmed by the SEM and the results are negative. UAE have a
negative relation with total debt and positive with the short term and long term debt.
Therefore, we accept the hypothesis for the countries with the negative results.
The cash flow is linked with the agency theory where it is suggested that using
debt would decrease the amount of cash the managers have to spent and act as
a discipline tool for managers and thus suggest that firms with high cash flows
would prefer to finance their projects using debt to monitor managers. Therefore
the agency theory suggest a positive relation. On the other hand, the pecking
order theory suggest that firms with high internal cash would use to finance their
projects and this won’t need any debt and therefore suggest a negative relation. As
discussed in the hypotheses section it is expected that the total debt have a negative
relation while the long term would have a positive relation. The results show that
Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE
all have a negative relation which support the pecking order theory. Therefore, we
accept the hypotheses and conclude that the majority of the countries in our sample
follow the pecking order theory. On the other hand, Qatar and Saudi Arabia both
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have a positive result for the short and long term debt which is in line with the agency
theory suggestion. The only country which is not following either of the theories is
Egypt with a positive relation to total debt.
The agency theory suggest that managers ownership reduce the agency costs.
On the other hand, empirical results discussed in Chapter 4 suggest that firms
owned by an institution would have low debt. The same is applicable to individual
and Institutional and therefore it is suggested that if the relation is negative then it
is line with the previous studies. If it is positive then it have no merit. The findings
show that for the majority of the countries it is negative and significant. However,
the results differ for the same country when changing from book debt to market
debt and also when using different methods. Due to the fact that many models
which include the dummies for the industrial sectors have problem with the variance
inflation factor these results should be interpreted with caution.
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Chapter 6
Capital Structure in Financial firms
6.1 Introduction
Islamic finance or banking follows the rules of Sharia Law in the financial trans-
actions. Islamic banks are operating worldwide with conventional banks opening
Islamic windows to try to capture the growth in the industry. According to Earnest
and Young (2011) Islamic banks assets with commercial banks reached 1.1 trillion
at the end of 2012 and with MENA Islamic Banking doubling by 2015 to reach 990
billion dollars. This growth makes it very important to study the capital structure of
Islamic and conventional banks in the MENA countries area.
The Islamic banking industry is growing rapidly at 17% percentage annually. A
report by Ernst and Young forecasted that the global Islamic banking assets would
reach 1.8 trillion dollars by the end of 2013. As the figures show the industry is
booming at the moment, the vast size of the industry has attracted conventional
banks to establish Islamic banks operation windows to take a share of the market.
Despite the vast promise of the Islamic banking industry it has not always been the
case. Yudistira (2003) states that Islamic banks suffered more than conventional
banks from the global crisis between 1998-1999. At that time the estimated Islamic
banking and finance industry size was around US$100 billion as reported by Hamwi
and Aylward (1999).
Capital structure research started with Modigliani and Miller (1958) exceptional
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work. Since then a significant amount of research has been directed toward finding
the factors that affect the decision of firms in choosing their capital structure. How-
ever, banks were always omitted on the basis that the choice of their capital is con-
trolled by regulations. Despite that, it is important to understand the determinants
of banks capital structure as non-financial firms. Recent evidence from Gropp and
Heider (2010) shows that banks capital structure is determined by standard capital
structure theories while regulations are of a second order.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First section (6.2) discuss
the research gap and the contribution of this study. Then, section (6.3) provides
a brief literature review of the determinants of capital structure and Islamic banks
followed by hypothesis development. Section (6.4) provides main results and find-
ings of this chapter. After that, Section (6.5) discuss and summaries the empirical
results.
6.2 Research Gap for Islamic Studies
Islamic finance is based on principle of fairness for all the members of the society.
From this principle Islam did forbid the use and charge of (Riba) and replaced it with
the profit-loss sharing principle in which both parties share the risks and rewards
of the loan agreement. Therefore, Islamic banking is they key toward and Islamic
finance and an Islamic economy. The importance of using banks and the banking
system did lead to the invention of the Islamic banks which is derived from the rules
of the Sharia law. Since Islamic banks started to operate it did lead to conventional
banks opening the Sharia windows or Islamic branches in which these banks try to
attract customers who prefer to use Islamic banking product. Despite a huge debate
to classify these windows as Islamic both are growing rapidly. Khan and Mirakhor
(1989) state that the Islamic profit and loss sharing does contribute to the welfare
of the society, where labour, capital and entrepreneurship are combined toward
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production and economics development. Although, they agree a percentage of the
profit it is not considered to be (Riba) as it is not guaranteed. Iqbal (1997) also state
that the cornerstone of the Islamic banking is the prohibition of (Riba). Although the
importance of Islamic banking to both Muslims and the industry to our knowledge
there is no theory about the capital structure of Islamic banks. Few studies did
discuss how the Islamic bank capital structure should be and how it is different to
the conventional banks capital structure. Therefore, this chapter will try to answer
this question empirically to shed light on the difference in the determinants of capital
structure of Islamic and conventional banks in the MENA countries area. This study
also intend to test if the capital structure can be explained by traditional theories
such as pecking order and trade-off theory. The main contribution of this study is
to test the determinants of the capital structure of Islamic banks. To our knowledge
this was not tested before. This study will also introduce the credit ratings as a
possible determinant for capital structure in the MENA countries banks; as it was
only used in studies of non-financial firms before. This study also test the ownership
structure relationship to the Islamic banks capital structure.
6.3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Modigliani and Miller (1958) is the base for research on capital structure theory. By
showing what is irrelevant they opened the door for further investigation towards
what is relevant. In their theory (which is also called the Irrelevance theory), the
main idea they argued is that under specific assumptions it makes no difference if
a company is financed using debt or equity. The assumptions they suggested are:
All investors have complete knowledge about the future returns, all firms within an
industry have the same risk irrespective of capital structure, no taxes or transactions
costs, individuals and corporations borrow easily at the same rate of interest, all
earnings are paid out as dividends and there is no growth, the average cost of
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capital is constant. In their second proposition Modigliani and Miller (1963), they
added taxes to their model and concluded that firms should use as much debt as
they can to take advantage off the debt tax shield. After their work several theories
tried to relax the assumptions, which are the trade-off theory, pecking order theory,
agency theory and market timing theory.
The trade-off theory was introduced by Modigliani and Miller (1963), however,
their conclusions were criticized by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973). Kraus and
Litzenberger (1973) put into state preference the tax advantage of debt and bankruptcy
penalties. Furthermore, it assumes that there are several benefits and costs accom-
panying the use of debt. Then, it was extended to include benefits and costs of debt
associated with agency conflicts. The trade-off theory was heavily criticized by My-
ers (1984); he argued that the theory is accepted to a certain degree however its
low value of the coefficient of determination R2 is not satisfactory. Another form of
trade-off theory is the dynamic, which assumes that a company’s capital structure
in specific time is not their target capital. Instead firms do adjust their capital struc-
ture dynamically. According to Leary and Roberts (2005) companies move toward
and adjust over years to reach their target capital structure.
Pecking order theory was first suggested by the classic book of Donaldson (1961).
He studied the general attitudes towards the use of external debt and surveyed
companies and found that companies prefer internal sources of funds rather than
external. As he finds in his book: It has been established that a majority of these
companies (12 out of 20) had demonstrated the capacity to generate internally vir-
tually all (96%) of their fundsI˙ (Donaldson, 1961: p. 51).
Although the original idea was Donaldson (1961), Myers (1984) put the theory
into practice. They assumed that given information asymmetry is between stake-
holders, firms will finance their investment project in an order that is first to internal
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funds then debt before equity. The intuition is that companies prefer debt over risky
stocks and that issuing equity might indicate for stock holders that stocks are over-
priced which would result in a decrease in the share price.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that the value of the firm is independent of
its capital structure and thus the method in which firms raise their capital would
be irrelevant. However firms operate in an environment of imperfections, where
bankruptcy costs, financial distress and transactions costs exist. They also operate
within governing regulations such as deposits insurance. Therefore, their market
valuation is dependent on their capital structure and level of debt in their capital
(Grais and Kulathunga 2007). Rajhi and Hassairi (2012) mention that the MM theory
of capital structure is based on the assumption that funds can only be raised through
debt and equity: in the case of banks it is between equity , debt and deposits.
Gropp and Heider (2010) work is the motivation for this chapter. They state that
deposit insurance and capital regulation are of second order and that there are con-
siderable similarities between banks and non-financial firms. Their work opposed
the general perception in the research bodies that banks capital structure is de-
cided by minimum capital requirement and that capital structure theories are not
applicable to financial firms. Their key findings can be summarized as follows: first,
standard determinants of firms capital apply to large publicly traded banks in the
US and EU except for banks near minimum capital requirements. Second, banks
tend to hold more discretionary capital, especially banks which are profitable, divi-
dend paying and have high MBT ratios. On the other hand, another theory widely
accepted in the literature of banks capital structure is as argued by Froot (2001) that
banks capital structure is a buffer against negative shocks to their value.
Octavia and Brown (2010) follow in the footsteps of Gropp and Heider (2010)
however they apply their study to the emerging markets. Their findings support
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the theory that capital regulations are of second order and that standard determi-
nants of capital structure have more power in explaining the capital structure. They
use five determinants, which are size, profitability, market-to-book ratio, collateral
value and dividend paying status. They find a negative relationship between prof-
itability and collateral with book leverage. On the other hand, they find a positive
relationship between size, MTB and dividends with book leverage. They conclude
that the determinants of capital structure have explanatory power in the developing
countries banks.
Sharpe (1995) based his study on the Australian banks sector. His choice was
based on the fact that research based on the US is unable to examine the determi-
nants of capital structure in the absence of deposit insurance and regulation. In his
study he tries to compare pre-1984 and post 1984 to see the effect of the capital ad-
equacy requirements. The findings are consistent with the pecking order theory of
Myers and Majluf (1984). He also concludes that the behaviour underlying the short
and long-term capital accumulation process was unaffected by the introduction of
capital adequacy requirements.
Karim and Ali (1989) suggest that Conventional banks use both debt and equity
to finance their investments while Islamic Banks are expected to finance their in-
vestments using mainly equity financing and customer deposits accounts. Metwally
(1997) argues that the higher the leverage ratio, the higher the probability that the
bank is Islamic. This could be linked to the fact that Islamic banks are more reliant
on equity and therefore the equity to total assets is higher in Islamic banks than
conventional banks. Furthermore, Samad (2004) finds that the ratio of debt to total
assets is significantly lower in Islamic Banks. Several studies argue that ROA and
ROE are higher in Islamic banks rather than conventional banks. These studies
are Iqbal (2001), Rosly and Bakar (2003) and Olson and Zoubi (2008). In addition,
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Kaouther et al. (n.d.) finds that the relation between leverage and ROE is negative
while positive with ROA. Liquidity is a very important factor in the banking system
as mismanaging the bank liquidity could cause bank ruin. Parashar (2010) notes
that Islamic banks have less liquid assets in comparison to conventional banks.
The main goal is to test if bank capital structure is determined by the standard
determinants and not by the regulatory capital requirements. We try to test these
variables for both Islamic banks and conventional banks. We use four variables to
represent leverage, 2 for Book leverage and 2 for Market leverage. Any significant
results in one of these will result in rejecting the hypothesis: deposit insurance and
capital regulation are of first order in the decision of capital structure and then we
could conclude that the capital regulations and requirements are of second order.
Gropp and Heider (2010) suggest that if the coefficient of the determinants of capital
structure is zero then the view of the regulation of banks capital structure holds.
In addition, Juca et al. (2012) and Sharpe (1995) find that standard determinants
of capital structure are significant. In the following section we develop the main
hypotheses of this study.
6.3.1 Profitability
The profitability of the company is the sole purpose of the firm. The trade-off theory
proposes that companies with higher profitability will have a higher level of leverage
which can be explained as a positive relationship as Modigliani and Miller (1963)
argue. In contrast the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest
a negative relationship as companies prefer to use internal funds before debt and
equity and therefore if the company generates more profit it is expected that it will
have a lower leverage.
We use four variables as the proxy for profitability to construct the latent of Profit.
These are Return on Equity ROE, and Return on Assets ROA as adopted by Booth
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et al. (2001) ,Wald (1999) and Song (2005). We also use Profit Margin Ratio PM and
Operating Profit Margin ratio. Strong support for the pecking order theory exists in
the literature as in Frank and Goyal (2009), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Titman
and Wessels (1988). Furthermore, studies which focused on the determinants of
banks find a negative relationship such as Gropp and Heider (2010) and Octavia
and Brown (2010). Therefore the following hypothesis will be tested:
H1: There is a significant and negative relation between the profitability of the bank
and its financial leverage.
6.3.2 Risk
Frank and Goyal (2009) argue that companies with volatile stock are expected to
be riskier due to the fact that prices reflect the business risk of the bank. Both the
pecking order theory and the trade-off theory predict a negative relationship be-
tween the risk and leverage. Higher risk means that the probability of paying their
debt is less and hence lenders will ask for higher return. Bradley et al. (1984) debate
that companies with higher volatility are expected to have less leverage. Further-
more, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that companies with high variability of
earnings are expected to have higher cost of debt and lenders might not lend to
these companies. We use yearly standard deviation for price volatility as used by
Halov et al. (2010) and Bradley et al. (1984). We also use the following measures
to represent the riskiness of the company operations. These are Alpha and Beta
for each stock. We suggest the following hypothesis:
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between the risk of the bank and its
financial leverage.
6.3.3 Dividends
Dividends proxy is one of the corners of the pecking-order-theory. As the theory
of the pecking-order suggests, companies finance their projects in an order where
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internal funds are their first choice. Therefore they tend to retain earnings and not
pay them as dividends to shareholders. The relation between the dividends paid
and the leverage is negative as Frank and Goyal (2007) found in their analysis.
They argue that more investigation needs to be done in this area, as results are
ambiguous. Dividends relationship with leverage could only be explained in the
light of the pecking order theory as there is no firm theory in that regard under the
trade off theory.
Different measures to represent the dividends proxy are used in the literature.
Frank and Goyal (2007) found a negative relationship between the amount of div-
idends paid and the leverage. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that although there
are cases where firms issue stocks while they could issue debt and thus reject the
whole theory of the pecking order, on aggregate it is evidence that the pattern ex-
ists that proves that companies think of the dividends as first choice. Furthermore,
Ben Naceur et al. (2006) and Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) supported the negative relation-
ship. We define the dividends proxy in 3 variables. First we use the dividends
pay-out ratio (DVDPR), then dividends per share (DPS) and log of the amount
paid in dividends (DivePO). We test the following hypothesis:
H3: There is a significant and negative relationship between the dividends paid by
the bank and financial leverage.
6.3.4 Size
Trade-off and the pecking order theories argue that large firms tend to have higher
leverage than small firms. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Titman and Wessels
(1988) suggest that large companies are in general more diversified and have more
firm cash flows which would result in lower probability of bankruptcy. Hence, we
expect a positive relation between leverage and firm size. Akhtar and Oliver (2009)
find a similar relationship for both multinational and domestic Japanese firms.
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Furthermore, studies in the emerging market found similar results to the previous
ones such as Huang and Song (2006), Booth et al. (2001) and Rajan and Zingales
(1995) who all support a positive relationship. The previous studies are based on
non-financial firms but could also be generalized to include banks like the findings
of Gropp and Heider (2010) and Octavia and Brown (2010). Different ratios are
used to represent the size of the company. These are the natural logarithm of total
assets, natural logarithm of Sales (Revenues) and the natural logarithm of Market
value. The three measures are used in this study. Based on this discussion, we
test the following hypothesis:
H4: There is a significant and positive relationship between size and leverage.
6.3.5 Growth
There is mixed evidence in the literature about the effect of growth on capital struc-
ture. Successful firms who have high growth are expected to require large injection
of capital to retain their profitability. The trade-off theory predicts that firms with
more investment opportunities will tend to issue more equity and have less lever-
age. The reason is that firms with high growth opportunities prefer to have more
flexibility that debt cannot provide and therefore suggest a positive relationship. On
the other hand the pecking order prediction is more complicated. A simple pre-
diction could be that firms who expect large investments in the future should use
more leverage to finance their investments, as the retained earnings alone are not
enough. However, the pecking order theory also suggests that highly leveraged
firms will not take more profitable investments simply because risks will be carried
by equity holders and bond holders will gain the bigger percentage of the returns
as defined by Myers (1977). He also argues that the agency cost problem can be
solved if firms use short-term instead of long-term debt. We expect a positive rela-
tion to growth if growing firms substitute short-term debt for long-term debt. Barclay
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and Smith (1995) find that firms who are regulated have more long term debt in their
capital structure and therefore suggest a positive relationship between capital struc-
ture and growth opportunities. Several studies’ findings were similar such as Goyal
et al. (2002) who finds that US defense companies have a positive relationship with
leverage. Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) also find support for the trade-off theory; they find a
positive relation in a sample of companies in Saudi Arabia. In addition, Chen2004
also finds a positive relationship in a sample of Chinese companies. Furthermore,
Al-Sakran (2001) finds that the effect of growth on leverage is negative for certain
sectors and insignificant for others. This could be interpreted as a company in dif-
ferent industries having a different relationship between leverage and growth. We
use 3 measures to represent this proxy. These are the percentage of the change
in the value of total assets, percentage of change in the yearly revenues and the
percentage of change in the market value every year. Based on the above, we test
the following hypothesis:
H5: There is a significant and negative relationship between growth opportunities
of the bank and its financial leverage.
6.3.6 Ownership Structure
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that there are agency costs between share-
holders and debt holders. Another conflict also exists between managers and
shareholders. These conflicts play a vital part when the company faces financial
distress. Therefore, firms should choose the optimal capital structure and owner-
ship in a way that reduces total agency costs. Furthermore, Berger and Bonac-
corsi di Patti (2006) argued that the agency costs’ main components are separa-
tion of ownership and control. They also emphasised that excluding the ownership
structure from the test of agency costs hypothesis might bias the results. They used
variables for insider shareholders, shareholders holding more than 5% and intu-
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itional shareholders. In addition, Michaely and Vincent (2012) find that institutional
holdings are a significant determinant of capital structure. They suggest that there
is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and capital structure.
These results were also verified by a study based on the Saudi Arabia stock
exchange by Al-Ajmi et al. (2009). On the other hand, Sharpe (1995) finds that there
is no difference between the privately owned banks and the government-owned
banks. They used dummy variables for government and private owned banks and
concluded that both have the same behaviour in their choice of capital structure.
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) find a similar result and they used three dummy variables to
model the ownership structure; these are government, family and institution. In this
study we intend to use more variables to investigate more.
The Bankscope data base contains data about the ownership structure. Since we
plan to use more than one model we created two sets of variables. The first set are
dummy variables showing the ultimate owner of the bank (the largest shareholder)
who owns a stake larger than 25%. The second set is the ownership percentages
of the largest shareholders in the company. The institutional variables we intend to
use are Individual, Holding company, Cooperation, Insurance firm, Bank, Govern-
ment, Investment advisor. For example, for the government dummy we assign 1 for
companies owned by governments or government funds or any other firm controlled
by a government and 0 for firms, which are not owned by governments. It is also
worth mentioning that some banks are owned by a combination of more than one
kind of owner, therefore we assign several scores for the same bank. The following
hypothesis is tested:
H6: There is a significant and negative relationship between bank leverage and
ownership structure.
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6.3.7 Age
The argument is that young firms depend heavily on debt as they do not have
internal funds to finance their operations. It is also argued that old companies have
good relationships with banks and it will be easier for them to enter the debt markets.
Previous empirical studies found different results depending on the chosen variable
for the debt. Romano et al. (2001) found a negative relationship between leverage
and firm age in the family business. Age variable is used as a numerical variable in
the SEM-PLS. It is also used as a dummy variable where banks were grouped into
three categories the first one is AgeA which include banks more than 25 years old
and the AgeC which include banks less than 25 years old. We propose the following
hypothesis:
H7: There is a significant negative relationship between the age of the bank and
financial leverage.
6.3.8 Tax
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest that firms with low non-debt tax shields will
have a lower leverage. This suggests a negative relationship between the tax and
leverage. Furthermore, Titman and Wessels (1988) suggested using 3 indicators
which are investment tax credits over total assets, depreciation over total assets
and direct estimates of non-debt tax shields over total assets. Due the unavailabil-
ity of data for two of the suggested variables we were forced to use only one which
is the ratio of total depreciation to total assets which was also suggested by Dro-
betz and Fix (2005). Titman and Wessels (1988) findings show there is a negative
relationship between the non-debt tax shield and the leverage. On the other hand
Ozkan (2001) argued that this proxy might not represent the non-debt tax shield
and that firms with higher deprecation ratios would have lower growth opportunities
and therefore he suggested a positive relationship. We suggest the following hy-
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pothesis:
H8: There is a significant negative relationship between the tax shield of the bank
and its financial leverage.
6.3.9 Liquidity
The pecking order theory hypothesis is that in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation, firms with liquid assets such as cash and marketable securities will prefer
to finance their investment internally. Therefore, firms with higher liquidity ratio are
expected to have lower leverage. Eldomiaty (2007) suggest that there is a nega-
tive relationship between leverage and liquidity proxy. Al-Ajmi et al. (2009), Sbeti
(2010), Nikolaos et al. (2007) and Ozkan (2001) find a negative relationship be-
tween liquidity and leverage. Furthermore, since the sample in this study are banks
liquidity it is crucial. Due to the importance of liquidity this thesis use various mea-
sures of liquidity. These are interbank ratio (INTERB), net loans to net assets
(NTLTA), net loans to customer short term funding (NTLSTF ), net loans to total
deposits and borrowing (NTLTDE), Liquid assets to customer short term funding
(LIQDEP ) and liquid assets to total deposits and borrowing (LIQTDE). We test
the following hypothesis:
H9: There is a significant and negative relationship between leverage and liquidity.
6.3.10 Credit Rating
An article by Kisgen (2006) finds that classic determinants of capital structure, the
ones we hypothesized in this study, explain capital structure. However he added
that firms in a special situation make their choice of capital structure based on their
credit rating. The argument is that firms near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade
issue less debt relative to equity than firms not near a change in rating. On the
other hand, Kemper (2011) finding shows that credit ratings are not a first order
concern of capital structure decisions, and that the model does not hold through
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the different classes of credit ratings. However, Shin2012 et al. (2012) find that
the effects between credit ratings on capital structure persist significantly in the
context of trade-off and pecking order theory. It is possible to implement the credit
rating dummies using the panel data regressions. However, when we use the SEM
it is not possible to test this assumption. Therefore this study included 2 sets of
variables for testing the hypotheses of credit rating effect on the capital structure.
We first create 2 dummy variables based on the Capital Intelligence credit rating
through the Bankscope database. Specifically we use the Financial Strength rating
as the credit rating variable. We construct a credit rating variable from historical
bank rating for the banks in the sample; if the variable is significant then banks do
consider their credit rating when they issue debt or equity. We construct 2 different
dummy variables to test the credit rating hypothesis. We construct 2 dummies which
are Crp and Crm and these take the value of 1 if the credit rating is plus (+) in Crp
and minus in Crm. We also construct credit rating score variables. We base it
on the 4 different credit rating agencies which are Fetch, SP, Moodys and Capital
Intelligence. These variables are CRSP , CRF ITCH, CRMODY and CRCI. We
convert the historical credit rating for each year in the sample into a score starting
from 1 for the highest rating and 25 for the lowest rating. The reason for creating
this variable is the need to use the construct of Credit Rating in the SEM mode.
We use historical data of credit rating at the end of each year of the sample. The
following hypothesis is tested:
H10: Banks do consider credit ratings in their decision of capital structure.
In this study our main goal is to compare the capital structure of Islamic banks and
conventional banks. Since the number of Islamic banks in the area of our interest is
considered small, it is important to use PLS as it is able to deal with a small sample
size. This study sample is drawn from the MENA countries; the sample includes
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108 conventional banks and 30 Islamic Banks. Table 4.1 presents the banks used
in this study by country. Data availability was a challenge and one of the main
limitations of this study. The source of the Data is Bankscope and Bloomberg. The
sample use eight yearly observations starting from 2006 to 2013 and any bank with
four years missing was excluded. Furthermore, in this study banks from Syria, Iraq
and Iran were dropped because of unavailable data.
6.4 Main Results
In Table 6.1 we find the results of using the Partial Least Squares (PLS) Structural
Equation Modelling to empirically examine the relationships between the dependent
and independent determinants of capital structure. First of all we could see that the
R2 value is 31.5% percent in Conventional banks and 67% for Islamic banks for the
dependent variables of the Book leverage. On the other hand, it also reports that
theR2 for the market leverage is lower than the book leverage, where the values are
19% for conventional banks and 36% for Islamic banks. According to Chen et al.
(1999) the values of the coefficient determinationR2 above .670 are substantial and
values around .33 are average and .190 weak. Therefore we believe that the R2
of our models are sound except for the Conventional banks market leverage model
where the values are weak.
Furthermore, we find that there is a deference in determinants of capital structure
between the Conventional banks and the Islamic banks in the profitabilty measure.
We start with the book leverage and find that the relation is significant for both
banks. The relation is positive which is not in accordance with our hypotheses and
therefore we reject the hypotheses. On the other hand, we find that the relationship
is significant for the market leverage and negative which is in agreement with the hy-
potheses. Secondly, risk is not significant when the book leverage is the dependent
variable but significant for the market leverage. The sign is positive for both banks
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which is not what the hypothesis indicates and therefore we reject the hypothesis.
Dividends are significant across all the banks and measures of leverage. How-
ever, different results are shown. When using the book leverage the sign is positive
which indicates that the banks do not follow the pecking order theory. On the other
hand, the results for market leverage shows that the relationship for Islamic banks
are negative and therefore we could conclude that Islamic banks do follow the peck-
ing order theory; however, conventional banks do not. Size is only significant with
Islamic banks when we use the book leverage however the sign of the coefficient
is not what we expected; this would indicate that Islamic banks do not need to take
leverage when they are large. This is in theory true as the major source of income
for Islamic banks is PLS products which would increase when the bank is large and
thus the banks will not be in a position where they need to increase their leverage.
Growth opportunities as we discussed before have mixed results in the empiri-
cal literature. Our findings are not far from that. We find that it is negative only
for the book leverage in the conventional banks and positive in the Islamic banks.
This indicates that banks require more cash injections as they focus on growth and
therefore they would increase their level of leverage when they have a growth op-
portunity and vice versa for the conventional banks. On the other hand when we
use the market leverage both banks are positive with leverage.
Ownership structure in the context of SEM could only indicate if it is important or
not. But we cannot differentiate between the relationships within the construct itself.
We can only conclude that if there is an ultimate owner the leverage level would
increase. However, it is not the case when we use the market leverage. Liquidity
results are a major distinction between the two banks. As Table5 shows, the liquidity
variables are not significant for the market leverage of the conventional banks and
are significant for others. However, the sign shows that the relationship is negative
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with the Islamic Banks and positive with the conventional banks. Our results for the
Islamic banks are in agreement with the previous literature and therefore we accept
the hypothesis only for Islamic banks.
Age variable is significant across all the banks. The relationship is negative with
book leverage and positive with the market leverage. This indicates that old banks
would have less leverage than new banks. On the other hand, when we use the
market leverage it is the reverse and therefore we would expect old banks to have
more leverage than new ones simply because they have a longer financial history.
Tax latent variable which is the non-debt tax shield is not significant across all the
banks. This might be because we only used on variable to measure it as there is
no available data to include more measures.
Credit rating is significantly positive in relation with the conventional banks and
negative with the Islamic banks. These can be explained as those conventional
banks with good rating would issue more debt. However, the relation is negative
with the Islamic Banks which could mean that banks with rating would issue less
debt in order to keep their healthy rating.
Table 7.2 and 7.3 shows the results using different models. The dependent vari-
ables are book leverage and market leverage. The Hausman test results indicate
which models are efficient and which are not. The test is not significant and there-
fore the fixed effect model is the most efficient one for the purpose of our study.
However, one drawback of the fixed effect model is that it drops the dummy vari-
able. Therefore, we chose to use the Tobit model for this purpose. Model 5 is a dy-
namical model, which we used to quantify the adjusting speed of the banks. As our
results show, several factors are significant across the different models. Therefore,
we could reject the null hypothesis that deposit insurance and capital regulation are
of first order in the decision of Capital Structure. We find that classic or non-financial
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firms determinants of capital structure are of first order and therefore banks choose
capital structure in the same way non-financial firms do which is in agreement with
the findings of Gropp and Heider (2010) and Octavia and Brown (2010).
We find that our profitability variable has a negative relationship to leverage. We
expect the results to be negative as we suggested in the hypotheses and thus we
accept the hypotheses. This result is in line with the pecking order theory in which
firms with more profit have less leverage since they have more internal funds to use
for their future investments. This result is in line with Gropp and Heider (2010) and
Octavia and Brown (2010). The profit ratio has a significant positive relationship
for both IB and CB. This result is in agreement with the findings of Berger (1995).
Interestingly the results for the volatility of the return on the price are not what we
expected. The relationship is positive across all the models which would indicate
that riskier banks would have more debt than the non-risky banks.
The pecking order theory argues that companies pay fewer dividends if they need
funds for their investment. In other words they try to use their internal funds before
they use debt. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between the two fac-
tors. Our results show a negative relationship, which is in line with the pecking
order theory, and thus we accept the hypotheses. The results are positive for Is-
lamic and negative for conventional banks. However, it is worth mentioning that the
relationship is not significant for Islamic banks and significant only for conventional
banks. This could be explained as that banks that have more leverage tend pay
less dividends and thus it could mean that banks used first their internal earnings
then they use debt and after that they use equity. Our results are consistent with
the finding of Gropp and Heider (2010). Therefore we accept the hypothesis only
for conventional banks.
In addition, the table shows that the liquidity proxy is negatively related to lever-
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age. This relationship is significant for both banks and significant across the dif-
ferent models. Therefore, we accept the hypotheses that banks with more liquid
assets issue less debt and vice versa. This results support the pecking order the-
ory. As the previous results show the non-debt tax shield which is the main variable
for the trade-off theory is not significant across all the models and samples. Our
size proxy is significant across all models which is similar to the results of Gropp and
Heider (2010) Octavia and Brown (2010), Akhtar (2005) and Al-Ajmi et al. (2009).
Our result could be interpreted as that the larger the banks is the more investors
are willing to lend and the higher is the demand for loans from the bank.
We find that growth has a significant positive relationship across the different
models for the Islamic banks. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and this
finding supports the trade-off theory and could be explained as companies with
more growth opportunities tend to use more debt to finance their operations. This
result is not significant for conventional banks. The regression results in table 5
show that growth is not an important factor in the choice taken by Conventional
banks. Ours result for CB is not consistent with the findings of Barclay and Smith
(1995) and therefore we accept the hypothesis that regulated banks have more long
term debt and therefore have more growth opportunities.
Furthermore, the Dynamical model assumes that banks have an optimal capital
structure and that they move toward this target and adjust. The model as suggested
by Arellano and Bond (1991)uses a lagged variable of the dependent variable as
an independent variable. If the result is significant then this means that banks do
adjust their capital structure over time. As table 5 shows the result is significant
across all the models for the banks.
As 7.4 and 7.5 shows, unfortunately none of the Ownership structure variables
are significant. This is mainly because there are a large number of dummy vari-
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ables. The thought is the SEM is more accurate in testing dummy variables than
other methods. The same problem is faced when using the Credit Rating variable.
More investigation should be done for the ownership structure and the credit rating
using the SEM method.
Moreover, Table 6.5 shows the results of using the GRNN and thus producing the
variable impact for each variable used in this study. Since one of the motivations for
conducting this chapter is to study if Islamic and conventional banks have different
capital structure it is worth doing these analyses. As the above table shows, these
are the top five variables with the highest impact on the dependent variable, either
market leverage or book leverage. It is obvious that when using the book leverage
the profitability measure of profit margin is the most important factor. However, after
that we can see that different measures of different determinants have a share of
the impact.
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Table 6.1: MENA Islamic and Conventional Banks SEM-PLS Results
This table shows the structural equation modeling partial least square SEM-PLS results. Book debt ratio is defined
as total debt to total assets and shareholders’ equity to total assets. Market debt is defined as total debt to market value and
total debt to shareholders equity in market values terms. Profitability attribute is defined as operating income to total assets
OI/TA, ROA return on assets, ROE return on equity, ROS return on sales. Size is defined as logarithmic of sales, total assets
and market value. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA), (GTS) growth
of total sales, and growth of earning per share EPS. Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets
(DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets (DIV/TA), dividend pay-out ratio and dividends
per share DPS. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility), beta of the share and alpha
of the share. Liquidity is defined as interbank ratio (INTERB), net loans to net assets (NTL/TA), net loans to customer and
short term funding (NTL/STF), net loans to total deposits and borrowing (NTL/TDE), Liquid assets to customer and short
term funding (LIQ/DEP) and liquid assets to total deposits and borrowing (LIQ/TDE). Bank Age is defined as a numerical
variable in the SEM-PLS (AGE). It is also used as a dummy variable where banks were grouped into three categories the
first one is (Age-a) which include banks more than 25 years old and the (Age-c) which include banks less than 25 years old.
Ownership structure dummies are for the major shareholders either governments, individuals, bank, insurance, investment,
holding firm, cooperation firm, where it takes 1 or 0 other wise. It also used as the ownership percentages in this table.
Credit rating is constructed as score variables. It is based on the four different credit rating agencies which are Fetch, S&P,
Moodys and Capital Intelligence. These variables are (CR-SP), (CR-FITCH), (CR-MODY) and (CR-CI). The historical credit
rating for each year in the sample is converted into a score starting from 1 for the highest rating and 25 for the lowest rating.
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks
Book Values Market Value Book Values Market Value
Determinant E P E P E P E P
Profit 0.111*** <0.001 0.085** 0.048 -0.342*** <0.001 -0.124** 0.008
Risk -0.008 0.39 0.05 0.163 0.074** 0.004 0.207*** <0.001
Dividends 0.159*** <0.001 0.142** 0.003 -0.076** 0.004 0.31*** <0.001
Size 0.022 0.217 -0.069* 0.089 0.004 0.44 -0.021 0.342
Growth -0.121*** <0.001 0.069* 0.089 0.055** 0.025 0.206*** <0.001
Ownership 0.218*** <0.001 0.285*** <0.001 -0.118*** <0.001 0.091** 0.037
Age -0.128*** <0.001 -0.18*** <0.001 0.269*** <0.001 0.11** 0.015
Tax 0.001 0.487 0.012 0.405 -0.006 0.412 0.062 0.111
Liquidity 0.476*** <0.001 -0.503*** <0.001 0.01 0.358 -0.176*** <0.001
Credit Rating 0.079** 0.003 -0.163*** <0.001 0.12*** <0.001 -0.161*** <0.001
R2 31.5 67 19 36
(APC) 0.120, P<0.001 0.151, P<0.001
(ARS) 0.315 P<0.001 0.514, P<0.001
(AARS) 0.309, P<0.001 0.496, P<0.001
(AVIF) 1.191 1.249
(AFVIF) 1.634 1.823,
(GoF) 0.425 0.547
(SPR) 0.8 0.85
(RSCR) 0.962 0.966
(SSR) 0.95 1
(NLBCDR) 0.775 0.725
340
CHAPTER 6. CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN FINANCIAL FIRMS
Table 6.2: MENA Banks Market Leverage Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Market debt ratio is defined as total debt to market value. Prof-
itability is measured by the return on sales ratio which is defined as net income to net sales. Size is defined as logarithmic of
total assets. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of earning per share EPS. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as the dividend pay-out ratio. Business risk is defined as
the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Liquidity is defined as interbank ratio (INTERB). Bank Age is defined as
as a dummy variable where banks were grouped into three categories the first one is (Age-a) which include banks more than
25 years old and the (Age-c) which include banks less than 25 years old. Ownership structure dummies are for the major
shareholders either governments, individuals, bank, insurance, investment, holding firm, cooperation firm, where it takes 1
or 0 otherwise. Credit rating is constructed as two dummy variables which are Cr-p and Cr-n and these take the value of 1 if
the credit rating have a plus (+) in Cr-p and minus in Cr-n. Also, macroeconomic variables are included which are inflation,
GDP growth and market risk
Market Leverage
Islamic Conventional
Variable OLS Fixed Random Dynamical Tobit OLS Fixed Random Dynamical Tobit
Profitability -0.0014 -0.000386 -0.000704 -0.000187 -0.000596 -0.180* -0.074 -0.095 0.00499 -0.0564**
Risk 0.0205*** 0.0127** 0.0137** 0.00796 0.00463** 0.0191 0.0691 0.0596 0.164 -0.0221
Dividends 0.0120** 0.000804 0.00409 0.000904 0.00258* -0.00460* 0.00245 0.000369 -0.000778 -0.000191
Size -0.0709 0.581** 0.253 0.769* -0.00432 0.0824 0.219 0.119 0.472 0.0643***
Growth -0.00157 -0.00600*** -0.00558** -0.00696*** -0.000292 -0.00345 0.000221 0.0000985 0.000326 -0.000633
Liquidity 0.00194 -0.00675 -0.00366 -0.0122 0.00149 0.00258 -0.0145** -0.00728* -0.0227*** 0.000634
Tax -8.889 -3.905 -5.129 -5.685 -1.453 -11.59 -0.266 -1.686 -0.172 1.529
GDP Growth -0.0619** -0.0133 -0.0284 -0.00623 -0.0267*** -0.0363* -0.0327* -0.0359* -0.0077 -0.00900*
Inflation -0.00799 0.0133 0.0125 0.0161 -0.00192 0.00977 0.00792 0.00895 0.0181 0.00515
Market Risk -27.07 -4.01 -12.34 22.54 -14.80** 0.638 12.15 7.67 41.58*** -5.027
Laggged 0.413*** -0.038
N 243 243 243 189 243 927 927 927 721 927
R2 15% 16% 12% 12%
Variable OLS Fixed Random Dynamical Tobit OLS Fixed Random Dynamical Tobit
Profitability -0.000597 -0.000402 -0.000442 -0.000266 -0.000408 -0.175* -0.0756 -0.0937 -0.0143 -0.0518**
Risk 0.0174** 0.0126** 0.0126** 0.0128* 0.00475** -0.0132 0.0939 0.0663 0.247* -0.029
Dividends 0.00725 0.0000105 0.000949 0.000406 0.00143 -0.00326 0.00196 0.000518 -0.0024 0.000547
Size 0.158 0.640*** 0.537*** 0.876* 0.0934* 0.183** 0.215 0.185 0.564 0.0747***
Growth -0.00399 -0.00608*** -0.00603*** -0.00702*** -0.000817 -0.00631 -0.00107 -0.00178 0.00046 -0.00128
Liquidity -0.00526 -0.00641 -0.0068 -0.0105 -0.00164 0.00254 -0.0143** -0.00726* -0.0213*** 0.00176**
Non Debt Tax -4.423 -3.826 -4.04 -5.274 0.659 -11.23 1.612 -0.402 1.578 0.894
Individual -0.541 . -1.15 0 -0.363** 0.0367 . 0.0288 0 -0.266***
Holding 0 . 0.181 . 0.119 0 0.00903
Cooperation 0.488 . 1.283 0 0.182 0.500** . 0.621 0 0.0748
Insurance 0 . -0.616 . -0.594 0 -0.387***
Bank 0.593* . 0.565 0 -0.0438 0.168 . 0.2 0 -0.0866*
Government -0.106 . -0.756 0 -0.167 0.222 . 0.241 0 0.0279
Advisor 0.885** . 0.74 0 0.185 0.322 . 0.347 0 -0.0258
cr_p -0.095 0.0489 0.0342 -0.0366 0.077 -0.37 0.0477 -0.0335 -0.0175 -0.0405
cr_n -0.0842 -0.0935 -0.0678 -0.303 0.0525 -0.165 0.207 0.105 -0.117 -0.0314
age_a -0.314 . 0 . -0.959* 0 -0.463***
age_b 0 . 0 .
age_c 0 . 0.41 0 -0.0606 0.940*** .
Lagged 0.380*** -0.0381
N 243 243 243 189 243 927 927 927 721 927
R2 17% 16% 15% 16%
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Table 6.3: MENA Banks Book Leverage Panel Data Results
This table shows the panel data regression results. Book debt ratio is defined as total debt to total assets. Prof-
itability is measured by the return on sales ratio which is defined as net income to net sales. Size is defined as logarithmic of
total assets. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of earning per share EPS. Non-debt tax shield is defined as
depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as the dividend pay-out ratio. Business risk is defined as
the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Liquidity is defined as interbank ratio (INTERB). Bank Age is defined as
as a dummy variable where banks were grouped into three categories the first one is (Age-a) which include banks more than
25 years old and the (Age-c) which include banks less than 25 years old. Ownership structure dummies are for the major
shareholders either governments, individuals, bank, insurance, investment, holding firm, cooperation firm, where it takes 1
or 0 otherwise. Credit rating is constructed as two dummy variables which are Cr-p and Cr-n and these take the value of 1 if
the credit rating have a plus (+) in Cr-p and minus in Cr-n. Also, macroeconomic variables are included which are inflation,
GDP growth and market risk
Book Leverage
Islamic Conventional
Variable OLS Fixed Random Dynamical Tobit OLS Fixed Random Dynamical Tobit
Profitability 0.00186 -0.000681 -0.00198 0.0015 0.000578 -0.214 0.518 0.483 0.990** -1.428*
Risk 0.197*** 0.0591* 0.0734* 0.0201 -0.00617 -0.724 -0.109 -0.147 -0.0236 -0.164
Dividends 0.123*** 0.00702 0.0164 0.00844 -0.00206 0.0243 0.0141 0.015 -0.00383 0.00349
Size -0.00579 4.571*** 4.139*** 3.475 0.118 0.35 0.667 0.542 1.205 0.402***
Growth 0.0149 -0.00628 -0.00581 0.0254* 0.000509 -0.0146 0.00208 0.00195 0.011 0.00243
Liquidity -0.0552 -0.262*** -0.205*** -0.121 0.00654 -0.00705 -0.0575** -0.0501** -0.0692* -0.0041
Non Debt Tax 78.1 2.217 2.996 27.81 1.441 27.48 -58.01* -53.1 -9.166 -9.64
GDP Growth -0.268 0.0511 0.0331 0.0268 -0.103*** 0.0272 -0.0283 -0.0284 0.134 0.0588*
Inflation -0.351 -0.0123 -0.0262 0.115 0.0287 0.0252 0.0429 0.0437 0.113 -0.0959**
Market Risk -389.4** -12.96 -43.6 -1.142 -19.2 170.7* 97.16* 98.48* -70 1.052
Lagged 0.348*** 0.625***
N 243 243 243 189 243 927 927 927 721 927
R-sq 18% 23% 34% 34%
Variable OLS Fixed Random Dynamical Tobit OLS Fixed Random Dynamical Tobit
Profitability 0.00429 -0.00109 -0.00154 0.0011 -0.000195 -0.116 0.46 0.438 0.963** -1.250*
Risk 0.154*** 0.0494 0.0557* 0.0213 -0.000022 -0.0777 0.107 0.0964 -0.149 -0.121
Dividends 0.108** 0.0104 0.0143 0.00804 -0.00236 0.0271 0.0108 0.0121 -0.0014 0.00428
Size 2.579* 4.630*** 4.607*** 3.426 0.479** 0.452 0.261 0.317 0.983 0.270*
Growth -0.00126 -0.00606 -0.00607 0.0258* 0.000148 -0.00221 0.0062 0.00667 0.0207 0.00683
Liquidity -0.182*** -0.264*** -0.240*** -0.109 0.00488 0.00211 -0.0566** -0.0480* -0.0671* -0.000787
Non Debt Tax 73.24 -2.209 -1.617 25.03 -1.277 33.74 -53.6 -48.78 -19.73 -12.73
Individual -2.109 . -1.149 -1.250* -4.217** . -4.134 0 -0.920***
Holding 0 . 0 0.915 . 1.119 0 0.612
Cooperation 12.50** . 17.39 0 1.336 -0.251 . 0.546 0 0.626
Insurance 0 . -8.109*** . -7.533 0 -0.985**
Bank 1.552 . 2.781 0 -0.952** -0.897 . -1.016 0 -1.056***
Government -3.281 . -4.317 0 -1.330** 0.498 . 1.093 0 0.643
Advisor 15.16*** . 19.12* 0 -0.951* 1.934 . 2.707 0 -0.578*
cr_p -0.757 -1.693 -1.585 -1.406 -0.0439 -0.28 -0.51 -0.48 0.874 0.199
cr_n 0.752 -1.686 -1.516 -0.502 0.152 -0.129 0.942 0.83 -0.412 -0.0958
age_a -2.727 . 0 . -6.609 0 6.687
age_b 0 . 0 .
age_c 0 . 5.798 0 -1.279*** 7.037*** .
Lagged 0.350*** 0.610***
N 243 243 243 189 243 927 927 927 721 927
R-Sq 31% 24% 27% 29%
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Table 6.4: MENA Banks ANN Results
This table shows the ANN results. Book debt ratio is defined as total debt to total assets. Market debt ratio is de-
fined as the total debt to market value. Profitability is measured by the return on sales ratio which is defined as net income to
net sales. Size is defined as logarithmic of total assets. Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of earning per share
EPS. Non-debt tax shield is defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as the dividend
pay-out ratio. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Liquidity is defined as interbank
ratio (INTERB). Bank Age is defined as as a dummy variable where banks were grouped into three categories the first one is
(Age-a) which include banks more than 25 years old and the (Age-c) which include banks less than 25 years old. Ownership
structure dummies are for the major shareholders either governments, individuals, bank, insurance, investment, holding
firm, cooperation firm, where it takes 1 or 0 otherwise. Credit rating is constructed as two dummy variables which are Cr-p
and Cr-n and these take the value of 1 if the credit rating have a plus (+) in Cr-p and minus in Cr-n. Also, macroeconomic
variables are included which are inflation, GDP growth and market risk
MENA Banks Book Leverage Market Leverage
Variable Conventional Banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Islamic Banks
Dividends 6.09% 5.77% 6.43% 9.08%
GDP Growth 1.17% 4.43% 10.69% 10.34%
Growth 14.85% 8.90% 0.04% 14.88%
Inflation 9.60% 0.11% 6.16% 7.32%
Liquidity 16.90% 19.47% 22.07% 10.16%
Market Risk 1.74% 1.77% 4.34% 4.44%
Non Debt Tax 14.92% 5.73% 10.95% 12.53%
Profitability 9.62% 18.31% 17.30% 12.77%
Risk 7.57% 19.77% 11.56% 11.36%
Size 17.52% 15.74% 10.44% 7.12%
N 927 243 927 243
Adding Dummies
Dividends 0.16% 0.07% 5.10% 3.88%
GDP Growth 0.01% 0.53% 5.34% 11.98%
Growth 0.00% 1.99% 5.30% 10.09%
Inflation 3.39% 0.00% 5.07% 7.06%
Liquidity 9.89% 18.43% 5.39% 2.90%
Market Risk 0.08% 2.57% 5.39% 6.91%
Risk 0.09% 1.39% 4.53% 9.07%
Non Debt Tax 6.82% 14.17% 4.57% 5.29%
Profitability 6.46% 0.41% 4.38% 14.32%
Size 10.74% 11.48% 4.97% 3.06%
Age Dummies
Age_A 0.00% 0.11% 4.20% 0.01%
Age_B 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Age_C 0.00% 0.11% 4.20% 0.01%
Ownership Structure Dummies
Bank 9.08% 1.78% 4.70% 4.07%
Cooperation 8.30% 17.62% 4.65% 0.28%
Government 10.18% 10.20% 5.34% 5.73%
Holding 6.63% 0.00% 4.51% 0.00%
Individual 9.21% 0.57% 4.64% 3.57%
Insurance 11.67% 0.62% 4.53% 3.54%
Advisor 7.10% 16.83% 4.61% 1.99%
Credit Rating Dummies
cr_n 0.13% 0.96% 4.36% 4.94%
cr_p 0.06% 0.14% 4.22% 1.28%
N 927 243 927 243
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6.5 Discussion
This study investigate whether the classic standard determinants if capital structure
are significant in determining the bank capital in the MENA countries. We prove that
the widely used non-financial determinants have explanatory power in the choice of
banks capital structure. We also prove that Islamic banks are different in their de-
terminants of capital structure. We find that Growth and liquidity are not significant
for Islamic banks but significant for conventional banks.
This chapter use different models in order to answer the question of what are the
determinants of capital structure. Although these methods were used interchange-
able in the literature this study shows that each method shed the light on a different
angle of the problem. The SEM method is very powerful and the results are more
generalised simply because it use many measure of the same construct. On the
other hand, the GRNN is also useful as it shows us which variable is more important
than the other one. We also find that banks in our sample do have a target opti-
mal capital structure, which they adjust their capital structure to follow. In addition,
we find that credit rating does not have an explanatory power in explaining capital
structure.
The study is one of the first attempts to empirically examines and compare the
determinants of capital structure is Islamic banks with conventional banks. To our
knowledge no previous studies has tested the determinants of Islamic banks with a
comparison of conventional banks in MENA area. We also introduced the credit rat-
ing as a possible new determinant for capital structure; it was only used in studies of
non-financial firms. In addition, despite the large size of the banking industry in the
MENA countries, the determinants of Islamic banks using credit ratings have never
been researched empirically. This chapter attempted to fill in the gap existed in the
literature by testing specific hypotheses on the determinants of capital structure in
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both Islamic and conventional banks.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
This thesis is devoted to understand the capital structure in the MENA countries.
The main purpose of this thesis is to study the determinants of capital structure
using the main approaches which are suggested in the previous literature. The
approaches are the Panel Data Models, Partial Least Square Structural Equation
Modelling PLS-SEM and the Generalized Regression Neural Networks. This thesis
is unique in the fact that it tries to examine the both the banks and the non-financial
firms. It also focus on the Islamic banks and how do they decide their capital struc-
ture mix.
7.2 Conclusions
The findings show that there is a difference in the results when we use different
methods. Furthermore, the empirical results we found are mostly in line with the
previous literature in that both the pecking order and trade-off theory as well as the
agency theory do contribute to the understanding of the capital structure choice.
Equally important, this thesis use booth book leverage and market leverage which
proved to give almost similar results. Our results show a strong explanation of
the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. Another issue is that it might
be incorrect to compare studies of determinants of capital structure because of
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the different definitions of leverage as well as the variances in the independent
variables. This study then try to explore the banks capital structure and finds that
classical capital structure determinants are significant and that regulations are of
second order. Furthermore, we prove that Islamic banks are deferent in their capital
structure to conventional banks.
The findings are divided into two categories which are the banks results and the
non-financial results. First, the findings of the non-financial shows that profitability
is a key determinants and is negative and significant in all countries in the sample,
except for Qatar. Which is interpreted as that the countries in the sample do follow
the trade-off theory. Also, as expected the majority of the countries in the sample
follow the agency theory and the pecking order theory as the liquidity attribute is
negative and significant for all the countries with the exception of Qatar and Saudi
Arabia. The tangibility attribute have a mixed results. Bahrain, Egypt, Oman and
Palestine all have a positive relation which support the trade-off theory. On the other
hand, the rest of the countries have negative relation or a mixed result. The risk
variable is only meaningful for Saudi Arabia and UAE, while in the other countries
it is positive and therefore it is not explained by the theory. Dividends is negative in
all the countries and therefore follow the pecking order theory. Also for the growth
opportunities findings show that all the countries follow the trade-off theory with a
negative relation except Oman and Saudi Arabia which follow the pecking order
positive relation. The cash flow attribute is negative for all the countries and follow
the pecking order theory. Ownership structure have a negative relation to leverage
and therefore suggest that when an ultimate owner exist it force firms to reduce their
debt.
Secondly, the findings for the banks show that profitability is positively related
to book leverage as argued by the pecking order and vice versa for the market
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leverage as suggested by the trade-off theory. Which prove that results could differ
depending on the definition of leverage. Also risk is significant but positive which
cannot be explained by the theory. Dividends is negative for the Islamic banks and
positive for the conventional banks. Growth is also negative in conventional banks
and positive for Islamic banks. The ownership structure relation with leverage is
the inverse of the relation this study finds in the non-financial firms. As it show
when there is an ultimate owner leverage increase. Liquidity is positive for the
conventional banks and negative with Islamic banks. Credit rating is also another
variable which show that there is a difference between the Islamic and conventional
banks where it is negative with the first one and positive with the second one.
7.3 Contribution
This thesis show that firms in the MENA countries follow the capital structure theo-
ries suggested in the developing countries. It also show that using book or market
leverage does have an effect on the results. It also show that using the three ap-
proaches would benefit the researcher as it could verify and add more confidence
to the results. It show that using multi approaches could lead to different results and
therefore researcher should be cautious when using a single approach. This study
is also the first study to use PLS-SEM to study cross-country in capital structure
and also to apply it to MENA countries. This thesis also use the GRNN which show
the variable impact and therefore validate the results of the other approaches. Fur-
thermore, the work done in this thesis in regards to the banks is also a contribution
to literature. First, very limited number of studies did investigate the banks capital
structure and none did study the banks in MENA countries. The comparison of the
capital structure of Islamic banks and conventional is also original does add value.
This thesis investigate both Banks and non-financial firms and therefore added in-
sight to the differences between the two industries within the same geographical
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area. It also use credit rating, ownership structure and industry classification as
determinants.
7.4 Implication and Limitations
Several limitations of this study do exist as the sample size of the listed companies
in the countries of our study is considered not big enough as the majority of devel-
oped markets. Therefore, caution should be taken before we generalize our results
to other emerging markets. Several popular proxies were doped from this study for
this reason such as uniqueness and credit rating for the non-financial firms. Also
the sample of credit rated banks in the Bankscope is very small and also the num-
ber of Islamic banks. Furthermore, a modelling problem with the SEM is that if the
researcher want to take full advantage of the methodology all the variables should
be attributes. However, this is not possible when applied in the capital structure as
different leverage definition will load differently. Causing the researcher to use them
as variables instead of attributes. Furthermore, controlling for dummy variables is
not straight forward. For example, trying to test the industry classification on the
leverage using the SEM is hard and the results are not always possible as many
dummies cause several empirical issues.
This study has several implications on investors, policy makers, regulators and
researchers. First, it is useful for investors when they make their decisions to in-
vest in the banking industry. It is also helpful for investors to understand the capital
structure decisions effects on the value of the firm. This thesis is also important for
researchers as it opens the doors for more research to be conducted in the banks
capital structure. Specially, Islamic banks as there is ambiguous theories about Is-
lamic banks capital structure. It also helpful for policy makers to understand how
Islamic banks capital structure behaves so they could take into consideration when
issuing new regulations. Furthermore, banks owned by large shareholders (govern-
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ment or family) generally are more risk averse. This could be useful for the investors
decision. Also, Islamic banks pay dividends even if they need the cash for their in-
ternal investments, this might be caused by the profit sharing principle. Therefore,
investors could get that Islamic banks by nature are more riskier than conventional
banks. Regulators (either International or domestic) should take into considera-
tion that Islamic banks have a different operation mechanism and therefore should
not be regulated in the same way as conventional bank and credit ratings are an
important aspect of capital structure decision.
7.5 Future research
Conducting this research leads to a couple of areas that should be explored in future
studies. First, it is recommend to use the survey approach and conduct a mixed
methods study with the quantitative data. This approach will explain more about
the capital structure. This approach will add more insight to the three approaches
this thesis did conduct. Furthermore, Market timing theory was not tested in this
study. This theory might explain the behaviour of the firms and banks in the MENA
countries. Also studying the dynamics of capital structure using SEM would be
an interesting study. In addition, an interesting project to investigate is the use of
multilevel analysis to try and answer the capital structure puzzle.
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A.1 Descriptive Statistics
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics (A)
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics (B)
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Table A.3: Bahrain Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.027 0.056 0 0.351 144
STDBVA 0.04 0.065 0 0.242 144
TDBVA 0.058 0.095 0 0.483 144
LTDMVE 0.024 0.051 0 0.395 144
STDMVE 0.047 0.082 0 0.422 144
TDMVE 0.071 0.11 0 0.478 144
Profitability 0.037 0.128 -0.573 0.26 144
Liquidity 3.76 3.613 0.558 17.28 144
Volatility 0.451 0.299 0 1.875 144
Size 17.782 1.671 14.325 21.6 144
Tangibility 0.341 0.247 0.03 0.869 144
Tax 0.013 0.019 0 0.062 144
Dividends 0.041 0.052 0 0.531 144
Growth 0.004 0.006 -0.016 0.028 144
FreeCash 0.152 0.14 0 0.6 144
Gov_D 0.056 0.23 0 1 144
Inst_D 0.444 0.499 0 1 144
Indiv_d 0.167 0.374 0 1 144
Oil 0 0 0 0 144
Materials 0.111 0.315 0 1 144
Industrials 0.111 0.315 0 1 144
ConsumerGoods 0.167 0.374 0 1 144
Healthcare 0 0 0 0 144
ConsumerServices 0.5 0.502 0 1 144
Telecomm 0.111 0.315 0 1 144
Utilites 0 0 0 0 144
Techonolgy 0 0 0 0 144
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Table A.4: Egypt Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.079 0.181 0 0.997 1480
STDBVA 0.055 0.129 0 0.978 1480
TDBVA 0.147 0.151 0 0.946 1480
LTDMVE 0.063 0.139 0 0.987 1480
STDMVE 0.08 0.16 0 0.983 1480
TDMVE 0.165 0.172 0 0.918 1480
Profitability 0.089 0.114 -0.534 1.012 1480
Liquidity 2.598 3.851 0.094 57.877 1480
Volatility 0.538 0.469 0 6.828 1480
Size 17.396 1.911 10.902 22.429 1480
Tangibility 0.148 0.181 0 0.995 1480
Tax 0.024 0.069 0 0.722 1480
Dividends 0.028 0.055 0 0.802 1480
Growth 0.003 0.017 -0.056 0.378 1480
FreeCash 1.037 4.554 0 54.305 1480
Gov_D 0.016 0.126 0 1 1480
Inst_D 0.378 0.485 0 1 1480
Indiv_d 0.184 0.387 0 1 1480
Oil 0.065 0.246 0 1 1480
Materials 0.119 0.324 0 1 1480
Industrials 0.297 0.457 0 1 1480
ConsumerGoods 0.243 0.429 0 1 1480
Healthcare 0.086 0.281 0 1 1480
ConsumerServices 0.114 0.317 0 1 1480
Telecomm 0.032 0.177 0 1 1480
Utilites 0 0 0 0 1480
Techonolgy 0.027 0.162 0 1 1480
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Table A.5: Jordan Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.058 0.11 0 0.953 904
STDBVA 0.13 0.16 0 0.969 904
TDBVA 0.178 0.165 0 0.98 904
LTDMVE 0.071 0.131 0 0.871 904
STDMVE 0.149 0.166 0 0.828 904
TDMVE 0.221 0.202 0 0.979 904
Profitability 0.02 0.089 -0.409 0.483 904
Liquidity 2.856 3.707 0 65.494 904
Volatility 0.508 0.447 0 7.37 904
Size 16.14 1.928 8.433 22.53 904
Tangibility 0.356 0.258 0 0.996 904
Tax 0.028 0.064 0 0.872 904
Dividends 0.018 0.036 0 0.295 904
Growth 0.002 0.016 -0.057 0.228 904
FreeCash 0.086 0.159 0 1.627 904
Gov_D 0.062 0.241 0 1 904
Inst_D 0.274 0.446 0 1 904
Indiv_d 0.398 0.49 0 1 904
Oil 0.018 0.132 0 1 904
Materials 0.186 0.389 0 1 904
Industrials 0.274 0.446 0 1 904
ConsumerGoods 0.221 0.415 0 1 904
Healthcare 0.088 0.284 0 1 904
ConsumerServices 0.221 0.415 0 1 904
Telecomm 0.009 0.094 0 1 904
Utilites 0 0 0 0 904
Techonolgy 0 0 0 0 904
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Table A.6: Kuwait Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.077 0.116 0 0.981 720
STDBVA 0.111 0.135 0 0.866 720
TDBVA 0.177 0.165 0 0.866 720
LTDMVE 0.084 0.123 0 0.87 720
STDMVE 0.14 0.186 0 0.993 720
TDMVE 0.213 0.213 0 0.993 720
Profitability 0.034 0.067 -0.254 0.233 720
Liquidity 2.889 3.5 0.054 34.014 720
Volatility 0.680 0.493 0 5.467 720
Size 17.809 1.767 11.412 22.731 720
Tangibility 0.273 0.239 0 0.976 720
Tax 0.015 0.022 0 0.111 720
Dividends 0.028 0.043 0 0.443 720
Growth 0.003 0.013 -0.052 0.152 720
FreeCash 0.099 0.114 0 0.72 720
Gov_D 0.033 0.18 0 1 720
Inst_D 0.533 0.499 0 1 720
Indiv_d 0.1 0.3 0 1 720
Oil 0.089 0.285 0 1 720
Materials 0.144 0.352 0 1 720
Industrials 0.4 0.49 0 1 720
ConsumerGoods 0.078 0.268 0 1 720
Healthcare 0.067 0.25 0 1 720
ConsumerServices 0.222 0.416 0 1 720
Telecomm 0.044 0.206 0 1 720
Utilites 0 0 0 0 720
Techonolgy 0.044 0.206 0 1 720
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Table A.7: Morocco Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.096 0.124 0 0.703 384
STDBVA 0.099 0.113 0 0.443 384
TDBVA 0.191 0.174 0 0.805 384
LTDMVE 0.104 0.135 0 0.644 384
STDMVE 0.115 0.151 0 0.635 384
TDMVE 0.219 0.218 0 0.952 384
Profitability 0.111 0.091 -0.293 0.405 384
Liquidity 1.894 1.461 0.429 14.666 384
Volatility 0.372 0.13 0.136 1.895 384
Size 18.21 1.713 11.466 22.576 384
Tangibility 0.273 0.206 0 0.825 384
Tax 0.008 0.021 0 0.138 384
Dividends 0.038 0.06 0 0.519 384
Growth 0.005 0.011 -0.024 0.115 384
FreeCash 0.048 0.056 0 0.331 384
Gov_D 0.021 0.143 0 1 384
Inst_D 0.479 0.5 0 1 384
Indiv_d 0.125 0.331 0 1 384
Oil 0.042 0.2 0 1 384
Materials 0.25 0.434 0 1 384
Industrials 0.271 0.445 0 1 384
ConsumerGoods 0.167 0.373 0 1 384
Healthcare 0.042 0.2 0 1 384
ConsumerServices 0.104 0.306 0 1 384
Telecomm 0.021 0.143 0 1 384
Utilites 0 0 0 0 384
Techonolgy 0.146 0.353 0 1 384
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Table A.8: Oman Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.139 0.216 0 0.996 648
STDBVA 0.101 0.157 0 0.961 648
TDBVA 0.274 0.236 0 0.971 648
LTDMVE 0.143 0.22 0 0.985 648
STDMVE 0.136 0.21 0 0.982 648
TDMVE 0.312 0.274 0 0.98 648
Profitability 0.059 0.106 -0.688 0.385 648
Liquidity 2.155 2.379 0.005 19.84 648
Volatility 0.412 0.758 0.003 7.029 648
Size 16.839 1.779 9.720 20.907 648
Tangibility 0.394 0.298 0 0.999 648
Tax 0.056 0.114 0 0.98 648
Dividends 0.035 0.059 0 0.974 648
Growth 0.005 0.012 -0.027 0.115 648
FreeCash 0.334 1.781 0 41.962 648
Gov_D 0.086 0.281 0 1 648
Inst_D 0.617 0.486 0 1 648
Indiv_d 0.136 0.343 0 1 648
Oil 0.025 0.155 0 1 648
Materials 0.136 0.343 0 1 648
Industrials 0.309 0.462 0 1 648
ConsumerGoods 0.333 0.472 0 1 648
Healthcare 0.012 0.111 0 1 648
ConsumerServices 0.173 0.378 0 1 648
Telecomm 0.025 0.155 0 1 648
Utilites 0 0 0 0 648
Techonolgy 0.012 0.111 0 1 648
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Table A.9: Palestine Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.042 0.056 0 0.39 184
STDBVA 0.022 0.038 0 0.246 184
TDBVA 0.16 0.075 0 0.481 184
LTDMVE 0.048 0.057 0 0.256 184
STDMVE 0.028 0.044 0 0.223 184
TDMVE 0.17 0.103 0 0.479 184
Profitability 0.041 0.052 -0.132 0.221 184
Liquidity 2.091 0.876 0.378 5.662 184
Volatility 0.488 0.614 0.104 8.435 184
Size 16.816 0.906 14.545 20.088 184
Tangibility 0.119 0.224 0 0.931 184
Tax 0.005 0.005 0 0.034 184
Dividends 0.028 0.023 0 0.158 184
Growth 0.003 0.003 -0.01 0.022 184
FreeCash 0.04 0.051 0 0.309 184
Gov_D 0 0 0 0 184
Inst_D 0.087 0.283 0 1 184
Indiv_d 0.043 0.204 0 1 184
Oil 0.043 0.204 0 1 184
Materials 0.174 0.38 0 1 184
Industrials 0.217 0.414 0 1 184
ConsumerGoods 0.174 0.38 0 1 184
Healthcare 0.13 0.338 0 1 184
ConsumerServices 0.174 0.38 0 1 184
Telecomm 0.13 0.338 0 1 184
Utilites 0 0 0 0 184
Techonolgy 0 0 0 0 184
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Table A.10: Qatar Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.105 0.128 0 0.66 152
STDBVA 0.061 0.095 0 0.558 152
TDBVA 0.15 0.109 0 0.499 152
LTDMVE 0.086 0.107 0 0.52 152
STDMVE 0.049 0.092 0 0.794 152
TDMVE 0.18 0.18 0 0.695 152
Profitability 0.023 0.126 -0.617 0.29 152
Liquidity 3 6.007 0.244 69.033 152
Volatility 0.329 0.121 0.109 0.775 152
Size 18.721 2.311 9.464 22.953 152
Tangibility 0.266 0.222 0 0.961 152
Tax 0.047 0.134 0 0.78 152
Dividends 0.045 0.041 0 0.181 152
Growth 0.008 0.012 -0.007 0.084 152
FreeCash 1.147 3.952 0 22.734 152
Gov_D 0.368 0.484 0 1 152
Inst_D 0.474 0.501 0 1 152
Indiv_d 0 0 0 0 152
Oil 0.105 0.308 0 1 152
Materials 0.105 0.308 0 1 152
Industrials 0.421 0.495 0 1 152
ConsumerGoods 0.158 0.366 0 1 152
Healthcare 0.105 0.308 0 1 152
ConsumerServices 0.105 0.308 0 1 152
Telecomm 0.105 0.308 0 1 152
Utilites 0 0 0 0 152
Techonolgy 0 0 0 0 152
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Table A.11: Saudi Arabia Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.117 0.204 0 0.994 856
STDBVA 0.088 0.154 0 0.993 856
TDBVA 0.191 0.164 0 0.884 856
LTDMVE 0.097 0.175 0 0.983 856
STDMVE 0.094 0.165 0 0.945 856
TDMVE 0.16 0.171 0 0.681 856
Profitability 0.082 0.096 -0.59 0.432 856
Liquidity 2.74 4.048 0.03 60.668 856
Volatility 0.391 0.215 0 2.817 856
Size 19.026 1.747 9.76 24.648 856
Tangibility 0.231 0.217 0 0.995 856
Tax 0.03 0.118 0 0.912 856
Dividends 0.041 0.061 0 0.423 856
Growth 0.005 0.008 -0.048 0.071 856
FreeCash 1.032 7.061 0 108.087 856
Gov_D 0.14 0.347 0 1 856
Inst_D 0.243 0.429 0 1 856
Indiv_d 0.383 0.486 0 1 856
Oil 0.019 0.136 0 1 856
Materials 0.215 0.411 0 1 856
Industrials 0.336 0.473 0 1 856
ConsumerGoods 0.168 0.374 0 1 856
Healthcare 0.047 0.211 0 1 856
ConsumerServices 0.187 0.39 0 1 856
Telecomm 0.037 0.19 0 1 856
Utilites 0 0 0 0 856
Techonolgy 0.009 0.096 0 1 856
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Table A.12: Tunisia Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.105 0.129 0 0.782 432
STDBVA 0.147 0.153 0 0.867 432
TDBVA 0.264 0.178 0 0.928 432
LTDMVE 0.12 0.124 0 0.918 432
STDMVE 0.154 0.141 0 0.89 432
TDMVE 0.273 0.213 0 0.983 432
Profitability 0.061 0.095 -0.576 0.237 432
Liquidity 2.032 1.69 0.324 16.267 432
Volatility 0.375 0.212 0.157 3.04 432
Size 17.846 1.6 14.701 23.724 432
Tangibility 0.274 0.187 0.008 0.897 432
Tax 0.026 0.047 0 0.359 432
Dividends 0.015 0.029 0 0.264 432
Growth 0.005 0.014 -0.034 0.068 432
FreeCash 0.072 0.075 0 0.609 432
Gov_D 0.037 0.189 0 1 432
Inst_D 0.296 0.457 0 1 432
Indiv_d 0.148 0.356 0 1 432
Oil 0.074 0.262 0 1 432
Materials 0.148 0.356 0 1 432
Industrials 0.315 0.465 0 1 432
ConsumerGoods 0.222 0.416 0 1 432
Healthcare 0.037 0.189 0 1 432
ConsumerServices 0.185 0.389 0 1 432
Telecomm 0.037 0.189 0 1 432
Utilites 0 0 0 0 432
Techonolgy 0.056 0.229 0 1 432
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Table A.13: UAE Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.09 0.178 0 0.994 440
STDBVA 0.103 0.177 0 0.959 440
TDBVA 0.147 0.138 0 0.699 440
LTDMVE 0.106 0.17 0 0.986 440
STDMVE 0.166 0.216 0 0.974 440
TDMVE 0.231 0.198 0 0.967 440
Profitability 0.05 0.078 -0.33 0.344 440
Liquidity 3.156 5.249 0.056 71.929 440
Volatility 0.594 0.308 0 1.836 440
Size 18.816 1.698 11.318 23.082 440
Tangibility 0.318 0.294 0 0.954 440
Tax 0.026 0.056 0 0.476 440
Dividends 0.02 0.029 0 0.209 440
Growth 0.006 0.012 -0.022 0.145 440
FreeCash 0.818 3.171 0 31.492 440
Gov_D 0.145 0.353 0 1 440
Inst_D 0.418 0.494 0 1 440
Indiv_d 0.236 0.425 0 1 440
Oil 0.127 0.334 0 1 440
Materials 0.145 0.353 0 1 440
Industrials 0.364 0.482 0 1 440
ConsumerGoods 0.2 0.4 0 1 440
Healthcare 0.073 0.26 0 1 440
ConsumerServices 0.182 0.386 0 1 440
Telecomm 0.036 0.187 0 1 440
Utilites 0 0 0 0 440
Techonolgy 0 0 0 0 440
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Table A.14: MENA Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data
This table shows the descriptive table for both the dependent and independent variables used for the panel data regression.
Book debt ratio is defined as short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets.
Market debt is defined as short-term debt to market value, long-term debt to market value and total debt to market value.
Profitability is defined as operating income to total assets OI/TA. Liquidity is defined as the current ratio, which is the current
liability to current assets. Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of the share price (volatility). Size is defined as
the logarithmic of sales Ln(Sal). Tangibility is defined as the net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Non-debt tax shield is
defined as depreciation expense to total assets (DEP/TA). Dividend is defined as dividends payment amount to total assets
(DIV/TA). Growth opportunities factor is defined as growth of the total assets in percentages (GTA).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTDBVA 0.089 0.164 0 0.997 6368
STDBVA 0.092 0.145 0 0.993 6368
TDBVA 0.183 0.172 0 0.98 6368
LTDMVE 0.088 0.152 0 0.987 6368
STDMVE 0.114 0.172 0 0.993 6368
TDMVE 0.206 0.205 0 0.993 6368
Profitability 0.062 0.101 -0.688 1.012 6368
Liquidity 2.616 3.62 0 71.929 6368
Volatility 0.492 0.456 0 8.435 6368
Size 17.631 2.013 8.433 24.648 6368
Tangibility 0.263 0.247 0 0.999 6368
Tax 0.026 0.077 0 0.98 6368
Dividends 0.029 0.05 0 0.974 6368
Growth 0.004 0.013 -0.057 0.378 6368
FreeCash 0.534 3.62 0 108.087 6368
Gov_D 0.068 0.251 0 1 6368
Inst_D 0.384 0.486 0 1 6368
Indiv_d 0.215 0.411 0 1 6368
Oil 0.053 0.224 0 1 6368
Materials 0.158 0.365 0 1 6368
Industrials 0.314 0.464 0 1 6368
ConsumerGoods 0.205 0.404 0 1 6368
Healthcare 0.064 0.245 0 1 6368
ConsumerServices 0.177 0.382 0 1 6368
Telecomm 0.036 0.187 0 1 6368
Utilites 0 0 0 0 6368
Techonolgy 0.026 0.16 0 1 6368
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A.2 SEM Results
Table A.15: Bahrain SEM Results
Determinant Market Book
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Prof -0.274 <0.001 -0.136 0.047
Size 0.261 <0.001 0.229 0.002
Growth -0.268 <0.001 0.03 0.357
Tang 0.051 0.267 0.132 0.053
Tax -0.225 0.003 -0.132 0.053
Risk 0 0.499 -0.039 0.317
Div -0.153 0.029 -0.092 0.132
Liqud -0.258 <0.001 -0.446 <0.001
R2 48 44
Model Fit
Average path coefficient (APC)=0.170, P=0.009
Average R-squared (ARS)=0.464, P<0.001
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.432, P<0.001
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.266, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
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Table A.16: EGYPT SEM Results
Determinant Market Book
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Prof -0.014 0.294 -0.304 <0.001
Size -0.037 0.078 0.164 <0.001
Growth 0.28 <0.001 -0.007 0.401
Tang 0.458 <0.001 -0.273 <0.001
Tax -0.088 <0.001 -0.075 0.002
Risk 0.005 0.424 0.023 0.183
Div 0.052 0.021 -0.061 0.009
Liqud 0.011 0.329 -0.349 <0.001
R2 42 41
Model Fit
Average path coefficient (APC)=0.138, P<0.001
Average R-squared (ARS)=0.415, P<0.001
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.412, P<0.001
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.234, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
Table A.17: Jordan SEM Results
Determinant Market Book
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Prof -0.261 <0.001 -0.226 <0.001
Size -0.039 0.121 0.238 <0.001
Growth 0.013 0.347 -0.054 0.052
Tang 0.271 <0.001 0.044 0.089
Tax -0.003 0.466 0.056 0.045
Risk -0.039 0.12 -0.068 0.02
Div -0.047 0.078 -0.144 <0.001
Liqud -0.201 <0.001 -0.405 <0.001
R2 21 33
Average path coefficient (APC)=0.132, P<0.001
Average R-squared (ARS)=0.273, P<0.001
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.266, P<0.001
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.299, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
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Table A.18: Kuwait SEM Results
Determinant Market Book
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Prof -0.107 0.002 -0.106 0.002
Size 0.076 0.02 0.255 <0.001
Growth -0.005 0.443 -0.016 0.334
Tang 0.437 <0.001 0.179 <0.001
Tax -0.08 0.016 -0.003 0.47
Risk -0.305 <0.001 -0.51 <0.001
Div -0.012 0.373 0.016 0.331
Liqud 0.092 0.006 0.087 0.009
R2 38 51
Average path coefficient (APC)=0.143, P<0.001
Average R-squared (ARS)=0.445, P<0.001
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.439, P<0.001
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.154, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
Table A.19: Morocco SEM Results
Determinant Market Book
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Prof -0.462 <0.001 -0.106 <0.001
Size -0.255 <0.001 0.255 <0.001
Growth 0.038 0.23 -0.016 0.32
Tang 0.008 0.436 0.179 0.04
Tax 0.095 0.03 -0.003 0.118
Risk 0.094 0.031 -0.51 0.118
Div -0.072 0.078 0.016 0.468
Liqud 0.257 <0.001 0.087 <0.001
R2
Average path coefficient (APC)=0.173, P<0.001
Average R-squared (ARS)=0.504, P<0.001
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.494, P<0.001
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.204, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
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Table A.20: Oman SEM Results
Determinant Market Book
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Prof -0.005 0.444 -0.154 <0.001
Size -0.252 <0.001 -0.35 <0.001
Growth -0.017 0.335 -0.014 0.358
Tang 0.37 <0.001 -0.004 0.457
Tax 0.029 0.226 0.064 0.052
Risk -0.006 0.438 -0.012 0.377
Div -0.023 0.283 0.042 0.139
Liqud -0.028 0.236 -0.484 <0.001
R2 25 56
Average path coefficient (APC)=0.116, P<0.001
Average R-squared (ARS)=0.404, P<0.001
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.397, P<0.001
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.186, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
Table A.21: Qatar SEM Results
Determinant Market Book
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Prof 0.295 <0.001 0.19 0.008
Size -0.109 0.084 0.26 <0.001
Growth 0.231 0.002 0.18 0.011
Tang 0.484 <0.001 0.28 <0.001
Tax -0.212 0.004 -0.154 0.026
Risk -0.005 0.476 0.068 0.199
Div 0.07 0.192 0.046 0.286
Liqud 0.059 0.232 0.014 0.431
R2 68
Average path coefficient (APC)=0.166, P=0.009
Average R-squared (ARS)=0.437, P<0.001
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.405, P<0.001
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.669, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
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Table A.22: Saudi Arabia SEM Results
Determinant Market Book
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Prof 0.035 0.152 -0.118 <0.001
Size -0.078 0.011 0.191 <0.001
Growth 0.014 0.336 0.016 0.321
Tang 0.79 <0.001 0.053 0.06
Tax -0.053 0.061 -0.036 0.144
Risk -0.005 0.441 -0.05 0.07
Div 0.033 0.167 0.095 0.002
Liqud 0.053 0.059 0.012 0.366
R2 64 6
Average path coefficient (APC)=0.102, P<0.001
Average R-squared (ARS)=0.351, P<0.001
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.345, P<0.001
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.151, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
Table A.23: Tunisia SEM Results
Determinant Market Book
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Prof -0.018 0.353 -0.053 0.133
Size 0.065 0.087 0.154 <0.001
Growth 0.021 0.332 0.187 <0.001
Tang 0.007 0.445 -0.101 0.017
Tax 0.102 0.017 -0.32 <0.001
Risk -0.227 <0.001 0.01 0.415
Div -0.221 <0.001 -0.015 0.375
Liqud -0.375 <0.001 -0.134 0.002
R2 32 27
Average path coefficient (APC)=0.126, P=0.002
Average R-squared (ARS)=0.301, P<0.001
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.287, P<0.001
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.120, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
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Table A.24: UAE SEM Results
Determinant Market Book
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Prof 0.044 0.176 0.023 0.317
Size -0.104 0.014 -0.155 <0.001
Growth 0.047 0.159 -0.057 0.116
Tang 0.557 <0.001 -0.117 0.007
Tax -0.095 0.022 0.018 0.349
Risk 0.042 0.188 -0.008 0.436
Div 0.14 0.002 0.077 0.052
Liqud 0.134 0.002 0.085 0.036
R2 39 4
Average path coefficient (APC)=0.106, P=0.006
Average R-squared (ARS)=0.226, P<0.001
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.212, P<0.001
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A.3 Background Tables
Table A.25: Anual Inflation consumer prices
Country Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Algeria 1.38 2.31 3.67 4.86 5.73 3.91 4.52 8.89 3.25
Bahrain 2.59 2.01 3.26 3.53 2.80 1.96 -0.36 2.75 3.19
Egypt 4.87 7.64 9.32 18.32 11.76 11.27 10.05 7.12 9.48
Iran 13.43 11.94 17.21 25.55 13.50 10.14 20.63 27.36 39.27
Iraq 36.96 53.23 -10.07 12.66 6.87 2.88 5.80 6.09 1.88
Jordan 3.49 6.25 5.39 14.93 -0.68 5.01 4.41 4.77 5.47
Kuwait 4.14 3.06 5.48 10.58 4.61 4.50 4.91 3.20 2.70
Lebanon .. .. .. .. 1.19 3.99 .. .. ..
Libya 2.65 1.46 6.25 10.36 2.46 2.80 15.52 6.06 2.61
Morocco 0.98 3.28 2.04 3.71 0.99 0.99 0.92 1.28 1.89
Oman 1.86 3.20 5.96 12.09 3.94 3.20 4.07 2.91 1.25
Palestine 3.47 3.88 1.83 9.89 2.75 .. .. .. ..
Qatar 8.81 11.84 13.76 15.05 -4.86 -2.43 1.92 1.87 3.13
Saudi Arabia 0.70 2.21 4.17 9.87 5.07 5.34 5.82 2.89 3.51
Syrian 7.24 10.02 3.91 15.75 2.92 4.40 4.75 36.70 ..
Tunisia 2.02 4.49 3.42 4.92 3.52 4.42 3.61 5.50 6.10
Turkey 10.14 9.60 8.76 10.44 6.25 8.57 6.47 8.89 7.49
UAE .. .. .. 12.25 1.56 0.88 0.88 0.66 1.10
Yemen 11.81 10.84 7.91 18.98 5.41 11.17 19.54 9.89 10.97
Arab World 3.47 3.88 4.97 11.27 2.92 3.97 4.75 4.77 3.16
World 4.09 4.36 5.03 9.01 2.91 3.49 4.98 3.69 2.63
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Table A.26: External balance on goods and services (% of GDP)
Country Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Algeria 23.13 26.89 22.20 19.26 -0.58 7.02 10.23 8.63 2.86
Bahrain 19.47 22.17 21.57 19.27 18.97 18.60 31.20 26.45 ..
Egypt -2.27 -1.62 -4.58 -5.59 -6.64 -4.78 -4.12 -8.42 -7.03
Iran 8.40 8.04 10.64 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Iraq -7.05 12.41 17.71 19.60 0.11 5.88 16.66 15.55 1.23
Jordan -41.50 -34.00 -37.52 -31.01 -23.20 -20.80 -26.20 -28.02 -28.84
Kuwait 35.71 41.38 35.10 40.84 30.07 36.32 47.32 48.45 45.01
Lebanon -20.73 -21.29 -24.83 -30.21 -24.52 -25.60 -27.95 -20.57 -13.60
Libya 38.13 45.84 38.21 39.92 .. .. .. .. ..
Morocco -5.60 -5.48 -9.12 -13.39 -10.99 -9.83 -13.11 -14.40 -13.21
Oman 27.22 24.51 16.49 21.30 15.99 24.45 33.47 26.72 ..
Palestine -59.00 -60.02 -58.44 -52.15 -52.42 -43.72 -37.49 -39.26 ..
Qatar 35.42 27.06 24.44 33.29 22.13 38.45 45.88 .. ..
Saudi Arabia 32.15 29.72 25.01 28.12 9.32 16.63 26.62 25.10 21.15
Syrian -1.24 0.78 0.81 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Tunisia -0.39 -1.88 -1.90 -3.05 -2.70 -4.76 -7.19 -9.17 -9.17
UAE 15.62 17.79 7.97 9.22 5.84 6.51 18.10 22.54 20.73
Yemen 5.02 0.44 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
World 0.21 0.21 0.24 -0.29 0.26 0.15 -0.13 -0.06 0.13
MENA 14.76 15.45 12.10 13.94 4.94 9.04 14.80 13.46 11.11
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